The article examines the British vision and assessments of the situation in Bukhara in the winter of 1921–1922, immediately after the split of the Union of Bolsheviks and Young Bukharians, which previously led to the creation of the so-called Bukhara People's Soviet Republic in the fall of 1920. Drawing on British archival sources, the article examines the decision-making process and projections for future development and outlines the mechanism of interaction between the various institutions of the British Indian administration and its decisions regarding Anglo-Bukharian relations. The United Kingdom needed to prevent any threat to its Indian possessions. Therefore, the recognition of the independent statehood of Bukhara immediately after the overthrow of the emir by the Bolsheviks and the Young Bukharans, and the establishment of the pro-Soviet regime, became particularly important. The problem of recognition affected a wide range of issues, including British positions in the East, its relations with individual countries of the region, primarily with Afghanistan, and the establishment of relations with Soviet Russia, which, on the one hand, showed its interest in promoting them, and on the other, engaged in anti-British activities in the East with an emphasis on India. The Afghan authorities, pursuing their own goals in Central Asia, persistently appealed to the British to recognize the independence of Bukhara, referring to the Soviet and Afghan examples. British diplomats reacted cautiously to all appeals, without losing sight of the Afghan plans and goals of London. Their final refusal to participate in the Bukhara chaos is caused, to a greater extent, by the lack of a real force on which the British could rely. Thus, the very idea of British recognition turned out to be unviable because of the nature of the puppet regime established in the BNSR, and because of the unwillingness of the British to aggravate their relations with Soviet Russia.
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