Blame Avoidance Strategies Research Articles

The French politics of retrenchment (2007–2012): Institutions and blame avoidance strategies

While the semi-presidential French regime and the reinforcement of ‘presidentialization’ under Nicolas Sarkozy have often been associated with the idea of disruptive and heroic changes, France’s post-crisis budgetary policy appeared strongly embedded in the previous commitments made by President Sarkozy and relied largely on measures of a gradual and low-profile nature without significant U-turns. In order to explain this result, the article emphasizes the effects of French institutions on government capabilities and on the potential allocation of blame and the related political strategies connected with the electoral cycle and timing. In addition, it also explores the specific characteristics of the French national crisis and its perceptions by top bureaucrats, as well as the nature of the external macro-constraints that influenced French budgetary policy, whether originating with markets, international organizations or the European Union.Points for practitionersThis article emphasizes the importance of institutions and political strategies in cutback management. The main argument is that budget reduction policies are embedded in political and electoral constraints that strongly affect their design and choices. The article provides many empirical elements about the specific characteristics of the French national crisis and how French governments reacted to the 2008 crisis. It puts emphasis on the specificities of French political institutions and the strong exposure to blame. The French political strategies of blame avoidance are described between 2008 and 2012, as well as the nature of the external macro-constraints that influenced French budgetary policy, whether originating with markets, international organizations or the European Union.

Risk and Compliance with Normative Frameworks Relating to Disaster Management

This article adopts a comparative socio-legal approach in exploring the relationship between disaster risk and compliance with normative frameworks concerning disaster management. Risk colonisation is the term given to the phenomenon whereby societal risks such as those posed by disasters create further risks, institutional in nature, to disaster management systems themselves. Disaster management systems are exposed to institutional risks, including those that arise from non-compliance with the range of laws and guidelines relating to disaster management developed in recent years. Grounded in exploratory case studies drawn from Indonesia and Ireland, it is suggested that the consequences of this phenomenon is that, in circumstances in which disaster risk is perceived to be high, patterns of compliance with regulatory frameworks are likely to be characterised by recourse to scientific expertise. Blame avoidance and defensive compliance strategies are also likely to occur. Conversely, in circumstances in which disaster risk is perceived to be relatively low, compliance patterns are likely to be ad hoc in nature and allow for significant governmental discretion. The implications of such consequences for the normative underpinning of disaster management are addressed.

Framing Effects and Comparative Social Policy Reform: Comparing Blame Avoidance Evidence from Two Experiments

Following Paul Pierson’s work on the New Politics of the welfare state, numerous studies on welfare state reforms have shown that governments enacting welfare cuts regularly employ blame avoidance strategies and use issue frames when they communicate welfare reform policies. However, it remains largely unexplained to what extent these blame avoidance strategies really impact on the attitudes of voters on the micro level. This study sets out to fill that void in the literature. Using data on pension reforms and student grant cutbacks, the article provides experimental evidence showing that blame avoidance and framing strategies affect individual attitudes towards the proposed policies – in particular in the case of pension reforms. Moreover, in the case of pensions, the impact is conditioned by individual risk exposure. These results add significantly to the literature on blame avoidance and welfare state reform policies by indicating that successful blame avoidance may be the reason why governments are not always punished for cutbacks to the welfare state.

Taking Stock of the Comparative Literature on the Role of Blame Avoidance Strategies in Social Policy Reform

This article takes stock of and reviews the comparative literature on blame avoidance strategies in social policy reform to identify the conditions under which blame avoidance strategies are necessary (or not). This helps to solve the seemingly contradictory findings that blame avoidance strategies may not (always) be necessary while they are often employed. Moreover, it proposes that experimental designs help to establish the effect of blame avoidance strategies and presents an approach for assessing systematically the employment and success of blame avoidance strategies. Hereby, the article outlines a research agenda for comparative theory development.

Unpopular Policies and the Imperative of Justification: Putting the Monti Government’s Reform Communication in a Comparative Perspective

Governments’ policy organization and communication, treated as an independent variable, has been shown to increase the public endorsement of unpopular reforms and to help to avoid blame. This study aims to shed further light on such strategic action from a largely neglected angle. It considers reform communication as a dependent variable and makes the case that the content of this communication does not so much depend upon blame avoidance motives but is primarily a function of contextual factors conditioning the limits and resources for a convincing communication. Using the Italian Monti government as a case where blame avoidance can be expected to be least likely, the analysis nonetheless shows clear features that resemble blame avoidance strategies for this case, namely a pronounced risk framing and justifications based on political cooperation. This communication can however, it is argued, be made plausible in light of political-institutional, political-cultural and economic circumstances.

Auditing and the Purification of Blame

AbstractAlthough public sector special audit and performance audit are frequently involved in blame, very few studies (save for Radcliffe 1997) provide detailed empirical accounts on how auditing participates in blame allocation. This study sets out to study one case of blame allocation by describing and characterizing the origins of failure and antecedents leading to the need for blame allocation, the institutional entities and arrangements that participate in the blame game, and how these entities, including the supreme audit institution, are mobilized in the processes of blame allocation. Applying a case methodology with Actor–Network Theory principles, the study extends Hood's (2002, 2007) research on blame and blame avoidance strategies by showing how a blame‐frame evaluates and allocates blame. The contribution of the paper is in four parts: first, it reveals the mechanisms that cause scapegoating of particular people and the role of auditors as experts in such mechanisms; second, it assists to develop an understanding of some factors at the core of the “accountability paradox” noted by Roberts (2009); third, it contributes to explanations as to why failing public sector reforms survive controversy and scandal since a scapegoating process can “reboot” reforms by erasing the reform's problems; and fourth, it demonstrates that an understanding of blame can be a useful addition to Actor–Network Theory.

Blame Games in the Amazon: Environmental Crises and the Emergence of a Transparency Regime in Brazil

Expanding on recent debates in environmental governance and political science, we show that the relationship between environmental transparency and public accountability is far from linear and politically neutral. This is particularly true in moments of environmental crises, when transparency regimes are most likely to emerge as an integral part of the palette of blame-avoidance strategies of accountors in their attempt to disqualify accountees’ perceptions of environmental harm and irreparable loss. Drawing upon the study of blame-avoidance strategies in political science, we discuss the emergence and evolution over time of deforestation monitoring in Brazil, a transparency regime based on GIS and remote sensing led by the Brazilian National Institute for Space Research since 1989. We arrive at three conclusions. First, the evolution of transparency regimes is conflictual, culturally embedded, and emergent. Second, the relation between accountors and accountees changes over time as blame-avoidance strategies unfold. Finally, solutions in a blame game may cause a future crisis, as the social context changes and becomes incompatible with the transparency regime of the day. Based on these considerations, we argue for the need to understand the instrumental dimension of transparency regimes alongside their normative and substantive dimensions.

Crisis Communication in Public Organisations: Dimensions of Crisis Communication Revisited

Research on crisis communication has traditionally focused on private organisations' reputation and blame avoidance strategies. As a result, there is limited knowledge on crisis communication from the perspective of public organisations. This is troublesome as public organisations have substantial responsibilities for preparing, communicating and managing large‐scale crisis events. In order to be able to better conceptualise public organisations' crisis communication, a typology based on communication aims and orientations is introduced. According to the typology, public organisations engage in two dimensions of crisis communication: reputation‐oriented vs. resilience‐oriented and strategic vs. operational. These dimensions are illustrated and discussed by empirical examples from theQueensland floods of 2010/2011. The paper ends with a discussion on how to understand these dimensions of crisis communication in relation to public organisations' priorities, processes and practices.

Blame avoidance, electoral punishment and the perceptions of risk

Recent findings about the electoral cost of welfare state retrenchment challenge the view of the ‘New Politics’ literature that cutting welfare state entitlements is electorally risky. In fact, there seems to be no systematic punishment for governments retrenching the welfare state. At the same time, however, studies show that governments use numerous blame avoidance strategies when cutting welfare. Reflecting on this apparent contradiction we put forward two points. First, qualitative evidence from interviews with political leaders suggests that it is not the actual risk of being punished that entices politicians to use blame avoidance but the perception of this risk. This explains why blame avoidance strategies are widely used. Second, the existing studies showing that governments are not systematically punished for cutting the welfare state suffer from the lack of control for blame avoidance effects. We show that an experimental design could be a remedy for this problem.

The Voice of Professionals—Lost in Evaluation?

Based on the merger of two Swedish university hospitals, this article examines the relationship between professionals and policymakers in public sector reform. Data from a survey to 663 physicians show that only 2 percent of physicians experienced a working dialogue in this relationship. The relationship with the hospital management was considered equally poor. The article seeks to understand why the voice of professionals was ignored. Results indicate that managers and policymakers collaborated—rather than competed—to avoid blame, by consequently ignoring the professionals’ feedback and attempts at whistle-blowing. This blame-avoidance strategy differs from that traditionally described in the agency literature. More studies in this area are encouraged.

Ageing Populations in Post‐Industrial Democracies: Comparative Studies of Policies and PoliticsVanhuysse, Peter and GoerresAchim (eds.) New York, Routledge (2012), 274 p., ISBN 978‐0‐415‐60382‐9

Ageing Populations in Post‐Industrial Democracies: Comparative Studies of Policies and PoliticsVanhuysse, Peter and GoerresAchim (eds.) New York, Routledge (2012), 274 p., ISBN 978‐0‐415‐60382‐9

Strategic Re‐framing as a Vote Winner: Why Vote‐seeking Governments Pursue Unpopular Reforms

Most political science accounts assume that governments in Western democracies avoid unpopular reforms to protect their re‐election chances. Nevertheless, governments sometimes embark on electorally risky reforms – even in times when they have no slack in the polls. In this article, it is argued that pursuing unpopular reforms can be a perfectly rational strategy for vote‐seeking governments. Based on a simple game theoretical model that compares strategic framing with the classic blame avoidance strategy, it is demonstrated that unpopular policy reforms allow governments to pursue gains of both policy and votes by opting for a highly visible strategy of reframing the substantive reform issue in question. This general argument is illustrated with the substantial 2011 retrenchment of Danish early retirement benefits. This particular welfare state programme was highly popular. Nevertheless, the incumbent Liberal prime minister proposed to abolish it only a few months prior to a national election while his government was trailing significantly in the polls.

The politics of health technology assessment in Poland

ObjectiveFirst, to identify risks associated with the scientific evaluation of drugs considered for state reimbursement in Poland through exploring strategies of influence employed by multinational drug companies in relation to the Agency for Health Technology Assessment (AHTAPol). Second, to ascertain whether the outcomes of drug evaluation meet the interests of the public payer in reimbursing cost-effective drugs supported by robust pharmacoeconomic evidence. MethodologyWe conducted 109 in-depth semi-structured interviews with a purposive sample of stakeholders involved in the reimbursement process in Poland. We analysed four available documentary sources, including recommendations issued by the AHTAPol. ResultsAHTAPol recommendations were an instrumental part of the blame avoidance strategy by political elites. Drug producers utilised direct and indirect strategies of influence. The direct strategies involved building relationships with a circle of health technology assessment analysts and medical experts working for the Agency. The indirect strategies employed leaders of opinion in the medical milieu, patient organisations, and political elites to endorse policy positions favourable to drug companies. The AHTAPol positively recommended an increasing proportion of the drugs it assessed, many of them reported as not cost-effective or supported by dubious pharmacoeconomic evidence. ConclusionsThe strategies of influence entail a number of risks that may undermine the scientific evaluation of drugs. Some outcomes of drug evaluation may favour the interests of multinational drug companies over those of the public payer. We suggest that the risks involved in drug evaluation might be mitigated through (1) professionalization of health technology assessment; (2) restriction of job seeking and post public-payer employment; (3) disclosure and management of experts’ conflicts of interest; (4) institutionalisation of patient and public involvement; and (5) increased institutional separation of the AHTAPol from political elites.

TOWARDS AN OPEN FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO WELFARE STATE CHANGE: PRESSURES, IDEAS, AND BLAME AVOIDANCE

Why are some governments able to push through radical welfare state reforms while others, operating in similar circumstances, are not? Why are some ideas more acceptable than others? We present an open functional approach to reform to answer these questions and illustrate it empirically by discussing the drastic reform of the Dutch disability scheme in the early 1990s. Ideas translate a functional pressure that existentially threatens a social insurance system into a drastic welfare state reform, such as a severe tightening of eligibility criteria. Functional requirements constrain the range of ideas that political actors can consider for welfare state reform, although they do not determine which ideas are adopted. But once adopted, ideas influence the reforms pursued. A government's choice of ideas and the political strategies to implement them determine the success or failure of the reform. Blame avoidance strategies mediate vitally between the functional pressure, the idea and the reform.

Extra‐Network Organizational Reputation and Blame Avoidance in Networks: The Hurricane Katrina Example

Research on public service networks has identified a variety of mechanisms to foster coordination, including trust and reciprocity norms. This article argues that network actors are also driven by a desire to avoid blame. Network membership is often a political responsibility rather than a voluntary act, and members may be at least as attuned to their extra‐network organizational reputation as to their intra‐network reputation, creating an incentive to utilize blame avoidance strategies when failure occurs. Blame avoidance strategies undermine intra‐network trust and coordination, representing a significant threat to the implementation of public policy. To illustrate the potential of the concept for network theory, blame avoidance strategies are identified under the conditions of high political risk and task salience, as represented by the crisis response network in the U.S. disaster of Hurricane Katrina.

Economic crises, population aging and the electoral cycle: Explaining pension policy retrenchments in 19 OECD countries, 1981–2004

After decades of recurrent improvements in the generosity of public pension programs, since the early 1980s many pension reforms aimed to decelerate pension spending growth and strengthen the finances of these programs by retrenching the duration and/or value of pension entitlements. To understand this historical reversal in public pension provision, this article examines the forces affecting the enactment of contemporary pension retrenchments in 19 OECD countries. Based on a synthetic review of the pension policy literature, it identifies 90 pension retrenchments passed in these countries between 1981 and 2004. A growing literature on pension policy reform suggests that these policy events occur only when policy-makers can devise mechanisms to reduce their political blame. Building on this research, this article argues that the strategic consideration of economic and electoral cycles constitute two blame-avoidance strategies. First, by passing a pension retrenchment early in the electoral cycle, policy-makers can expect to face less electoral retaliation. Second, due to uncertainty in demographic projections, the demographic transition constitutes a weak discursive strategy to legitimate pension retrenchments. For this reason, population aging only affects the likelihood of reform by increasing the impact of economic crises. The article presents results from conditional frailty models for recurrent and sequential events that support this argument.

The blame game: spin, bureaucracy, and self-preservation in government

List of Illustrations vii Preface ix Part One: Blame, Credit, and Trust in Executive Government Chapter One: Credit Claiming, Blame Avoidance, and Negativity Bias 3 Chapter Two: Players in the Blame Game: Inside the World of Blame Avoidance 24 Part Two: Avoiding Blame: Three Basic Strategies Chapter Three: Presentational Strategies: Winning the Argument, Drawing a Line, Changing the Subject, and Keeping a Low Profi le 47 Chapter Four: Agency Strategies: Direct or Delegate, Choose or Inherit? 67 Chapter Five: Policy or Operational Strategies 90 Chapter Six: The Institutional Dynamics of Blameworld: A New Tefl on Era? 112 Part Three: Living in a World of Blame Avoidance Chapter Seven: Mixing and Matching Blame-Avoidance Strategies 135 Chapter Eight: Democracy, Good Governance, and Blame Avoidance 157 Chapter Nine: The Last Word 181 Notes 187 References 201 Index 219

The electoral consequences of welfare state retrenchment: Blame avoidance or credit claiming in the era of permanent austerity?

This article challenges the dominant assumptions in the literature that cutting social policy incurs voter wrath and that political parties can efficiently internalise electoral fallout with blame avoidance strategies. Drawing on the diverse literature on the role of partisanship in the period of permanent austerity, several partisan hypotheses on the relationship between social policy change and electoral outcomes are posited. The results indicate that religious and liberal parties gain votes, and thereby are able to ‘claim credit’, for retrenching social policy. None of the other coefficients for the effect of social policy cuts reach significance, raising the question of whether parties excel at blame avoidance or the public fails to place blame in the first place.

The Politics of Budget Consolidation in Britain and Germany: The Impact of Blame Avoidance Opportunities

According to important parts of the literature, blame avoidance opportunities, i.e. the necessity and applicability of blame avoidance strategies, may differ between countries according to the respective institutional set-ups and between governing parties according to their programmatic orientation. In countries with many veto actors, a strategy of ‘Institutional Cooperation’ between these actors is expected to diffuse blame sufficiently to render other blame avoidance strategies obsolete. In contrast, governments in Westminster-style democracies should resort to the more unilateral strategies of presentation, policy design and timing. At the same time, left-wing parties are expected to have an easier time implementing spending cuts while right-wing parties are less vulnerable when proposing tax increases. Evidence from the politics of budget consolidation in Britain and Germany does not corroborate these hypotheses. Instead, it seems that party competition conditions the effects institutions and the partisan complexion of governments have on the politics of blame avoidance.

What happens when transparency meets blame-avoidance?

This article explores what happens when the much-discussed doctrine of transparency as a key to good governance meets the widely observed behavioural tendency of blame-avoidance in politics and public administration. It begins by discussing transparency as an idea and distinguishing different strains of the doctrine, proceeds to discuss blame-avoidance and to identify three common types of blame-avoidance strategy, and then explores what can happen when a widely advocated governance doctrine meets a commonly observed type of behaviour. The article identifies ways in which that conjunction can produce nil effects, side-effects and reverse-effects in the pursuit of transparency. It concludes that the tension between the pursuit of transparency and the avoidance of blame is at the heart of some commonly observed problems in public management, and suggests that something other than the ‘bureaucratic’ strain of transparency may be called for when those problems are serious.