Blank Cheque Research Articles

The applicability of the Polluter Pays Principle in the field of nuclear energy in the EU

This article will examine whether the Polluter Pays Principle is formulated and applied in EU versus nuclear (Euratom) law and what consequences such application could have for the EU Member Countries, e.g., when deciding on new nuclear projects or life time extension of nuclear installations. The ECJ had already clearly accepted the Polluter Pays Principle’s function of internalization of all environmental costs. It is crystal clear that EU Institutions are required to apply the PPP, together with the Precautionary and the Proportionality Principles. The application of the PPP in the nuclear field has been emphasized in an EU Commission Recommendation of 24 October 2006. On the other hand, with Council Directive 2011/70/EURATOM of 19 July 2011, a Community framework for the responsible and safe management of spent fuel and radioactive waste was launched. In its Article 5(1) the duty to establish and maintain a national framework was formulated, but no mention is made of the application of the PPP, not in this Directive nor in the national reports and the EU follow up reports. The terminology used therein, ‘adequate financial resources’, falls short of an unambiguous adherence to the Polluter Pays Principle. The PPP should hold that ALL costs for decommissioning, waste conditioning and final disposal should be carried by the polluter. A cap on the nuclear waste costs as decided in Belgium seems to be in full contradiction with the earlier decisions of the ECJ and with the EU Commission’s Recommendation of 2006. Furthermore, the EU General Environmental Principles are made applicable to the nuclear energy sector by the ECJ in the Hinkley Point C case. As argued in the present article, the Polluter Pays Principle will be a heavy burden to bring the EU legal acquis in line with all the uncertainties on the costs of closing the cycle of nuclear energy production. Accepting a ‘cap’ on the nuclear waste costs leaves a blank cheque for later generations, which is not only against the Polluter Pays Principle, but is also completely in contradiction with the EU Green Deal regarding fair competition in the field of energy production and limiting the effect of subsidies for costs which have to be borne by the nuclear waste producers.

Blank Cheques Commercial Law Perspective

Cheques are one of the Securities Regulated in the Commercial Law Code, the use of cheques is increasing day by day, cheques as a means of payment is very beneficial for the issuer, because this check gives a sense of security for the issuer who issued the check and also the issuer can issue a check backwards if at the time the issuer issued the check, the funds in the bank is not enough. But in practice, there is often abuse of check issuance by issuing blank checks. By issuing a blank cheque will result in the issuer's account will be closed and reporting to Bank Indonesia, and the issuer's account should not be associated banks and may also be subject to criminal acts of fraud.

A Miscalculated Risk: Austria-Hungary, the “Blank Cheque” and the Origins of the First World War

This paper examines whether Austria-Hungary would have gone to war with Serbia and thereby initiated the First World War if it had not received the “blank cheque” from Germany on July 5th and 6th, 1914. The article begins by exploring political debates over war against Serbia in Austria-Hungary’s Ministerial Council following of the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, as informed by the diverse personal and domestic interests of the council’s members. It then analyzes the probability of Austro-Hungarian victory in a hypothetical invasion of Serbia without German support. Possibilities of a peaceful resolution of the assassination crisis that may have been achieved without German obstruction are also taken into account. Overall, this paper concludes that an Austro-Hungarian invasion of Serbia in 1914 becomes unlikely without the blank cheque. It also offers insights into the role of diplomatic support in emboldening risk-taking by states past and present, even when major wars are possible. The extent to which such support is unconditionally guaranteed in alliances continues to be an important factor when de-escalating international crises today.

Re-analysis, measurement and misperceptions of cost overruns at Olympic Games

ABSTRACT The so-called ‘Oxford Study’ by Flyvbjerg et al shows Olympic cost overrun of 170-750% with a substantial risk of a further cost overrun above this range in the future. The aim of this paper is to re-analyse the results by using a method in accordance with the international convention of comparing across time and geographies. The dataset used has abundantly more governmental data than in the Oxford Study. The results of the Oxford Study for the period of 2000–2016 could not be replicated. It is argued why the statistical analysis and their data reliability are misleading, thus leading to a discovery of six typical misperceptions. In contrast to those authors, this paper shows cost overruns (Olympics 2000–2014) for direct non-OCOG investments in the range of 13–178%. Further, it shows that the costs of the Olympic Games represent less than 0.28% of the GDP; hence, it is clear that the Games cannot cause a severe national economic crisis. This paper provides a discussion on the underlying assumptions of the Oxford study, thus providing valuable insights for politicians who intend to submit an Olympic bid, and contextualises cost overruns caused by fixed deadlines and long planning horizons. I disagree with the claim by Flyvbjerg et al. that hosts give a blank cheque to the IOC and I contend that demands and a tight coupling are fixed in the Host City Contract, thus negating the blank cheque assertion.

Of Landlords and Tenants: Property in the Midst of a Pandemic

This is an unprecedented Bill to deal with an unprecedented crisis. Over the coming months, every aspect of the way that we do things in Britain will come under strain. As in wartime, we will have to change the way that we do things, and when it is all over things will not revert to business as usual. Some things will have changed forever, and the way that we do business here will assuredly fall into that category. I am sure that everyone in your Lordships’ House wishes the Government well as they grapple with coronavirus. But democracies never give the Executive a blank cheque. As a Parliament, we must retain our critical faculties and, if we do so, it will help the Government and the country to get through this crisis together (Hansard HL Deb, vol 802, col 1659, 24 March 2020).

The Church of America and the Heresy of Peace

America, said G. K. Chesterton, is a nation with the soul of a church. It is a sacred community commanding sacrificial loyalty. It is also a violent and weapon-loving civilization, in which force is tethered to patriotism and national identity. American culture is at once militarist and theological, Christian and violent. How can this paradox be explained? This article discusses the role of New England puritanism in establishing a providentialist nationalism that would define war as a theological prerogative and non-violence as heresy. It shows how theologians such as Cotton Mather identified the emerging nation of America with the sacred vessel of the Christian church to the point that ‘chosenness’ or divine election represented a blank cheque for military adventure. It also shows how theologies of peace and restraint were anathematized as not merely heretical but a form of spiritual violence against the American project. In this sense, American nationhood functions as a controlling consideration akin to an institution, and Christian pacifism serves as a charismatic critique – or inspiration. To what extent were attitudes to violence framed by models of salvation? How did identity or chosenness trump ethics or the duty of love in the puritan imagination? The article concludes with more recent observations about the relationship of the ‘institution’ of nationhood to the troublesome, fissiparous energies of peace.

The Right of Religious Freedom in Light of the Coronavirus Pandemic: The Greek Case

The purpose of this article is to take into consideration the impact of unprecedented restrictions due to COVID-19 on the exercise of religious freedom according to the Greek legislation and case-law. The crucial fact to be examined is the proportionality of the exceptional measures of the Greek State. At the beginning of the pandemic, religious ceremonies were allowed only in the presence of clerics, but nowadays they are permitted on the condition that the measures of “social distancing” are being followed strictly. As it is generally accepted, the Greek State managed to deal with the pandemic without deviations from constitutional order and protection of fundamental rights, in accordance with a “pressing social need”. In this context, the case-law of the Greek courts is of great importance, which ruled that the above mentioned restrictions did not offend the principle of proportionality, especially because of their temporary and short-term character. Nevertheless, these restrictive measures must be revised from time to time, considering the updated, epidemiological data in order to be selected the most appropriate and less stringent on a case-by-case basis. Consequently, these judgments do not give government a blank cheque regarding the management of the pandemic, but rather provide them with a clear framework which is able to guarantee the measures’ accordance with the Greek Constitution. However, the potential risk that people may become used to the restrictions imposed after the crisis has passed must not be overlooked.

‘All Necessary Means’ to Protect Civilians

Abstract In this article, I aim to explore the interpretation and implementation of United Nations (UN) Security Council mandates authorising the protection of civilians (PoC) and, in particular, the meaning of an authorisation to use ‘all necessary means’ to protect civilians. Over the past two decades, the UN Security Council has repeatedly provided UN (mandated) peace operations with an explicit mandate to protect civilians. In doing so, it has typically authorised the use of ‘all necessary means’ to achieve the aforementioned objective. This PoC language has been subject to varying interpretations and implementations in practice and is therefore often considered ambiguous. The conclusion reached in this article is that PoC language is indeed vague, but that this is not necessarily problematic. It might even be unavoidable in light of the cascade structure in which the PoC mandate is placed and whereby the PoC mandate is interpreted and implemented at the various levels of authority, command, and control. What is problematic is that there is uncertainty and discussion about the limits to the use of force in the implementation of PoC mandates. After all, the formula to use ‘all necessary means’ cannot be regarded as a ‘blank cheque’ to use any amount of force. Therefore, I identify the upper limit to what UN (mandated) peace operations may lawfully do to protect civilians when being provided with a mandate to use ‘all necessary means’. I also detect an emerging lower limit for what UN (mandated) peace operations must lawfully do to protect civilians when being provided with such a PoC mandate.

Opening the Pandora’s Box: Kelsen and the Communist theory of law

ABSTRACT This paper examines Hans Kelsen’s Communist Theory of Law in the context of his general critique of natural law theories. Kelsen argues that since there is no such thing as objectively determined natural law, a theory that attempts to use it to establish constraints on positive law is at risk of automatically justifying the latter. Kelsen deploys this ‘Pandora’s Box Objection’ in his characterisation of the Communist theory of law as the ‘handmaiden’ of the Soviet government that conserved, rather than challenged, oppressive policies. The Objection is limited in scope. Firstly, it applies only to ‘forward-looking’ Communist theories of law that justify transitional socialist legal arrangements rather than seek to abolish the legal form as a whole. Secondly, it does not eliminate the Rule of Law constraints that are independent from natural law fetters – hence the state does not have a ‘blank cheque’ to introduce any positive law.

Opening the Pandora’s Box: Kelsen and the Communist Theory of Law

This paper examines Hans Kelsen’s Communist Theory of Law in the context of his general critique of natural law theories. Kelsen argues that since there is no such thing as objectively determined natural law, a theory that attempts to use it to establish constraints on positive law is at risk of automatically justifying the latter. Kelsen deploys this ‘Pandora’s Box Objection’ in his characterization of the Communist theory of law as the ‘handmaiden’ of the Soviet government that conserved, rather than challenged, oppressive policies. The Objection is limited in scope. Firstly, it applies only to ‘forward-looking’ Communist theories of law that justify transitional socialist legal arrangements rather than seek to abolish the legal form as a whole. Secondly, it does not eliminate the Rule of Law constraints that are independent from natural law fetters - hence the state does not have a ‘blank cheque’ to introduce any positive law.

A wake-up call for data integrity invulnerability

Data has become the most valuable commodity today, as all human endeavours – from routine chores, healthcare, business enterprises to government policies – are all directed by it. 1 It is like a blank cheque, disclosure or modification of which may cause irreparable loss.

Canadian Medical Association and Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide in Canada: Critical Review of CMA Approach to Changes in Policy and Law

Canadian Medical Association and Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide in Canada: Critical Review of CMA Approach to Changes in Policy and Law

Independent or employed? There is a third way. . .

General practice is in crisis. Many posts lie empty and large numbers of older doctors are due to retire soon. The current system is failing, with patients waiting weeks for appointments. Something radical has to be done. Currently we are small groups of self employed doctors with limited career progression, a blank cheque of responsibility, and seeing in excess of 30 patients a day in 10 minute appointments.1 The combination of acute and routine work required means that GPs often finish surgeries then do house calls over lunchtime. Paperwork is done in the margins of the day. Increasing pressure is making general practices dysfunctional, chaotic, unhappy, and lonely places. A sickness absence can …

Beyond the Blank Cheque: Arming Iran during the Ford Administration

ABSTRACTWhen President Gerald Ford decided to maintain and deepen arms relations with Iran, he cemented a momentum that became near impossible for a successor to break by continuing the policy of his predecessor Richard Nixon. Nixon had given the Shah of Iran a “blank cheque” to purchase whatever American arms he desired—short of nuclear weapons. Although Ford’s authority would be challenged by members of his own Administration and a Congress seeking to claw back some of its authority, the need to support allies in the Middle East against the threat of the Soviet Union, even during a time of détente, remained paramount.

Richard Nixon's Road to Tehran: The Making of the U.S.-Iran Arms Agreement of May 1972

In May 1972, Richard Nixon travelled to Tehran and signed a deal with the shah of Iran that allowed the Iranian monarch to purchase any U.S. weapons system he desired, in any quantity, short of nuclear weapons. This so-called 'blank cheque' was a highly irregular move, and a revolutionary change in both U.S. arms sales policy and U.S.–Iran relations. It formed the major component of a new U.S. Persian Gulf policy and became a major application of the Nixon doctrine. Exploring in detail how and why this agreement came to pass form an important, and so far overlooked, episode in U.S. foreign policy.

A Review Article on Prescription Behavior of Doctors, Influenced By The Medical Representative In Rajasthan, India

The World Health Organization defines drug promotion as all informational and persuasive activities by manufacturers and distributors, the effect of which is to influence the prescription, supply, purchase or use of medicinal drugs but misleading information, incentives and unethical trade practices were identified as methods to increase the prescription and sale of drugs. Medical representatives provide incomplete medical information to influence prescribing practices; they also offer incentives including conference, Seminars, national and aboard sponsorship. Doctors also demand for gifts and other incentives, they look to every medical representative as a blank cheque for themselves, as when doctors' associations threaten to boycott companies that do not comply with their demands for sponsorship. Manufacturers, chemists and medical representatives use various unethical trade practices of particular interest was the finding that chemists are major players in this system, providing drug information directly to patients.

Choosing Sides in the Horn of Africa: Wikileaks, the Ethiopia Imperative, and American Responses to Post-9/11 Regional Conflicts

The United States has faced at times the policy dilemma of seeing conflict erupt between two countries with which it maintains friendly diplomatic relations. The bureaucratic biases of relevant agencies can play an important role in determining whether to choose sides or remain neutral in these conflicts. In the early 1960s the Africa Bureau adopted a pro-Ethiopia bias that shaped American policy in the Horn of Africa. With the insights provided by the 2010 Wikileaks cables, this analysis explores how the “Ethiopia imperative” affected three inter-related American policy decisions in the Horn of Africa in the early twenty-first century: the decision to support Ethiopia despite its refusal to abide by a legally binding decision that favoured Eritrea following the 1998–2000 Eritrea–Ethiopia border war; to give Ethiopia what amounted to a “blank cheque” to invade Somalia in December 2006 and overthrow the Council of Islamic Courts (CIC); and to confront and isolate Eritrea diplomatically for waging proxy war against Ethiopia in Somalia.

Mezhdunarodnyi krizis 1939 goda v traktovkakh rossiiskikh i pol´skikh istorikov (The International Crisis of 1939 in the Works of Russian and Polish Historians) (review)

M. M. Narinskii and S. Dembski, eds., Mezhdunarodnyi krizis 1939 goda v traktovkakh rossiiskikh i pol'skikh istorikov (The International Crisis of 1939 in the Works of Russian and Polish Historians). 480 pp. Moscow: Aspekt Press, 2009. ISBN-13 978-5756705799. As interest in the Soviet experience of World War II continues to gather steam, it was perhaps inevitable that the tumultuous year spanning the period between the Munich Conference and the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact should become a focus of discussion once again. The diplomatic history of that period has been enmeshed, as few other topics were, in the framework of the Cold War propaganda conflict. The defining battle of its historiography was launched when the Allies brought to light documents captured from the German Foreign Ministry. Published in January 1948, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941 was a carefully arranged and selected collection illuminating the scope of cooperation between the USSR and Hitler's Germany. (1) The implication of this material was that, in the run-up to World War II, the Soviet Union acted as a disruptive influence in international affairs and shared a substantial degree of blame for causing the war. The USSR wasted little time in responding by launching its own historiographical broadside. In February of the same year, the Soviet Information Bureau published a communique titled Falsifiers of History, singling out the Western policy of appeasement as the main contributing factor in Hitler's rise to dominance of Central and Eastern Europe. (2) Within the Soviet bloc, the version established by Falsifiers of History persisted until the 1990s as the defining framework for interpreting the causes of World War II. Western historiography, however, was in fact both more polyphonous and more volatile. Thus A. J. P. Taylor, in the course of his revisionist account of the interwar years, sympathized with the Soviet view that Stalin was essentially committed to the collective-security approach and was forced into accommodation with Hitler only by the machinations of the Western appeasers. (3) His modern heirs, for example Geoffrey Roberts, to this day maintain that--governed by ideological as well as realist concerns--the Kremlin had been genuinely committed to the ideals of collective security. (4) This school of thought, in turn, was problematized by the postrevisionists of the late 1970s and 1980s, such as Jonathan Haslam, who envisioned Stalin's foreign policy as the product of ruthless realpolitik adaptation, based on pure self-interest, with the Soviet Union's security as the ultimate touchstone. (5) Neither long-term plans nor ideology guided Stalin's actions; rather, all possibilities were considered as they presented themselves. This approach currently reflects the dominant Western view on this issue. It is not without its critics, however. Scholars who give considerably more weight to the ideological features of the Soviet decision-making process have taken the lead in countering it. The so-called German school and historians like Ernst Topitsch argue that an ideological mindset framed Stalin's policy, the core of which was provocation of war between the capitalist states. These historians postulate that the Non-Aggression Pact was the culmination of a concerted effort on Stalin's part to woo Hitler and to reestablish Soviet-German post-Rapallo cooperation. (6) This conception then presents Stalin as the key architect of the conflict, with the Pact as a blank cheque issued to Berlin. The Western debates over war guilt reached their apogee with the Icebreaker controversy. This polemic followed Viktor Suvorov's suggestion that the German attack on the USSR was essentially a preventive measure that preempted an imminent Soviet invasion. (7) Largely dismantled by historians like Gabriel Gorodetsky and David Glantz, Suvorov's thesis today occupies a marginal position in Western scholarship, although it remains relevant for the wider Western public and among some scholars in post-Soviet Russia and Eastern Europe. …

Credit Cards, Overdraft Facilities and European Consumer Protection: A Blank Cheque for Unfairness?

This contribution takes a close look at overdraft facilities, the most eccentric type of credit under the scope of Directive 2008/48 EC on credit agreements for consumers. Even in the absence of a ‘smoking gun’ linking consumer credit to personal insolvency, the tacit nature of this type of credit represents a significant “spiral of debts” risk. Armed with some overdraft facility basics we provide several theoretical insights on imperfect markets for consumer finance and consumer (un)awareness and biases when contracting for money. Today’s information requirements only partly capture the reality of Homo sapiens kind of borrowers. European consumer protection ought to safeguard consumers from behavior diverging from (perfect) rationality. It should therefore abandon narrow legal reasoning and include ethical, economical and social norms. In an attempt to reach a substantial information equilibrium we call for multi-layered and intelligent credit regulation incorporating aforementioned behavioral evidence. While such rules might be better aligned with product legislation, new IT solutions pave the way for targeted point of sale disclosure and tailored monthly statements. A strict regulatory dichotomy between regulation with regard to a consumer’s assets (e.g. investor protection) and debts (e.g. consumer credit) seems superseded. The last part of our contribution shines a light on the evolved Belgian approach with regard to overdraft facilities, foreclosing an unlimited freedom of the market for price setting.

CHEONAN AND YEONPYEONG

Divergent responses to the sinking of the ROKS Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010 have raised tensions in Northeast Asia. China's enabling response appeared to write North Korea a blank cheque for further provocations; but Beijing has in fact been constrained by fear of destabilisation of the Kim regime. The incidents have prompted a reappraisal of bilateral relations within the region – in particular, the South Korea-US alliance – and revealed the continuing importance of the Sino-US relationship in Korean peninsular security affairs.