Combating the Collision Horror: The Interstate Commerce Commission and Automatic Train Control, 1900—1939 MARK ALDRICH This factor of humanjudgment is the factor which an automatic train stop is designed to eliminate. [Inter state Commerce Commission, 1922] The relative and not the intrinsic value of train control must be considered, and I am here to tell you that in my opinion, as a relative life saver it isn’t worth the money it costs. [Alexander Holley Rudd, 1926]' On the morning of January 12, 1919, New York Central train no. 17, the Wolverine, left Rochester for Buffalo at 2:54 a.m., an hour and thirty-one minutes late. It was traveling west on track 1 of four main tracks, all of which were protected with automatic block signals. At 3:35 it arrived at signal station 37, an interlocking plant that con trolled crossovers between the tracks. There the train stopped; engineman Gibbons informed the tower man that his locomotive was not steaming properly and asked for an engine. At 3:07 a.m., just thirteen minutes behind the Wolverine, train no. 11 operated by engineman Friedley also left Rochester for Buffalo on track 1. At 3:42 a.m., near South Byron, New York, it collided at about 50 miles per hour with the rear end of train no. 17. The impact knocked the Wolverine about 250 feet forward on the track and telescoped the rear Dr. Aldrich is professor of economics at Smith College. He would like to thank Dr. Michele Aldrich and the Technology and Culture referees for helpful comments on earlier drafts. Thanks are also due to Mr. Albert West of the Interstate Commerce Commission library for his assistance, and to Dr. Alan Leviton of the California Academy of Sciences for help with the figures. ‘Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), “In the Matter of Automatic TrainControl Devices,” Report 69 (1922): 258—79, quote on 276; Alexander Holley Rudd, “Automatic Train Control,” Engineers and Engineering 43 (January 1926): 20-29, quote on 23 (emphasis in original). Rudd was the Pennsylvania Railroad’s chief signal engineer.© 1993 by the Society for the History of Technology. All rights reserved. 0040-165X/93/3401-0004$01.00 49 50 Mark Aldrich Fig. 1.—The wreck of the Wolverine at South Byron, New York, 1919. The Canfield, in which all the deaths occurred, has the Croton Falls telescoped inside it. (Interstate Commerce Commission, “Report of the Chief of the Bureau of Safety regarding Investigation of an Accident on the New York Central Railroad Near South Byron, New York on January 12, 1919,” in Accident Reports [Washington, D.C., 1920].) car, the Croton Falls, entirely through a Pullman named the Canfield (see fig. 1). Twenty-two people were killed—all in the Canfield—and seventy-one injured. The signal controlling entry into the block that train 17 occupied (the rear home signal) was approximately 3,400 feet east of train no. 17; a warning signal (the distant signal) for that block was nearly 5,000 feet east of the home signal. In spite of the protection from automatic block signals, engineman Gibbons whistled his flagman back to protect his train as the rules required. The flagman testified that he placed a torpedo (an explosive warning device) on the rails about twenty car lengths behind train 17, then continued back, dropping a flare and swinging a lantern when he was passed by train 11 about twenty-five lengths from his own train. How could train 11 have run a distant signal and a home signal and ignored the flagman’s warnings? Although engineman Friedley later swore that the signals showed green, they were in perfect working order and showing red immediately after the accident. Friedley had been without rest (but not on duty) for eighteen hours and probably fell asleep. He also testified that he saw no flagman or flare but did see lanterns on the ground about twelve telegraph poles distant. He thought that they The Interstate Commerce Commission and Automatic Train Control 51 were for track 3. He next saw the rear marker of the Wolverine and applied the brakes. Ten seconds later, the collision occurred. It was a cold night...
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