Brian Leftow Research Articles

Timelessness à la Leftow

Brian Leftow has argued in significant detail for a timeless conception of God. However, his work has been interacted with less than one might expect, especially given that some have contended that divine timelessness should be put to death and buried. Further, the work that has critically interacted with Leftow does a very poor job at discrediting it, or so I will contend. As we shall see, the main reason for this is either because what is central to Leftow’s view is not affected by the objection, or because Leftow provides another way of getting his theory off the ground. Why, then, do so many objections miss the mark? I suspect it’s because many struggle to understand Leftow’s view and what is central to it. As such, one of the main goals of this paper will be to make Leftow’s account more accessible and to elucidate the main elements of the theory, whilst also providing responses to the main objections raised against his view. The overall result of this, I hope, will be a more fruitful examination of Leftow’s view in the future.

Temptation, Sinlessness, and Impeccability

Hebrews 4:15 says that Jesus was tempted like other human beings yet never sinned. Sinlessness is not the same as impeccability. Chalcedonian Christology or some variant of it seems necessary to show that Jesus was metaphysically unable to sin. Metaphysical impossibility to sin, though, appears to rule out temptation as experienced by ordinary human beings. This paper argues that Oliver D. Crisp, T. A. Hart, Brian Leftow, and Gerald O’Collins all fall short in trying to show how Jesus was both impeccable and tempted as we are.

The Trinity as social and constitutional: a rejoinder to Brian Leftow

AbstractBrian Leftow continues to argue against my use of the constitution relation in explaining the Trinity. I consider his arguments, and have a bit more to say about Leftow's own formulation of trinitarian doctrine.

Revisiting Anselm on Time and Divine Eternity

How to understand Saint Anselm of Canterbury on time and divine eternity is subject to debate. Katherin Rogers argues that Anselm is a four‐dimensionalist, whereas Brian Leftow argues that he is a presentist. Despite the disagreement, both scholars assume that Anselm has a positive account of time and divine eternity to offer. I challenge this assumption, arguing that Anselm is not interested in offering an account of the metaphysics of time and divine eternity. The reading defended here is deflationary in the following sense: Anselm is trying to purify, so to speak, the notion of ‘divine eternity’ from creaturely imperfections that are suggested by our language.

On Emily Paul on Brian Leftow

Emily Paul has recently argued that Brian Leftow’s account of why the import of God’s becoming Incarnate is not temporal but modal fails. She argues that Leftow’s required modal variation is not satisfied. That is, we do not have the required variation across logical space concerning the Incarnation. Paul examines her argument on two possible worlds theories: theistic ersatzism and (what I call) Lewisian theism. She thinks that both possible worlds theories face difficulties. I argue that Paul fails to provide a compelling argument against Leftow because, firstly, her defence of one her premises fails, and, secondly, she misjudges what is required for some of Leftow’s claims to be true. I also argue that some of the problematic consequences that Paul raises for theistic ersatzism and Lewisian theism either are not problematic or can be avoided.

Constituting the Trinity

AbstractRecently several authors have developed accounts of the Trinity employing the metaphysical notion of constitution. I expound one such proposal and defend it against objections from Keith Yandell and Brian Leftow. In the process, I propose an improved definition of the constitution relation as applied to the Trinity. I then compare the resulting trinitarian metaphysics with Leftow's own view.

Incarnation, Divine Timelessness, and Modality

A central part of the Christian doctrine of the incarnation is that the Son of God ‘becomes’ incarnate. Furthermore, according to classical theism, God is timeless: He exists ‘outside’ of time, and His life has no temporal stages. A consequence of this ‘atemporalist’ view is that a timeless being cannot undergo intrinsic change—for this requires the being to be one way at one time, and a different way at a later time. How, then, can we understand the central Christian claim that the Son of God ‘becomes’ human? This paper examines one such explanation, drawn from a brief remark by Brian Leftow: the Word takes on flesh by exhibiting modal variation with regards to the incarnation. On this account, a timeless God ‘becomes’ incarnate simply due to variation across logical space: at some possible worlds He is incarnate and at others He is not. Modal variation need not, therefore, require temporality: it only requires variation across (static) possible worlds. I draw out the problems with Leftow’s modal claim under the heads of Ersatzism and Genuine Modal Realism about possible worlds, respectively. I argue that in both instances, Leftow’s desired cross–worldly variation of the Son’s incarnation cannot be achieved.

Patience and the Trinity

AbstractThis article commends the motif of patience for thinking about the Trinity. It opens with an analysis of Church Dogmatics I/1, worrying about a spare account of intratrinitarian relations but finding promise in Barth's treatment of the Spirit. It then proposes that Barth's remarks about patience could nourish constructive reflection. The divine life itself involves the exercise of patience: each Person bears the distinctions and relations basic to God's being. To nuance this claim, work by Brian Leftow, Hans Urs von Balthasar, and Linn Tonstad is analyzed. A conclusion considers social trinitarianism and the “modestly speculative” character of trinitarian reflection.

Futura contingentia, ockhamizm (retroaktywizm) i tomizm (eternalizm)

In the current paper, I enter into debate with Marcin Tkaczyk and the chosen Anglo-Saxon analytic philosophers of religion to discuss the theological version of the problem of future contingents. I take into consideration some varieties of Ockhamism (retroactivism)—the position denying the temporal necessity (non-determination) of all past events and allowing some form of retroactivity. Strong Ockhamism postulates real retroactive causation, moderate Ockhamism limits it to the meanings of physical and psychical events, and weak Ockhamism replaces the notion of retroactive causation with that of retroactive dependence. I compare different forms of retroactivism with eternalism (of Boethius, St. Anselm of Canterbury, and St. Thomas Aquinas) to show that the latter has significant advantage. At the same time, I point out that eternalism in its presentist and relativist version (proposed by Brian Leftow) avoids the objections put forward against it, and that, within such eternalism, the problem of future contingents does not arise.

Reply to my commentators

AbstractThis article contains my responses to the discussions of my views on the nature of God by Howard Robinson and Herman Philipse, my views on the strength of arguments for the existence of God by Herman Philipse, Brian Leftow, Timothy Mawson, and Christoph Jäger, and my views on the nature and justification of Christian faith by Mark Wynn and Cyrille Michon, contained in this issue of Religious Studies.

Analytic Philosophical Theology and the recovery of metaphysics An interview with Brian Leftow

In this interview Prof. Brian Leftow answers questions concerning the causes of the emergence of Analytic Philosophical Theology within the analytic tradition; the advantages of maintaining the traditional picture of perfect being theology with regards to divine attributes; his conception of the origin of necessary truths; the problem of evil; and the importance of university investment in research on philosophical theology.

Review of Brian Leftow, God and Necessity

Review of Brian Leftow, God and Necessity

Modal Oecumenism

We want a theory of metaphysical modality to answer at least two sets of questions: and Attempts to answer these questions have led many contemporary metaphysicians to surprising and strange ontological beliefs. David Lewis thinks the best combined answer to the foundational and structural questions requires a pluriverse of concrete worlds.1 Timothy Williamson thinks that the Barcan formulas are logical truths and that every object necessarily exists.2 Even the characteristically levelheaded Alvin Plantinga thinks the best unified answer to the two questions will require surprising belief in a host of uninstantiated individual essences – one for every merely possible object.3 If Brian Leftow’s right, these modal theories are not just controversial, they are downright heretical … in the traditional sense of the term. These theories – and seemingly every other popular modal metaphysics of recent decades – require postulating objects, properties, worlds or propositions that float free of God: concrete worlds (for Lewis), non-concrete necessary existents (for Williamson) and sets of propositions and individual essences (for Plantinga). Because of these ontological requirements, they threaten a core tenet of the major Abrahamic religions, namely that God is the ultimate source of everything. In God and Necessity, Leftow develops this worry about ultimacy and responds by developing an alternative theory of modality.4 In Leftow’s theory, God’s power and will play a central role in answering the foundational and structural questions.

The Method of Perfect Being Theology

How might this formula help us to decide questions about the divine attributes? A plausible answer to this question, which is employed in many discussions of the divine attributes, is that we can decide between rival incompatible hypotheses about God by asking which hypothesis would make God greater. Given that God is the greatest possible being, it seems, we can at least rule out the hypothesis which would accord God the lower level of greatness. One finds this line of thought, in various guises, all over contemporary philosophical theology. Murray and Rea, I think, state the orthodox view when they say that the Anselmian formula “provide[s] us with a rule or recipe for developing a more specific conception of God.”1 The aim of this paper is to raise some questions about the argumentative strategy informally sketched above, and hence about the idea that perfect being theology provides anything like a satisfactory recipe for answering questions about the divine attributes. In doing so I won’t challenge the truth of [GPB] — I think that it is true — but only the idea that it can play the envisaged role in philosophical theology. The paper has three parts. In the first, I examine the version of this argumentative strategy which has recently been defended at length by Brian Leftow.2 Leftow, I think, succeeds in making explicit the method which has been implicit in many recent discussions of the divine attributes. I’ll argue that this method fails. In the second section, I’ll ask whether Leftow’s method can be fixed if we rely, not on the claim that God is the greatest possible being, but on the claim that God is the greatest conceivable being. I’ll argue that it cannot. In the last section, I turn to the question of how Leftow’s

A-Time Beats No Time. A Response to Brian Leftow

In this paper, I present a new argument against the compatibility of human free will and divine timelessness when conceiving of eternity in terms of an additional dimension as presented by brian leftow. The paper is organized as follows: After giving a brief sketch of leftow’s model, I argue that assuming libertarianism, free will presupposes presentism, since metaphysical indeterminism is only compatible with a presentist A-theory of physical time. Given this result, I make a case for the incompatibility of presentism and divine eternity modelled as a frame of reference, implying the incompatibility of the latter with human free will.

God and Necessity, by Brian Leftow

God and Necessity, by Brian Leftow

Splitting the Horns of Euthyphro's Modal Relative

There is a modal relative of Euthyphro’s dilemma that goes like this: are necessary truths true because God affirms them, or does God affirm them because they’re true? If you accept the first horn, necessary truths are as contingent as God’s free will. If you accept the second, God is less ultimate than the modal ontology that establishes certain truths as necessary. If you try to split the horns by affirming that necessary truths are somehow grounded in God’s nature, Brian Leftow meets you with an argument. I will argue that Leftow’s argument fails and that, contrary to his argument, there is a good reason to believe that necessary truths are grounded in God’s nature.

In defence of logical nominalism: reply to Leftow

AbstractThis paper defends (especially in response to Brian Leftow's recent attack) logical nominalism, the thesis that logically necessary truth belongs primarily to sentences and depends solely on the conventions of human language. A sentence is logically necessary (that is, a priori metaphysically necessary) iff its negation entails a contradiction. A sentence is a posteriori metaphysically necessary iff it reduces to a logical necessity when we substitute for rigid designators of objects or properties canonical descriptions of the essential properties of those objects or properties. The truth-conditions of necessary sentences are not to be found in any transcendent reality, such as God's thoughts. ‘There is a God’ is neither a priori nor a posteriori metaphysically necessary; God is necessary in the sense that His existence is not causally contingent on anything else.

Jesus and philosophy: new essays

Introduction: Jesus and philosophy Paul K. Moser Part I. Jesus in His First-Century Context: 1. Jesus: sources and self-understanding Craig A. Evans 2. Sipping from the cup of wisdom James L. Crenshaw 3. The Jesus of the Gospels and philosophy Luke T. Johnson 4. Paul, the mind of Christ, and philosophy Paul W. Gooch Part II. Jesus in Medieval Philosophy: 5. Jesus and Augustine Gareth B. Matthews 6. Jesus and Aquinas Brian Leftow Part III. Jesus in Contemporary Philosophy: 7. The epistemology of Jesus: an initial investigation William J. Abraham 8. Paul Ricoeur: a biblical philosopher on Jesus David F. Ford 9. Jesus and forgiveness Nicholas Wolterstorff 10. Jesus Christ and the meaning of life Charles Taliaferro.

THE COMPOSITIONAL ACCOUNT OF THE INCARNATION

In a pair of recent articles, Brian Left ow and Eleonore Stump off er independent, although similar, accounts of the metaphysics of the Incarnation. Both believe that their Aquinas-inspired theories can off er solutions to the kind of Leibniz’s Law problems that can seem to threaten the logical possibility of this traditional Christian doctrine. In this paper, I’ll have a look at their compositional account of the nature of God incarnate. In the end, I believe their position can be seen to have unacceptable philosophical and theological implications, and that is it inadequate to solve the Leibniz’s law problems that motivate it in the fi rst place.