Breakdown Of Cooperation Research Articles

Arctic cooperation with Russia: at what price?

Abstract After February 2022, it seemed that a breakdown of political, economic and scientific cooperation in the Arctic would be one of the many examples of collateral damage from Russia's war of aggression in Ukraine. Two years on from the invasion, however, the Arctic 7 (the United States, Canada and the Nordic countries) have renewed their engagement with Russia on polar issues. The Arctic Council has emerged as the exceptional case of a regional body in which Russia and NATO nations continue to collaborate, albeit at a more limited level through the working groups. This article examines the dilemmas facing the Arctic 7 as they seek to balance a values-based policy and strong stance against Russia in solidarity with Ukraine, with a desire to ensure the continuing survival of the Arctic Council and its primacy in regional governance. We argue that Russia has sought to weaponize the Council—withholding vital climate data and threatening to bring China further into regional politics—as part of a wider strategy of coercive diplomacy and hybrid threats in the Arctic. The Arctic 7 should recognize that they ultimately stand to lose more from giving into Russian tactics than from freezing Moscow out of the Arctic Council while the war in Ukraine continues.

Cooperation under the shadow of political inequality

We study cooperation among individuals and groups facing a dynamic social dilemma in which the benefits of cooperation are divided according to political power obtained in a contest. The main theoretical and experimental results focus on the role of the incumbency advantage. Specifically, an incumbency advantage in the political contest leads to a rapid breakdown of cooperation in the social dilemma. In addition, we investigate whether groups behave differently than individuals and provide simulations based on the individual evolutionary learning model of Arifovic and Ledyard (2012) to shed light on the difference observed in the experiment.

Consequences of the war in Ukraine on the Arctic: an analysis of post-conflict macro-scenarios

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has opened a Pandora’s box with certain global consequences. From the beginning of the invasion, the first effects on government, research and economic activities also appeared. This conflict has radically changed the dynamics of security in the Arctic. The deterioration, unprecedented since the end of the Cold War, in relations between Russia and the West has meant that cooperation between the two blocs has also disappeared in the main and perhaps the only region of the globe still spared from political tensions.The outbreak of the conflict led to a breakdown in cooperation and an escalation of military tensions in the Arctic. How these disputes end will be decisive in determining the Arctic region’s future political and strategic balances.The seven remaining Arctic states denounced Russia’s operation in Ukraine from the start, thus suspending all activities related to the Arctic Council. This is an immediate consequence and it indicates rapid and challenging changes for Arctic governance.

India’s Security and Climate Policy: Navigating the China Challenge

In a world rich in climate knowledge but short on climate action, it is important to understand the political reasons behind the apparent failure of states to address this planetary crisis. One underexplored dimension of this phenomenon is the impact of broader geopolitics and rivalry, in specific the ability and willingness of potential and actual security and economic rivals to leave their contention at the gates of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). This article focuses on India’s multifaceted approach to its ‘China challenge’ with and outside the climate regime. While conventional scholarship focuses on the security and economic dimensions of this rivalry, this study offers a distinct perspective that examines whether this rivalry might lead to a breakdown of cooperation and an increased potential for conflict and weaponisation of seemingly disconnected issue areas. Drawing on a comprehensive triangulation of policy documents, government statements and scholarly literature, this article evaluates the domestic and international factors shaping India’s climate-related China policies, including the countries’ unique economic ambitions, development imperatives, energy needs and global climate commitments. Furthermore, the article examines Sino-Indian interactions in international arenas such as the UNFCCC and Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (BRICS), and how these interactions influence global climate governance.

The Impact of Cognitive Load on Cooperation and Antisocial Punishment: Insights from a Public Goods Game Experiment.

This paper investigates the impact of cognitive load on the formation and maintenance of cooperation within a public goods game experiment featuring a punishment option. By integrating the experimental designs of prior studies and manipulating cognitive load through the memorization of numbers with varying digits, we reveal that high cognitive load accelerates the breakdown of cooperation, irrespective of the presence of a punishment system. Furthermore, under high cognitive load, participants are more likely to engage in antisocial punishment, while the punishment of free riders remains unaffected. These findings suggest that increased cognitive load depletes the cognitive resources needed for deliberative decision-making, leading to a higher propensity for antisocial punishment. Our study contributes to the literature by demonstrating the significant influence of cognitive load on cooperative behavior and providing new insights into the causes of antisocial punishment.

Evolution of cooperation in the indefinitely repeated collective action with a contest for power

AbstractSocial and political inequality among individuals is a common driving force behind the breakdown in cooperation. In this paper, we theoretically and experimentally study cooperation among individuals facing a sequence of collective-action problems in which the benefits of cooperation are divided according to political power that is obtained through a contest. We have three main results. First, we find that cooperation predictably responds to the fundamental parameters of the collective-action problem. Specifically, it is increasing in the benefit to cooperation and how much benefit is gained from partial group cooperation, and decreasing in the number of players. Second, we find that when players are unrestricted in their expenditures in the contest, cooperation is much lower than when expenditures are set to a specific proportion of earnings. Finally, we find that individual norms and beliefs account for a substantial proportion of explained variance in individuals’ decisions to cooperate.

Distributed cooperation optimization of multi-microgrids under grid tariff uncertainty: A nash bargaining game approach with cheating behaviors

Multi-microgrid system (MMGs) has drawn extensive attention recently because of its high energy efficiency. However, MMGs’ operational efficiency can be affected by market price fluctuations and intermittent renewable energy. This paper proposes an energy-sharing model based on the Nash bargaining game between multi-microgrids. The proposed model provides a robust energy trading schedule to deal with uncertainties brought by grid tariffs and renewable energy. To ensure the model is tractable, the original game problem is equivalently converted into a system benefit maximization subproblem and an additional profit distribution subproblem to get optimal energy sharing power and prices. In addition, microgrid has the motivation to cheat for maximizing its benefits which may lead to the breakdown of cooperation. Furthermore, cheating behaviors in energy transaction are analyzed; the energy sharing scheme based on cheating equilibrium is derived by proposing an intermediary transaction mode. Finally, the alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM) is used to protect the players’ privacies in a distributed way. Simulation results show that the proposed model can realize stable cooperation, effectively reduce operating costs and immunize against multiple uncertainties and cheating behaviors.

Российско-германское сотрудничество в сфере энергетики: смена парадигмы и ее экономические и политические последствия для ФРГ

The article analyzes the economic and political consequences for Germany of the essentially total breakdown of Russia-Germany cooperation on energy. The author notes that the breakdown jeopardizes Germany’s entire contemporary economic model built around imports of cheap Russian energy resources and makes the country increasingly dependent on the US and other exporters of hydrocarbons to keep its economy afloat. Special attention is given to political consequences of the crisis, including emerging geopolitical and domestic issues. The West consolidation to counter Russia and, further out in time China, is forcing Germany to sacrifice pragmatic defense of its national priorities in favor of the West’s ideological interests. Domestic consequences of the disrupted Russia-Germany energy cooperation include dissent growing within and among the political parties that make up the ruling coalition; deteriorating public approval of the federal government; increasing likelihood of dramatic changes in Germany’s Party system; and intensifying protests instigated by right-wing extremists in the East Germany States.

Group Formation and the Evolution of Human Social Organization

Humans operate in groups that are oftentimes nested in multilayered collectives such as work units within departments and companies, neighborhoods within cities, and regions within nation states. With psychological science mostly focusing on proximate reasons for individuals to join existing groups and how existing groups function, we still poorly understand why groups form ex nihilo, how groups evolve into complex multilayered social structures, and what explains fission–fusion dynamics. Here we address group formation and the evolution of social organization at both the proximate and ultimate level of analysis. Building on models of fitness interdependence and cooperation, we propose that socioecologies can create positive interdependencies among strangers and pave the way for the formation of stable coalitions and groups through reciprocity and reputation-based partner selection. Such groups are marked by in-group bounded, parochial cooperation together with an array of social institutions for managing the commons, allowing groups to scale in size and complexity while avoiding the breakdown of cooperation. Our analysis reveals how distinct group cultures can endogenously emerge from reciprocal cooperation, shows that social identification and group commitment are likely consequences rather than causes of group cooperation, and explains when intergroup relations gravitate toward peaceful coexistence, integration, or conflict.

Small bots, big impact: solving the conundrum of cooperation in optional Prisoner's Dilemma game through simple strategies.

Cooperation plays a crucial role in both nature and human society, and the conundrum of cooperation attracts the attention from interdisciplinary research. In this study, we investigated the evolution of cooperation in optional Prisoner's Dilemma games by introducing simple bots. We focused on one-shot and anonymous games, where the bots could be programmed to always cooperate, always defect, never participate or choose each action with equal probability. Our results show that cooperative bots facilitate the emergence of cooperation among ordinary players in both well-mixed populations and a regular lattice under weak imitation scenarios. Introducing loner bots has no impact on the emergence of cooperation in well-mixed populations, but it facilitates the dominance of cooperation in regular lattices under strong imitation scenarios. However, too many loner bots on a regular lattice inhibit the spread of cooperation and can eventually result in a breakdown of cooperation. Our findings emphasize the significance of bot design in promoting cooperation and offer useful insights for encouraging cooperation in real-world scenarios.

Shifts from cooperative to individual-based predation defense determine microbial predator-prey dynamics

Predation defense is an important feature of predator-prey interactions adding complexity to ecosystem dynamics. Prey organisms have developed various strategies to escape predation which differ in mode (elude vs. attack), reversibility (inducible vs. permanent), and scope (individual vs. cooperative defenses). While the mechanisms and controls of many singular defenses are well understood, important ecological and evolutionary facets impacting long-term predator-prey dynamics remain underexplored. This pertains especially to trade-offs and interactions between alternative defenses occurring in prey populations evolving under predation pressure. Here, we explored the dynamics of a microbial predator-prey system consisting of bacterivorous flagellates (Poteriospumella lacustris) feeding on Pseudomonas putida. Within five weeks of co-cultivation corresponding to about 35 predator generations, we observed a consistent succession of bacterial defenses in all replicates (n = 16). Initially, bacteria expressed a highly effective cooperative defense based on toxic metabolites, which brought predators close to extinction. This initial strategy, however, was consistently superseded by a second mechanism of predation defense emerging via de novo mutations. Combining experiments with mathematical modeling, we demonstrate how this succession of defenses is driven by the maximization of individual rather than population benefits, highlighting the role of rapid evolution in the breakdown of social cooperation.

The Elusive Gains from Nationally Oriented Monetary Policy

The consensus in the recent literature is that the gains from international monetary cooperation are negligible, and so are the costs of a breakdown in cooperation. However, when assessed conditionally on empirically-relevant dynamic developments of the economy, the welfare cost of moving away from regimes of explicit or implicit cooperation may rise to multiple times the cost of economic fluctuations. In economies with incomplete markets, the incentives to act non-cooperatively are driven by the emergence of global imbalances, i.e., large net-foreign-asset positions; and, in economies with complete markets, by divergent real wages.

Institutional resilience: how the formal legal system sustains informal cooperation

Abstract This paper introduces the concept of institutional resilience based on a population game. Agents in an economy are randomly matched to play a coordination game with two strategies, cooperate and defect. A breach of contract can be adjudicated in court. Agents can update their strategy, which is modelled using the replicator dynamic. In this context, cooperation is defined as the informal institution, whereas the legal system (contract law) constitutes the formal institution. Institutional resilience is defined by how the formal institution of a functioning legal system complements the informal institution of cooperation in a dynamic way. In the wake of an adverse exogenous shock, the formal institution can prevent a total breakdown of cooperation in the population.

Anticipatory Threat Mitigates the Breakdown of Group Cooperation

Humans are exposed to environmental and economic threats that can profoundly affect individual survival and group functioning. Although anecdotal evidence suggests that threat exposure can increase collective action, the effects of threat on decision-making have been mainly investigated at the individual level. Here we examine how threat exposure and concomitant physiological responses modulate cooperation in small groups. Individuals (N = 105, ages 18–34 years) in groups of three were exposed to threat of electric shocks while deciding how much to contribute to a public good. Threat of shock induced a state of physiological freezing and, compared with no-threat conditions, reduced free riding and enabled groups to maintain higher cooperation over time. Exploratory analyses revealed that more cooperative responses under threat were driven by stronger baseline prosociality, suggesting that habitual prosociality is reinforced under threat. The current results support the view that human groups respond to outside threat with increased cooperation.

Global Politico-Economic Dynamics during a Local Conflict: Reciprocal Patterns of Cooperation and Sanctions

Abstract Employing global daily news coverage on interactions between stakeholders in G20 countries, this research offers a near-real-time analysis of changing interaction patterns between Russia and other G20 economies after the onset of open military conflict. Building on an event study over eight months, further analyses of reciprocal response dynamics point to potentially costly short-term consequences of sanctions, such as the breakdown and diversion of international cooperation amongst major economies in a broader sense. Once such a reciprocal cooperation decay has set in, re-establishing international cooperation between major societal actors may take considerable time.

Российская наука в период санкций

After the Russian government announced a special military operation in Ukraine on February 24, Russia faced unprecedented sanctions pressure, which could not but affect the sphere of science and education. This paper touches on the problems and sudden changes that have affected Russian science, such as: shortages of equipment and components, the breakdown of international cooperation, and the "brain drain. Based on a summary of statements and statements by scientists, politicians, ministers, and officials representing Russian and foreign science, the impact of sanctions on domestic science is analyzed and potential options for developments are considered.

How not to interfere in another country's domestic politics

Abstract Foreign interference poses an increasing threat in the current tensions among major powers, given pervasive expectations regarding its strategic effects and low costs. Transborder operations seeking to undermine a government or reinforce it against opposition emerge as a safer alternative to forcible coercion. Such operations incorporate assistance to political groups and individuals within a target state aiming to reorient its foreign policy, weaken its capabilities or promote one's ideology. However, this article exposes their deficiencies. It indicates the low chances of proxies to establish their rule, the difficulties in converting such accomplishments into benefits for an interfering state, and the emotional grievances from unfulfilled expectations. By delegating responsibilities, an interfering state loosens its operational control. The article strongly warns against targeting major powers as they are hard to subvert and supply proxies with opportunities to defect. The record of Soviet assistance to the Chinese Communists reveals the negative repercussions of the seemingly successful interference. It is a rare instance where interference targeting a major power produced a change in its government. For several years the People's Republic of China remained a military ally and ideological disciple to Moscow, but these accomplishments were unsustainable. Soviet leverage dissipated as the Chinese Communists consolidated their rule, while disagreements over standing and past wrongs precipitated the breakdown of cooperation. Although the recent debates on interference emphasize anxiety over the technological transformations, this article focuses on fundamental political limitations, ensuring applicability of its lessons in spite of potential changes in means employed by interfering states.

A Criminological Study on Family Environmental Factors Affecting Child Sexual Abuse in Sri Lanka

Child sexual abuse is a serious crime prohibited by Sri Lankan criminal law, which is discussed under child abuse. There are various factors that contribute to the sexual abuse of children. This research has conducted a criminological study of the family environmental factors affecting child sexual abuse in Sri Lanka. The research was conducted in the Kalutara and Colombo districts of the Western Province and 228 sexually abused children were used as the main sample in 2015-2020. Two separate samples were also used for officers on duty with regard to parents and children from the victims. The data obtained from the research have been extensively analyzed quantitatively and qualitatively. 87% of victims of sexual abuse are girls. The majority of 42% represent the 15-17 category. 47% of the majority are victims of corruption. The boyfriend (42%) is responsible for most of the abuse. 33% of victims have been sexually abused in their own home and 32% in the home of the abuser. Family vulnerabilities such as family economic difficulties, parental ignorance, extramarital affairs, single parent family, parental separation, family disputes, parental emigration, paternal and drug abuse, various physical and mental disorders of the parents, family moral decline, and breakdown of parent-child cooperation And various problems of children, problems in the social environment can be identified as factors contributing to sexual abuse. A child faces many problems when he or she is sexually abused. This physical, mental and social impact is detrimental not only to the child affected but also to his family, society and the country as a whole. It can be pointed out that an integrated approach is more effective in controlling and preventing child sexual abuse.

Early exclusion leads to cyclical cooperation in repeated group interactions.

Explaining the emergence and maintenance of cooperation among selfish individuals from an evolutionary perspective remains a grand challenge in biology, economy and social sciences. Social exclusion is believed to be an answer to this conundrum. However, previously related studies often assume one-shot interactions and ignore how free-riding is identified, which seem to be too idealistic. In this work, we consider repeated interactions where excluders need to pay a monitoring cost to identify free-riders for exclusion and free-riders cannot participate in the following possible game interactions once they are identified and excluded by excluders in the repeated interaction process. We reveal that the introduction of such exclusion can prevent the breakdown of cooperation in repeated group interactions. In particular, we demonstrate that an evolutionary oscillation among cooperators, defectors and excluders can appear in infinitely large populations when early exclusion is implemented. In addition, we find that the population spends most of the time in states where cooperators dominate for early exclusion when stochastic mutation-selection is considered in finite populations. Our results highlight that early exclusion is successful in solving the mentioned enigma of cooperation in repeated group interactions.

Inequality between identity groups and social unrest.

Economic, social and political inequality between different identity groups is an important contributor to violent conflicts within societies. To deepen our understanding of the underlying social dynamics, we develop a mathematical model describing cooperation and conflict in a society composed of multiple factions engaged in economic and political interactions. Our model predicts that growing economic and political inequality tends to lead to the collapse of cooperation between factions that were initially seeking to cooperate. Certain mechanisms can delay this process, including the decoupling of political and economic power through rule of law and allegiance to the state or dominant faction. Counterintuitively, anti-conformity (a social norm for independent action) can also stabilize society, by preventing initial defections from cooperation from cascading through society. However, the availability of certain material resources that can be acquired by the state without cooperation with other factions has the opposite effect. We test several of these predictions using a multivariate statistical analysis of data covering 75 countries worldwide. Using social unrest as a proxy for the breakdown of cooperation in society, we find support for many of the predictions from our theory.