Britain's Wartime Research Articles

Influence without power: the last Khedive of Egypt and the great powers, 1914–18

One of the few remaining mysteries of World War I in the Middle East is why the last Ottoman viceroy in Egypt, the Khedive Abbas Hilmi II, deposed by Britain in December 1914, remained during much of the war the object of substantial attention lavished on him by the Great Powers of Europe. The popular postwar view of Abbas Hilmi was that of an incompetent and corrupt former Muslim ruler, stripped of his power and made harmless to Britain's wartime control over Egypt, mainly because he acted during the war for no ideological purpose, but instead for his own 'personal position'.' Little doubt exists that personal and dynastic ambitions served as the driving forces for the ex-Khedive's actions. However, a study of European archives reveals that during the war the Great Powers treated Abbas Hilmi as an influential player in Middle Eastern politics. Britain, Germany, Austria and the Ottoman Empire nearly always viewed the Khedive as either potentially powerful or useful to them. In return, he saw the Great Powers in the same light. The example of the ex-Khedive's wartime relations to the Great Powers illustrates in a major way the different and competing interests of the Powers in the Middle East as well as the opportunity for Muslim leaders in the region to exploit such differences, even occasionally to the leaders' advantage. The Ottoman interest in Abbas Hilmi stemmed mainly from his pre-war involvement with the Arabs and from the Ottoman desire to recapture complete control of Egypt and replace him as Khedive with someone wholly loyal to the Sublime Porte. But the interest of Britain, Germany and Austria in him resulted more from their perception of his worth to them in Egypt and among Orientals exiled in Europe and from their wish to keep him from joining the enemy side in the war. Great Power regard for the Khedive long predated the world war. Historians have emphasized how the Vienna-educated Abbas, following his accession to the Khedivat as a twenty-two-year-old in January 1892, desired to rid Egypt of British control and free the country of Ottoman suzerainty. The young Khedive, who possessed no political or military means to achieve his ambition of personal autonomy from both Britain and the sultan,

British Imperial Strategy and the Origins of the Cold War 1944-49.

Britain's wartime allies, post-war planning and the future of the Empire the Empire and global strategy - imperial needs defined April 1944-August 1945 Empire and global strategy 1944-46 - implementing an imperial strategy and the breakdown of allied cooperation, September 1945-December 1946 Empire and global strategy 1944-46, the implementation of an imperial strategy - the Empire and the pursuit of European cooperation 1945-46 drowning Europeans clutch at African straws, 1947 there's no success like failure - the collapse of an imperial strategy 1948-49.

Turco-Armenian Relations And British Propaganda During The First World War

In this paper I intend to trace cursorily the background of the incidents that took place in the Ottoman Empire, mainly in 1915, that caused a great tragedy to the people of Anatolia, especially to the Turks, other Muslims, and Armenians. I also intınd to examine that tragedy, its instigators, causes, effects, and how it was exploited by Britain's wartime propagandists, in the light of new documents that have come to my notice during recent studies. I hope that my conclusions may contribute to a better understanding of the Turco-Armenian relations, and of how those amicable relations were disrupted and exploited by external and extremist forces immediately before and during the fateful years of the First World War.

Indicative cases of Britain's wartime policy in Egypt, 1942–44

(1994). Indicative cases of Britain's wartime policy in Egypt, 1942–44. Middle Eastern Studies: Vol. 30, No. 1, pp. 91-122.

Britain's wartime policy in Egypt, 1940–42

(1989). Britain's wartime policy in Egypt, 1940–42. Middle Eastern Studies: Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 64-94.

A canard out of time? Churchill, the War Cabinet and The Atlantic Charter, August 1941

1. The charges against ChurchillDid Mr Churchill, Britain's wartime Prime Minister, display ‘cavalier behaviour5 towards his Cabinet over The Atlantic Charter9 of 1941? Having decided ‘to ignore’ their views, did he somehow seek to ensure, ‘rather ineptly’, that crucial telegrams should conceal his deviousness?Dr A. P. Dobson makes these accusations in this Review in April 1984,] They relate to ‘RIVIERA’, Churchill’s first wartime meeting with President Roosevelt, between 9 and 12 August 1941 in Placentia Bay, Newfoundland. Concerned primarily with wartime collaboration, though the United States was not yet formally a belligerent, the two leaders outlined peace aims in a hastily drafted joint declaration, promptly named ‘The Atlantic Charter’. Their fierce debate over its fourth economic ‘Point’ reflected American pressure to secure advantage from assistance, under the Lend-Lease Act of March 1941, to Britain's war effort.

The Society for the Oversea Settlement of British Women and the Problems of Empire Settlement, 1917–1936

The “deluge” of World War I not only produced change within British society, but it intensified governmental and societal interest in the empire. This trend occurred for several reasons. Britain's wartime co-operation with her dominions led many Britons to assume that this new imperial unity could, and should, be cultivated in the post-war period. The imperial pessimism generated in some circles by the tragedy of the Boer War faded from the public's memory. Equally important, however, by 1917 the government was conscious of the serious economic and social problems Britain would confront once victory had been attained. One of several imperial solutions studied extensively during the war was state supported emigration. The government, which since 1914 had played an increasingly prominent role in solving society's problems, believed that emigration would serve a variety of useful purposes. It would alleviate the distress of thousands of British women, it would accelerate the economic and social development of the dominions, and it would strengthen the British Empire, giving it the power and self-assurance necessary to carry out its diplomatic and military roles in the post-war world. During the course of these deliberations during and immediately after World War I, the importance of women to any comprehensive strengthening of the empire was fully accepted by the government for the first time in British history.The growth of interest in government sponsored imperial migration, including that of women, did not occur, however, in a vacuum. The 1920s and 1930s were, as it is increasingly recognized, “a great age of British Imperialism,” during which the “mass pheonomena of Empire—the Empire Shopping Weeks, the Empire Exhibitions and Empire Day celebrations” became a prominent part of the British social scene.

The Audit of War: The Illusion and Reality of Britain as a Great Nation.

second book in The Pride and the Fall sequence on power in the 20th century, this work places Britain's decline since World War II in a new perspective. Based on an analysis of unpublished government records, the text shows that Britain's wartime performance, far from marking a supreme achievement of national genius and effort, was in reality characterized by all the classic symptoms of the British disease. By the time they had taken down the bunting from the streets after V-E Day and turned from the war to the future, the British, in their dreams and illusions, and in their flinching from reality, had already written the scenario for Britain's post-war descent.

British Labour and the Cold War: The Foreign Policy of the Labour Governments, 1945–1951

Labour took office in 1945 amid high hopes that its socialist message could be applied abroad as well as at home. Although Clement Attlee, Ernest Bevin, and other Labour leaders had had almost as much responsibility as their Conservative counterparts for Britain's wartime foreign policy, it was widely believed that once on its own Labour would play a different role in world affairs.Let Us Face the Future, the party's election manifesto, pledged to “apply [a] Socialist analysis to the world situation.” Bevin's famous “Left understands Left” remark was widely taken to mean that Labour would be more sympathetic to revolutionary developments throughout the world but above all to the Soviet Union. For many in the Labour movement, a socialist foreign policy and sympathy for the Soviet Union also implied distrust of the United States and its attempt to create what theNew Statesmancalled a capitalist “economic empire.” For the Labour movement as a whole, the story of these years can be summarized simply: the reluctant abandonment of hopes of Anglo-Soviet friendship and the grudging acceptance of an Anglo-American alliance.Labour leaders, of course, did not fully share the assumptions of their more enthusiastic followers, and they made clear from the start that they intended no radical break with the foreign policy of the wartime coalition that they had helped to shape. Ernest Bevin told the Commons in his first major speech as foreign secretary that he accepted the foreign policy of his predecessor, Anthony Eden. But a commitment to continuity in foreign policy did not immediately entail complete hostility to the Soviet Union or a special relationship with the United States.

Full Employment: The Elusive Quest

During the early post-war "reconstruction" years most Western countries enjoyed full and frequently overfull — employment. Whilst this led some commentators to voice concern regarding the lack of discipline in the work force which goes with a shortage of workers, such a malaise was not universally noted, and was in any case submerged in the euphoria surrounding the assumption that the scourge of unemployment had been conquered. The consensus pointed to the view that a Keynesian manipulation of the economy would continue to provide full employment and that designs for full employment such as Britain's war-time Beveridge Plan had been realised. Now matters are rather different.

How Shall We Ever Get Them Back to Work?

Introduction During the early post‐war “reconstruction” years most Western countries enjoyed full — and frequently overfull — employment. Whilst this led some commentators to voice concern regarding the lack of discipline in the workforce which goes with a shortage of workers, such a malaise was not universally noted, and was in any case submerged in the euphoria surrounding the assumption that the scourge of unemployment had been conquered. The consensus pointed to the view that a Keynesian manipulation of the economy would continue to provide full employment and that designs for full employment such as Britain's wartime Beveridge Plan had been realised. Now matters are rather different.

Winston Churchill and the Singapore Naval Base, 1924–1929

Sir Winston Churchill's doctor has recalled the “stupefying” effect which the fall of Singapore on 15 February 1942 had upon his patient. Britain's wartime leader, Lord Moran suggests, knew that the surrender was “something more than a reverse. I think he wondered if it were a portent”. The spectre of one of the worst defeats in British military history was to return to haunt Churchill in later years. His torment was, perhaps, not solely portentous but also recollective for in the years 1924–29 Churchill himself, while serving in Stanley Baldwin's second government, had played the major role in delaying the building and defence of the Singapore naval base and in disparaging its associated strategy.

Britain's Nursery Schools

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Additional informationNotes on contributorsLouise MorganChildren who attended Britain's wartime nurseries improved so much that educationists and parents began to realize the value of these institutions. What Britain is doing today to nurture its youngest is related by Louise Morgan who is on the staff of the London News Chronicle.

Rationing and Exchange Control in British War Finance

Two major objectives of British policy which can and should be implemented by the same regulatory technique, 171.— I. The non-quantitative approach: burdens likely to be heavy, 172; and require maximizing of resources 173.— The Economist's educational campaign, 174.— Hansen's view, 176.— The best sterling exchange rate for the duration of the war would be nearer $5.00 than $4.00.— Theoretical justification of this position, 177.— II. The statistical approach: points to be established, 182.— Volume of British exports likely to fall, 183.— Britain's foreign markets will not be reduced by war, and may be increased, 185.— What depreciation is costing Britain, 186.— Behavior of British prices, 190.— III. Summary of Britain's wartime economic problems, 196.