REVIEWS 563 Soviets were excluded, and that ofGenoa which they attended, and seeks to test the theory that 'all the parties involved made their contribution to the maintenance of peace or the outbreak of war' (p. 166). In particular, Dukes argues, only the examination of domestic and foreign policies together can be relied upon to support viable theories of international relations. He closes with a quotation fromViacheslav Nikonov who argues fora global system inwhich post-Soviet Russia will replay the role itonce had in the nineteenth century. The irony is that itsauthor is the grandson ofViacheslav Molotov. Mary Hannah Byers describes the rise of Socialist Realist art as a project of theTretiakov Gallery in Moscow in 1928-32, when theGallery rearranged its collections 'to reflect a revised history ofRussian art based on Marxism Leninism'; from the embodiment of bourgeois values to a 'bastion ofMarxist Leninist ideals' (p. 184).No proletarian aesthetic emerged, however. On the contrary, Socialist Realism, or the depiction of reality as it should be, and not as it is, continued the aesthetic values of the pre-revolutionary bourgeois art, and the experiment was abandoned. In the mid-1930s, Stalin set about demolishing theMarxist school of history, established byMikhail Pokrovskii, and replacing itsabstract formulae of class struggle with narrative that was accessible to the masses, as well as stressing the positive contributions made by such figures as Ivan the Ter rible and Peter theGreat, Suvorov and Kutuzov. Had Pokrovskii not died of cancer in 1932, he would surely have been a prominent victim of the purges, and not merely the convenient scapegoat depicted inDavid Brandenberger's article. StAntony'sCollege,Oxford Harold Shukman Lojko, Miklos. Meddling inMiddle Europe: Britain and the 'Lands Between' igig-ig2j. Central European University Press, Budapest and New York, 2006. x + 377 pp. Notes. Bibliography. Index. $49.95: 41.95: ?28.95. Can British involvement in the financial reconstruction of post-war Central Europe trulybe described as 'meddling'? Judging fromMontagu Norman's far-fetched scheme 'to establish one by one the newparts of oldAustria' with a view to achieving the 'ultimate [federal] solution forEastern Europe' (p. 71), the author's hint of ironymay well be justified. And yet, the reader of this volume may feel a little uneasy about accepting such an uncharitable inter pretation of Britain's diplomatic and economic role inWarsaw, Prague and Budapest in the first half of the 1920s.After all, British professions of support for the resurrection of the Danubian Monarchy rarely amounted to more than a blatant recognition of the evident flaws in the territorial settlement. It is far from clear how far federalist political ideas, or the financial diplomacy of the governor of the Bank of England, reflected British government policy. More importantly, British plans for Central European reconstruction were no flakier, or any less realistic, than those of the other Great Powers in the aftermath of theFirstWorld War. After all,which victor power played a more constructive role inCentral Europe than thatplayed by Britain? 564 SEER, 86, 3, JULY 2008 In this well-researched and scholarly monograph, Miklos Lojko duly acknowledges the British contribution to the recovery of the defeated states. At the same time, he maintains, 'Itwas France that took the initiative in engaging Central Europe in schemes forwider security and maintained the momentum in the early twenties' (p. 6). He contrasts the modest British achievements inAustria and Hungary with the rapidly fading British influ ence in interwarCzechoslovakia and Poland. To underline the point, Lojko devotes nearly a third of his book to Poland, despite the fact thatAnglo-Pol ish relations were treated separately from the affairs ofCentral Europe by the Northern Department of theForeign Office. In his view, this special treatment was the result of the political controversies surrounding the territorial settle ment; a reflection of the strains inAnglo-Polish relations, not of geopoliti cal realities. Be that as itmay, the examples of Poland and Czechoslovakia demonstrate in equal measure the Foreign Office's propensity to dissociate itself from the successor states by the mid-i920s. Conversely, the case ofHungary shows a fluctuating,but significantlyhigh er, level of British commitment to the region. Consequently, the author joins the recent chorus of area specialists in questioning...
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