Blame Avoidance Strategies Research Articles

Sorry Not Sorry: Presentational strategies and the electoral punishment of corruption

A growing literature has explored various factors that hamper the electoral punishment of corruption. Most studies have focused on how voters react to a corruption allegation, but this focus leaves out an important, common aspect of corruption allegations that voters also encounter: politicians' blame avoidance strategies. This study examines how politicians' presentational strategies in response to corruption allegations affect voter sanctioning. Employing an online survey experiment on a sample of 3531 U.S. citizens, we find that politicians' action-oriented strategies, such as denying allegations, acknowledging a problem but denying responsibility, or acknowledging a problem and taking responsibility, are more effective than passive non-response. These three active strategies do not differ in their effectiveness. This result is robust to heterogenous levels of state-level corruption, partisan bias, and political knowledge. Our findings suggest that politicians’ presentational strategies may undermine political accountability for corruption, although they do not fully counteract the effect of corruption on voting intentions.

Analysing the ‘follow the science’ rhetoric of government responses to COVID-19

At the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, many leaders claimed that their public health policy decisions were ‘following the science’; however, the literature on evidence-based policy problematises the idea that this is a realistic or desirable form of governance. This article examines why leaders make such claims using Christopher Hood’s (2011) blame avoidance theory. Based on a qualitative content analysis of two national newspapers in each of Australia, Canada and the UK, we gathered and focused on unique moments when leaders claimed to ‘follow the science’ in the first six months of the pandemic. We applied Hood’s theory to identify the types of blame avoidance strategies used for issues such as mass event cancellation, border closures, face masks, and in-person learning. Politicians most commonly used ‘follow the science’ to deflect blame onto processes and people. When leaders’ claims to ‘follow the science’ confuse the public as to who chooses and who should be held accountable for those decisions, this slogan risks undermining trust in science, scientific advisors, and, at its most extreme, representative government. This article addresses a gap in the literature on blame avoidance and the relationship between scientific evidence and public policy by demonstrating how governments’ claims to ‘follow the science’ mitigated blame by abdicating responsibility, thus risking undermining the use of scientific advice in policymaking.

Legislating Bureaucratic Autonomy as a Potential Blame Avoidance Strategy in Westminster Polities: A Comparative Study of the Adoption of Oncology Drugs into the Provincial Formularies of Alberta and Ontario

Legislating Bureaucratic Autonomy as a Potential Blame Avoidance Strategy in Westminster Polities: A Comparative Study of the Adoption of Oncology Drugs into the Provincial Formularies of Alberta and Ontario

From anticipatory strategies to reactive blame games in multi-level settings: the role of structure and politics in stability and policy change

AbstractStudies of multi-level blame avoidance strategies generally assume that (1) governments prefer to shift responsibility to other levels and (2) an unclear distribution of formal responsibilities complicates blame allocation to a single actor. Considering the temporal location of such strategies – in anticipation or as a reaction to adverse events – the article tests these assumptions. Drawing on the case of air quality policy in Mexico City, the article uses causal process tracing to develop the mechanism leading to an anticipatory strategy and its unfolding. If the distribution of responsibilities on connected policy instruments is clear and major political actors share power, then government levels from different parties engage in a joint anticipatory strategy to avoid crisis and keep stability. The mechanism breakdown leads to reactive behaviour and policy change. Contextual changes redistributing power can destabilise the arrangements, leading to reactive blame games, fostering policy change.

When blame avoidance backfires: Responses to performance framing and outgroup scapegoating during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Public officials use blame avoidance strategies when communicating performance information. While such strategies typically involve shifting blame to political opponents or other governments, we examine how they might direct blame to ethnic groups. We focus on the COVID‐19 pandemic, where the Trump administration sought to shift blame by scapegoating (using the term “Chinese virus”) and mitigate blame by positively framing performance information on COVID‐19 testing. Using a novel experimental design that leverages machine learning techniques, we find scapegoating outgroups backfired, leading to greater blame of political leadership for the poor administrative response, especially among conservatives. Backlash was strongest for negatively framed performance data, demonstrating that performance framing shapes blame avoidance outcomes. We discuss how divisive blame avoidance strategies may alienate even supporters.

“I did not know that there were problems”: government officials’ blame avoidance strategies in the Life Esidimeni Arbitration Hearings

Abstract The travesty of the Life Esidimeni project in South Africa, which claimed the lives of 144 mental health users at psychiatric facilities in Gauteng between 2016 and 2017, is multifaceted. One facet involves strategies of blame avoidance designed to escape liability for the deaths that were expressed by the former Member of the Executive Council for Health and other public health officials during the Life Esidimeni Arbitration Hearings. These hearings were broadcast on state television between October 2017 and 2018, and eight samples from the hearings were analysed for specific blame avoidance strategies. Following the principles of qualitative discourse analysis, this paper extends research on blame avoidance behaviour in the public administration and policy domain, exploring three key officials’ micro- and macro-level choices of blame avoidance in the context of the arbitration hearings to develop a more comprehensive account of these strategies. A public hearing is a discourse setting that is reactionary in nature, and our findings on the micro-level, a neglected dimension of research on blame avoidance behaviour, extend our understanding of these behaviours. We propose that at least two continua for blame avoidance are relevant in this setting.

Bad government performance and citizens’ perceptions: A quasi-experimental study of local fiscal crisis

The link between actual government performance and citizens’ performance perceptions has been controversial. Given the prevalence of negativity bias, however, the link between bad performance and citizens’ perceptions could appear to be strong. To explore this theoretically unconfirmed link, this study uses a quasi-experiment that contrasts a Japanese town in fiscal crisis, involving tax increases and service cuts, with a control village not in fiscal crisis. Using a difference-in-differences analysis with a careful retrospective pretest, it finds negative effects of the fiscal crisis on citizens’ process perception, while it shows no effects on citizens’ service satisfaction and trust in the mayor, council, and administrators. The study further finds positive associations between citizens’ performance perceptions and civic engagement. It discusses these findings to identify the boundary conditions in which a bad performance–negative perception link is likely to appear. Points for practitioners Psychology literature on negativity bias suggests that the causal links and mechanisms between bad performance and negative perceptions are stronger than those between good performance and positive perceptions. Not only citizens, but also politicians and administrators, hold negativity bias. Their blame-avoidance strategies could alleviate the growth of citizens’ negative perceptions with bad performance. Participatory governance might moderate the bad performance–negative perception link by placing citizens in a performance-improvement process and promoting their interaction with government officials.

When Collaborative Water Governance Meets Authoritarian Environmentalism: The Dilemma of Safe Water Supply Project in Coal Mining Villages of China’s Shanxi Province

The framework of collaborative water governance (CWG) has been championed as a promising model for water management across the globe. China is a country confronted by serious water pollution and shortage problems. In recent years, many scholars and practitioners have turned to CWG as an effective model for water crisis management in China. However, the political nature of CWG and China’s Authoritarian Environmentalism is inherently conflictual, hence, the development of CWG in China poses a theoretical puzzle, i.e., how the bottom-up CWG model can coexist with the top-down Authoritarian Environmentalism in China’s water politics. To better understand this puzzle, this article explores CWG’s intertwinement with environmental authoritarianism through a case study of “safe water supply project” in 11 coal-mining villages in Shanxi province of North China. Drawing on fieldwork between 2019 and 2021 in H city of Shangxi province, this research shows that the central government’s pledge to provide safe water to every villager in rural China has not materialized so far. The dilemma of safe water supply in coal mining villages in H city shows that, on one side, the central government attempted to show its great will and commitment to providing safe water to everyone in rural China through an approach of environmental authoritarianism; while on the other side, the local governments tended to select the CWG model as a method for practical implementation as well as a blame avoidance strategy. Our study identifies five stakeholders in the villages’ safe water supply projects: the Department of Water Resources of the City Government, the Township Government, Coal Mining Enterprises, village cadres and villagers. The outcome of the safe water supply project in these villages is constrained by the transparency and trust deficit among stakeholders when facing cooperation and conflict management obstacles.

Pandemic response credit-claiming and blame-avoidance in Czechia

Abstract Credit claiming led in Czechia during the first wave to centralization and during the summer to decentralization. During the second wave, blame-avoidance led again to centralization. First Wave: Similar to other Central and Eastern European countries, Czechia's number of cases and deaths per capita during the first wave were some of the lowest in Europe. The Czech Prime Minister, Andrej Babiš (of the centrist populist ANO) was in a good position to take credit for these results. While this level of centralization of power attracted some criticism, the unprecedented context as well as the undeniable results of the timely intervention translated into genuine political credit. The government's measures enjoyed overwhelming popular support: an April survey found 76% of respondents saw them as “adequate” (and 16% as too lenient). Summer: The Czech government relaxed measures relatively quickly, precipitated by judicial challenges to the procedural aspects of lockdown measures. Thanks to the low prevalence of COVID-19 in the country, rapid reopening did not lead to dramatic increases in infections. Between June and September, there were virtually no restrictions in Czechia. Second wave: In September, the PM admitted the extent to which restrictions had been eased during the summer was a mistake, but explained his decisions by “societal demand” and prioritizing the economy. Explicit blame avoidance strategy through decentralization of responsibility between governments came only one year into the pandemic. The government obliged and, unconstitutionally, declared a new state of emergency (24). In one weekend, a year after total centralization of responsibility for the pandemic, regional governors (mostly belonging to opposition parties) were co-opted into the government's blame game that crossed party lines, ahead of the October 2021 parliamentary elections.

Working Hard or Hardly Working? Examining the Politics of In-Work Conditionality in the UK

The intensification of behavioural requirements and punitive measures in unemployment benefits by UK governments has been popular and instrumental to the politics of welfare reform. Yet there is scant research into the politics of extending this approach to working households, known as ‘in-work conditionality’ (IWC), which was introduced in the UK under Universal Credit in 2012. Addressing this gap, we examine the preferences of political parties and voters towards IWC, using data from an online survey of 1,111 adults in 2017, party manifestos and parliamentary debates. While we find evidence of a partisan split between voters and politicians on the left (oppose IWC) and right (support IWC), intra-party divides and the relative infancy of IWC suggests the politics of IWC is not set in stone. This helps to explain the blame avoidance strategies of current and previous Conservative governments responsible for IWC.

Dolce far niente? Non-compliance and blame avoidance in the EU

The politicisation of the EU renders blame avoidance for unpopular EU policies an essential task for governments. This article looks at one particular blame avoidance strategy, which governments have at their disposal in the EU policy process: the threat of non-compliance. In order to gauge its effectiveness, we present two competing arguments. According to the blame avoidance hypothesis, non-compliance enables governments to shift responsibility for unpopular policies to the EU, because the public lacks knowledge about EU policy-making. Conversely, the blame attraction hypothesis posits that threats of non-compliance will backfire and blame will stick with the government, because non-compliance mobilises constituents favouring compliance with EU rules. We test these hypotheses by analysing blame attributions in the news media covering the Italian government’s threat not to comply with the EU budget provisions in 2018. The findings support the blame attraction hypothesis, suggesting that domestic compliance constituents can impede governments’ blame-shifting attempts. Supplemental data for this article can be accessed online at: https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2021.1909938 .

An uncertain, erratic story: the pandemic in the UK

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to study the pandemic from the perspective of the UK health-care system and risk management.Design/methodology/approachThis paper follows a storytelling perspective. The author reflects on his experiences through the lens of research on health care and risk management.FindingsThe impact of the pandemic has been so massive that it has challenged the capacity of the UKs National Health Service. The political influences at work have not always promoted best practice in risk management and indicate blame-avoidance strategies by politicians.Research limitations/implicationsA single country experience of COVID-19.Practical implicationsThere are major issues of asset management, of delays in decision-making, of supply chain problems and the need to reform processes of handling of crisis management.Originality/valueThis is an individual account of experiences of the pandemic.

Blame Avoidance Strategies of Multiple Administrative Agencies During Policy Failure: A Case Study of Taiwan’s 2014 Waste Oil Scandal

This study examines the blame avoidance (BA) strategies that may be adopted after policy failures of multiple agencies. A classification of agencies is proposed based on two factors: the amount of actual responsibility that an agency is obliged for, and the extent of an agency’s perceived responsibility. Agencies can thus be classified into four types, which may have different tactical goals and specific BA strategies that contradict other agencies’ goals, thereby leading to a complicated interaction between them. The results show that one of the three related agencies does not adopt suggested BA strategy and therefore fails to avoid blame.

The political economy of minimum income benefits: How parties, unions and migration influence benefit adequacy

How we treat the people most in need of support is a good indicator of the state of our societies. But we lack empirical evidence on how political parties affect minimum income benefits. The classic partisan difference theory leads us to expect opposite effects of governing right and left parties on benefit levels. The analysis of 16 OECD countries over the period of 1990 to 2009 shows that this hypothesis must be rejected as – if anything – right and left parties are associated with cuts. The inconsistent party effects point towards ‘new politics’ of blame avoidance strategies. A novel approach in the field of minimum income benefits is the analysis of the context of partisanship: how do unions and migration alter governments’ effects on benefits? The effect of migration on parties cannot be captured using the net migration rate; in the future we should look at how public opinion on migration influences policies. In line with the power resources approach, trade unions show a consistently strong association with higher benefits, but they cannot constrain right nor left parties in cutting benefits. The findings confirm that the politics of new social policies differ from the politics of old ones: (1) new politics are at work, (2) signs of negotiated retrenchment between unions and right governments are not robust and (3) no evidence of coalition building between left parties and unions was found.

Blame avoidance strategies in governmental performance measurement

AbstractPerformance measurement and blame avoidance are significant forces that shape the development of the public sector. Unfortunately, extant literature has not paid much attention to blame avoidance in performance measurement. Thus, this article aims to show how blame avoidance strategies can be embedded in performance measurement. This case study's results provide theoretical ideas and empirical examples that demonstrate how a particular performance measure––central government productivity––enabled blame avoidance. These results will help practitioners and academics view blame avoidance aspects in performance measurement.

The politics of blame avoidance in complex delegation structures: the public transport crisis in Berlin

AbstractThe article analyses the public attribution of blame and the use of presentational strategies of blame avoidance in complex delegation structures. We theorize and empirically demonstrate that complex delegation structures result in the diffusion of blame to multiple actors so that a clear allocation of responsibility becomes more difficult. The article shows that public attribution of blame follows a distinct temporal pattern in which politicians only gradually move into the centre of the blame storm. We also find that blame-takers deploy sequential patterns of presentational management and use blame shifting to other actors as a dominant strategy. However, the analysis suggests that complex delegation structures impose limitations on blame-takers’ use of blame avoidance strategies, and that sequential presentational management becomes less useful over time. The article uses media content analysis to study blame games during a major crisis of the public transport system in Berlin, Germany.

Risky Business? Welfare State Reforms and Government Support in Britain and Denmark

Are welfare state reforms electorally dangerous for governments? Political scientists have only recently begun to study this seemingly simple question, and existing work still suffers from two shortcomings. First, it has never tested the reform–vote link with data on actual legislative decisions for enough points in time to allow robust statistical tests. Secondly, it has failed to take into account the many expansionary reforms that have occurred in recent decades. Expansions often happen in the same years as cutbacks. By focusing only on cutbacks, estimates of the effects of reforms on government popularity become biased. This article addresses both shortcomings. The results show that voters punish governments for cutbacks, but also reward them for expansions, making so-called compensation, a viable blame-avoidance strategy. The study also finds that the size of punishments and rewards is roughly the same, suggesting that voters’ well-documented negativity bias does not directly translate into electoral behavior.

Policy drift and its reversal: The case of prescription drug coverage in the United States

Policy drift occurs when actors block attempts to adjust policies to changing realities, thereby changing policy impact. We know much about the conditions for policy drifting, but lack theorization of the conditions for reversing the drift by updating the policy. This article examines when and how actors favouring drift decide to reverse it. These actors have different characteristics from those favouring policy update. Based on the case of prescription drug coverage in the US, the article argues that actors promote drift reversal when maintaining the current drift becomes politically risky. Even then, they will act only when able to limit the scope of the reversal. In addition, in order to implement the policy update, actors will use blame avoidance strategies to gain the support of their constituency and soften opposition.

Anticipative strategies of blame avoidance in government

AbstractPublic communication practices of executive governments are often criticised by journalists, politicians, scholars, and other commentators. Therefore, government communication professionals routinely adopt various blame avoidance strategies, some of which are meant to ‘stop blame before it starts’ or to reduce their exposure to potential blame attacks. The linguistic aspects of such anticipative strategies are yet to be studied by discourse analysts.I contribute towards filling this gap by showing how written professional guidelines for government communicators could be interpreted as complex discursive devices of anticipative blame avoidance.I outline historically and institutionally situated issues of blame that inform the occupational habitus of government communicators in the UK. I bring examples from their propriety guidelines to illustrate how the use of certain discursive strategies limits the possible perceived blameworthiness of individual officeholders. I conclude by explicating the discursive underpinnings of two common operational blame avoidance strategies in government: ‘protocolisation’ and ‘herding’.

The interplay of actor-related strategies and political context: a fuzzy-set QCA analysis of structural reforms in continental welfare states

ABSTRACTEuropean welfare states face numerous challenges which often necessitate risky policy choices. This article focuses on the role of key political actors, asking which actor-related strategies, under certain conditions, lead to structural reforms. These strategies are ideational leadership or reform-enhancing blame-avoidance strategies, combined with two political-contextual conditions. Four set-theoretic hypotheses about combinations of the latter and structural reforms are examined, using fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis. The data include 16 reform cases in four continental welfare states that are notoriously hard to reform: Germany; Austria; the Netherlands; and France. The findings show that the two actor-related strategies matter for structural reform in combination, while contextual conditions function as their complements. Distant elections are indeed conducive to such reforms, while governments with a positive or negative welfare image achieve them along different paths: either combined with two strategies; or, when elections are distant, combined with ideational leadership or concession-making.