Bloc Voting Research Articles

Female Ballots: The Impact of the Nineteenth Amendment

The Impact of the Nineteenth Amendment Although a Ladies' Home Journal editorial urged women to clean house in the 1920 election and start housekeeping again with good, honestly made furniture, not all looked upon the innovation of nationwide woman suffrage with such relish. Many politicians feared the potential power of a monolithic female voting bloc even after the I920 election did not produce one. Speaking at a League of Women Voters banquet, Nathan L. Miller, Governor of New York, criticized the concept of an organization of women voters and warned that seeking political influence in ways other than through participation in the two major political parties would be a menace to American institutions. The League of Women Voters (created out of the disbanded membership of the National American Woman Suffrage Association) found the governor's comments to be as inappropriate as they were inaccurate. Following Carrie Chapman Catt's advice at its founding, the League was determined to remain an educational and nonpartisan organization. Neither its leadership nor its rank and file had intentions of forming a women's bloc. Yet League members, along with other women who had been active in the suffrage campaign, expected that their votes would make a difference in their society.1

Racial Voting in a Biracial City

In this analysis of three biracial 1982 New Orleans municipal run-off elections—mayor, civil sheriff, and district judge-we examine the relationship of race and class to political mobilization and vote choice, and racial bloc voting. We found the elections characterized by high voter turnout, low voter dropoff in subordinate elections, and bloc voting by both whites and blacks (but especially by blacks). Class was found relevant only in locating white support for black candidates. Furthermore, the data analyzed suggest the need to reexamine the impact of electoral institutions on electoral behavior.

Measuring racial bloc voting is difficult for small jurisdictions

Measuring racial bloc voting is difficult for small jurisdictions

The Political Culture of Middle-Period United States

Kermit L. Hall. The Politics of Justice : lower Federal Judicial Selection and the Second Party System, 1829-61. Lincoln : University of Nebraska Press, 1979. 268 + xvii pp. Daniel Walker Howe. The Political Culture of the American Whigs. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1979. 404 + vii pp. Richard B. Latner. The Presidency of Andrew Jackson: White House Politics, 1829-1837. Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1979. 291 + ix pp. Harry L. Watson. Jacksonian Politics and Community Conflict: The Emergence of the Second American Party System in Cumberland County North Carolina. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1981.354 + xii pp. Since the publication of Lee Benson's The Concept of Jacksonian Democ- racy more than twenty years ago, the progressive, socioeconomic inter- pretation of the Jacksonian period has been under heavy siege. A number of historians, the so-called "new political historians," following Benson's footsteps, have argued that it was ethnocultural factors such as ethnicity and religion that shaped antebellum voting patterns. Challenging the claims of the progressive historians, Benson concludes, in his study of middle-period New York, that "the stand of the major parties on socioeconomic issues had relatively little effect upon bloc voting." Instead, New Yorkers cast their ballots in response "to factors initially associated with positive and negative reference groups and subsequently with fulfillment of political roles."1 A student of Benson, Ronald Formisano, tested his mentor's hypotheses in Michigan and finds similar results. It was cultural and moral issues that divided the parties, with the Democrats appealing to the "antievangelical social groups who rejected the moral society which pietist Protestants pro- moted through Anti-masonry and then Whiggery." Formisano challenged his colleagues to confront the "brute fact that large portions of the electorate do not have meaningful beliefs, even on issues that have formed the basis of intense controversy for substantial periods of time."2

The political process and the Jews in Britain

A more complex pressure‐group model is a more accurate explanation of Anglo‐Jewish political behaviour at the constituency level than any ethnic bloc vote thesis, the evidence for which does not exist. The alleged ethnic bias of Jews towards the Conservatives after 1970 is questionable when allowance is made for the socio‐economic profile. However, the postwar swing towards the Conservatives is accepted and complementary electoral behaviour, or growing conservatism, can also be seen in the USA and Australia. The religious/cultural factor in this trend is asserted in the context of surveys and historical data on Jews in other countries.

Southern Reaction To the Second Reconstruction: the Case of South Carolina

WATHILE it is clear that forces such as the Civil Rights Movement and the South's increasing industrialization and urbanization have had a profound effect on Southern politics, there is uncertainty about what will replace, or has replaced, the one-party, race-dominated politics described by Key.' Three models of the South's reaction to the Reconstruction2 have been proposed: convergence, realignment and dealignment.3 The convergence model states that the South will react to the Second Reconstruction by replacing its traditional style of politics with a two-party, competitive type of politics similar to that found elsewhere in the country. In this new Southern politics, political preferences will be more a matter of social status than of race. According to the convergence model, class issues will become more important, and race issues will become relatively less important in Southern politics. The realignment model states that party competition will increase in the South as a result of efforts on the part of the white electorate to maintain the pre-Second Reconstruction form of politics despite the challenges presented by the enfranchisement of a large number of black voters. White Southerners will maintain the pre-Second Reconstruction form of politics by uniformly shifting their party loyalties from the black-supported Democratic party to the Republican party. Thus, according to the realignment model, race will continue to be the dominant factor influencing political preferences in the region. The dealignment model also states that party competition will increase in the region. Additionally, the dealignment model, like the realignment model, states that (1) race will continue to be the dominant factor influencing political preferences in southern politics, and (2) white Southerners, in order to maintain the pre-Second Reconstruction form of politics, will abandon the pro-integrationist Democratic party. The dealignment model, however, does not hold that the Republican party will benefit from this shift in party loyalties. Instead, the dealignment model hypothesizes that white Southerners will become unattached to any party, and thus will constitute a floating bloc of voters available to whatever candidate best represents their interests.4

Electoral Stability and Electoral Change: The Case of Dutch Catholics

Pendant presque cinquante ans, les catholiques hollandais ont voté exclusivement pour un parti politique particulier: le Parti catholique. Ils ont constitué de beaucoup la sous-culture politique la plus unie de l'Europe occidentale. Puis, en 1967, la base du parti a commencé à s'effriter. En 1972, it n'y avail plus qu'une petite fraction des catholiques qui votait encore pour le parti; en 1980, le parti n'existait plus. Le cas des catholiques hollandais donne l'occasion d'évaluer les théories du vote religieux, particulièrement les théories de la persistance des clivages religieux dans les sociétés industrielles et celles sur la stabilité et le changement électoraux. Les conclusions indiquent que l'autoritarisme de l'Eglise, les initiatives économiques et sociales du clergé et des chefs laics ainsi que les forces économiques expliquent la cohésion exceptionnelle d'avant 1967. Le Parti catholique n'a joué qu'un rôle réduit. La dissolution du bloc catholique pendant les années soixante et le déclin concomitant de la clientèle du Parti catholique résultaient, pour une bonne part, des initiatives des chefs de l'Eglise. Les facteurs politiques ont joué un rôle secondaire. Non seulement l'Eglise retirait-elle ses sanctions, mais encore les catholiques étaient encouragés à explorer de nouveaux moyens de participation sociale, religieuse et politique. A partir de données agrégées et d'enquêtes, l'étude conclut à l'importance des élites et des forces économiques tant pour maintenir le clivage religieux que pour altérer les bases des partis politiques. Les résultats suggèrent également que les blocs religieux comprenant un éventail de classes s'adaptent mieux aux processus d'industrialisation que les mouvements on partis socialistes, un point qui pourrait s'avérer utile pour expliquer le succès des partis religieux ailleurs.

Bloc Voting and The Freshman Justice Revisited

Previous articleNext article No AccessResearch NotesBloc Voting and The Freshman Justice RevisitedEdward V. Heck, and Melinda Gann HallEdward V. Heck Search for more articles by this author , and Melinda Gann Hall Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Politics Volume 43, Number 3Aug., 1981 Sponsored by the Southern Political Science Association Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.2307/2130641 Views: 7Total views on this site Citations: 27Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1981 Southern Political Science AssociationPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Madelyn Fife, Greg Goelzhauser, Stephen T. Loertscher Selecting Chief Justices by Peer Vote, State Politics & Policy Quarterly 21, no.22 (Jun 2021): 165–194.https://doi.org/10.1177/1532440020945285Rachael Houston, Siyu Li, Timothy R. Johnson Learning to Speak Up: Acclimation Effects and Supreme Court Oral Argument, Justice System Journal 42, no.22 (Feb 2021): 115–129.https://doi.org/10.1080/0098261X.2021.1881668Elisha Carol Savchak, Jennifer Barnes Bowie A Bottom-Up Account of State Supreme Court Opinion Writing, Justice System Journal 37, no.22 (Jul 2015): 94–114.https://doi.org/10.1080/0098261X.2015.1012571Christopher E. Smith, Madhavi M. McCall, Michael A. McCall The Roberts Court and Criminal Justice: An Empirical Assessment, American Journal of Criminal Justice 40, no.22 (Aug 2014): 416–440.https://doi.org/10.1007/s12103-014-9271-5Hemant Sharma, Colin Glennon A Case for Supreme Court Term Limits? The Changing Ideological Relationship between Appointing Presidents and Supreme Court Justices, Politics & Policy 41, no.22 (Apr 2013): 267–297.https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12008Ryan J. Owens, Justin P. Wedeking Justices and Legal Clarity: Analyzing the Complexity of U.S. Supreme Court Opinions, Law & Society Review 45, no.44 (Dec 2011): 1027–1061.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5893.2011.00464.xDrew Noble Lanier Acclimation Effects and the Chief Justice: The Influence of Tenure and Role on the Decisional Behavior of the Court’s Leader, 1888-2007, American Politics Research 39, no.44 (Jul 2011): 682–723.https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X11401813Drew Lanier Acclimation Effects and the Chief Justice: The Influence of Tenure on the Decisional Behavior of the Court’s Leader, 1888-2007, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2011).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1846631Hemant Sharma, Colin Glennon Ideological Congruity between Appointing Presidents and Supreme Court Justices, 1937-2008, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2011).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1852678Ryan J. Owens, Justin Wedeking Justices and Legal Clarity: Analyzing the Complexity of Supreme Court Opinions, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2010).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1695775Banks Miller, Brett Curry Expertise, Experience, and Ideology on Specialized Courts: The Case of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Law & Society Review 43, no.44 (Dec 2009): 839–864.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5893.2009.00390.xPaul M. CollinsJr. The Consistency of Judicial Choice, The Journal of Politics 70, no.33 (Jul 2015): 861–873.https://doi.org/10.1017/S002238160808081XErin B. Kaheny, Susan Brodie Haire, Sara C. Benesh Change over Tenure: Voting, Variance, and Decision Making on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, American Journal of Political Science 52, no.33 (Jul 2008): 490–503.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00325.xPamela C. Corley, Artemus Ward, Amy Steigerwalt Deciding to Agree: Explaining Consensual Behavior on the United States Supreme Court, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2008).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1120522Mark S. Hurwitz, Oseph V. Stefko Acclimation and Attitudes: “Newcomer” Justices and Precedent Conformance on the Supreme Court, Political Research Quarterly 57, no.11 (Mar 2004): 121–129.https://doi.org/10.1177/106591290405700110Virginia A. Hettinger, Stefanie A. Lindquist, Wendy L. Martinek Acclimation Effects and Separate Opinion Writing in the U.S. Courts of Appeals*, Social Science Quarterly 84, no.44 (Dec 2003): 792–810.https://doi.org/10.1046/j.0038-4941.2003.08404009.xC. L. Ostberg, Matthew E. Wetstein, Craig R. Ducat Acclimation Effects on the Supreme Court of Canada: A Cross-Cultural Examination of Judicial Folklore *, Social Science Quarterly 84, no.33 (Aug 2003): 704–722.https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6237.8403013Christopher E. Smith The Rehnquist Court and Criminal Justice, Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 19, no.22 (Jul 2016): 161–181.https://doi.org/10.1177/1043986203251607Virginia A. Hettinger, Stefanie A. Lindquist, Wendy L. Martinek Separate Opinion Writing On The United States Courts Of Appeals, American Politics Research 31, no.33 (Jul 2016): 215–250.https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X03251196Saul Brenner, Timothy M. Hagle Opinion writing and acclimation effect, Political Behavior 18, no.33 (Sep 1996): 235–261.https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01498601Robert L. Dudley The Freshman Effect and Voting Alignments, American Politics Quarterly 21, no.33 (Nov 2016): 360–367.https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X9302100308Timothy M. Hagle A NEW TEST FOR THE FRESHMAN EFFECT, Southeastern Political Review 21, no.22 (Nov 2008): 289–308.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-1346.1993.tb00364.xTerry Bowen, John M. Scheb Reassessing the “freshman effect”: The voting bloc alignment of new justices on the United States Supreme Court, 1921–90, Political Behavior 15, no.11 (Mar 1993): 1–14.https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00993413Paula C. Arledge, Edward V. Heck A Freshman Justice Confronts the Constitution: Justice O'Connor and the First Amendment, Western Political Quarterly 45, no.33 (Sep 2016): 761–772.https://doi.org/10.1177/106591299204500311David W. Allen Voting Blocs and the Freshman Justice On State Supreme Courts, Western Political Quarterly 44, no.33 (Sep 2016): 727–747.https://doi.org/10.1177/106591299104400313T. M. Hagle, H. J. Spaeth Voting Fluidity and the Attitudinal Model of Supreme Court Decision Making, Political Research Quarterly 44, no.11 (Mar 1991): 119–128.https://doi.org/10.1177/106591299104400107 Saul Brenner Another Look at Freshman Indecisiveness on the United States Supreme Court, Polity 16, no.22 (Nov 2016): 320–328.https://doi.org/10.2307/3234610

An Investigation of the Distribution of Power in the APB and FASB

The method of self-regulation exercised by the accounting profession has been increasingly criticized in recent years with one of the most direct assaults contained in the Metcalf Staff Report, The Accounting Establishment: A Staff Study [1976]. There it is implied that effective control over policy making boards is held by several large accounting firms (the Big Eight). This power is claimed to derive from the disproportionate representation on the Accounting Principles Board (APB) and the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) maintained by the Big Eight, along with alleged control over board funding, staffing of research support groups, and representation on the overseeing Financial Accounting Foundation. Although no evidence of actual manipulation is presented, the subcommittee staff attempts to make a convincing case against the accounting establishment based on potential usurpations of the system by the Big Eight. Instigated by these and previous criticisms of private-sector policymaking in accounting, a number of changes have been made in the structure and composition of the policymaking mechanism. The accounting profession has become much more sensitive to its public image, desiring at least to convey the appearance that the standard-setting process is equitable to all interested constituencies. Thus, although bloc voting has not yet been documented (e.g., see Brown [1981]), it is still considered desirable to reduce any ostensible control by a single group such as the Big Eight. Accountants therefore should be concerned about

Race and Political Cleavage

A persistent and well identified cleavage in local politics is the behavioral or act cleavage activated by racial identification. ' Racial cleavages have been observed in those elections where either a candidate or an issue has been closely associated with racial concerns (Walton, 1972: 50-55). The observed cleavages have been normally identified in local elections with the appearance of cohesive or bloc voting patterns. Numerous studies have related these bloc voting patterns to a racial identification variable and have noted that such a variable will generally override both class and status variables in explanatory significance (Bacote, 1954; Pomper, 1960; Walker, 1959; Walton, 1972; Wilson, 1965). The emergence of racially motivated bloc voting patterns has been well established, for example, in those local elections where a Black candidate is running for the city's chief executive post (Bartley, 1970; Cho, 1974; Glantz, 1959; Hadden et al., 1967; Hahn and Almy, 1971; Miller, 1957; Pettigrew, 1972). Limited evidence also suggests that bloc voting among Blacks also emerges in local referendum voting (Cho, 1974; Bowman et al., 1972;

Judicial Career Patterns and Majority Opinion Assignment on the Supreme Court

Previous articleNext article No AccessResearch NotesJudicial Career Patterns and Majority Opinion Assignment on the Supreme CourtElliot E. SlotnickElliot E. Slotnick Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Politics Volume 41, Number 2May, 1979 Sponsored by the Southern Political Science Association Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.2307/2129783 Views: 5Total views on this site Citations: 15Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1979 Southern Political Science AssociationPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Erin B. Kaheny, John Szmer, Robert K. Christensen Status characteristics and their intersectionality: majority opinion assignment in state supreme courts, Politics, Groups, and Identities 8, no.55 (Feb 2019): 894–917.https://doi.org/10.1080/21565503.2019.1569538Drew Noble Lanier Acclimation Effects and the Chief Justice: The Influence of Tenure and Role on the Decisional Behavior of the Court’s Leader, 1888-2007, American Politics Research 39, no.44 (Jul 2011): 682–723.https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X11401813Drew Lanier Acclimation Effects and the Chief Justice: The Influence of Tenure on the Decisional Behavior of the Court’s Leader, 1888-2007, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2011).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1846631Solomon Omoregie Ukhuegbe Recruitment and Tenure of Supreme Court Justices in Nigeria, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2011).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2034920Forrest Maltzman, Paul J. Wahlbeck A Conditional Model of Opinion Assignment on the Supreme Court, Political Research Quarterly 57, no.44 (Dec 2004): 551–563.https://doi.org/10.1177/106591290405700404Lori Hausegger, Stacia Haynie Judicial Decisionmaking and the Use of Panels in the Canadian Supreme Court and the South African Appellate Division, Law <html_ent glyph="@amp;" ascii="&"/> Society Review 37, no.33 (Sep 2003): 635–657.https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-5893.3703006C. L. Ostberg, Matthew E. Wetstein, Craig R. Ducat Acclimation Effects on the Supreme Court of Canada: A Cross-Cultural Examination of Judicial Folklore *, Social Science Quarterly 84, no.33 (Aug 2003): 704–722.https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6237.8403013Saul Brenner, Timothy M. Hagle Opinion writing and acclimation effect, Political Behavior 18, no.33 (Sep 1996): 235–261.https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01498601Timothy M. Hagle A NEW TEST FOR THE FRESHMAN EFFECT, Southeastern Political Review 21, no.22 (Nov 2008): 289–308.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-1346.1993.tb00364.xTerry Bowen, John M. Scheb Reassessing the “freshman effect”: The voting bloc alignment of new justices on the United States Supreme Court, 1921–90, Political Behavior 15, no.11 (Mar 1993): 1–14.https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00993413J. F. Kobylka Leadership on the Supreme Court of the United States: Chief Justice Burger and the Establishment Clause, Political Research Quarterly 42, no.44 (Dec 1989): 545–568.https://doi.org/10.1177/106591298904200407Peter J. Bergerson JUDICIAL BACKGROUND TRAITS UNDER THE MERIT SELECTION PLAN: THE MISSOURI COURT PLAN REVISITED, Southeastern Political Review 15, no.22 (Nov 2008): 169–188.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-1346.1987.tb00241.x Edward V. Heck , and Melinda Gann Hall Bloc Voting and The Freshman Justice Revisited, The Journal of Politics 43, no.33 (Oct 2015): 852–860.https://doi.org/10.2307/2130641 Steven A. Peterson Dissent in American Courts, The Journal of Politics 43, no.22 (Oct 2015): 412–434.https://doi.org/10.2307/2130375 Gregory J. Rathjen Conventional Wisdoms Don't Die Easily: Judicial Career Patterns and the Context of Majority Opinion Assignment, The Journal of Politics 42, no.44 (Oct 2015): 1170–1172.https://doi.org/10.2307/2130746

Factions in Committees: The U.S. House of Representatives

This study undertakes a major reanalysis of the decision-making processes in eight committees of the U.S. House of Representatives–Agriculture, Education and Labor, Interior and Insular Affairs, International Relations, Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Post Office and Civil Service, Public Works and Ways and Means. While past studies have relied mainly on interviews, this study uses a data base composed of recorded committee roll-call votes. The analysis consists of a Q-component analysis to determine voting blocs or factions; an R-component analysis to discover issue dimensions; and step-wise regression and correlation utilizing demographic, political and electoral characteristics to define the nature of the voting blocs. The results are then compared with previous analyses of the same eight committees to determine what changes, if any, have occurred since the committees were last analyzed. The findings suggest that partisanship and ideology have become stronger influences on committee decision making than previously noted.

Voting Behavior of Chicago Democrats at the Illinois Constitutional Convention

By analyzing roll call voting behavior and the socioeconomic characteristics of representatives to the 1970 Illinois Constitutional Convention, this study seeks to assess: (1) the roll call cohesiveness of Chicago Democrats and other voting groups in the assembly; (2) the social, economic, and ethnic composition of major voting blocs; and (3) the kinds of issues which may tend to factionalize machine delegates. Factor analysis shows that the Chicago Democratic group was by far the most unified voting set at the Con-Con. However, given the heterogeneous elements which comprised the machine bloc, there were various roll calls—basically revolving around divergent ethnic and religious interests -which promoted substantial disunity in the ranks of the Chicago organization.

Bloc Voting on the International Court of Justice

The results of a Rice-Beyle cluster bloc analysis of votes in the International Court of Justice reveal several two- and three-judge blocs, but these blocs do not conform closely to the blocs which would be expected on the basis of the political alignments or common cultural patterns of the judges' countries. These results are reinforced by the analysis of predetermined blocs based upon the political alignments and common legal systems of the judges' countries, although the Soviet and Polish judges do show distinctive voting patterns from the rest of the Court. A conceptual framework of the judicial decision making process is then introduced to help explain the results, leading to the conclusions that while social background and personal and policy attitudes do not seem to be major factors in explaining judicial behavior of the judges, the factor of judicial role perceptions, stemming primarily from professional traming and associations, may be of great significance.

The Power of Voting Blocs: An Example

How does one measure power in a voting situation? A mathematical power index proposed by Lloyd Shapley and Martin Shubik in [3] has found wide favor among mathematicians and social scientists. In this note, I wish to use this index and some elementary game theory to analyze a particular voting situation, illustrative of a class of voting problems. The Shapley-Shubik power index is calculated as follows. Assume that voters one by one join a coalition in support of a proposal. The voter who, upon joining the coalition, changes the coalition from a losing coalition into a winning coalition is called pivotal. A voter's Shapley-Shubik power index is simply his probability of being pivotal, assuming in the absence of other information that all orders of coalition formation are equally likely. The Shapley-Shubik index is thus intuitively pleasing, and easy to calculate at least in simple cases. It is also supported by an elegant axiomatic characterization (see [1]). The problem to which I wish to apply the index concerns the distribution of power in the county government of Rock County, Wisconsin. Rock County, in southern Wisconsin, is dominated by the two cities of Janesville (population 46,000) and Beloit (population 36,000). There is often considerable rivalry between the two cities. The remainder of the county consists of small towns and rural areas. The county is governed by a Board of County Supervisors consisting of 40 members, elected from districts roughly equal in population. 11 supervisors are from the city of Beloit, 14 are from Janesville, 15 from town and rural areas. Historically, the supervisors from each city have been quite independent of one another in philosophy and voting behavior. Bloc voting by the supervisors from Beloit, or from Janesville, has not developed. I do not know about the situation in Janesville, but in Beloit there has been considerable unhappiness among city officials over this lack of cohesiveness. Surely Beloit would wield more influence if its delegation would agree-to vote as a bloc. We can analyze this situation by using the Shapley-Shubik power index to calculate the total power of Beloit's eleven supervisors if they vote independently, and if they organize as a bloc. In the first case, each supervisor will have 1/40 of the total power, and Beloit's eleven together will have 11/40 or 27M%. In the second case, there are effectively 30 voters: 29 independent supervisors, and the Beloit bloc casting 11 votes. Since 21 votes are needed to pass a measure, Beloit will pivot if it joins a coalition 11th through 21st, i.e., 11/30 of the time. Beloit will have 11/30 or 362% of the power, a considerable increase. Janesville's supervisors, who had 14/40 = 35% of the power before Beloit organized, would have 14/29 19/30 = 30'% of the power after Beloit organizes. The problem with this scenario is, of course, that if Beloit's supervisors organized as a bloc, there would be considerable pressure for Janesville's supervisors to organize also. If that happened, we would have a game of 17 voters: 15 casting a single vote, Beloit casting 11, and Janesville casting 14. We can compute the Shapley-Shubik power indices for this game by counting the lattice points in the regions labeled B, J and 0 in FIGURE 1. A point (x, y) in this figure represents a voting coalition whose xth member in order of joining is Beloit and whose yth member is Janesville. The regions B, J, 0 represent points where Beloit, Janesville or others, repectively, are pivotal. This figure shows that

The Political Use of Religions Symbols: A Case Study of the 1972 Presidential Campaign

The relationship between politics and religion in the United States has been studied by political scientists from many perspectives. Church-state relations, religious bloc voting, political issues with strong religious overtones—these and other politico-religious phenomena have long been subjects of scholarly activity within the discipline. However, the use of religious symbols in politics has been much neglected by political scientists (though not by sociologists, psychologists and scholars). Long ago Harold D. Lasswell said “It is of the utmost importance to political science to examine in detail … the processes of symbolization.” Religious symbolization in American politics urges itself upon the political analyst, moreover, because of “the unique relationship” which has existed between religion and politics throughout the history of the nation. And there are, perhaps, no richer and more concentrated examples of politico-religious symbolism than those found in the campaign oratory to which the American public is regularly subjected. Candidates for the American presidency have long resorted to the manipulation of such symbols. Hence, a presidential campaign is a good situation for the study of the political use of religious symbols. The 1972 contest between George McGovern and Richard Nixon is an excellent case study. Frequently characterized by the public press as an election to choose “a national minister” because of the manifest use of politico-religious symbols by the candidates, the campaign provides ample evidence of the uses to which religious symbolization can be applied in American politics.

Ethnicity and Religion in Philadelphia Politics, 1924-40

HISTORIANS AND POLITICAL SCIENTISTS HAVE ONLY RECENTLY COME to recognize something that was always apparent to grass-roots politicians: a voter's ethnic and religious affiliation is an important determinant of how he casts his ballot. The major substantive fruit of the behavioral revolution that is slowly overtaking American political history has been the discovery of cultural roots in voting behavior and a downgrading of economic, class and sectional interpretations. Lee Benson in a seminal study of New York during the Jacksonian period found that the stand of parties on socioeconomic issues had relatively little effect upon bloc voting; far more important were factors that stimulated reference group associations, both positive and negative. Pious Yankees, for example, were attracted to WhigAnti-Masonic appeals for state guided moral reforms; Irish Catholics were hostile.' In complementary studies of the political realignment of the 1890s, Paul Kleppner and Richard Jensen2 pursued the main thrust of Benson's reference group analysis to discover that the polarization of important segments of the voting population of selected Midwestern states between those of pietistic religious bent (Methodists and Baptists) against those of more ritualistic orientation (e.g., Catholics and Lutherans) was a major force in sustaining the political stalemate that prevailed until the 90s. The political vacillation that accompanied the realignment resulted from the shifting of party allegiance of critical blocs, particularly the German Lutherans, in response to cultural issues but little related to national political debates or

State Party Delegations in the United States House of Representatives: An Analysis of Group Action

Professor Deckard's study, based on congressional interviews, seeks to explain the varying degrees of alliance among members of different state party delegations. She considers cohesiveness (intragroup activities) and alliance behavior (externally directed behavior: bloc voting, cooperation in winning committee assignments, and delegation action on district problems). The underlying assumption is one of rational judgment by congressmen of the gains and losses to their political careers from different forms of cooperation.

Ethnic Voters and the Election of Lincoln (review)

268 civil war history strength in the 1850's as due to a "drastic drop in migration from the South and a corresponding increase from the Northwest and Middle Atlantic states," satisfactory. And finally, although a roll call analysis enabled him to chart the contours of the inter- and intraparty splits with some accuracy, a greater effort to explain the motives of the radicals , conservatives and W7higs would have been welcome. James Roger Sharp Syracuse University Ethnic Voters and the Election of Lincoln. Edited by Frederick C. Luebke. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1971. Pp. xxxii, 226. $9.75. ) W7ho elected Lincoln in 1860? Until not too long ago, many historians answered, "the Germans," whose bloc vote provided the Republican margin of victory in the Northwest. Many years ago Joseph Schafer raised some sensible doubts about this conclusion, but it was not until the 1960's that a new generation of historians, armed with quantitative techniques for analyzing voting behavior, thoroughly discredited the old conclusion. This useful collection of essays contains eleven articles on the general subject of ethnic voting in the election of 1860, ranging from the early interpretation, represented by Donnai V. Smith and others, to articles published in the 1960's by George Daniels, Robert Swierenga and Paul Kleppner, dealing, respectively, with German voting in Iowa, Dutch voting in the same state, and the religious basis of political alignments in Pittsburgh. There are also two previously unpublished essays, by Robert P. Formisano on Michigan, and James M. Bergquist on Illinois, and an introduction by the editor, Frederick Luebke. Among other virtues, the collection provides a case study of the evolution of historical concepts and methodology. The earlier writers relied heavily on such evidence as the German-American press and the campaign activities of such well-known German-Republicans as Carl Schurz and Gustav Koerner. They made only the most superficial use of election statistics, and assumed that Germans voted as a bloc, without regard to intragroup religious divisions. The more recent studies, heavily influenced by the pioneering work of Lee Benson and Samuel P. Hayes, tend to dismiss the words of politicians and editors as "elitist" sources, and focus heavily on local voting data, which is compared with laboriously-compiled information about the ethnic and religious make-up of voting units. Readers who approach this book hoping to be enlightened in the contemporary uses of quantitative analysis may be a bit bewildered by the array of statistical techniques displayed here, and by the equally striking absence of other methods. Only Paul Kleppner makes use of correlations; others merely present tables, consisting of the party vote BOOK REVIEWS269 and ethnic composition of various voting units. Without further analysis , these strings of figures are not likely to be very useful to most readers. Nowhere in the book is use made of such a basic tool as multiple regression analysis, nor are tests of statistical significance given. The recent writers have, it is safe to say, established that except in Illinois, Germans did not vote Republican in anything like the numbers previously believed, and that within the group, Protestants were much more likely to be attracted to the party of Lincoln than Catholics. As a result, they seem to agree that the slavery issue has been overrated as a determinant of voting behavior in the 1850's and that, as Formisano writes, "anti-Catholic and nativist elements" contributed "much more importantly" to the early Republican party than anti-slavery. Oddly enough, the evidence for this interpretation comes from the same sources historians have always used. W7hen a newspaper speaks of the slavery issue, these historians tend to dismiss it as "elitest" evidence , but when it talks about nativism and ethnic conflict it is cited to prove that, in Daniels' words, "Republicanism was linked, at least in the popular mind, with Know-Nothingism." None of these writers addresses himself to such questions as why it was the Republicans who tried to play down ethnic issues and stress the slavery question, while Democrats felt more comfortable when campaigns revolved around ethnic conflicts, or why Republican leaders felt the lowest common denominator of their support was anti-slavery and anti-southern sentiment . It...

A Rapid Change of Sentiment

The rapid collapse of political resistance to lowering the voting age is here noted and the potential effect of the lowering is analyzed. The prediction is also made that several political assumptions concerning youth voting, firmly held until recent times, are likely to be shattered. Among them is the assumption that young people will vote pretty much as does the general population. It is also contended that dissatisfaction among the young is more likely to divide them than produce a youth bloc vote. The old shibboleths of politics are not accepted by the young, leaving candidates for office the task of guessing what their approach to the large mass of new voters should be.