Biological And Toxin Weapons Convention Research Articles

The history of biological warfare: Human experimentation, modern nightmares and lone madmen in the twentieth century

The history of biological warfare: Human experimentation, modern nightmares and lone madmen in the twentieth century

Infectious diseases and bioweapons: Science and the political economics of affliction

Infectious diseases and bioweapons: Science and the political economics of affliction

Strengthening the BTWC. The role of Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in combating natural and deliberate disease outbreaks.

Public health in reverse; this term has been applied to the deliberate use of microorganisms to cause and spread disease (Harris & Paxman, 1982, p. xii). Biological warfare is not only a perversion of science; it goes against the very heart of human efforts to reduce and eliminate infectious disease as a scourge of society. The developed world had assumed that the impact of natural infectious diseases had been eliminated by, among other things, clean water, antibiotics and vaccinations; we know now that this is far from the truth. Since the early 1970s, at least 30 previously unknown infectious diseases, have been identified for which there is as yet no fully effective treatment (US Department of Health, 2002). One could also be forgiven for believing that the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) had eliminated the threat posed by the deliberate release of these microorganisms. Unfortunately, since the convention came into force in 1975, the historical record has been unequivocal. Both the former Soviet Union and Iraq have pursued major clandestine bioweapons programmes concealed both within government and, ostensibly, civil and academic facilities, such as vaccine and other pharmaceutical plants. The misuse of ‘dual‐use’ knowledge, facilities and technologies and the proliferation of potential biological weapons remains a risk, despite the existence of the BTWC, and underscores the need to find more effective ways of combating and deterring the acquisition, possession and use of offensive bioweapon capabilities. We should not forget that the term ‘bioweapons’ applies to the misuse of microorganisms to cause disease or harm to humans, animals and plants—indeed, the threat to crop monocultures, food supplies and agricultural trade should not be underestimated (Chalk, 2001; Wheelis et al ., 2002). A major stumbling block with the current BTWC is that it contains weak compliance provisions. Article …

From offence to defence? Russia's reform of its biological weapons complex and the implications for Western security

The Russian Federation's military microbiological complex is of global significance and represents one of the world's major reservoirs of biological weapons (BW) expertise, embracing several thousand weapons scientists, extensive stocks of highly pathogenic (and potentially, genetically modified) strains, dedicated research and production facilities and delivery systems. These are a legacy of the vast offensive biological weapons programme aggressively pursued throughout the 1970s and the 1980s by the Soviet Union. This article looks beyond public statements reaffirming Russia's commitment to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) and seeks to determine, where possible, the degree of progress which has been made, over the past decade and more, towards the dismantlement of the Soviet infrastructure supporting an offensive biological warfare programme. It seeks to provide a balanced analysis of legitimate concerns regarding the management and direction of Russian BW programmes and places these within the context of recent US and European reservations regarding Russia's full compliance with the 1972 BWC.

International mechanisms for threat reduction of chemical and biological weapons. Steps the United States needs to take to strengthen current global initiatives.

Discusses steps the United States needs to take to strengthen current global initiatives. If U.S. policymakers want the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) to be effective threat-reduction mechanisms, they must replace rhetoric with action. In this age, the United States government can ill afford to neglect any mechanism that has a constructive role to play in lowering the threat that nations or terrorists might obtain and unleash chemical and biological weapons. This article outlines several steps that the United States can take in the near term to put the BWC and the CWC on stronger footing. Otherwise, the United States will have to shoulder the lion's share of the blame for the weakened status of these treaties.

Hope and ambition turn to dismay and neglect: The biological and toxin weapons convention in 2001

The background to the failure of the December 2001 Fifth Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) to agree a politically binding final declaration is discussed. Negotiations in the Ad Hoc Group (AHG) of the BTWC, which was set up after the 1994 Special Conference, are described. Accusations of non‐compliance with the BTWC are not new and it is concluded that the ultimate failure of the 2001 Review Conference was principally, but not entirely, due to rejection by the United States that the AHG should remain in being. Strengthening the BTWC remains as important as ever, but it remains to be seen if there is the political will to achieve this.

Closing loopholes in the biological weapons convention

The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) received two major blows in the past months. Negotiations for a protocol to strengthen the BTWC came to a halt and the Fifth Review Conference was unable to reach agreement on a final declaration. In addition, ongoing research projects, predominantly in the United States, are threatening to undermine the comprehensive ban on the development, production and use of biological weapons. This article provides two examples of research that exploit perceived loopholes in the BTWC or impinge on the scope of the Convention, namely the planned use of biological agents for forced drug eradication and the development of anti‐material agents.

The potential for abuse of genetics in militarily significant biological weapons

Concern has been expressed at successive Review Conferences of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) regarding the possible misuse of new biological knowledge; this article reviews some of these developments. Genetic manipulation, and genomics in particular, would modify existing pathogens and render previously harmless organisms pathogenic. Viruses could be modified as vectors to alter their pathogenicity in animals and man or act as carriers for genes or toxins. Plant pathogens, particularly fungi, could be modified as biological warfare agents against crops. An effective verification protocol for the BTWC is an essential part of the web of deterrence against these developments.

Mass spectrometric identification of toxins of biological origin

The chemical/biological (CB) threat spectrum encompasses a wide range of potential agents including chemical warfare agents, biological warfare agents and toxins of biological origin that fall between these two main agent categories. These proteinaceous and non-proteinaceous toxins, commonly referred to as mid-spectrum agents, range in molecular mass from a few hundred to more than a hundred thousand daltons. The large number of potential candidates as well as the structural diversity of possible mid-spectrum agents makes identification of these compounds a challenge. The NATO defense community has recognized these challenges and has a working group that is developing identification protocols and evaluating methods through a series of international analytical exercises. Identification strategies rely heavily on recent advances that have been made in both mass spectrometry (MS) and liquid chromatography (LC), with LC–MS typically being employed as the primary method for separation/identification. While this paper focuses on the application of these and related instrumental analytical techniques for the identification of mid-spectrum agents, the approach described could be applied in the fields of toxicology, forensic science and environmental analysis. Areas for future research have been identified and application of developed mid-spectrum identification methods to the ongoing biological and toxin weapons convention (BTWC) are anticipated.

China's role in the chemical and biological disarmament regimes

Modern China has been linked with the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and missile weapons technology to states of proliferation concern, and its compliance with arms control and disarmament is seen as key to the effectiveness of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) nonproliferation efforts. In this context, the answer to Gerald Segal’s question, “Does China really matter?” is most definitely, “Yes.” In the realm of chemical and biological weapons (CBW), Beijing’s role is closely linked to its view of the multilateral disarmament regimes for CBW, namely the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), and of related multilateral export control efforts. These views, in turn, depend on how CBW figure in China’s tactical and strategic posture, which includes a declared nuclear weapons (NW) capability and a strategic missile force. Where CBW proliferation is concerned, the key question today is not whether China matters, but whether the Chinese government is serious about eliminating both chemical and biological weapons—it maintains it never developed the latter—and preventing the proliferation of CBW-related technology. China has been an active participant (at least in the last two decades) in both chemical and biological disarmament and arms control negotiations. Outwardly at least—and with considerable diplomatic effort—China broadcasts its commitment to both the CWC and the BWC.

Challenges to Disarmament Regimes: The Case of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

A disarmament treaty is an agent of change in the international security environment in its own right. Disarmament requires the total elimination of the weaponry under consideration. At minimum, the agreement could therefore be expected to remove the threat posed by that weaponry from the overall threat equation. Unfortunately, the effect of a disarmament treaty on the external security of a state is not as straightforward: the security bene® ts obtained under the treaty must be evaluated relative to the possible security losses in other domains. The research into disarmament dynamics and their impact on security is constrained by the fact that only four disarmament treaties exist: the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the 1997 Anti-personnel Mines (APM) Treaty. They cover different weapon categories and, because of the compartmentalisation of analysis, few connections between them have ever been made. Furthermore, the four treaties vary in scope, participation and enforceability. The INF Treaty was negotiated between two states, the United States and the USSR, and is applicable only to a wellcircumscribed territory. It calls for veri® cation and on-site inspections, which

Challenge of Biotechnology (Review Paper)

The unravelling of the human genetic code whose first draft was announced in June 2000 has rightly blood been hailed as a momentous achievement, opening thc book of life, certain to be the dominant technology of the 21st century, which will inform all about medicine and biology. and lead us to a total understanding of life. Simultaneously, concerns have been expressed about thc implications of this work. In the past, major new technologies have been used intensively for hostile purposes. What is thc challenge that biotechnology poses in this regard'? This review paper looks at the enormous changes in civil society that thc genomics revolution could bring. Against this background, thc growing concerns about its potential misuses have been reviewed. Thc strengths and weaknesses or the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) are then touched upon. The BTWC presently lacks an adequate verification mechanism. Although biotechnology has been used by human beings since prehistoric times (eg. making of bread. cheese. wines) its scientific understanding came only in the latter part of the 19th century. Thc decisive turning point in the field came in the 1970s with the advent of genetic engineering. In the military context classical agents like anthrax and toxin remain the threat today. Although thc current level or sophistication for many biological agents is low, there is enormous potential for making more sophisticated weapons. It might be possible to specifically target the genetic makeup of different ethnic groups. The limited varieties of staple crops and the limited strains of modern animals make agriculture particularly open to attack. Another serious possibility is the impact of genomics in neuroscience. With a better understanding of cellular receptor systems and bioregulators, it is not inconceivable that new means would be evolved for disturbing the functions of the nervous system. Thc genomics revolution can be used for peaceful purposes. However, a key requirement is the political will to bring into force a Protocol to strengthen thc BTWC.

View the PDF document Defending against biological attack : Importance of biotechnology in preparadness (Review Paper)

danger of biological warfare has rightly received increasing attention during the past decade. Although 143 State Parties have signed the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), there have been reports of around a dozen states possessing or seeking to possess biological weapons. There is even a view that the potential threat from biological and chemical weapons is greater than that from nuclear weapons. Biological warfare programme are also being considered for counter-insurgency use and tactical applications in the regional conflicts. Even small groups appear to have the means to launch a biological attack, an example of which was the attack with the nerve gas, sarin, in a Tokyo subway, in 1994, Defence against biological attacks has so far received little attention.This article begins with an assessment of the potential biological threat and considers the vulnerabilities of states facing such threat. It then considers the role of political-military coalitions in meeting the challenges of the aggressor and goes on to evaluate and identify the vulnerabilities of coalition partners. It also addresses the measures necessary to minimise those vulnerabilities, by active and passive defence, and examines the role biotechnology in such protective measures. It then briefly surveys the biological warfare defence capabilities of different countries. It concludes with a discussion of policy initiatives useful for addressing gaps by promoting cooperation among the interested parties. The key elements of protective measures against biological and toxin weapons attack are hazard assessment, detection, physical protection, identification and diagnosis, and medical countermeasures. Biotechnology is vital for further advances in all these areas for both civil and military requirements

Biological warfare against crops.

List of Figures List of Tables Preface Acknowledgements Glossary Introduction Iraqi and the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) A Study of Disease in Plants Anti-Crop Biological Warfare and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) The Context of US Biological Warfare Research and Development Aspects of Anti-Crop Biological Warfare Activity, France, Germany, and Japan Post-World War Two United States Anti-Crop Biological Warfare Some Aspects of UK and US Anti-Crop Warfare Collaboration Between 1943 and 1958 Munitions for Anti-Crop BW Agents Targets Conclusions Related International Prohibitions and Controls on Dangerous Plant Diseases Appendices Notes Bibliography Index

Biological Weapons Control

The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), which prohibits the acquisition of biological materials for hostile purposes and armed conflict, entered into force in 1975 and now has the participation of 140 nations (158 nations have signed the BWC, but only 140 of these have also ratified it). However, there is no monitoring mechanism associated with the BWC. Diplomatic efforts are now under way to create a supplemental, legally binding protocol to strengthen the convention. Measures to strengthen the BWC are analogous to the diagnostic processes familiar to physicians; the problem facing negotiators is to identify procedures with high positive and negative predictive value. Few proposed measures meet these criteria. However, the investigation of unusual disease outbreaks and allegations of use are highly diagnostic of illicit activities while avoiding false-positive accusations. At the same time, such information generated by the BWC can contribute to worldwide efforts to improve public health, control emergent disease, and establish an international norm against biological weapons proliferation.

Biological weapons control. Prospects and implications for the future.

The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), which prohibits the acquisition of biological materials for hostile purposes and armed conflict, entered into force in 1975 and now has the participation of 140 nations (158 nations have signed the BWC, but only 140 of these have also ratified it). However, there is no monitoring mechanism associated with the BWC. Diplomatic efforts are now under way to create a supplemental, legally binding protocol to strengthen the convention. Measures to strengthen the BWC are analogous to the diagnostic processes familiar to physicians; the problem facing negotiators is to identify procedures with high positive and negative predictive value. Few proposed measures meet these criteria. However, the investigation of unusual disease outbreaks and allegations of use are highly diagnostic of illicit activities while avoiding false-positive accusations. At the same time, such information generated by the BWC can contribute to worldwide efforts to improve public health, control emergent disease, and establish an international norm against biological weapons proliferation.

Production and Use of Biological Weapons: Need for International Sanctions?

To the Editor. —Offical US government assessments indicate that from 1972 through 1975, when the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) was signed and came into force, 4 countries in the world had biological weapons (BW) development programs. In the 1990s, that number is around 10 and includes China, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Syria, and Taiwan, with the status of the BW programs that existed in the past in Russia and South Africa ambiguous at present. 1-6 It is not clear exactly how many of these nations are currently producing or stockpiling BW agents, but apparently 2 or 3 (possibly China, Iran, and Iraq) may be. 1-6 Of particular significance is the fact that several of these 10 nations are signatories of the BWC, which prohibits both the development and production of BW. There was no serious international response to the use of chemical weapons by Iraq against

The Role of Declarations in UNSCOM's Program in Iraq

Written declarations have been identified as one of the most useful tools in determining a nation's potential for a biological warfare capability. Declarations are defined as mandatory reports (provided on a periodic basis) that describe various aspects of a state's biological infrastructure, including both academic and governmental programs. Specifically included are descriptions of facilities, summaries of research projects, and other information considered relevant to making an evaluation of that country's capabilities. Notifications of specific events of interest are also considered as part of the required declaration. As part of the confidence-building measures (CBMs) of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), between 25 and 30 of the State Parties have been providing written declarations for a number of years. With specific regard to the Iraqi experience, the government of Iraq was required (under the auspices of United Nations Security Council Resolution 687) to provide specific declarations about any and all facilities potentially associated with their biological warfare program. UNSCOM inspectors have the responsibility of verifying the accuracy of the information provided by Iraq in declarations.

Controlling the proliferation of biological weapons

Brad Roberts is a Research Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., where he also serves as Editor of The Washington Quarterly. His recent publications include Biological Weapons: Weapons of the Future? and Ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention. An earlier version of this article was presented to a symposium of the American Bar Association's Committee on National Security. In the panoply of global security interests as they have emerged after the Cold War, biological weapons are nearly an afterthought. It is common to hear such weapons lumped together with nuclear and chemical weapons—and their delivery systems—in descriptions of the emerging proliferation challenge, but with little or no differentiation of the biological aspect from the larger context. Why, in fact, do biological weapons (BW) merit any specific concern? After all, despite the high potential lethality of such weapons, their use in modern warfare has been virtually unknown. Moreover, there has been a global arms control regime in place in the biological domain for over two decades—the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC)—with more than 100 states parties. The answer is straightforward: the biological warfare problem appears to be growing worse. There are four reasons for thinking so.

Dilemmas of a Dual-Use Technology: Toxins in Medicine and Warfare

Several toxins are “dual-use” in that they have legitimate therapeutic, pharmaceutical, or scientific applications as well as potential military utility as toxin warfare (TW) agents. The growing peaceful applications of such toxins may complicate efforts to ban their use for warfare or terrorist purposes. Worldwide consumption of toxins for medical therapy and scientific research has increased from a few grams to the current level of hundreds of grams per year, and the projected future growth of toxin therapies will require tens to hundreds of kilograms of material annually, blurring the distinction between medically useful and militarily significant quantities. As a result, a proliferator might seek to acquire an offensive TW capability under the guise of “peaceful” activities permitted by the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). To examine this problem more closely, the case of ricin—a putative toxin warfare agent with expanding scientific and medical applications—is discussed in detail. Finally, an analysis of policy options for regulating dual-use toxins concludes that precise monitoring of toxin production would be impracticable in many cases, and that international efforts to achieve greater openness and transparency offer the most realistic basis for distinguishing between the legitimate and banned uses of toxins.