REVIEWS 345 than the Russians (p. 2IO),which obliged the latter to make improvements. But he does not ask himself whether well-attested Russian atrocities against civilians stimulated resistance: here M. Gammer's study of I994, not cited, would have added balance. The reforms associated with Alexander II's long-serving War minister, Dmitrii A. Miliutin, naturallywin pride of place. Robert F. Baumann deals expertlywith the way the I874 universalmilitaryservicelawwas implemented in practice. Forall its inequitiesthe measurewas 'fundamentallysound [. . .] a catalyst for civic improvement'; notably, it promoted social mobility and by 191 I 49 per cent of officers were non-nobles (pp. 32, 23). In a pioneering study Mark von Hagen examines conscription's ethnic impact. Certain minoritieswere exempted and othersdiscriminatedagainst,but by 19I7 these 'privileges'had been radically curtailed and there were several non-Russian units. The role of railways in mobilizing such masses of men was crucial (Jacob W. Kipp, pp. 82-103). Though much was achieved, it was never enough, and already the war with Turkey (I877-78) exposed Russia's weaknessin thisrespect.Nor was the high command up to the mark,since the reformers,who rightly pushed for a bold offensive strategy,were worsted by the grand-ducallobby. David A. Rich shows that the conservativessuffereda major (hitherto disregarded)setback in i887, when the Main Staff devised 'Russia's first truly viable war plan' based on specialized knowledge rather than 'the prerogatives [. . .] of the dynastic regime' (p. I84). Once again, however, the reformers' success was temporary, as the Russo-Japanesewar would amply demonstrate. After I905, rescued from ignominious defeat by the diplomats, Russia's militaryleadersvigorouslydebated organizationalchanges to boost efficiency, but the result was an uneasy compromise. Menning commends the muchmaligned V. A. Sukhomlinov and his offensive strategy, whereas John W. Steinbergmore plausiblybacksV. P. Mikhnevich, the prudent commandant of the general staff academy, who in I907 was forced to resign his post. David M. McDonald puts his fingeron the cardinalproblem:'how could one create an army and general staff on the Prussian model when the supreme warlord would let that process go only partway?' (p. 321). Many officers realized the autocratic system'sbasic weaknessbut could do precious little to correctit. The resultwas Tannenberg and 19I7. Two off-beatcontributionsdeserveto be noted. Persson(Sweden)writeson Russian military attaches' role in intelligence gathering in mid-century, and David R. Jones on the boy scout movement, which offered an alternative 'non-coercive' service model (p. 63). By I9I7 this organization had some 50,000 members (includingeven somegerl-gaidy). Bern,Switzerland JOHNKEEP Engelstein,Laura. Castration andtheHeavenly Kingdom: ARussian Folktale. Cornell University Press,Ithaca, NY and London, 2004. xviii + 283 pp. Illustrations . Notes. Index. $22.95: LI 3.95 (paperback). A wide variety of sects broke away from the Russian Orthodox Church from the seventeenth century onwards. The Old Believerswere the largestof these 346 SEER, 83, 2, 2005 groups, but there was a wide range of sects with roots in Orthodoxy, but whose religious practices had strayed very far from traditional Orthodox ritual. Laura Engelstein's book examines aspects of the most extreme and notorious of these groups:the Skoptsy.The Skoptsytook physical asceticism to an extreme by practising genital mutilation as an essential part of their religiousbeliefs, along with abstinence from meat, tobacco and alcohol. This is not a book for the squeamish, since Engelstein does not shy away from explicit and vivid descriptionsof the physical mutilationsthemselves,but this does help to bring home the strength of the devotion of the Skoptsyto their beliefs. The state persecuted the Skoptsyconsistently. The authoritiesfound their beliefs disturbingand were concerned lest the Skoptsy should challenge the Orthodox Church with their own particular brand of millenarianism. Members of the sect were exiled to remote regions of the empire, where the government hoped they would exert little influence. The Skoptsy, however, remained a highly secretive group, and their members were extremely reluctantto give evidence againsteach other, or even to admit that they were members of the sect, often providing medical explanations for their physical mutilation. It was thus extremely difficult for the Russian government to stampout the sect, the more so since in otherrespects,the Skoptsybehaved as model citizens, valuing work and eschewing the traditional Russian vice of vodka. Engelsteinnotes...