Brain-mind Problem Research Articles

Cognitive paradoxes and brain mechanisms

It is generally agreed amongst philosophers and neuroscientists that the main obstacle between the science of the brain and the conscious nature of the mind is rooted in an objective-subjective dichotomy. It is further common to classify natural sciences in terms of their epistemological values and their ontological existential attributes. As a result, one concludes that a computer that is useful for studying nature, such as the conscious mind, is not itself part of nature, or as phrased differently by the noted philosopher, John Searle, ‘there are no Turing Machines in nature! However, the great physicist John Archibald Wheeler, by declaring the famous dictum, ‘it from bit’, did impart a somewhat different approach to the true nature of reality. To reconcile the two contrasting portraits, a different picture, based on the principle of self-reference, will be presented, and applied to the brain-mind problem. It is demonstrated how this principle imparts a thermo-qubit syntax, i.e., ‘bit from it’, for communication between increasingly more complex physical systems. Altogether, the steady state situation produces negentropic pockets for quantification and storage of information. The communication protocol entails cognition mechanisms that display unexpected equivalences that prompts fundamental interpretations of general optical illusions such as Necker’s cube, the Rubin vase, and the Spinning Dancer. The derived syntax also embodies an interesting deconstruction of the recently observed dodecanogram brain signal, experimentally elucidated by Anirban Bandyopadhyay and his team.

On the Carlos Castilla Del Pino “Axiom of behavioral significance” and its relevance in philosophy of psychiatry: The unification of clinical neuroscience

Carlos Castilla del Pino (1922-2009) was a Spanish psychiatrist and essayist with a wide work ranging from neuropsychiatry to social psychiatry. His essays include interesting psychopathological, anthropological and semiotic ideas.The “axiom of behavioural significance” proposes that human behaviour is not an objective event but a meaningful act. As the objective of human behaviour is relation between human beings, it must be studied only under this communicative perspective.Based in this axiomatic approach of Castilla del Pino, some arguments of interest to philosophy of psychiatry will be exposed:– Mind is based in language and language is a communicative acts system in need of a dialogic community, namely, in need of a group of interacting brains. So, referring to the “brains-mind problem” is proposed to be preferred instead of referring to the “brain-mind problem”. Mind is a language-based emergent property of the social group, not a property of a single brain.– The intention of human behaviour and the content of mental subjective phenomena should not be taken as a sign of any brain disease. Human behavior and mental representations always refers to a social group and a social context, not to a single brain. The only disease indicators we can take as disease signs are the formal aspects of behaviour and mind contents, as disexecutive syndrome or mental automatism are.– As a corollary, it is proposed that neurology and psychiatry do not have any epistemic difference, leading to defence the unification of clinical neuroscience.Disclosure of interestThe authors have not supplied their declaration of competing interest.

Can neuroimaging help solve the mind–body problem?

The brain–mind problem is a fundamented issue addressed by philosophers and neuroscientists for centuries. They have been divided into those believing that the mind is just a reflection of physiological processes (two monistic view) and those claiming that while the mind has parallel brain activities, they are basically different and unbridgeable entities (dualistic view). The availability of modern neuro-imaging, particularly fMRI, has allowed new approaches to this problem. fMRI has been very effective in identifying brain areas involved in neural and mental processes.

Philosophical approaches to the brain-mind problem

Philosophical approaches to the brain-mind problem

Emergentist monism, biological realism, operations and brain–mind problem: Reply to comments on “Natural world physical, brain operational, and mind phenomenal space–time” by An.A. Fingelkurts, Al.A. Fingelkurts, C.F.H. Neves

Emergentist monism, biological realism, operations and brain–mind problem: Reply to comments on “Natural world physical, brain operational, and mind phenomenal space–time” by An.A. Fingelkurts, Al.A. Fingelkurts, C.F.H. Neves

A unitary hypothesis of mind-brain interaction in the cerebral cortex

A brief introduction to the brain-mind problem leads on to a survey of the neuronal structure of the cerebral cortex. It is proposed that the basic receptive units are the bundles or clusters of apical dendrites of the pyramidal cells of laminae V and III-II as described by Fleischhauer and Peters and their associates. There are up to 100 apical dendrites in these receptive units, named dendrons. Each dendron would have an input of up to 100,000 spine synapses. There are about 40 million dendrons in the human cerebral cortex. A study of the influence of mental events on the brain leads to the hypothesis that all mental events, the whole of the World 2 of Popper, are composed of mental units, each carrying its own characteristic mental experience. It is further proposed that each mental unit, named psychon, is uniquely linked to a dendron. So the mind-brain problem reduces to the interaction between a dendron and its psychon for all the 40 million linked units. In my 1986 paper (Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B 227, 411-428) on the mind-brain problem, there was developed the concept that the operation of the synaptic microsites involved displacement of particles so small that they were within range of the uncertainty principle of Heisenberg. The psychon-dendron interaction provides a much improved basis for effective selection by a process analogous to a quantal probability field. In the fully developed hypothesis psychons act on dendrons in the whole world of conscious experiences and dendrons act on psychons in all perceptions and memories. It is shown how these interactions involve no violation of the conservation laws. There are great potentialities of these unitary concepts, for example as an explanation of the global nature of a visual experience from moment to moment. It would seem that there can be psychons not linked to dendrons, but only to other psychons, creating what we may call a psychon world.

Self-organization in the nervous system

Abstract The usefulness—if not heuristic value—of the notion of ‘self-organization’ is examined in order to understand the ‘essence of neural’. Self-organization is considered as a mechanism for generating emergent complex structures. One of its most striking properties is the capability to create order from noise. Self-organization phenomena are illustrated in very simple and highly complex neural structures. An attempt is made to interpret development, learning, and perhaps even dynamic memory organization in terms of neurodynamic principles. Ontogeny, normal performance, and plasticity of the nervous system are viewed in the framework of conceptually coherent phenomena and/or principles. The ‘essence of neural’ ought to be reconsidered before continuing the discussion of the brain-mind problem.

Explaining the Brain by W. Ritchie Russell with A. J. Dewar (review)

psychic creation is, after all, but a special case of the emergence of novel forms in all of nature. And not only a special case, but one readily accessible for study, and one important to science and human concerns in general. Frank Barron Psychology Board University of California, Santa Cruz Explaining the Brain. By W. Ritchie Russell with A. J. Dewar. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1975. Pp. 157. $11.50 (cloth); $4.00 (paper). W. Ritchie Russell is one of the grand old men of British neurology. In the 1930s he interviewed many individuals suffering memory deficits after head trauma. During World War II he analyzed soldiers with head injuries so rigorously that other neurologists jokingly acused him of starting the war to further his memory research. The present volume summarizes Russell's ideas about brain function. The first chapters are readable overviews of macroscopic neuroanatomy and general neurophysiology. Interspersed throughout are clinical correlations and conceptualizations . When discussing the concept of inhibition, for example, Russell proposes that cataplexy and sleep paralysis might result from hyperactive inhibitory systems. The book contains separate chapters on seizures and on convulsions . Russell's brief clinical vignettes are always interesting: "A Polish airman was questioned three weeks after he crashed in 1941. He was still confused and said it was 1936 and when asked about war with Germany replied, 'We are not ready yet.' " The sections on brain metabolism and on psychoactive drugs were written with A. J. Dewar. The final chapter gives Russell's ideas on education, concluding with the advice to "look after your brain." This book is for two audiences. The avowed audience is the college student or layman who wants a popular, brief, readable overview of brain function. Though not free from minor errors, the book will serve well these readers. The second audience consists of those mature neuroscientists who can appreciate the important principles underlying Russell's attempts to translate his extensive clinical experience into a popular scientific treatise. The author clearly states the standard scientific answer to the so-called brain-mind problem. The brain generates all mental function and the mind stops when the brain dies. "I have written with the assumption that man has neither a soul nor a spirit" is Russell's pessimistic axiom. Regarding evolution, he suggests that early man's use of his hands for weapons and tools selected for more complex brains, brains complex enough to develop language and subsequently reason. An interesting section entitled "enemies of the neuron" tabulates environmental events which might damage or kill brain cells. In addition to standard items such as trauma and poor nutrition, Russell lists a few surprises. Not all will agree that all-night parties or sleeping in a sitting posture can kill neurons. While this brief monograph is aimed at the beginning student of brain function , neuroscientists of all levels of training can benefit from the mature Perspectives in Biology and Medicine · Autumn 1976 I 159 thoughts of a clinician who has spent a lifetime observing human brain dysfunction . Frank R. Freemon Department of Neurology Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee 37203 Immunologic Aspects of Anesthetic and Surgical Practice. Edited by Alix Mathieu and Barry D. Kahan. New York: Grune & Stratton, 1975. Pp. 400. $29.00. Drs. Mathieu and Kahan have edited the first book which relates the disciplines of immunology and anesthesiology, a relationship which has been developing rapidly during the past decade. It is a timely and valuable volume. It will help the anesthesiologist to become increasingly aware of the immunologic responses of patients to infection, allergy, drugs, blood transfusion, and organ transplantation. The book is written by 24 authors, mainly from Boston and Chicago. It has 17 chapters, divided into two parts. Part 1 is an introduction to immunology and covers cell-mediated immunity, phytohemagglutinin stimulation of human lymphocytes , the cellular basis of antibody production, immunoglobulin structure, immediate hypersensitivity, the complement and kinin-forming systems of human plasma, host defense and the altered host, effects of anesthesia and surgery on immunity, and anesthesia, surgery, and infection. Each chapter is a review in the style of the author and is directed to an audience that understands basic immunologic terms. The chapters...

BRAIN AND CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCE

Experience. Edited by Sir John Eccles. Price, $16.80. Pp 591. Springer-Verlag New York Inc., 175 5th Ave, New York 10010, 1966. This book represents proceedings of a study week at Pontifical Academy of Science in Rome, from Sept 28 to Oct 4, 1964. Sir John Eccles, Nobel Prize winner in Physiology and Medicine in 1963, undertook responsibility of organizing symposium, which included representatives of various neurological sciences, and of editing volume of proceedings. Following Laurentian Conference in 1953, published as Brain Mechanisms and Consciousness, this is perhaps first book to treat same general subject. A group of international experts were assembled to serve as contributors and discussants of various papers. Absent from study week was a professional philosopher. In his preface, Sir John explained that he was instructed by chancellor that the academy by its constitution has for aim to promote study and progress of physical, mathematical and neural sciences and their history. Thus discussion of philosophical questions is excluded. Despite this limitation, philosophical questions abound in papers and discussions, particularly in contributions of Lord Adrian, D. M. MacKay, R. W. Sperry, and H. L. Teuber. Though many of papers present original recent contribu¬ tions from authors' own laboratories, much is in nature of reviews and sum¬ maries. The active researcher will not find much that is new in this volume. Selected topics in neuroanatomy are presented by Colonnier (neocortex) and An¬ dersen (hippocampal formation); and neurophysiology by Eccles (synaptic mecha¬ nisms) and Mountcastle (mechanoreceptive responses). The fifth chapter is Granit's re¬ view of sensory mechanisms as elucidated by work of his laboratory, and that of Hubel and Wiesel. Creutzfeldt and his coworkers summarize some characteristics of nerve cell activity in relation to information transmission in nervous system. Effects of electrical stimulation on threshold of conscious experience in man are reported by Libet. Much of work of Teuber and his students on perception after brain injury is summarized by Teuber. A paper on localiza¬ tion of speech and perception is given by Penfield. The contributions of Jasper and Brenner reflect their continued interest in neural processes underlying various states of consciousness. The starting effects of commissural section are again reviewed by Sperry. Eccles espouses molar view of memo¬ ry mechanisms propounded by Lashley in 20's, and adds to this molecular memory of Hyden. Neural mechanisms in sleep are masterfully reviewed by Moruzzi. A most stimulating discussion of precentrai motor mechanisms in relation to willed movement is given by Phillips (eg, . . electrical stimulation does not . . . evoke natural functioning of cortical neuronal apparatus. . . .). MacKay's contribution re¬ lates information theory to concept of control of action. An essay on brainmind problem (Gomes) and a review of ethological concepts (Thorpe) should close symposium. However, there is appended a paper on dopamine and central neuro¬ transmission (Heymans), and another on psychosomatic problems (Schaefer). Although many of participants repeat¬ edly acknowledge state of ignorance as far as behavior mechanisms is concerned, discussions following each presentation and at end of symposium are gener¬ ally stimulating and literate. The use of rnicroelectrodes in attempts to elucidate neural mechanisms underlying behavior is becoming more and more fashionable, and this is embodied in character of sym¬ posium. I found this research least relevant

A Note On Professor Sir Henry Cohen’s Manson Lecture “The Status of Brain in the Concept of Mind,” Philosophy, July, 1952

Professor Cohen makes extensive reference to a lecture “Hypotheses relating to the brain-mind problem” which was published in Nature (July 14th, 1951). He gives a succinct account of the suggestions that I put forward, and then goes on to state that they “illustrate two fallacies which are to be found in so many contributions to the study of the body-mind relationship.” Be that as it may, but Professor Cohen has chosen most unsuitable illustrations, for in both cases they are based on misunderstandings of my article.

Hypotheses relating to the brain-mind problem.

MAY I be permitted, at this late date, to comment on Prof. J. C. Eccles's “Hypotheses relating to the Brain–Mind Problem” (Nature, July 14, 1951, p. 53), which had previously escaped my notice.

Hypotheses relating to the brain-mind problem.

Hypotheses relating to the brain-mind problem.

Hypotheses relating to the brain-mind problem.

I REGRET that Dr. W. A. Cobb takes exception to my quotation of his article in “Electroencephalography” in support of my statement that the unconsciousness of concussion is associated with a depressed activity of the cerebral cortex as revealed by the electroencephalogram (E.E.G.). The misunderstanding apparently has arisen because Dr. Cobb is considering merely the wave form of the electroencephalogram and I was specifically referring to the “activity in the [cerebral] cortex as revealed by the electroencephalogram”. I must confess that electrophysiologists must accept responsibility for such misunderstanding, because we have given the electroencephalographers very little help in the interpretation of their electroencephalogram records, and they perforce have invented a descriptive nomenclature and empirically related the different types of wave forms to various cerebral disorders. In this context reference may be made to my review on the “Interpretation of Evoked Potentials in the Cerebral Cortex”1. An attempt is there made to show how these potentials may be explained by the known electrical responses of nerve cells. The relevant point for the present discussion is that the electroencephalographers assess activity by simple reference to the electrical wave forms they record, whereas my phrase “activity in the [cerebral] cortex” refers to an assessment of the level of active neuronal responses in the cortex. Admittedly there is much uncertainty in such assessment, but there is good evidence that intense patterned neuronal activity would give a very small and rapid electrical wave-form, whereas large slow potential waves indicate a low level of activity which would be largely attributable to synaptic potentials that are generated in cortical neurones by afferent discharges to the cerebral cortex. A further point is that recording from the scalp, as is usual in clinical electroencephalography, is so inefficient that the small rapid electrical activity is likely to be lost in the general noise background, as presumably occurs in the so-called ‘flat’ electroencephalogram on which Dr. Cobb bases so much of his argument.