ABSTRACT Despite the existence of various international instruments designed to protect children from involvement in armed conflicts, the practice of recruiting children as soldiers persists. This situation suggests that the existing International Humanitarian Regulations (IHRs) may have shortcomings in terms of protecting children from forced recruitment by conflict actors. Consequently, this research investigates the efficacy of the IHRs in curbing the forced recruitment of children. It argues that governments and rebels are unlikely to adhere to IHRs, but rather more likely to recruit children coercively, with the exception of secessionist rebel groups. Utilising the child soldier dataset from Haer, Faulkner and Whitaker (2020), this research employs various models, including the IV-probit and the logistic regression, to reflect the different actors that engaged in forced child recruitment. The statistical findings suggest that commitment to IHRs is associated with a greater likelihood of forced child soldiering by governments and rebel groups. Conversely, secessionist groups appear to be less likely to recruit children coercively after IHRs are introduced.