There have been many discussions in India, where Yogacara originated, and elsewhere. Inevitably it was misrepresented and the misrepresentation repeated and copied. Now, this situation is much more complicated than would first appear. In India there was a practice starting from the Veda of memorizing texts by repetition and transmitting them orally. Much later in the A.D. period there was a writing down of such scriptures, and then a copying of them. The Buddhists transmitted their scriptures in a comparable manner, and the written-down canon was also copied. Such scriptures-whether Hindu or Buddhist-are regarded by the respective groups as conveying truth. Therefore, we cannot argue against copying itself. Clearly, it is what is copied that concerns us now, namely, whether or not there are misrepresentations. Then, as concerns 'misrepresentations', it could be asked: What is wrong with them? Well, some are good-natured and some are rather venomous. In general there is a great range of such, extending from speculations and guesses to downright lies, that are repeated and copied. In the case of misrepresentations of the Yogacara, I accept them as usually of the good-natured kind, whether it be a type of refutation in a Hindu commentary, or by a Buddhist opponent of the Yogacara. An important illustration of the Hindu type of refutation comes from the commentaries on the Brahmasutras, where the author, say Sarkara, can write in terms of the system itself, setting forth its tenets, or attempts to express certain tenets, while distorting an opposing system.1 These Hindu systems and their rival systems were established by geniuses or otherwise brilliant persons. It might have been thought better that these rival systems not be presented correctly, or followers might get confused, wondering if their own system was indeed better, or whether a certain tenet being refuted was not really identical with a tenet of their own system. Therefore, when the Buddhist system supposedly being refuted in such a Hindu commentary can reasonably be identified with a sort of Yogacara position, it seems fair to conclude that it is a good-natured type of refutation-one necessary for a successful commentary. Perhaps the same judgment could be rendered for the quarreling between the Hindu logic school and the Buddhist logicians, which at least in modern times is acknowledged to have sharpened the arguments on both sides, so that when Buddhism left India around A.D. 1200, the Hindu logic school began to stagnate for lack of intelligent opposition. I interpret also the Madhyamika Buddhist refutation of the Yogacara philosophical position to be a good-natured type-probably more an exercise in discourse, with the premise that some tenets can be expounded Professor Emeritus of Sanskrit at Columbia University