Britain's Relationship Research Articles

The role of the settlement area in British race relations.

This paper attempts to analyse some of the local social structural factors accounting for racial attitudes towards coloured settlers, and will concentrate particularly on the way in which the coloured settlement zones, often known loosely as ghettos, promote the formation of racial attitudes and relationships in Britain.

Division over Cyprus

The shots that rang out on December 21, 1963, unleashed a battle for control of Cyprus which, muted and restrained, is with us to this day. It has divided Greece from Turkey, compromised Britain's relations with Greece, prejudiced the United States' rapport with Turkey, strained Cyprus's dealings with just about everybody, separated the United Nations from its coffers and frayed the Eastern Mediterranean bond of nato. As far as Greece and Turkey were concerned, it could not have come at a worse time.

Great Britain's relations with the young turks 1908–1914

(1966). Great Britain's relations with the young turks 1908–1914. Middle Eastern Studies: Vol. 2, No. 4, pp. 302-329.

German-Soviet Relations and the Anglo-Soviet Break, 1927

In May 1927 Sir Austen Chamberlain precipitated the first great international crisis of the post-Locarno period by denouncing the Anglo-Soviet trade agreement and severing Britain's diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Although Germany was not directly involved, the dispute nevertheless was to have a profoundly disturbing effect on German-Soviet relations. By raising the possibility of a wide-ranging diplomatic, economic, and perhaps even military confrontation between London and Moscow, it strained Germany's diplomatic system, which rested on the Locarno Pact (1925) and the Treaty of Berlin (1926). Thus it posed some fundamental questions for the German Foreign Ministry: Were the policies associated with those agreements compatible with each other only in fair weather? Did Germany have the freedom to remain neutral if the dispute should deepen? In short, was it still realistic to believe that Germany could maintain equally intimate ties with London and Moscow? Because Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann had previously denned a balancing role as the sine qua non of Germany's international revival, the imbroglio soon led to a great debate in the Wilhelmstrasse. The issue on which it turned was, as a leading participant observed, “whether Germany's ties with Russia are worth enough to our present and future political interests so that it pays to assume the political expenses and risks involved in maintaining them.”

Britain and the Arabs: the Need for a New Start

T 11 ODAY, Britain's relations with the Arab world are worse than those of any other Western country. From 1798 until recently, we could usually rely on France to relieve us of the invidious role of being the Arabs' Western Enemy Number One. Indeed, there was a moment during the First World War-after the Husain-McMahon correspondence and before the Balfoutr Declaration-when, in Arab eyes, Britain was the Arabs' champion, while France remained their villain. But President de Gaulle has now shown the imagination and the strength of will to change the image of France in Arab eyes. He has put an end to France's atrocious war in Algeria: he has given Algeria her independence. He has cut out an ulcer that was poisoning France's relations with Tunisia: he has evacuated the great French naval base at Bizerta. So, today, Britain is left playing, in isolation, the ugly role of an ex-imperial Power still dragging its feet in its exit from its last foot-holds in the Arab world. We are getting no sympathy from the United States. Her commitment to Israel has written her name in capital letters in the Arabs' black book. She cannot afford to throw the Arabs completely into Russia's and China's arms by now giving them, gratuitously, an additional cause of offence; and she reacts strongly against being asked by Britain to embroil herself with the Arabs still further in support of a nostalgic Briti-sh imperialist policy in Southern Arabia. European imperialism is traditionally obnoxious to Americans anyway, on its own intrinsic demerits, apart from its being detrimental to American national interests, as it 'is in this particular case. Our British attitude towards the Arabs has, for long, been curiously ambivalent. On the one hand, we have been delighted when eminent Britons-Hester Stanhope, Gertrude Bell, T. E. Lawrence-have got on well with the Arabs individually, but we have not had any corresponding desire to get on well with them collectively. Since 1882, when we invaded and occupied Egypt by force of arms, we seem always to have been wanting to have some Arabs to bully. Our ability still to bully Arabs has shored up our waning belief that Britain is still a Great Power in the traditional, brutal meaning of the term; and this prop to a misguided form of collective self-esteem has given us a

Britain and the Common Market

The European Economic Community, generally known as the Common Market, was founded nearly five years ago. What it is and stands for cannot be understood without reference to its origins. Nor can the decision of the British Tory government to apply for admission now, after holding aloof for all these years—although it would have been much easier and more advantageous to go in on the ground floor when the situation was fluid and Britain's accession was regarded as well-nigh essential—be understood without considering Britain's relationship to the United States.This article can also be found at the Monthly Review website, where most recent articles are published in full.Click here to purchase a PDF version of this article at the Monthly Review website.

Britain's Intervention in Malaya: The Origin of Lord Kimberley's Instructions to Sir Andrew Clarke in 1873

It is well known that British political control in the Malay States began with the Pangkor agreement of January 1874, which was soon followed by the appointment of the first Resident in Perak. The Earl of Kimberley's famous instructions' of 20 September 1873 have generally been accepted as providing the basis for this new phase in the history of Malaya and of the British empire. Sir Andrew Clarke was told that the conduct of Britain's relations with the Malay States which were not subject to Siamese influence, would be an important part of his duties as governor. Since growing anarchy was injuring trade and British interests generally, the government had to consider whether it could do anything to improve matters in the States. Although the British government had no desire to interfere in the affairs of the Peninsula, said Kimberley, Clarke should inquire into the condition of each state and report any steps which the Straits government could take to restore peace and to protect trade. Kimberley also added the often-quoted words:“I would wish you especially to consider whether it would be advisable to appoint a British Officer to reside in any of the Malay States. Such an appointment would only be made with the full consent of the native government.…”

Ramsay Macdonald and Britain's Domestic Politics and Foreign Relations, 1919–1931: A Study Based on Macdonald's Letters to an American Friend

Ramsay Macdonald and Britain's Domestic Politics and Foreign Relations, 1919–1931: A Study Based on Macdonald's Letters to an American Friend

Myxomatosis in Britain.

IN his article, Dr. C. H. Andrewes1 directs attention to the contrast between the host/vector relationship in Britain and Australia. When we have acquired further information about the biology of the rabbit flea (Spilopsyllus cuniculi) and also other possible arthropod vectors, we may find that a somewhat different set of factors comes into operation in Britain between major epizootics.

The “Atlantic Alliance” in Perspective

facts of central importance in the international scene are so familiar, yet so difficult to understand and assess, as the relations of Britain and English-speaking North America. With an unbroken history stemming back into the seventeenth century these relations have in the twentieth gained, not lost, significance. In two World Wars they have been the determining element ; in the face of the upsurging authoritarian systems of our own day, they have been the bulwark of free government. Yet no fact of comparable importance seems to have been less studied by statesmen, politicians, and scholars. In a mountainous literature of journalistic impressions and fragmentary analyses, there is still no truly satisfying work of synthesis and broad perspective. In the realm of high policy, the aims and principles of Anglo-American relations are repeatedly shown to be ill-defined, wavering, and inconsistent. And yet the pattern of these relations with all their baffling complexities, political, economic, cultural, and psychological, seems in a way simple enough. Between Canada and her two seniors, the persistent trend has been toward Canadian nationhood with a very long but on the whole successful effort to get the best possible out of the frustrating relations of two headstrong parents who never seem able to decide whether their match is one of grudging affection, convenience, or necessity. Between Britain and the United States the pattern has been one of deep affinities in thought and action, which, in times of great international crisis, have had a tremendous recurrent influence, but which even more often have been so overlaid, obscured, and frustrated by suspicious misunderstandings, and particular conflicts of interest, that the two nations have been repeatedly at critical points brought to the verge of open conflict, as they were in 1812 actually brought into an unnecessary three year war. In high policy the fundamental historic interest has till our own day centred around the control of the Atlantic, with all its

The Conflict of Legal Systems in the Federation of Malaya and Singapore

S1NCE the war Malaya--the Federation and Singapore-has been going through a period of rapid constitutional change, but the law still stands on the foundations laid down during the nineteenth century, when the Settlements were established and the States were taken under protection. Before the Japanese invasion Malaya consisted of a Colony, comprising the three Settlements of Penarg, Malacca and Singapore, and nine States, of which four were federated. Agreements of various dates but similar form governed the relations of Britain and the States; their external affairs were controlled by Britain, and a British Adviser was appointed to each State, whose advice had to be sought and accepted on all matters of government other than those concerning the Muslim religion or Malay custom. An idea of the practical importance of the different systems of law which will be considered may be gained from the different populations of the region. In 1917 the population of the Federation and Singapore, taken together, was in round figures as follows:

Britain and Europe

would be foolish to attempt to discuss Britain's relationship with the countries of Continental Europe without making some quick glance back at the history of the last ten years; oversimplified as the resulting picture will be, the oversimplification in itself is revealing. Politically, the ten years fall into three periods, the first the thirty months that ended with the Communist coup d'etat in Czechoslovakia and the Berlin Blockade, the second the period of fear and uncertainty between 1948 and 1950, the third that which began four months after the invasion of South Korea with M. Rene Pleven's proposal for a European Army. The climax to that period was the EDC treaty; the anti-climax, the rejection of the whole project by the French National Assembly in August, 1954. Yet, while the story of the treaty is one of a descending curve of hope and interest, two other events diluted the feelings of increasing despondency. One was the death of Stalin, the other the negotiations for the treaty that replaced EDC, for out of that came a definite committment by the United Kingdom Government to be concerned in the supervision and control of German rearmament. From all points of view that period ended with the meeting this summer of the four leaders at Geneva, and in its way that conference typified the whole ten years. It broke up with an exchange of admirable sentiments and it left all the problems of German reunification unsettled, and shelved for someone else to discuss later.

Britain's Strategic Relationship to Europe

Britain's Strategic Relationship to Europe

184. A Preliminary Statement of a Survey of Negro-White Relationships in Britain

184. A Preliminary Statement of a Survey of Negro-White Relationships in Britain

Britain's Cultural Relations with Other Nations

Britain's Cultural Relations with Other Nations

The Quest of American Life American Interpretations The Development of the Soviet Economic System Our Threatened Values

WITH a year of peace behind us and the high hopes of victory replaced by a mood which must in frankness be called one of disillusionment, this seemin fc /ttaphazard collection of four volumes present stimulating survey of some of the back-grpjibri of the ideological differences that mark the relations of Britain with the two leading powers of the world, the United States and the U.S.S.R. Ii would have been naive to imagine that the comradeship of war could have removed these differences or even have contributed to their mitigation; but there was from 1941 a widespread hope in Britain that a greater mutual understanding would arise, and if public goodwill could have created that understanding it would certainly have come. In the event, however, the joint victory has served but to emphasize the differences. True, there is at this time, in all probability, a greater appreciation among British people of the American outlook than has ever existed before, and a greater patience with what seem to the Briton the vagaries of American political life. But with the U.S.S.R., on the other hand, a closer acquaintance has thrown into relief a fundamental difference of outlook. With the best will in the world to understand and to work in common partnership for peace, the British people are frankly puzzled, and it has become clear that many of the formulae of Allied unity issued during the War were face-saving devices that served to conceal what they could not cure. By ‘democracy’, for example, the Russians obviously mean something far removed from the Anglo-American conception of the word. The fundamental distinction can be expressed quite simply. The Russian view of democracy is essentially collectivist: it is government in the interests of the many, the proletariat, how exercised, or by whom, being details of lesser importance provided that the interests of the majority are genuinely served. “Democrats,” Mr. Vyshinsky has said, “are those who give their efforts to the service of the people, who are ready to sacrifice even their lives, who work for the people.” It is a definition that has little relevance for Britain and America. For them democracy is essentially individualist: it exists to give the citizen the fullest possible scope for his development as an individual rather than as a unit in a collective grouping. The Quest of American Life By George Norlin. University of Colorado Studies Series B. Studies in the Humanities, Vol. 2, No. 3. Pp. xvi + 283. (University of Colorado, 1945.) American Interpretations Four Political Essays. By David Mitrany. Pp. v + 124. (London: Contact Publications, Ltd., 1946.) 6s. net. The Development of the Soviet Economic System An Essay on the Experience of Planning in the U.S.S.R. By Alexander Baykov. (National Institute of Economic and Social Research: Economic and Social Studies, 5.) Pp. xv + 514. (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1946.) 30s. net. Our Threatened Values By Victor Gollancz. Pp. 157. (London: Victor Gollancz, Ltd., 1946.) 5s. net.