The tobacco field provides a useful lesson for how alcohol prevention experts could implement Dr Giesbrecht's [1] call for educational programs that increase public support for policy-level interventions. Consumers are remarkably willing to let tobacco and alcohol companies sell them probabilistically dangerous products, so further explication of the health damage of these products may have little impact. In contrast, the public is less willing to be knowingly tricked or cheated in their dealings. Knowledge that tobacco companies purposely enhanced the addictiveness of their product and withheld information about risks to increase sales fostered support for successful tobacco-control interventions. Similarly, explaining how alcohol biologically distorts purchasing decisions to trick consumers into paying more for alcohol may facilitate support for controls on alcohol sales and marketing. New research on the pharmacological effects of alcohol on behavioral decision-making shows that alcohol has a predictable unfair advantage over other products. Models have explicated the neurobiological mechanisms that underlie our ability to make behavioral choices based upon the expected value of potentially available rewards [2, 3]. These studies show that alcohol, like all addictive drugs, specifically disrupts calculations made by the brain's reward circuitry. To determine the value of naturally rewarding products, the brain conducts an in-depth calculation of the impact of consumption of the product on the consumer within his current and historical environment. Alcohol short-circuits this assessment by pharmacologically augmenting a signal indicating the difference between the predicted value of the reward and the observed reward, such that the circuit mistakenly calculates that it underestimated the value of consuming alcohol regardless of whether the drinker was helped or hurt as a result of drinking. As the brain corrects its ‘underestimates’, it increases expectations about the value of alcohol consumption. This leads the drinker to overvalue alcohol and thus favor working harder to obtain alcohol, even if the product provided no objective or subjective benefit to the user. While other products undergo strict evaluations of their worth by the brain's reward circuitry, alcohol ‘cheats’ by reprogramming the circuit to rate it as better than expected regardless of the actual effects on the user or original expectations. These neurobiological results demonstrate that the alcohol industry's profits derive in part from a form of trickery. Their product includes a chemical that directly distorts the brains' decisions about how much work to devote to consuming their product—thus ensuring that people will pay more to get the product than the product is worth. Were an industry to play the same trick outside the brain (e.g. use a computer virus to reprogram purchasing systems to overcharge for their product), the practice would probably be declared illegal and governments would intervene. It seems unlikely that consumers or other producers would allow the alcohol industry this unfair advantage if they understood it. In light of these effects, intervention by alcohol industries to prevent recommendation or implementation of regulation on alcohol marketing is, as Giesbrect notes, unethical. Were alcohol purchasing governed by the same decision-making processes as all other products, then singling out alcohol for tighter regulation than other potentially unhealthful products would be unfair. However, alcohol bypasses brain processes that limit purchasing and consumption to levels commensurate with the consumers' personal benefit from the product. Thus, regulation of alcohol sales only compensates for pharmacological effects of alcohol on purchasing decisions. With this argument, whether alcohol benefits or harms the consumer is irrelevant; alcohol should be regulated to correct for purchasing induced by ‘tricking’ brain reward circuits. Policy-level intervention does not penalize alcohol industries for the harm that results from consumers' misuse of alcohol; it simply levels the playing field so that alcohol industries do not have an unfair market advantage. Punishing one group for another's mistakes is generally not appealing, but ensuring fair competition is a commonly held goal, and may make for a more persuasive argument for policy interventions.
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