Corruption is known to inhibit economic growth. The dearth of data on actual bribe payments, however, has been the major impediment for reliable quantitative knowledge of bribery and resulted in little consensus in methods of fighting corruption. This paper tests whether increased access to information on corruption affects prices and price dispersion of bribes paid when obtaining public services in India. In doing so, we take advantage of a novel dataset that is the most comprehensive ever-compiled on bribery. Our findings are three-fold. First, we find existence of substantial price dispersion of bribery for given month, city, and transactions. Second, the price and price dispersion tend to fall over time in competitive market but not in monopoly market. Third, we find that increased access to information on-line reduces price and price dispersion in monopoly market but not in competitive market. Consistent with the search cost models in industrial organization, these results highlight substantial effect of information on competition in the market of bribery.