174 SEER, 84, I, 2006 refugee, the construction of new communities in Britain and, in some ways most interestingof all, what allthis has meant for the subjectsof study. The final chapter, 'Identities', is less than fifteen pages long but does manage to provide some provocative material.It stressesthe differentways in which people responded to flight from their homes. Some felt free when they obtained Britishpassports,but still retained a sense of being 'Polish'. Others resisted British citizenship on the grounds that it threatened to compromise something they regardedas essentialabout themselves.Even within the same family, children emerge as having widely varying attitudes towards their parents' original nationality. Some see it as something exotic which is to be embraced,othersassomethingcompletelyalien to them. Ifthereis agreement, it seems only that when emigres return to their original homeland decades afterdeparture,theyfinddisappointmentand plenty to complain about. Naturallyit is alwayspossible to find issuesto question about a text. In this case, some might wonder whether it is reallyvalid to push together Poles and Baltsin a singlevolume. Why not one volume for Poles and anotherfor Balts? Why not include Ukrainians as well? How would the interviewees feel about this kind of classification?And are these people really likely to be the most objective source of views about, say, the Latvian Legion and the Holocaust? Forsome tastes, this text might not dwell on issuessuch as the latter two with sufficientdepth and with a sufficientlycriticaleye. A bit more time might also have been spent discussingwhat other oral historicalprojectshave said about areasof ground covered in thisstudy.But stillit would be wrong to finishon a negative note. Tom Lane has produced an entertaining text which attempts the worthygoal of displayinghow meta-politicseventuallygets translatedinto the personal experiences of ordinarymen and women. In the process he has helped make accessible an introduction to phases of history which more typically are overlooked, not least the creeping Soviet takeover of the Baltic Statesin I939-41. The text isjustifiedon these groundsalone. School ofSocialandInternational Studies MARTYN HOUSDEN University ofBradford Hamrick, S.J. Deceiving theDeceivers. KimPhilby, Donald Maclean andGuyBurgess. YaleUniversityPress,New Haven, CT and London, 2004. xvii + 297 pp. Appendices. Notes. Index. [i8.99. IN this intriguing book, S. J. Hamrick, a former US Foreign Service officer, argues that British intelligence knew about the activities of Philby, Maclean and Burgess earlier than people have previously thought. Received wisdom has it that Maclean was exposed as a Soviet agent in April I95I, a month before he and Burgessfled Britain,and that Philbywas only finallyrecognized as a spy when he was confronted by a Britishintelligence officerin Beirut in I963. According to Hamrick, however, certain figuresin Britishintelligence (notably Dick White, head of M16 from I956), knew of their activities some yearsbefore:Maclean, for example, was identifiedas a spy sometime between mid-I948 and August 195o; and the fact that Philbywas an agent was already known before he became head of M16 in Washington in October 1949. REVIEWS 175 However, instead of accusing these men of spying, the British decided to involve them in a counter-espionage operation;in particularPhilby,who was regarded as reliable by Moscow, was used as a channel for passing false information to the Soviets about the extent of the Britishnuclear deterrence; and he was also used as a stalkinghorse in a wider operation to try to trap Maclean and Burgess, an operation that would have succeeded had it not been for 'bungling'in London by Burgessand Blunt. This is allfascinating,even it is not alwayswrittenin an accessibleway. The problem with the argument, as Hamrick himself acknowledges,is that much of the evidence is circumstantial.The case dependspartlyon a certainreading of the British review of the Venona project that took place in I996 (which followed the US National Security Agency's declassificationof the Venona archive in 1995); according to Hamrick, British intelligence's account of Venona's role in exposing Maclean as an agent was deliberatelyselective and even deceptive, and designed to cover up how much M15 had really known. In regardto Philby,the case also owes somethingto a comment once made by a prominent US intelligence officer, General Edwin Sibert, that Philby was used by Washingtonto passfictitiousinformationabout US defence capabilities to Moscow during the Korean War. The detail...