Bonus Contracts Research Articles

Are CEOS Incentivized to Avoid Corporate Taxes? - Empirical Evidence on Managerial Bonus Contracts

markdownabstract__Abstract__ In this paper, we test empirically whether there is a relationship between corporate income taxes and CEO bonus payments. Using Compustat and ExecuComp data from 1992 to 2010, we find mixed results. Looking at the whole sample, the average bonus contract rewards tax savings excessively in comparison to other determinants of corporate net income. A possible ex- planation is that managers require to be compensated for the additional risk inherent in running an aggressive tax strategy. In accordance with previous lit- erature, we document a substantial heterogeneity in compensation practices across industries. It appears that our main result is driven by firms in the In- dustrial and Retail sectors. We further find that companies with greater tax planning opportunities, for example by virtue of size or operations abroad, are more likely to condition the CEO’s bonus on corporate income taxes.

Bank Bonuses and Bailouts

This paper shows that bonus contracts may arise endogenously as a response to agency problems within banks, and analyzes how compensation schemes change in reaction to anticipated bailouts. If there is a risk‐shifting problem, bailout expectations lead to steeper bonus schemes and even more risk taking. If there is an effort problem, the compensation scheme becomes flatter and effort decreases. If both types of agency problems are present, a sufficiently large increase in bailout perceptions makes it optimal for a welfare‐maximizing regulator to impose caps on bank bonuses. In contrast, raising managers' liability can be counterproductive.

Bonus pools and the informativeness principle

Previous work on moral-hazard problems has shown that, under certain conditions, bonus contracts create optimal individual incentives for risk-neutral workers. In our paper we demonstrate that, if a firm employs at least two workers, it may further benefit from combining worker compensation via a bonus-pool contract and relative performance evaluation. Such combination leads to saved rents under a wide class of luck distributions. In addition, if the employer is wealth-constrained, complementing individual bonus contracts by the possibility of pooling bonuses can increase the set of implementable effort levels. All our results hold even though workers' outputs are technically and stochastically independent so that, in view of Holmstrom's informativeness principle, individual bonus contracts would be expected to dominate bonus-pool contracts.

Optimal Delegated Search with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard

The paper studies a model of delegated search. The distribution of search revenues is unknown to the principal and has to be elicited from the agent in order to design the optimal search policy. At the same time, the search process is unobservable, requiring search to be self-enforcing. The two information asymmetries are mutually enforcing each other; if one is relaxed, delegated search is efficient. With both asymmetries prevailing simultaneously, search is almost surely inefficient (it is stopped too early). Second-best remuneration is shown to optimally utilize a menu of simple bonus contracts. In contrast to standard adverse selection problems, indirect nonlinear tariffs are strictly dominated.

Why do managers avoid EPS dilution? Evidence from debt–equity choice

Survey evidence reveals that managers prefer to avoid dilution of earnings per share (EPS), though financial theory suggests it is irrelevant in firm valuation. We explore contracting and behavioral explanations for this apparent paradox using a large sample of debt–equity issuers. We first provide evidence that firms with greater agency conflicts between managers and shareholders are more likely to use EPS as a performance measure in bonus contracts. After controlling for possible endogeneity related to compensation contract design, we find that managers are more likely to avoid earnings dilution when their bonus compensation explicitly depends upon EPS performance. This effect is increasing in the magnitude of bonus compensation for this subset of firms; we document no such associations for the firms that do not use EPS in setting bonus pay. Additional tests of firms’ speed of adjustment to target leverage ratios and firms’ debt conservatism levels indicate that explicitly rewarding executives on EPS performance helps to resolve underleveraging problems. We also find that clientele effects are associated with managers’ aversion to earnings dilution. Our findings provide a deeper understanding of the factors that underlie the use of accounting performance in compensation contracts and new evidence on the implications of the contracting role of accounting in firm decision-making.

The Effect of Contract Framing on Budgetary Slack and Performance

We examine the effect of contract framing on subordinates’ propensity to create budgetary slack and subsequent performance. The contract is designed in economically equivalent penalty and bonus forms, with a reporting bonus (penalty) associated with reporting budgeted production accurately and a production bonus (penalty) associated with beating (not meeting) a budget target. By design, this contract creates a direct link between the budgeting component and the effort (performance) component. In such a setting, the effects of contract framing may lead to different behavioral responses than previously examined or predicted. We find that under bonus-framed contracts individuals create budgetary slack by underreporting their productive capabilities. Consistent with prospect theory, we find evidence that subordinates working under penalty-framed contracts over-report their capabilities. This reporting of optimistic slack is an interesting finding. The results suggest that under penalty-framed contracts subordinates are more likely to over-report their capabilities, whereas subordinates under bonus-framed contracts are more likely to under-report their capabilities. The findings demonstrate that penalty contracts impact how individuals report their capabilities, suggesting that penalty contracts may be more advantageous than bonus contracts in some settings.

Bubbles and Incentives: An Experiment on Asset Markets

We explore the effects of competitive incentives and of their time horizon on the evolution of both asset prices and trading activity in experimental asset markets. We compare i) a no-bonus treatment based on Smith, Suchanek and Williams (1988); ii) a short-term bonus treatment in which bonuses are assigned to the best performers at the end of each trading period; iii) a long-term bonus treatment in which bonuses are assigned to the best performers at the end of the 15 periods of the market. We find that the existence of bonus contracts does not increase the likelihood of bubbles but it affects their severity, depending on the time horizon of bonuses. Markets with long-term bonus contracts experience lower price deviations and a lower turnover of assets than markets with either no bonuses or long-term bonus contracts. Short-term bonus contracts increase price deviations but only when markets include a higher share of male traders. At the individual level, the introduction of bonus contracts increases the trading activity of males, probably due to their higher competitiveness. Finally, both mispricing and asset turnover are lower when the pool of traders is more risk-averse.

Bank Bonuses and Bail-Outs

This paper shows that bonus contracts may arise endogenously as a response to agency problems within banks, and analyzes how compensation schemes change in reaction to anticipated bail-outs. If there is a risk-shifting problem, bail-out expectations lead to steeper bonus schemes and even more risk-taking. If there is an effort problem, the compensation scheme becomes flatter and effort decreases. If both types of agency problems are present, a sufficiently large increase in bailout perceptions makes it optimal for a welfare-maximizing regulator to impose caps on bank bonuses. In contrast, raising managers’ liability can be counterproductive.

Earnings and Cash Flows in CEO Annual Bonus Contracts

Earnings and Cash Flows in CEO Annual Bonus Contracts

Voluntary Clawback Adoption and the Use of Financial Measures in CFO Bonus Plans

Firms trade-off CFOs’ fiduciary duties against their decision-making duties when designing CFO bonus plans. Decreasing bonus incentives tied to financial measures benefits CFOs’ fiduciary responsibilities at the expense of motivating their decision making duties. As prior research indicates that clawbacks increase personal misreporting costs through the loss of previously awarded compensation, we examine whether clawbacks allow firms to increase incentives in CFO bonus contracts. Based on a sample of U.S. firms between 2007 and 2013, we find that clawbacks are associated with greater CFO bonus incentives. We also find the increase in incentives to be more pronounced for CFOs relative to other executives. Our results are moderated by firms’ susceptibility to misreporting. The relation between clawbacks and incentives is weaker when firms experienced internal control deficiencies, have larger abnormal accruals, when CFOs are more vulnerable to pressure from CEOs, and when audit committees have less financial expertise and prestige.

Relationships between Accounting Performance and Career Decisions

Despite the theoretical prescription of a non-zero weight on an organizational performance indicator in bonus contracts, we know little about the effect of organizational performance on the personnel decisions of workers whose contribution to the organizational performance is limited. This paper empirically examines whether performance of an organization, measured in return on assets (ROA), affects decisions to promote or dismiss executives in the organization and explores potential moderators of the relationship. In a sample of 4,657 executive-years in a Korean conglomerate, I find that (1) the likelihoods of promotions (dismissals) are positively (negatively) associated with corporate and segment ROAs; (2) the association exists only when promotions involve hierarchical advancement; (3) it is significant only for executives at lower ranks or with lower managerial responsibility; and (4) it is stronger when there are greater inter-organizational interdependencies. The findings suggest probable mechanisms that help large organizations to mitigate promotion-related constraints and to retain the intensity of promotion-based incentives even for organizational performance.

Sticks and Carrots: The Effect of Contract Frame on Effort in Incomplete Contracts

ABSTRACT In this study, we examine the effect of incentive contract framing on agent effort in an incomplete contract setting. Prior research suggests that when governed by complete incentive contracts, agents exert greater effort under penalty contracts relative to bonus contracts. However, in an incomplete contract setting, in which the incentive contract does not govern all tasks for which the agent is responsible, the agent's trust in the principal is relevant. In this setting, we predict that bonus contracts create a more trusting environment, and this effect spills over to tasks not governed by the incentive contract, such that bonus contracts elicit greater effort on these tasks as compared to penalty contracts. We develop and experimentally validate a theoretical model of the effects of contract frame on trust and effort in this incomplete contract setting. The main intuition behind the model is that the framing of an incentive contract affects the degree to which the contract terms are interpreted by the agent as a signal of mistrust. More specifically, penalty contracts engender greater distrust than do bonus contracts and, therefore, when contracts are incomplete, penalty contracts lead to lower effort on tasks not governed by the contract than do bonus contracts.

Salesforce Contracting Under Demand Censorship

We study salesforce contracting in an environment where excess demand results in lost sales and the demand information is censored by the inventory level. In our model, a firm contracts with a risk-neutral sales agent with limited liability whose effort increases the demand stochastically. The firm designs the incentive contract and invests in inventory; the agent decides the sales effort. We find that the sales-quota-based bonus contract is optimal in such an environment, and the quota should be set equal to the inventory level when the first-best solution is not attainable. We further reveal that demand censorship can introduce peculiar effects on the optimal sales effort and service level that the firm implements. From our analysis of the additive and multiplicative effort cases, we find that in the additive effort case, it can be optimal, under demand censorship, for the firm to induce an effort and maintain a service level both greater than those under the first-best solution. Scenarios also exist where the firm should induce zero effort. For the multiplicative effort case, the optimal sales effort under demand censorship is lower than the first-best effort, whereas the optimal service level is higher than the first-best service level. The agent earns zero rent in the additive effort case but may earn a positive rent in the multiplicative effort case. Finally, our numerical analysis shows that demand censorship can have a significant negative impact on the value of contracting with the sales agent, especially when the sales margin is low and the market uncertainty is high.

Threshold Incentives and Sales Variance

In this paper, we analyze the impact of two forms of commonly used threshold‐based incentive schemes on the observed sales variability. The first form of the incentive comprises an additional marginal payment on crossing a specified sales threshold and the second form of the incentive scheme comprises a lumpsum bonus payment on crossing the predetermined sales threshold. We model the effect of such incentives under two specific scenarios: an exclusive dealership selling a single product and a non‐exclusive dealer selling two competing products. For an exclusive dealer, we show that a bonus contract not only increases the expected sales, but, more importantly, decreases the sales (order) variance. Consequently, the bonus‐based scheme allows the manufacturer to regulate sales variance better. With a non‐exclusive dealer, the sales variance increases substantially with an additional marginal payment contract. However, our analysis suggests that the bonus contract continues to perform better in this case, too, if the threshold level is set appropriately using the underlying demand distribution.

The Choice of Different Types of Subjectivity in CEO Annual Bonus Contracts

ABSTRACTIn assessing the performance of the CEO, subjectivity by the board of directors is often present in one form or another. We specifically focus on: (1) the ex ante option to ex post override a formula-based contract (“discretionary bonus”), and (2) the ex ante absence of any formula in a contract (“subjective weights”). We argue that the two types of deviations are driven by different contracting problems, which relate to whether post-contract information does or does not affect the agent's optimal action choice. We refer to these different contracting problems as problems of risk and problems of noncongruity, respectively, and hypothesize that discretionary bonuses are used for risk-reduction purposes, while subjective weights on different performance dimensions are used for congruity-improvement purposes. Our results are consistent with our expectations, showing that the use of the different types of subjectivity is consistent with optimal contracting considerations.Data Availability: All data are publicly available from the sources identified in the text.

Job matching when employment contracts suffer from moral hazard

We consider a job matching model where the relationships between firms and wealth-constrained workers suffer from moral hazard. Specifically, effort on the job is non-contractible so that parties that are matched negotiate a bonus contract. Higher unemployment benefits affect the workers' outside option. The latter is improved for low-skilled workers. Hence they receive a larger share of the surplus, which strengthens their effort incentives and increases productivity. Effects are reversed for high-skilled workers. Moreover, raising benefit payments affects the proportion of successful matches, which induces some firms to exit the economy and causes unemployment to increase.

Individual vs. Relative Performance Pay with Envious Workers and Non-Verifiable Performance

In a moral-hazard environment, I compare the profitabilities of a rank-order tournament and independent bonus contracts when a firm employs two envious workers whose individual performances are not verifiable. Whereas the bonus scheme must then be self-enforcing, the tournament is contractible. Yet the former incentive regime outperforms the latter as long as credibility problems are not too severe. This is due the fact that the tournament requires unequal pay across peers with certainty, thereby imposing large inequity premium costs on the firm. For a simple example, I show that the more envious the agents are, the larger is the range of interest rates for which the bonus scheme dominates the tournament.

The Joint Effect of Competition Intensity and Competition Type on the Use of Customer Satisfaction Measures in Executive Annual Bonus Contracts

This paper empirically examines the interactive effect of competition intensity and competition type on the use of customer satisfaction measures in executives’ annual bonus contracts. Specifically, we predict a stronger association between competition intensity in an industry and the use of customer satisfaction measures in executives’ annual bonus contracts when the competition is non-price-based than when the competition is price-based. Using hand-collected data from S&P 1500 firms’ disclosures of the use of customer satisfaction measures in executive bonus contracts in 2006 and 2010 proxy statements, we find results consistent with our prediction. Our results are robust to alternative measures of competition type and competition intensity. We also find similar results when we use the weight on customer satisfaction measures in executive bonus contracts as the dependent variable. Our study extends the literature on the effect of competition on the design of managerial incentives by distinguishing between competition intensity and competition type and providing the first large-sample empirical evidence on the joint effect of these two dimensions of competition on the incentive use of an important nonfinancial performance measure.

Job Matching When Employment Contracts Suffer from Moral Hazard

We consider a job matching model where the relationships between firms and wealth-constrained workers suffer from moral hazard. Specifically, effort on the job is non-contractible so that parties that are matched negotiate a bonus contract. Higher unemployment benefits affect the workers’ outside option. The latter is improved for low skilled workers. Hence they receive a larger share of the surplus, which strengthens their effort incentives and increases productivity. Effects are reversed for high skilled labor. Moreover, raising benefit payments affects the proportion of successful matches which induces some firms to exit the economy and causes unemployment to increase.

The association between non-financial performance measures in executive compensation contracts and earnings management

Executive compensation, especially cash bonus compensation, has come under fire by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the US Federal government, and the media for its role in the current economic crisis. Specifically, the SEC has argued that some compensation packages provide incentives for risk-taking that may undermine shareholder value over the long-term. Short-term incentive payments to executives in the form of cash bonuses are mostly contingent on reaching targets of accounting-related measures or financial performance measures (FPMs). However, the incentives from these payments may lead to accrual manipulation and earnings management (EM). Alternative measures are non-financial performance measures (NFPMs). We expect that firms that employ NFPMs in bonus contracts will have a lower prevalence of EM, since these measures tend to focus executives on the long-term. In this paper, we examine the type of performance measures used by firms in the S&P 500 index in their cash bonus compensation. We find that firms that use both FPMs and NFPMs have lower discretionary accruals compared to firms that use only FPMs, consistent with lower income-increasing EM. However, we do not find evidence of a reduction in EM behavior using the incidence of meeting or just beating analyst earnings benchmarks, another common EM proxy. In additional tests on a subset of firms with equity offerings, in which incentives for income-increasing manipulation are likely high, we find that firms with NFPMs have lower discretionary accruals. The implication is that NFPMs can be used in compensation contracts to reduce EM behavior and mitigate erroneous executive compensation. This is important to investors as well as regulators, especially in light of the recent debate on compensation reform.