Botswana Democratic Party Research Articles

The conflict between President Mokgweetsi Masisi and his predecessor, Ian Khama, in Botswana

ABSTRACT This article discusses the conflict between President Mokgweetsi Masisi and his predecessor, Ian Khama, in Botswana. It argues that the conflict is a struggle for the control of the Botswana state and its resources. Ian Khama, whose family has controlled the state since independence, sought to oust his successor so he re-gains control. To achieve this, Khama employed three strategies: supporting his successor’s challenger within the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) in 2019, forming a loose alliance with the opposition during the 2019 general election, and conducting an international campaign against the regime of his successor.

Botswana’s 2019 General Elections: A Referendum on General Ian Khama

AbstractOn October 23, 2019, Botswana held its twelfth free and fair election. For the first time in the history of Botswana’s electoral democracy, a former president (Ian Khama) defected from the ruling party and supported the opposition. The opposition coalition, working informally with Khama, mounted a spirited campaign against the well-oiled machine, the incumbent and long-ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP). Seabo and Nyenhuis reflect on the 2019 general election, analyze the outcome, and consider the implications for the future of Botswana’s electoral democracy. They argue that barring other factors, the BDP’s resounding victory was mainly a result of Batswana’s rejection of former president Ian Khama.

Ex-President of Botswana Ian Khama: Ascents and Reversals in the Political Career of a Former Pilot

The article shows the development of the political career of the ex-president of Botswana Ian Khama, a son of the country’s first president Seretse Khama. The article analyzes domestic and foreign policy of the government of the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) headed by Mr. Ian Khama, whose first term in office coincided with difficulties of the global economic crisis that began in 2008. It is noted that during Mr. Khama’s presidency the West-oriented foreign policy of Botswana was well-balanced, pragmatic and aimed at attracting investments. It was rather bold and independent, which was largely due to the independence of Botswana, a major exporter of diamonds to the world market, as regards donors’ assistance. At the African level Mr. Khama’s image has been that of a consistent critic of authoritarian and despotic regimes, he also adhered to a consistent firm position regarding the political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe, calling on Robert Mugabe to transfer power. Mr. Khama is an extraordinary political leader. The style and methods of his leadership (harsh bureaucratic methods, frequent decision-making without coordination with the government, disdain of opposition’s criticism and of public opinion) led to accusations of authoritarianism. The author makes an attempt to define its nature which was somewhat different from the authoritarianism of other African leaders. The issue of corruption and nepotism in Botswana is also discussed. During the ten-year period of Mr. Khama’s rule (2008–2018), the problem of nepotism was especially often the focus of the criticism by the local opposition and media. This had a negative effect for the president’s political image and for that of the authorities in general. At the same time, Mr. Khama’s government managed to maintain stability of the economics and of the internal political situation. The properties of the situation in the Botswana Democratic Party, which has ruled the country for almost 55 years and still holds a central position in the country’s political landscape, are shown. Despite a number of mistakes in governing the country, President Ian Khama managed to preserve and strengthen the authority of Botswana in the eyes of the international community for its commitment to the international law, its respect for human rights, good governance and active foreign policy. It is pointed out that Mr. Khama, respecting the Constitution, peacefully transferred power to the country’s vice-president Mokgweetsi Masisi whom he chose as his successor. However, a conflict arose between them very soon, and their confrontation led the ex-president to supporting the opposition at the general elections in October 2019. The events of recent years in Botswana serve an important evidence of the problematic issue – insecurity of democracy in the context of a long dominance of one political party. The unexpected emergence of Khama-Masisi confrontation questioned to a certain extent the tradition of early power transfer from the head of state to the vice-president which established in the country in recent decades. However, this confrontation did not go beyond the framework of the electoral struggle and did not lead to serious tension in the internal political situation.

The British and the transfer of power in the Bechuanaland Protectorate: Neo-colonialism or passive revolution?

Deploying the theoretical framework of Italian Marxist thinker, Antonio Gramsci, this article argues that rather than a neo-colonial arrangement, the transfer of power from the British to locals in the Bechuanaland Protectorate (Botswana) could be conceptualized as a passive revolution. This passive revolution, which was triggered by demands for independence by radical nationalists, entailed the formation of a pro-British political party, the Botswana Democratic Party, and transferring power to it in a carefully managed decolonization process. The passive revolution aimed not just at preserving British economic interests in the protectorate but also at state formation for purposes of expanding the capitalist mode of production in the newly independent state. Thus, the transfer of power took place concurrently with the creation of a legitimate capitalist state that served the interests of both the British and the cattle-owning Botswana Democratic Party elite that assumed power at independence. Post-independence, the cattle bourgeois class at the apex of the Botswana Democratic Party embarked upon the construction of hegemony through the creation of an interventionist developmental state that addressed the narrow interests of other classes and groups constituting the post-independence historical bloc. Such hegemony has allowed the Botswana Democratic Party to retain power to the present day.

Botswana Votes 2019: Two-Party Competition and the Khama Factor

The October 2019 Botswana national election, which returned the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) to power for the twelfth consecutive time, was dominated by a man whose name was not even on the ballot: former President Ian Khama. In an unprecedented move, Khama had broken with the BDP, a party he had led as president for 10 years, to form a new political party and to campaign against his successor, President Mokgweetsi Masisi. A highly controversial figure, Khama was none the less embraced by the main opposition coalition, the Umbrella for Democratic Change (UDC). Although the ‘Khama factor’ helped the UDC in some parts of the country, the decision to work with Khama proved overall to be a major strategic blunder by the opposition, which suffered a decline in its vote share and its representation in parliament. Paradoxically, despite the continued electoral dominance of the BDP, the election reinforces a long-standing trend toward the emergence of a competitive two-party system in Botswana.

English

This article examines political trust in the institution of the presidency. It focuses on the Khama era and aims to find out the underlying motivations to trust the president. Using the Afrobarometer surveys, the paper finds that Batswana are more likely to distrust the president if they perceive high levels of corruption, poor government performance and are dissatisfied with democracy. Partisanship is important in trust for president and the most significant finding is that supporters of the Botswana Democratic Party have lost confidence in the president. Key words: Botswana, political trust, institutions, presidency, attitudes.

Elite interests and political participation in Botswana, 1966–2014

ABSTRACTBotswana’s tiny economy is overwhelmingly government-driven and political participation, particularly on the side of the ruling party, is critical for one’s economic survival and prosperity. This has led to enduring intrigue and conflict among the country’s political power elite. Opposition party activists traditionally have embraced leftist policies and claimed to be representing the country’s poor and downtrodden while castigating the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (in power since 1966) of being pro-rich and politically connected business. Ironically, some members of the opposition elite also engage in business ventures with their ruling party counterparts. The scramble for economic opportunities has fuelled debilitating factionalism within both the ruling and opposition parties over the years. In some instances tribalism was mobilised in intra- and inter-party elections for positions of influence even though voters are more interested in service delivery than traditional ethnic issues. Our paper considers the question: ‘Whose interests do Botswana’s politicians represent?’

Towards understanding Botswana and South Africa’s ambivalence to liberal democracy

ABSTRACTDespite their recognised democratic successes, Botswana and South Africa have had ambivalent experiences with liberal democracy. It is contended that they fall somewhere in-between what scholars refer to as electoral and liberal democracies; dominant party systems within Carothers’ ‘gray zone’. Two explanations are offered. The first relates to the underlying political culture of the ruling elite: the liberal democratic values of the founders and early elites of both the African National Congress (ANC) and the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) were never fully embedded; instead, their political cultures were influenced by traditions and ideologies with illiberal values. The second explanation focuses on a key feature of a liberal democracy – restraining of power, namely through encouraging an autonomous civil society and limiting executive access to the state. It is argued that for fear of losing their dominant positions, the ANC and the BDP resist restraints on their access to state power.

Historical entanglements, conflicting agendas and visions: Radio Botswana and the making of a national radio station

Abstract Botswana’s government as one of the celebrated postcolonial democracies in Southern Africa continues to have the state owning and controlling the media – in particular, broadcast media. The history of government-owned and controlled media in Botswana can be understood through colonial lenses – it stands out as a product of historical entanglements with the influence of apartheid South Africa’s role, and the invention of Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) hegemony. These were further mitigated by other factors that include the sections of Information and Broadcasting’s own internal politics and growth, and, within the geopolitical prism, the Cold War period. This article focuses on the history of radio in Botswana showing its multiple origins and the conflicting visions as to the role and nature of broadcasting in the colony and postcolony. We posit that the aims of modernization, nationalism, national identity and public versus government ownership all had their place in the establishment of radio in the country. Further, we argue that the powerful presence of a coercive and quite overbearing neighbour, South Africa with its South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), and a paternalist British voice alongside an anxious postcolonial government, all shaped the eventual identity of Radio Botswana.

Understanding the Conflict Choices of Dictatorships

Dictators at War and Peace. By Jessica L. P. Weeks Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2014. 247 pp., $24.95 paperback (ISBN-13: 978-0-8014-7982-3). The aggressive acts of dictatorships often dominate news headlines, ranging from Russia's annexation of the Ukraine's Crimea in early 2014 to North Korea's decision to test-fire both short- and medium-range missiles on multiple occasions that same year in violation of UN resolutions. Though we often associate dictatorships with belligerence, many dictatorships are, in fact, peaceful; for example, Malaysia (led by the United Malays National Organisation) or Botswana (led by the Botswana Democratic Party). Broad statements about the international conflict behavior of dictatorships are unlikely to be accurate, simply because there is enormous variation across dictatorships in how politics works within them. In the last decade, this insight—that dictatorships often differ from one another as much as they do from democracies—has led to an explosion of research in the comparative politics literature emphasizing the importance of disaggregating dictatorships for understanding political outcomes. This research has demonstrated that systematic differences among dictatorships help to explain important variations in the ways they repress (Davenport 2007), their use of foreign aid (Wright 2008), their prospects for democratization (Geddes 2003), and more (see Ezrow and Frantz 2011 for a review of this literature). One of the central messages to emerge is that lumping all dictatorships into one category can lead to misunderstandings of authoritarian politics. A few studies in the international …

Elite-Mass Congruence in African Dominant Party Systems: The Cases of Botswana and Lesotho

This study investigates elite-mass partisan congruence in African dominant party systems. I argue that dominant party systems with stable opposition parties provide more capacity for programmatic issue congruence between voters and their political representatives than dominant party systems with volatile opposition parties. To test this argument I compare Lesotho and Botswana. Both countries feature regular and fairly free elections, which so far resulted in dominant party systems where the same party holds more than 50 percent of the lower house seats in subsequent elections. However, in Botswana, a stable opposition embodied in the Botswana National Front (BNF) confronts the dominant Botswana Democratic Party (BDP). In Lesotho, on the other hand, the dominant Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) faces a fluid and fragmented opposition. Accordingly, I expect to find more congruence on partisan policy preferences between political elites and voters in Botswana than in Lesotho. I measure the extent of elite-mass partisan congruence by combining an original elite dataset and survey data.

Winners, Losers and the Playing Field in Southern Africa's ‘Democratic Darlings’: Botswana and South Africa Compared

Botswana and South Africa are often hailed as Southern Africa's democratic darlings. These democracies, however, occur within the context of dominant party systems; one party dominates over a prolonged period in an ostensibly democratic system. The Botswana Democratic Party has ruled since 1965, while the African National Congress has governed since 1994. This paper aims to ascertain what happens to opposition parties within dominant party systems, using Levitsky and Way [2010. “Why Democracy Needs a Level Playing Field.” Journal of Democracy 21 (1): 57–68] theory of an ‘uneven playing field,’ where democratic competition is undermined less by electoral fraud or repression than by unequal access to state institutions, resources and the media. The leaders of key opposition parties in both countries have been interviewed. It is subsequently argued that opposition parties are weakened by the dominant party system context, and so declaring their elections as ‘fair’ becomes problematic. Despite this, some of the opposition parties have adopted a number of strategies to remain relevant: cooperation, coalition and co-optation.

Renegotiation of Executive Powers and Executive-Legislative Relations in Botswana

The strength of the legislature has been identified as one of the strongest predictors of democratic survival. Executive-legislative relations are defined by formal constitutional arrangements, but also by their interpretation in the practice of political power and in the courts. Renegotiation of executive-legislative relations thus occurs through reinterpretations of political practice as well as constitutional change. What conditions and processes prompt the renegotiation of executive-legislative relations and influence whether changes favor a strengthening of the executive or the legislature? These issues are examined through an analysis of the renegotiation of executive power and executive-legislative relations in Botswana. Although Botswana has never had a strong legislature, the weakness of the legislature became more glaring in the 1990s as the long-ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) faced growing competition from both the opposition and internal factions. Growing opposition, both internal and external to the BDP, made the legislature more threatening to the executive. A number of developments further concentrated power in the hands of the executive. These include constitutional amendments, court cases, and changes in political practices such as an increased reliance on presidential directives that favor the executive. Calls for constitutional reform to check the power of the executive and strengthen the legislature featured prominently in Botswana’s 2009 elections. When the tenth parliament opened in November 2009, MPs from across the political divide stood up and called for constitutional reforms. The paper will analyze the dynamics associated with the strengthening of the executive and evaluate the possibilities for launching a renegotiation of executive-legislative relations that is more favorable for the legislature. The analysis draws on research conducted in Botswana during August 2009 and May – July 2010.

Electoral competition, factionalism, and persistent party dominance in Botswana

ABSTRACTThe Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) has maintained a super-majority in the National Assembly for over forty years despite increasingly competitive elections. Several factors contribute to the BDP's continued legislative dominance, including features of the electoral system, fragmentation of the party system, and obstacles to strategic voting behaviour. Factional competition has played a particularly important role. Botswana's political institutions encourage factional competition, and factionalism interacts with the electoral system to hinder consolidation of the party system. Botswana's experience underlines the importance of internal party dynamics and their interaction with features of the electoral and party system in enabling the persistence of legislative dominance in competitive electoral systems.

Elections in Botswana: A Ritual Enterprise?

Botswana has the reputation of being Africa's longest surviving democracy having held uninterrupted elections at five year intervals since the pre-independence elections of 1965. The latest elections were held in October 2009. Al- though in democratic discourse it is assumed and/or expected that the holding of regular free, fair and competitive multi- party elections should provide an opportunity of regime change, this has so far not materialized in Botswana. The country is therefore a dominant-party system with only one political party, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), having won all the elections held so far. This paper argues that there is nothing inherently undemocratic with people voting for the same political party provided the political playing field is level. A number of factors are advanced to explain the dominance of the BDP in the country's politics. These include, inter alia, the perceived delivery of the ruling party, the politics of pa- tronage, advantages of incumbency and other factors related to the culture of Batswana. Having said this, it is concluded that recent political events in the country point towards the emergence of a new undemocratic culture which may result in the reversal of the system of one-party dominance. Thus, it is argued that the dominance of the BDP in the country's poli- tics is likely to be seriously challenged in the not too distant future.

The weakness of opposition parties in Botswana: A justification for more internal-party democracy in the dominant Botswana Democratic Party (BDP)

Botswana’s opposition parties are too weak to unseat the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP). To substitute for weak opposition, this paper advocates for more internal democracy in the BDP for Botswana’s democracy to consolidate. The BDP has leadership elections but few other elements of internal democracy. Policy-making is centralised on the party leadership to the exclusion of party membership. The leadership is also excessively intolerant of dissent and parliamentary backbench. Furthermore, the leadership dominates candidate selection, thus determining the composition of parliament. With membership excluded from policy-making, critics silenced and backbench disciplined, possibilities exist for the BDP government to become unresponsive, unaccountable and authoritarian. For internal democracy to substitute for weak opposition, the paper proposes that BDP factionalism should shift from opportunism to principle. Finally, considering that Botswana’s constitution compounds autocracy in the BDP by centralising power on the president and granting him/her immunity from prosecution, the paper advocates for constitutional amendment. Key words: Botswana, democracy, consolidation, opposition, internal-democracy, party- factionalism.

Autocracy, insecurity and pre-modernity in Botswana

The elevation of Lt-General Ian Khama to the presidency in April 2008 brought an escalating emphasis on security. A Directorate of Intelligence and Security was operationalised under the aegis of the President, and a spate of extra-judicial killings followed. Khama simultaneously asserted his control over the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), despite the fact that a pro-democratic faction – Barata Phathi – emerged victorious at the BDP congress in Kanye in July 2009. In an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty, Khama aimed at 70 per cent of the vote in national elections in October 2009 but achieved just 53.4 per cent. Evidence emerged in early 2010 indicating that Sir Ketumile Masire had been in the pocket of the De Beers corporation throughout his presidency, 1980–98, and that his indebtedness and De Beers’ concerns over this had influenced the transition to Ian Khama. This suggested that diamond dependency and corruption were at the core of the autocracy and insecurity, and that together they characterised the debilitating pre-modernity in which the economy and society was trapped.

In permanent opposition: Botswana's other political parties

Political opposition parties are considered crucial to the nurturing, enhancing and consolidating of democracy in every political system. Indeed, their existence is proof of political tolerance, competitive party elections, the provision of choices to the voting public and the possibility of alternation in power. However, the political opposition on the African continent is generally weak, and particularly so in Botswana, resulting in the predominance of the ruling party in political affairs. This article analyses the weaknesses of Botswana's opposition parties by tracing their historical evolution, characteristics, electoral base, and performance against the background of the political and electoral system in Botswana and the strength of the ruling party itself. It concludes that future prospects for the opposition to make greater inroads into the Botswana Democratic Party's support are small because of the fragmented nature of the opposition itself and the relative satisfaction of citizens with the current government's performance.

Stagnation of a 'Miracle': Botswana’s Governance Record Revisited

Botswana has been dubbed an “African miracle.” The country has been praised not only for maintaining a multiparty system and high growth rates since independence but also for its good governance record. In contrast to other African countries, the extent of neopatrimonialism, which runs counter to good governance, is said to be low. This article aims to a) precisely assess Botswana’s neopatrimonial profile and b) put forward explanations for the comparatively low level of neopatrimonialism and for the recent “stagnation of a miracle.” The paper finds that there have always been neopatrimonial tendencies in Botswana, though they have been largely overlooked by mainstream analyses. The crucial difference is the limited nature of these tendencies relative to other African countries. This can be attributed to the independence period, characterized by the homogeneity of political, economic, and administrative interests in safeguarding private property rights through a “strong” rational-legal state, that is, by limiting neopatrimonialism. Financed by massive revenues stemming from diamonds, the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), and the Bank of Botswana, the government of the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) was able to secure its reign through the provision of public goods and limited neopatrimonial exchange relations. However, due to decreasing electoral dominance and elite cohesion, the ruling party is now reverting to some neopatrimonial and authoritarian means in order to safeguard its rule. Oftmals wird Botswana als “afrikanisches Wunder” bezeichnet. Das Land wird nicht nur fur seine Mehrparteiendemokratie und sein hohes Wirtschaftswachstum seit der Unabhangigkeit geschatzt, sondern auch fur gute Regierungsfuhrung. Im Gegensatz zu anderen afrikanischen Landern wird der Umfang von Neopatrimonialismus, der guter Regierungsfuhrung entgegensteht, fur niedrig gehalten. Um dies zu uberprufen, verfolgt dieser Artikel zwei Ziele: 1) die systematische Erfassung von Botswanas neopatrimonialem Profil und 2) die Erklarung des vergleichsweise niedrigen neopatrimonialen Niveaus des Landes und der “Stagnation des Wunders” in jungster Zeit. Es zeigt sich, dass in Botswana schon immer neopatrimoniale Tendenzen bestanden haben, die in den meisten Analysen ubersehen werden. Jedoch sind diese Tendenzen begrenzter als in anderen afrikanischen Landern. Von besonderer Bedeutung ist dabei die Zeit der Unabhangigkeit, die durch die Homogenitat politischer, okonomischer und administrativer Interessen gekennzeichnet war. Die Elite unterstutzte die Garantie von Eigentumsrechten durch einen starken Staat. Der Abbau von Diamanten, die Uberweisungen der Zollunion des Sudlichen Afrikas (SACU) und die Profite der Zentralbank erbrachten zudem hohe Staatseinnahmen, mit denen die Regierung offentliche Guter finanzieren konnte. Dies stabilisierte die Herrschaft der seit der Unabhangigkeit amtierenden Regierungspartei Botswana Democratic Party (BDP). Jedoch nehmen ihre Dominanz bei Wahlen sowie die Elitekohasion in jungster Zeit spurbar ab. Als Reaktion darauf bedient sich die herrschende Elite nun einiger neopatrimonialer und autoritarer Mittel, um ihre Herrschaft zu sichern.

Opposition Party Alliances and Elections in Botswana, Lesotho and Zambia

The Southern African Development Community has made significant democratic progress since the 1990s following a wave of ferocious internal conflicts, as in Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo. In order for the achievements to be sustained the region requires viable political parties, which are key role players in a democracy. The majority of the current ruling parties in the SADC region such as the African National Congress, the Botswana Democratic Party, Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique (Frelimo), the Lesotho Congress for Democracy, Zambia's Movement for Multiparty Democracy and the South West Africa People's Organisation are very powerful, while opposition parties are fragmented and generally weak. However, a trend has developed for opposition parties, having recognised their limitations, to form alliances in order to play a meaningful role. This route has been followed by opposition parties in Botswana, Lesotho and Zambia. On the eve of the recent general elections in Lesotho and Zambia, parties negotiated strategies to maximise their chances of winning. In Botswana the negotiation process is still under way, albeit threatened by the failure of parties to move from their fixed positions. These developments raise a critical question: does the formation of alliances constitute a viable option for opposition parties aspiring to power? Put differently: could alliances be the winning formula for the opposition parties in their attempts to circumvent the glaring paucity of their numbers and become a force to be reckoned with?