Breakdown Of Cooperation Research Articles

The CERN Community; A Mechanism for Effective Global Collaboration?

AbstractGridlock is a term to describe the breakdown in cooperation of countries in international institutions to address policy problems that span borders; it refers both to deadlock in existing organisations and the difficulty of countries to come to new agreements as issues arise. Global science mega‐projects and their communities have seemingly been remarkably effective in evolving complex processes and mechanisms to enable collaboration. Previous research into CERN has focused on recounting the stories of CERN's scientific feats and technical innovations. This research has investigated the reasons behind these triumphs from a social sciences’ perspective to see why it is an exemplar of organisational success. The CERN communities’ governance and leadership regimes are examined. Extensive field work has added insights into two themes that emerge from the literature: the primacy of the state and the employment of combined routes through and beyond gridlock. Through exercising consensual governance with its Member States to manage multi‐polarity and using a light leadership approach with collaborative partners and international staff, CERN consistently achieves outstanding results. This research contributes to the global gridlock debate by being part of the examination of pathways and mechanisms in successful international collaborations.

Abstract 203: Regenerable altruism drives chemotolerance in clonal cancer cells

Abstract Introduction: Cancer is thought to represent a breakdown of multicellular cooperation and reversion to Darwinian dynamics characterized principally by self-interested competition. However, there is increasing evidence that cancer cells can behave as communities, manifesting social behaviors that influence cancer progression. Methods: Circulating tumor cells enrichment, microRNA extraction, qRT-PCR, MTS assays, RNA in situ hybridization, immunohistochemical staining, SILAC-based mass spectrometry, flow cytometry, ChIP-sequencing, and western blotting. Results: We report here evidences of altruistic cooperation in clonal breast cancer cells. Heterogeneity in expression of a microRNA, miR-125b, leads to sectoring of clonal breast cancer cell populations into minority miR-125b-high and majority miR-125b-low subpopulations. Enhanced population-wide tolerance to taxane-based chemotherapy is mediated by the miR-125b-high minority, in part through increased secretion of extracellular public goods such as insulin-like growth factor binding protein 2 (IGFBP2) and chemokine (C-C motif) ligand 28 (CCL28). Cost-benefit analysis established this helping behavior to be altruistic, as survival benefits conferred to the miR-125b-low cells, via public goods sharing, occurred at a fitness cost to the miR-125b-high cells. Notwithstanding this fitness cost, miR-125b-high altruists regenerate readily from isolated populations of miR-125b-low defectors, via Kruppel-like factor 2-mediated epigenetic mechanism of histone deacetylation. As therapeutic proof-of-principle, we demonstrated that targeting extracellular IGFBP2 and CCL28, through ligand neutralization, markedly blunted the tolerance response of cancer cells towards taxane chemotherapy. Conclusions: Our results demonstrate how positive social engagement such as altruism may be employed by heterogeneous clonal cancer communities to drive chemotolerance, and understanding of such social behaviors could help formulate more effective treatment strategies. Citation Format: Kee Wah Lee, Muhammad Sufyan Masroni, Karen Meiling Tan, Mo-Huang Li, Lihan Zhou, Steven Tucker, Lynette Su Mien Ngo, Chan Fong Chang, Boon Huat Bay, Soo Yong Tan, Mikael Hartman, Huiwen Chua, Tze Ping Loh, Thomas Putti, Sai Mun Leong, Evelyn Siew-Chuan Koay. Regenerable altruism drives chemotolerance in clonal cancer cells [abstract]. In: Proceedings of the American Association for Cancer Research Annual Meeting 2018; 2018 Apr 14-18; Chicago, IL. Philadelphia (PA): AACR; Cancer Res 2018;78(13 Suppl):Abstract nr 203.

The Future of Offshore Dollar Creation: Four Scenarios for the International Monetary System by 2040

In order to sketch the possibility space for the future setup of the International Monetary System (IMS), this paper develops four different scenarios that outline potential outcomes of the IMS’s evolution by 2040. These scenarios derive from the analytical exercise of adopting a Money View perspective of today’s institutional shape of the IMS. The paper argues that the IMS’s current setup crucially relies on the supply of US Dollar-denominated credit money forms issued by private and public institutions outside the United States — through Eurodollar deposits, central bank swaps as well as ‘shadow money forms’ created by non-banks such as overnight repurchase agreements, money market fund shares and foreign exchange swaps. As this ‘realm’ of offshore dollar creation forms the heart of the present IMS, the four scenarios project potential institutional developments in coming decades following different trajectories. The Continued Dollar Hegemony scenario depicts the sustained dominance of private international money creation via offshore dollars within the Pax Americana. The Competing Monetary Blocs scenario envisions the US, the EU, and China as three gravitational centers with private international money creation in the blocs’ peripheries via offshore dollars, offshore euros and offshore renminbi. In the International Monetary Federation scenario, countries have created a strong publicly organized IMS, comprising a multilateral framework of one international and several regional clearing unions, based upon Keynes’ ideas for an International Clearing Union. Finally, the International Monetary Anarchy scenario entails the post-crisis emergence of a non-system with a substantial breakdown of public and private international monetary cooperation and creation. This discussion paper is the first in a series of two complementary pieces on the past, present and possible futures of the International Monetary System. It is based on the theoretical and historical foundations developed in the paper “Offshore Dollar Creation and the Emergence of the Post-2008 International Monetary System”, authored by Steffen Murau (https://ssrn.com/abstract=3191981).

UNIVERSALISM AND THE VALUE OF POLITICAL POWER

AbstractAlthough legislatures typically use majority rule to allocate a budget in distributive legislation, unanimous consent over the broad allocation of benefits is pervasive. I develop a game‐theoretic model where members strategically interact in a universal coalition to determine allocations, with noncooperative bargaining as a threat point for the breakdown of cooperation. To quantify the effects of political power on the agreed‐upon allocation, I structurally estimate the model using the “Bridge Bill Capital Budget” in 1992. I find that 16.73% of the budget would be allocated differently if allocations were determined only based on actual needs.

Symbiont switching and alternative resource acquisition strategies drive mutualism breakdown

Cooperative interactions among species, termed mutualisms, have played a crucial role in the evolution of life on Earth. However, despite key potential benefits to partners, there are many cases in which two species cease to cooperate and mutualisms break down. What factors drive the evolutionary breakdown of mutualism? We examined the pathways toward breakdowns of the mutualism between plants and arbuscular mycorrhizal fungi. By using a comparative approach, we identify ∼25 independent cases of complete mutualism breakdown across global seed plants. We found that breakdown of cooperation was only stable when host plants (i) partner with other root symbionts or (ii) evolve alternative resource acquisition strategies. Our results suggest that key mutualistic services are only permanently lost if hosts evolve alternative symbioses or adaptations.

Ecological suicide in microbes.

The growth and survival of organisms often depend on interactions between them. In many cases, these interactions are positive and caused by a cooperative modification of the environment. Examples are the cooperative breakdown of complex nutrients in microbes or the construction of elaborate architectures in social insects, where the individual profits from the collective actions of her peers. However, organisms can similarly display negative interactions by changing the environment in ways that are detrimental for them, for example by resource depletion or the production of toxic byproducts. Here we find an extreme type of negative interactions, in which Paenibacillus sp. bacteria modify the environmental pH to such a degree that it leads to a rapid extinction of the whole population, a phenomenon we call ecological suicide. Modification of the pH is more pronounced at higher population densities, and thus ecological suicide is more likely with increasing bacterial density. Correspondingly, promoting bacterial growth can drive populations extinct whereas inhibiting bacterial growth by the addition of harmful substances – like antibiotics – can rescue them. Moreover, ecological suicide can cause oscillatory dynamics, even in single-species populations. We find ecological suicide in a wide variety of microbes, suggesting that it could play a significant role in microbial ecology and evolution.

A model of risk and mental state shifts during social interaction.

Cooperation and competition between human players in repeated microeconomic games offer a window onto social phenomena such as the establishment, breakdown and repair of trust. However, although a suitable starting point for the quantitative analysis of such games exists, namely the Interactive Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (I-POMDP), computational considerations and structural limitations have limited its application, and left unmodelled critical features of behavior in a canonical trust task. Here, we provide the first analysis of two central phenomena: a form of social risk-aversion exhibited by the player who is in control of the interaction in the game; and irritation or anger, potentially exhibited by both players. Irritation arises when partners apparently defect, and it potentially causes a precipitate breakdown in cooperation. Failing to model one’s partner’s propensity for it leads to substantial economic inefficiency. We illustrate these behaviours using evidence drawn from the play of large cohorts of healthy volunteers and patients. We show that for both cohorts, a particular subtype of player is largely responsible for the breakdown of trust, a finding which sheds new light on borderline personality disorder.

Principles for Post-War International Economic Cooperation

At the close of the Second World War, American officials, in concert with their allies in the United Kingdom and elsewhere, set out to remake the machinery of international commerce. They did so not as naive globalists, but as desperate realists – realists who had survived the Great Depression and the second great war of the century. In designing the framework that would govern post-war international economic policy, American leaders and technocrats adhered to a set of essential principles. These principles had emerged from their hard-earned experience during the breakdown of global cooperation in the interwar years and the staggering bloodshed of the war itself. A careful review of the substance of negotiations over the formation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and political communications by US officials in support of those institutions – including essays, speeches, and testimony before Congress – suggests a set of vital and, perhaps, enduring principles that won the day: multilateral coordination, liberalization, mutual benefit-mutual responsibility, and economy = security. To American leaders these principles were abundantly evident. Their task was to persuade their domestic and international peers of the necessity of these principles and to put them into action. Ultimately they created a set of interlocking multilateral institutions to facilitate global commerce and global peace.

Cancer and intercellular cooperation.

The major transitions approach in evolutionary biology has shown that the intercellular cooperation that characterizes multicellular organisms would never have emerged without some kind of multilevel selection. Relying on this view, the Evolutionary Somatic view of cancer considers cancer as a breakdown of intercellular cooperation and as a loss of the balance between selection processes that take place at different levels of organization (particularly single cell and individual organism). This seems an elegant unifying framework for healthy organism, carcinogenesis, tumour proliferation, metastasis and other phenomena such as ageing. However, the gene-centric version of Darwinian evolution, which is often adopted in cancer research, runs into empirical problems: proto-tumoural and tumoural features in precancerous cells that would undergo ‘natural selection’ have proved hard to demonstrate; cells are radically context-dependent, and some stages of cancer are poorly related to genetic change. Recent perspectives propose that breakdown of intercellular cooperation could depend on ‘fields’ and other higher-level phenomena, and could be even mutations independent. Indeed, the field would be the context, allowing (or preventing) genetic mutations to undergo an intra-organism process analogous to natural selection. The complexities surrounding somatic evolution call for integration between multiple incomplete frameworks for interpreting intercellular cooperation and its pathologies.

Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma*

Abstract More than half a century after the first experiment on the finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma, evidence on whether cooperation decreases with experience—as suggested by backward induction—remains inconclusive. This article provides a meta-analysis of prior experimental research and reports the results of a new experiment to elucidate how cooperation varies with the environment in this canonical game. We describe forces that affect initial play (formation of cooperation) and unraveling (breakdown of cooperation). First, contrary to the backward induction prediction, the parameters of the repeated game have a significant effect on initial cooperation. We identify how these parameters impact the value of cooperation—as captured by the size of the basin of attraction of always defect—to account for an important part of this effect. Second, despite these initial differences, the evolution of behavior is consistent with the unraveling logic of backward induction for all parameter combinations. Importantly, despite the seemingly contradictory results across studies, this article establishes a systematic pattern of behavior: subjects converge to use threshold strategies that conditionally cooperate until a threshold round; conditional on establishing cooperation, the first defection round moves earlier with experience. Simulation results generated from a learning model estimated at the subject level provide insights into the long-term dynamics and the forces that slow down the unraveling of cooperation.

Guilty repair sustains cooperation, angry retaliation destroys it

Sustained cooperative social interactions are key to successful outcomes in many real-world contexts (e.g., climate change and energy conservation). We explore the self-regulatory roles of anger and guilt, as well as prosocial or selfish social preferences in a repeated social dilemma game framed around shared electricity use at home. We explore the proposal that for sustained cooperation, guilty repair needs to override angry retaliation. We show that anger is damaging to cooperation as it leads to retaliation and an increase of defection, while, through guilt, cooperation is repaired resulting in higher levels of cooperation. We demonstrate a disconnect between the experience of anger and subsequent retaliation which is a function of participants’ social preferences. While there is no difference in reports of anger between prosocial and selfish individuals after finding out that others use more energy from the communal resource, prosocials are less likely to act on their anger and retaliate. Selfish individuals are motivated by anger to retaliate but not motivated by guilt to repair and contribute disproportionately to the breakdown of cooperation over repeated interactions. We suggest that guilt is a key emotion to appeal to when encouraging cooperation.

Does high relatedness promote cheater-free multicellularity in synthetic lifecycles?

The evolution of multicellularity is one of the key transitions in evolution and requires extreme levels of cooperation between cells. However, even when cells are genetically identical, noncooperative cheating mutants can arise that cause a breakdown in cooperation. How then, do multicellular organisms maintain cooperation between cells? A number of mechanisms that increase relatedness amongst cooperative cells have been implicated in the maintenance of cooperative multicellularity including single-cell bottlenecks and kin recognition. In this study, we explore how relatively simple biological processes such as growth and dispersal can act to increase relatedness and promote multicellular cooperation. Using experimental populations of pseudo-organisms, we found that manipulating growth and dispersal of clones of a social amoeba to create high levels of relatedness was sufficient to prevent the spread of cheating mutants. By contrast, cheaters were able to spread under low-relatedness conditions. Most surprisingly, we saw the largest increase in cheating mutants under an experimental treatment that should create intermediate levels of relatedness. This is because one of the factors raising relatedness, structured growth, also causes high vulnerability to growth rate cheaters.

Offensive Patent Portfolio Races

In a patent portfolio race, firms attempt to assemble a large collection of patents. Traditional explanations for patent portfolio races rest on an assumption of fragmented patent ownership where multiple unknown firms employ defensive strategies to forestall holdup. However, patent portfolio races can be observed when patent ownership is concentrated to the hands of a few firms. To explore patent portfolio races under conditions of concentrated ownership we turn to the newspaper printing machine industry, an industry characterized by a few dominant firms. Using multiple sources e patent analysis, archival data, and interviews e we identify antecedents to a phenomenon we label offensive patent portfolio races. Contrary to received wisdom, we find that patent portfolio races can be offensive, aimed at gaining rather than avoiding loss of competitive advantage. Offensive patent portfolio races hinge on the breakdown of cooperation e triggered by changes in the perceived benefits, effectiveness, and/or costs of patents, partly mediated by the adoption of a gain frame towards increased patenting, and regulated by the potential losses from further increases. We explain the behavior by invoking the folk theorem in game theory and conclude that while triggering offensive patent portfolio races may yield temporary advantages, managers are advised to tread carefully as offensive patent portfolio races may have severe implications for the effectiveness and efficiency of the innovation process.

The Baltic Sea region and increasing international tension

For many years, the Baltic Sea region stood out for its remarkable stability. The dramatic changes following the end of the Cold War did not have a profound effect on the territory. However, Russia's cooperation with other states in the Baltic Sea region began to lose momentum. This paper discusses the negative effects of the Ukrainian and Syrian crises and the increasing tension between Russia and other countries in the Baltic Sea region. In the short term, these trends are unlikely to reverse. Of the two possible scenarios — suspending relations until a solution to the political and military problems is found or trying to make use of every opportunity in economy, culture, science, education, etc., — the latter is preferable. A breakdown in regional cooperation will weaken Russia’s position. However, gaining positive momentum may prove instrumental in overcoming the confrontation between Russia and the West in the future.

Social identity, cross-cutting cleavages, and explaining the breakdown of interethnic cooperation

This article expands upon Fearon and Laitin’s seminal Explaining Interethnic Cooperation, a paper that formalized an explanation for how ethnic groups achieve cooperation through the use of in-group policing strategies that yield a more stable and substantively convincing equilibrium than tit-for-tat (spiral) reprisals by each side. This article expands the Fearon and Laitin framework in two ways. First, it generalizes their basic framework of two equally sized groups to an arbitrary number of arbitrarily sized groups. Second, the article expands the framework to allow for multiple interacting dimensions of identity. The paper uses this generalized framework to endogenize social identity into the formal model using a global games approach, in which there is uncertainty over which stage game will be played based on which dimension of identity is triggered by context.

Interbranch cooperation and the shadow of the future

Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD) experiments confirm and extend Axelrod’s (The evolution of cooperation. Basic Books, New York, 1984) Shadow of the Future hypothesis: subjects cooperate in infinitely repeated PD, but they also cooperate until near the end in finitely repeated PD. So the extended hypothesis is that cooperation depends on the probability of continued play. Observational tests of this hypothesis, or even applications, have been rare at best. Here we not only apply but test it for interbranch cooperation under separated-powers constitutions, specifically those of the American states, using the end of governors’ final terms as end points and the rate of overridden vetoes as the extreme case of a breakdown in interbranch cooperation. Controlling for a variety of factors, including divided government, we find support for the hypothesis, whose explanation of interbranch interaction fills a gap left open by Madison’s Federalist 51: how republican government can control itself when what is needed is “energy” more than safeguards.

Repeat proteins challenge the concept of structural domains

Structural domains are believed to be modules within proteins that can fold and function independently. Some proteins show tandem repetitions of apparent modular structure that do not fold independently, but rather co-operate in stabilizing structural forms that comprise several repeat-units. For many natural repeat-proteins, it has been shown that weak energetic links between repeats lead to the breakdown of co-operativity and the appearance of folding sub-domains within an apparently regular repeat array. The quasi-1D architecture of repeat-proteins is crucial in detailing how the local energetic balances can modulate the folding dynamics of these proteins, which can be related to the physiological behaviour of these ubiquitous biological systems.

Cancer across the tree of life: cooperation and cheating in multicellularity.

Multicellularity is characterized by cooperation among cells for the development, maintenance and reproduction of the multicellular organism. Cancer can be viewed as cheating within this cooperative multicellular system. Complex multicellularity, and the cooperation underlying it, has evolved independently multiple times. We review the existing literature on cancer and cancer-like phenomena across life, not only focusing on complex multicellularity but also reviewing cancer-like phenomena across the tree of life more broadly. We find that cancer is characterized by a breakdown of the central features of cooperation that characterize multicellularity, including cheating in proliferation inhibition, cell death, division of labour, resource allocation and extracellular environment maintenance (which we term the five foundations of multicellularity). Cheating on division of labour, exhibited by a lack of differentiation and disorganized cell masses, has been observed in all forms of multicellularity. This suggests that deregulation of differentiation is a fundamental and universal aspect of carcinogenesis that may be underappreciated in cancer biology. Understanding cancer as a breakdown of multicellular cooperation provides novel insights into cancer hallmarks and suggests a set of assays and biomarkers that can be applied across species and characterize the fundamental requirements for generating a cancer.

Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma

More than half a century after the first experiment on the finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma, evidence on whether cooperation decreases with experience, as suggested by backward induction, remains inconclusive. This paper provides a meta-analysis of prior experimental research and reports the results of a new experiment to elucidate how cooperation varies with the environment in this canonical game. We describe forces that affect initial play (formation of cooperation) and unraveling (breakdown of cooperation). First, contrary to the backward induction prediction, the parameters of the repeated game have a significant effect on initial cooperation. We identify how these parameters impact the value of cooperation — as captured by the size of the basin of attraction of Always Defect — to account for an important part of this effect. Second, despite these initial differences, the evolution of behavior is consistent with the unraveling logic of backward induction for all parameter combinations. Importantly, despite the seemingly contradictory results across studies, the paper establishes a systematic pattern of behavior: Subjects converge to using threshold strategies that conditionally cooperate until a threshold round; and conditional on establishing cooperation, the first defection round moves earlier with experience. Simulation results generated from a learning model estimated at the subject level provide insights on the long-term dynamics and the forces slowing down the unraveling of cooperation.

The excuse principle can maintain cooperation through forgivable defection in the Prisoner's Dilemma game

Reciprocal altruism describes a situation in which an organism acts in a manner that temporarily reduces its fitness while increasing another organism's fitness, but there is an ultimate fitness benefit based on an expectation that the other organism will act in a similar manner at a later time. It creates the obvious dilemma in which there is always a short-term benefit to cheating, therefore cooperating individuals must avoid being exploited by non-cooperating cheaters. This is achieved by following various decision rules, usually variants of the tit-for-tat (TFT) strategy. The strength of TFT, however, is also its weakness-mistakes in implementation or interpretation of moves, or the inability to cooperate, lead to a permanent breakdown in cooperation. We show that pied flycatchers (Ficedula hypoleuca) use a TFT with an embedded 'excuse principle' to forgive the neighbours that were perceived as unable to cooperate during mobbing of predators. The excuse principle dramatically increases the stability of TFT-like behavioural strategies within the Prisoner's Dilemma game.