British Naval Policy Research Articles

Severing the Sinews of the Spanish Empire: British Naval Policy and Operations Regarding the Silver Fleets during the War of Jenkins’ Ear, 1737–1740

ABSTRACT In studies on the War of Jenkins’ Ear, a conflict between the British and Spanish empires, historians tend to focus on colonial expeditions, such as those against Porto Bello and Cartagena. On the other hand, operations against Spanish silver fleets, the mainstay of the Spanish imperial trade system, have attracted far less attention. This article examines these somewhat undervalued operations against the silver fleets as well as those concerning other Spanish shipping during the War of Jenkins’ Ear, giving their political and diplomatic backgrounds. This analysis demonstrates the significance of the issue of the silver fleets in Anglo-Spanish relations at the time. It also indicates the deep involvement of France in this issue and its influence on British naval operations. Finally, this article describes the development and implementation of British naval policy to put economic and financial pressure on the Spanish empire, arguing that the naval operations during this period were one of the earliest attempts at using blockades on both sides of the Atlantic, which Britain further developed in later imperial wars that took place during the long eighteenth century.

Arthur Jacob Marder: A Glorifier of the British Sea Power

In this article the author analyses the academic career of Arthur Jacob Marder, a prominent student of British naval policy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Even though he graduated from Harvard, Marder faced serious difficulties in obtaining a position at American universities because of the ethnic and religious prejudices prevalent in the 1930s. Marder chose British naval policy of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as his field of research. A key issue in this vast area of study were the reforms put in place by Admiral John Fisher to prepare the British Navy for the Great War. His first monograph, “The Anatomy of British Sea Power”, was published in 1940. After encountering restrictions on access to British Admiralty documents in the 1940s and 1950s, Marder turned to private archives to locate sources for his study. He managed to publish both Sir Herbert Richmond's diaries and the three-volume correspondence of Sir John Fisher. The five-volume treatise “From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow” was the crowning achievement of Marder's research. Marder is considered the founder of the classic concept of the so-called naval revolution of Sir John Fisher. Marder had the unique opportunity to study British naval documents, most of which no longer exist today and are forever lost to future generations of historians. This is the primary reason why Marder's work retains its significance to this day.

Continuity and Change: Strategy and Technology in the Royal Navy, 1890–1918

Abstract This article presents a new interpretation of the relationship between technology and warfare at sea before and during the First World War. It challenges existing accounts which view technological innovations as the primary driver of naval strategy during this period, and argues for a more contingent, incremental and contextualised approach to the relationship between technology and strategy. It illustrates these points with a specific example: the highly controversial topic of the Royal Navy’s so-called ‘Battle Cruisers’, three of which suffered catastrophic explosions at the Battle of Jutland in 1916. In doing so it forwards a new interpretation of British naval policy between 1890 and 1918, the Anglo-German naval arms race, and elements of the First World War at sea.

Book Review: The Transformation of British and American Naval Policy in the Pre-Dreadnought Era: Ideas, Culture and Strategy. Robert Mullins and John Beeler

Book Review: <i>The Transformation of British and American Naval Policy in the Pre-Dreadnought Era: Ideas, Culture and Strategy</i>. Robert Mullins and John Beeler

A Revolution in Naval Affairs? Technology, Strategy and British Naval Policy in the ‘Fisher Era’

This article examines the applicability of the concept of ‘revolutions’ in warfare to the study of pre-First World War British naval history. It argues that by attaching an overt degree of importance to the role of technological change in affecting transformations in contemporary views of war-fighting, historians have overlooked many aspects of Admiralty policy that can be better understood in terms of continuity, rather than ‘revolution’.

Naval History by Conspiracy Theory: The British Admiralty before the First World War and the Methodology of Revisionism

Revisionist interpretations of British naval policy in the Fisher era claim that an elaborate smokescreen was created to hide the Royal Navy’s real policies; while documents showing the true goals were systematically destroyed. By asserting this, revisionists are able to dismiss those parts of the documentary record that contradict their theories, while simultaneously excusing the lack of evidence for their theories by claiming it has been destroyed. This article shows that this methodology is misleading and untenable.

Evolution or Revolution? British Naval Policy in the Fisher Era

This article outlines recent trends in the scholarship on the Royal Navy in the years preceding the outbreak of the First World War. It explains the evolution of the historiography on the topic and outlines how and why new approaches are required to progress our understanding of the topic henceforth.

Book Review: In Defence of Naval Supremacy: Finance, Technology and British Naval Policy, 1889-1914

Book Review: In Defence of Naval Supremacy: Finance, Technology and British Naval Policy, 1889-1914

Sentiment vs Strategy: British Naval Policy, Imperial Defence, and the Development of Dominion Navies, 1911–14

This article examines British naval policy towards imperial defence and the development of autonomous Dominion navies in 1911–14. It shows that the Admiralty's main goal under the leadership of Winston Churchill was to concentrate British and Dominion warships in European waters, and ideally in the North Sea, to meet the German threat. Churchill's approach to naval developments in the Dominions was also shaped by his desire to fulfil the Cabinet's policy of remaining strong in the Mediterranean Sea. He made some concessions to sentiment in the Dominions, but his attempts to create a coherent imperial policy for the naval defence of Britain and its empire were ultimately unsuccessful. By 1914 it was clear that the Dominions would not provide the additional warships Britain required for the Mediterranean, and on the eve of war the Admiralty was beginning to prepare an imperial naval strategy that more accurately reflected the Empire's capabilities.

On Standards and Scholarship: A Response to Nicholas Lambert

This article examines Nicholas Lambert’s criticisms of the article ‘Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution Reconsidered: Winston Churchill at the Admiralty, 1911–1914’ ( War in History 18, 2011), which challenged revisionist claims that in July 1914 the Royal Navy was on the verge of implementing a ‘naval revolution’ based on radical ideas attributed to Admiral Sir John Fisher. It demonstrates that Lambert’s criticisms are unfounded, and provides additional evidence to support an alternative interpretation of British naval policy in the period 1912–14. Important changes were undoubtedly under way on the eve of the First World War, but the revisionists exaggerate Fisher’s influence and oversimplify an inherently complex decision-making process. The Admiralty’s plan to substitute torpedo craft for some of the battleships in its 1914 programme was intended to bolster a conservative strategy, and the changes under consideration were essentially evolutionary in nature.

Britain's Great Security Mirage: The Royal Navy and the Franco-Russian Naval Threat, 1898–1906

This article focuses on the relationship between the threat perception analyses of the British Admiralty and the strategic orientation of the Royal Navy at the outset of the twentieth century. The current view is that this was an era when fear of France and Russia drove British naval policy. However, as this article will show, Britain's Naval Intelligence Department formed a low opinion of French and Russian naval capabilities at this time and this negative evaluation exerted considerable influence over decision making. The belief that, owing to multiple qualitative deficiencies, these powers could definitely be beaten in battle lessened the standing of the Franco-Russian naval challenge and freed the Admiralty to consider the danger posed by other possible enemies, most notably Germany.

Strategy and War Planning in the British Navy, 1887-1918, by Shawn T. Grimes

Strategy and War Planning in the British Navy, 1887-1918, by Shawn T. Grimes, Woodbridge, UK, Boydell Press, 2012, xiv, 263 pp. $115.00 US (Cloth). The history of the Royal Navy before and during the First World War has been an area well worn by historical interest. Despite hundreds of monographs and articles, scant consensus has emerged regarding the direction of British naval policy for much of the period. The Navy's war plans, or lack thereof, has been an area in which historians have been especially critical of the Admiralty. This trend was begun by intellectual officers such as Herbert Richmond, who attacked the Admiralty heavily on this score during and after the First World War. Claims that the legacy of Sir John was no plans for war, no knowledge of an enemy's plan or movements and that the Navy had very big body with a very small brain have proven to be enduring. In this book, based upon the author's 2003 doctoral thesis, Shawn Grimes conclusively rebuts these claims. The reader might be excused for wondering how the opinions of such august service luminaries might be effectively addressed. However in by far the most cohesive, well researched and thorough treatment of British naval war planning of the period, the author not only addresses these claims, but also conclusively illustrates them to be baseless. Grimes demonstrates the development of the Admiralty's thinking department, the work done planning for a war against Germany, and the consistency with which the Admiralty acted in accordance with these plans. Through a careful study of the manoeuvres of the period, fleet distributions, and procurement, Grimes is able show long-term trends and progressions in the Admiralty's war planning which are hard to deny. The book's central argument is that the war planning conducted by the Navy before and during the Fisher era followed a discernible path into the First World War. Plans developed for war against a potential Franco-Russian combination before 1905 informed and shaped those developed later against Germany. Grimes subscribes to the recent trend of challenging revisionist interpretations which have claimed that Germany was not viewed as a naval threat before 1905. He cites extensive evidence of naval planning for a war against Germany from 1901-2 onwards. In one of the most important and original elements of this work he also emphasizes the importance of the Baltic in Admiralty planning against Germany between 1905-9. This is combined with a valuable tracing of the development of the Admiralty's commercial blockade against Germany and the demonstration that this strategy was confirmed as the Navy's primary offensive option as early as 1912. …

On Standards: A Reply to Christopher Bell

During his first term as first sea lord (1904–10), Admiral Sir John Fisher set in motion the intellectual, organizational, and technological forces that, in very rapid order, combined and recombined to generate new approaches to British naval policy. Like most if not all ‘revolutions’ in technology and warfare, this one did not start and end neatly under one man’s control, but took on a life of its own. Not all elements of his original vision advanced as far as others. Yet, however variable the direction and extent of the revolution at particular times, in retrospect we can say indubitably that it was Fisher who launched it. This essay is a response to Professor Christopher Bell’s July 2011 article: ‘Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution Reconsidered: Winston Churchill at the Admiralty, 1911–1914’.

SOUTH AFRICA AND IMPERIAL NAVAL DEFENCE

There are various themes which emerge in a consideration of South Africa's involvement in British naval policy. There is the expansion of the British empire itself, from its Atlantic beginnings into eastern seas and its century-long conflict with France. There is the theme of India, and the fluctuating fortunes of a trading company. There are the changes in marine technology and the world's balance of naval power. All of these broad themes must be considered if the South African contribution is to be seen in its proper context.

En pos de nuevos botines. Expediciones inglesas en el Pacífico novohispano (1680-1763)

&lt;span style="line-height: 115%;"&gt;En este trabajo se abordan las navegaciones inglesas a lo largo del Pacífico novohispano durante la primera parte del siglo XVIII, principalmente a partir de los diarios de viaje de los expedicionarios británicos. Lo anterior evidencia el conocimiento que éstos tenían del territorio americano y la manera en la que los intereses ingleses se expandieron hacia el Pacífico. Dicho cambio forma parte de un proceso marítimo mercantil en el que distintas potencias europeas y territorios coloniales se vieron inmersos y en el que los mercados americanos fueron de gran interés para las coronas europeas, por lo que buscaban expander sus redes mercantiles por el Mar del Sur. Prueba de ello son las expediciones inglesas que incursionaron en este océano. Cada viaje abordado representa un momento determinado en las políticas navales británicas.&lt;/span&gt;

British Naval Strategy: The Russian Black Sea Fleet and the Turkish Straits, 1890–1904

For much of the nineteenth century and certainly at least until 1904 the most formidable challenge to Britain's maritime-based global hegemony, somewhat ironically, emanated from Russia, Europe's f...

Review Article: From Pre- to Post-Dreadnought: Recent Research on the Royal Navy, 1880—1945

Naval historians have had a good fewyears recently, with a number of informative and readable scholarly works reaching publication that have taken a wide range of approaches to the subject: operational, technical, cultural, policy and social. The complexities of British naval policy, operations, administration, technology and finance defy the tidy grouping of research into discrete chronological boundaries; in many ways the Navy’s contemporary history can best be seen as the cumulative effect of previous successes and failures of naval and defence policy. After all, the Royal Navy’s behaviour at the start of the second world war and during the interwar period cannot be fully understood without a clear comprehension of the first world war and the legacy of Jutland and submarine warfare. Yet at the same time, any analysis of the first world war is rooted in the administrative, strategic and technological changes made by Admiral Sir John Fisher during his time as First Sea Lord between 1904 and 1910, and the Fisher period and its navalism, competition andDreadnoughts cannot be fully understood without reference to the problems and concerns of the pre-Dreadnought era.

The First Shot was the Last Straw: The Sinking of the T.S.S. Athenia in September 1939 and British Naval Policy in the Second World War

On 3 September 1939 the passenger liner Athenia, sailing from Liverpool to Montreal, was sunk by the German submarine U-30 with a loss of 112 lives. This action, while not intended by the German government, was in violation of Germany's commitments under the London Naval Treaty and it complicated its desire to keep hostilities confined to Poland. The British government and Admiralty, confronted with an attack on an unarmed passenger liner within nine hours of the declaration of war, and several freighters shortly thereafter, concluded that the German Navy intended to wage unrestricted submarine warfare. This article shows that as a result of the sinking of the Athenia, the government and the Admiralty implemented convoys within the first week of the war, sooner and more completely than had been intended. Naval ship building priorities were also subsequently adjusted to quickly provide escort vessels for the newly organized convoys.

Switching horses: The admiralty's recognition of the threat from Germany, 1900–1905

In three books published in 1940, 1956, and 1961, Arthur J. Marder established what became the orthodox view of the development of the British navy in the years leading up to the First World War.1 Building upon the work of Sir Llewellyn Woodward, who argues that, from the outset of the twentieth century, British naval policy was framed as a response to the threat posed by the rising German naval power,2 Marder makes precise claims about the nature of the response. In particular, he states that, under the leadership of the first sea lord from 1904 to 1910, Admiral Sir John Fisher, the admiralty undertook two root-and-branch reforms. First, it redeployed Britain's fleets and squadrons, reducing the number of foreign stations, scrapping obsolescent vessels, and stationing the most powerful units of the fleet in European waters. Next, at Fisher's prompting, it triggered a naval revolution by ordering the building of a new type of warship, HMS Dreadnought, the world's first turbine-powered, all-big-gun battleship. In both cases, Marder is unambiguous about the motive: the redeployment adjusted Britain's force posture to ensure a preponderance of strength in the vicinity of the North Sea, the theatre in which the expected war with Germany would be fought. The new type of ship was necessary to help to modernize the navy's matériel in keeping with advances in gunnery, propulsion, and torpedoes. If not explicitly aimed at Germany, the new ship would ensure that the navy was better prepared for a war that Fisher perceived to be ‘inevitable’s.

The Royal Navy and the Capital Ship in the Interwar Period: An Operational Perspective

Joseph Moretz's innovative work focuses on what battleships actually did in the inter-war years and what its designed war role in fact was. In doing so, the book tells us much about British naval policy and planning of the time. Drawing heavily on official Admiralty records and private papers of leading officers, the author examines the navy's operational experience and the evolution of its tactical doctrine during the interwar period. He argues that operational experience, combined with assumptions about the nature of a future naval war, were more important in keeping the battleship afloat than conservatism in Navy.