Biological And Toxin Weapons Convention Research Articles

Rethinking biosecurity in the 21st century: An enhanced role for civil society

In this paper, we briefly discuss the historical issues concerning the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and analyse the current situation after the COVID-19 pandemic with emphasis on the new developments at 9th Review Conference of the BTWC. In particular, we discuss the mission of the new working group agreed at the review conference to identify, examine, and develop specific and effective measures, including possible legally binding measures and to make recommendations to strengthen and institutionalise the Convention in all its aspects, and compare it with productive activities associated with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the World Health Organisation (WHO). The enhanced role for civil society in support of the BTWC is then proposed with some solid examples from our own recent projects. We hope this analysis will help to facilitate new thinking about strengthening BTWC in coming years.

Guarding Against Catastrophic Biological Risks: Preventing State Biological Weapon Development and Use by Shaping Intentions.

Guarding Against Catastrophic Biological Risks: Preventing State Biological Weapon Development and Use by Shaping Intentions.

International legal issues on biosafety: general overview

Objective: The legal concept and content of biosafety is discussed in the context of International Law. Biosafety issues are enumerated as part of a definition of concrete aspects related to responsibility of the states for using biological weapons. The latest trends in international law on ensuring the international biosafety are analysed. Legal issues concerning the definition of a just war are discussed in terms of international humanitarian law, the issues of fundamental principles in current international law (the principle of necessity governing the use of force, the right of states to self-defence in case of a bioattack, the principle of the peaceful settlement of international disputes, the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states, arms control, and responsibility). The article presents an overview of new types of sovereignty such as biosovereignty, cyber sovereignty, and genomic sovereignty of states, along with the legal concept of international biocrime (genomocide), as well as classifications of bioterrorism, bioaggression, biopolitics and bioeconomics. Under current conditions, the importance of facilitating a broad interpretation of the concept of biosafety is emphasized.Methodology: The research uses general scientific and special cognitive techniques wherein legal analysis and synthesis, systemic, formal-legal, comparative-legal, historical-legal and dialectical methods are applied.Results: Despite the prohibition of biological weapons, urgent issues, such as establishing an international control mechanism for monitoring the non-proliferation of biological weapons, remain. Moreover, the Protocol to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), which entered into force in 1975, is yet to be fully adopted and / or ratified by all member states. Identifying certain types of biomedical research that should be banned according to generally accepted principles, the study concludes that the problem of banning these research activities has yet to be solved by some states. The concept of biosafety is interpreted broadly in terms of issues arising in relevant industrial processes. Biosecurity and biosafety are directly related to ensuring environmental security, marine security, food security and the security of outer space. Principles governing effective legal regulation for ensuring environmental, biological, and food safety are presented.

BWC assurance: increasing certainty in BWC compliance

ABSTRACT Following the 2001 end to negotiations on a legally binding protocol, states parties to the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) developed entrenched positions about the necessity of treaty verification, hindering progress on treaty aims. The study described in this article was designed to facilitate dialogue on verification-related issues outside the context of those positions, using the term “assurance” to represent the degree of certainty that states parties are meeting their treaty obligations. From August 2020 to July 2021, the researchers conducted 36 interviews—16 with state-party delegations and 20 with independent experts, representing 20 countries. They performed mixed-methods analysis on the interviews, including quantitative metrics on qualitative interview content. Interviewees’ views on verification, compliance, and related concepts varied widely. Future efforts by states parties to achieve common understanding on these topics could facilitate concrete progress. While no single mechanism is sufficient to achieve verification or assess compliance, packages of mechanisms could increase assurance. Interviewees expressed general support for implementing assurance mechanisms, even in the absence of a comprehensive, legally binding protocol or verification regime, even among states parties for which that is the primary goal. Avenues to increase assurance among BWC stakeholders merit further discussion in the current intersessional program.

Key issues in the implementation of the Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines for Codes of Conduct for Scientists: A survey of biosecurity education projects

In order to effectively implement the Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines for Codes of Conduct for Scientists, biosecurity awareness-raising and education are essential because if these are not in place scientists will not understand the need for biosecurity codes of conduct. In an effort to assist in the implementation of the guidelines, a small-scale survey was carried out in early 2022 of biosecurity awareness-raising and education projects that have been developed over the last two decades to discoverwhat resources and experience have been accumulated. It is argued that the survey demonstrates that much of what is needed to implement the guidelines effectively has been developed, but that there are specific deficiencies that need to be remedied quickly. In particular, an updated teaching resource covering the core issues related to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and the problem of dual use in scientific research needs to be made widely available and translated into at least the six official United Nations (UN) languages. Additionally, more specialists from the Humanities with expertise in ethics need to become involved in biosecurity awareness-raising and education activities. While advantage should be taken now of the available national, regional and international networks of people involved in related activities, it is suggested that in the longer term cooperation in biosecurity awareness-raising and education will benefit from the development of an equivalent organisation to the International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN) organised through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Problems of Biosafety in Current International Law

INTRODUCTION. The presented article is devoted to an extremely curious and, without exaggeration, urgent topic. The authors seek to understand the content and legal concept of biosafety in International Law. The researchers seek to list the biosafety issues in order to define concrete aspects related to responsibility of the States for using biological weapons. The authors analyze new legal trends on ensuring the international biosafety. The article is focused on legal issues by raising many questions about what should be considered a just war in the view of international humanitarian law, the issues of fundamental principles in current international law (the principle use of force, the right of States to self-defense in case of a bioattack, the principle of the peaceful settlement of international disputes, the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of States, arms control, and responsibility). The writers give an overview of new types of sovereignty such as biosovereignty, cyber sovereignty, cyberbiosovereignty, and genomic sovereignty of States, the legal concept of international biocrimes (genomocide), the legal classification of bioterrorism, bioaggression, biopolitics, and bioeconomics. The authors consider the importance of facilitating the broad interpretation of the concept of biosafety.MATERIALS AND METHODS. The research uses general scientific and special cognitive techniques wherein legal analysis and synthesis, systemic, formal-legal, comparative-legal, historical-legal and dialectical methods are applied.RESEARCH RESULTS. The authors found out that despite the prohibition of biological weapon there are still other urgent issues such as an international control mechanism for monitoring the non-proliferation of biological weapons has not been established yet. The Protocol to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) has not been adopted yet. The study concludes with an idea that the problem of banning certain types of biomedical research has not been solved in some States and at the international level. The authors note such important problems as the lack of an international control mechanism for monitoring the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons, as well as the threat to the safety of genomic research and confidentiality of genetic data. In this paper, we interpret the concept of biosafety rather broadly, considering the issues typical of allied industries. Biosecurity and biosafety are directly related to ensuring environmental security, marine security, food security and outer space security. The researchers paid attention to the issue of legal regulation of ensuring environmental, biological, and food safety. Due to this fact, it is hard to do so with regard to the causal link between the acts (bioterrorism) of state agencies, the violation of the principles of international law, standards of human rights and the consequences that occurred. It is not clear from the text of the BTWC Convention which international organ/body can investigate such acts in international affairs and which norm of international law directly should be applied.DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS. Following a review of the content, the authors raise possible problems, strategies, suggestions and guidelines for ensuring biosafety in international law. The authors conclude that near future new categories of weapons of mass destruction appear in the world, moreover, genetic weapons should be classified as weapons of mass destruction, along with chemical, biological, bacteriological, and nuclear weapons. Technological developments will trigger the issues of fundamental principles in current international law. The authors came to the conclusion about extension of the universal jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court in case biological and genetic weapons are used. The authors encourage the complement to the international legal regulation the necessity to adopt a Protocol to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), establishing an international control mechanism for verifying prohibitions on the development, production, and stockpiling of biological weapons is obvious. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction adopted in 1993, which contains a mechanism for verifying compliance with the prohibitions of the Convention, can be considered a precedent for the effective regulation of the circulation of hazardous substances all over the world.

Governance of Heritable Human Gene Editing World-Wide and Beyond.

To date, the controversy surrounding the unknown risks and consequences of heritable genome editing has grown, with such work raising biosafety and ethical concerns for future generations. However, the current guideline of global governance is limited. In the context of the new framework for the governance of human genome editing developed by the World Health Organization (WHO) committee, this paper presents further analysis by highlighting predicaments of governance on germline engineering that merit the most attention: (1) building a scientific culture informed by a broader set of values and considerations in the internal scientific community at large, such as codes of ethics, and education, in addition to awareness-raising measures; and (2) reflecting on and institutionalizing policies in grassroots practice according to local conditions in external governance, such as the experimentalist governance, which is a multi-layered model of governance that establishes an open-ended framework from the top and offers stakeholders the freedom of discussion. The key to achieving these goals is more democratic deliberation between the public and the inclusive engagement of the global scientific community, which has been extensively used in the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). On a global scale, we believe that practicing heritable human genome editing in accordance with the WHO and BTWC appears to be a good choice.

Strengthening biological security after COVID-19: Using cartoons for engaging life science stakeholders with the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)

The devastating effects of the COVID-19 pandemic have acutely shown the need for maintaining robust international and national systems for biological security and ensuring that life sciences are used only for peaceful purposes. Life science stakeholders can play an important role in safeguarding scientific and technological advances in biology and related fields against accidental or deliberate misuse, not least because they are on the frontlines of driving innovation. In this paper, we argue that enhancing awareness and understanding of the risk of deliberate disease is essential for effective biological security. We first discuss the issue of ‘dual use’ in science and technology as it relates to disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Second, we review how scientist engagement with dual-use risks has been addressed in the context of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). Third, we report on the development of an innovative awareness-raising tool, a cartoon series, that can be used for engaging life science stakeholders with BTWC issues. Finally, we outline a set of practical considerations for promoting sustainable life science engagement with the BTWC.

Современные проблемы биобезопасности и перспективы международного сотрудничества

Biological safety is one of the most important components of the overall security system of both individual states and the entire world community. Today it has become quite obvious that the problems of biosafety are more urgent than ever and require the maximum attention of the world community. Against the background of the emergence and spread of diseases caused, as a rule, by dangerous and especially dangerous microorganisms, a number of problems arise in the world not only in the field of health care, but also of a political, social and economic nature. A striking example of this is the COVID 19 coronavirus pandemic that has continued since the end of 2019. The issues related to biosafety in the agricultural sector and ecology are considered. It is obvious that constant monitoring and analysis of a wide range of biosafety problems, early development of measures to minimize the threats of exposure to already known dangerous pathogens not only on human health, but also on the environment, agricultural and food sectors are necessary. The issues related to the development of new research directions that can lead to the creation of biological systems with specified properties and functions that have no analogues in nature are discussed. In research aimed at the development of new biological technologies, to one degree or another related to the production of biological warfare, the primary and mandatory requirement is to ensure the safety of all personnel involved in these works and the availability of well-trained qualified scientists, as well as certified laboratory facilities in which these works are carried out. It is important to constantly pursue the purposeful development of multilateral international cooperation in the field of biosafety, and make creative decisions to ensure it on the territory of the Russian Federation. The importance of Russia’s active international participation in solving existing and potential biological threats within the framework of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is noted.

Enhancing the Utility of Codes of Conduct for Chemical and Biological Security through Active Learning

The role of codes of conduct in promoting the norms of chemical and biological security among science stakeholders has been recognized within the context of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). This paper focuses on the mutually reinforcing relationship between codes of conduct and education as a basis for the implementation of integrated approaches for strengthening the prevention of chemical and biological security risks and ensuring that chemical and life sciences are used only for peaceful purposes. The paper draws upon concrete examples of innovative active learning strategies to elucidate the conceptual link between codes of conduct and education and examine its implications for embedding chemical and biological security considerations in the professional practice of public and private science stakeholders.

Анализ текущего состояния КБТО: проблемы и возможные пути их решения

The COVID‑19 pandemic has highlighted the relevance of biosecurity and biosafety issues, including such risks as the deliberate use of biological weapons, agroterrorism, and developments in life sciences with dual-use potential. Throughout its almost 50-year history, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) regime has faced many challenges, a majority of which have demanded attention ever since. For example, the problem of universality remains topical. The verification mechanism has not received enough development since 2001. Also, the BTWC regime has to face the inequality of economic, scientific and technological development of the States parties that, altogether with the inequalities in the BTWC implementation experience, makes the regime vulnerable. Amid these long-standing and profound issues new threats continue to emerge, like the erosion of global arms control and disarmament architecture as well as developments in science and technology. Even though States parties to the BTWC agree on the need to establish effective mechanisms for reviewing scientific and technological developments, there is no unanimity in approach or possible format. Moreover, agroterrorism, despite its increased relevance, is not covered properly within the BTWC regime. The list of challenges is extensive, however, there is a larger list of possible measures designed to strengthen this regime. Given that the sustainability of any regime is based on the political will of its members to comply, it is essential to enhance states’ commitments and stimulate their interest through a variety of proposed measures. Joint activities, like the renewal of confidence building measures, addressing risks of bioterrorism, or reviewing scientific and technological developments related to the Convention, in particular, may give the impetus needed.

Twentieth-century nonproliferation meets twenty-first-century biotechnology

ABSTRACT This article explores emerging science and technology advances relevant to the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), and existing and needed frameworks for their identification, risk assessment, and evaluation of benefit. Threats from biological weapons continue to be a major concern as state and non-state actors have developed, used, or expressed interest in these types of weapons. International nonproliferation instruments and related efforts in health security, specifically the 2005 International Health Regulations and the 2014 Global Health Security Agenda, recognize deliberate biological incidents as one of three threats to address (the others being natural and accidental biological events). To date, these instruments and their subsequent regional and national-level implementation efforts focus primarily on pathogens and toxins as biological threat agents. Unlike the other instruments, the BWC focuses on preventing the diversion of peaceful and prophylactic uses of biology to the development, production, stockpiling, or dissemination and delivery of biological weapons. Accordingly, the BWC recognizes the importance of scientific and technological advances in enabling different actors to develop or disseminate biological agents, altering the risk profile of deliberate biological threats. To identify and discuss advances that may affect implementation of the BWC, the US National Academy of Sciences and the BWC Implementation Support Unit conducted or sponsored several activities to explore science and technologies that may be most relevant to the BWC. However, the biotechnology landscape continues to change drastically, expanding the focus of security risks beyond pathogens and toxins to include other biological data and materials, such as synthetic organisms. Factors promoting the development of biotechnology capabilities include new funders and funding models, practitioners from other disciplines leveraging the tools of biology, new nations investing in the biological sciences, and research leveraging advances in engineering, computer, data, materials, physical, and chemical sciences. These advances may reveal new capabilities that significantly alter biological nonproliferation efforts, including both new security threats and benefits to society.

Verification and implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

ABSTRACT This article looks at verification and implementation as two aspects of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) that Ray Zilinskas had identified as weaknesses. Based on his predictions and suggestions to develop a comprehensive and effective verification regime, the first part of this article offers some reflections on the status and prospects of BWC verification. It provides a brief overview of persisting controversies surrounding aspects Zilinskas discussed, and considers the effectiveness of the BWC despite the absence of verification, including verification “alternatives” that Zilinskas had also anticipated. The second part of this article focuses on the national legislative implementation of the BWC. This topic has received less attention in Zilinskas’s publications but remains an important component of the BWC regime, with expanding obligations to adopt laws and regulations relating to biological weapons, yet persisting gaps in national legal regimes.

Reflections on the 2001 BWC Protocol and the verification challenge

ABSTRACT The history of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) shows that efforts to make its compliance provisions more effective have invariably fallen short. The high point of these efforts came during the 1995–2001 verification-protocol negotiations in the Ad Hoc Group (AHG). Despite solid preparation by the 1992–93 verification experts’ meetings, the AHG failed to reach agreement on a Protocol. The challenges of devising effective verification measures were then, and remain now, considerable: a combination of complex scientific, technological, diplomatic, and legal obstacles proved insurmountable. Despite the passage of time, some states parties continue to call for the AHG’s resumption, but many of those doing so have forgotten the challenges and that their own positions in the 1990s were instrumental in the AHG’s failure. This does not augur well for future efforts to strengthen the BWC at its Ninth Review Conference.

Compliance mechanisms and their implementation: the contrast between the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions

ABSTRACT The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) are key components of the international arms-control landscape. Yet the two conventions differ widely, particularly in the ways that are available to treaty parties to resolve any questions about compliance with the treaties. Both contain language concerning consultation and cooperation, but the CWC also has extensive procedures available to investigate allegations of noncompliance. This article reviews these differences in the conventions and explains, in part, how and why they came about. The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has engaged in several consultations regarding compliance issues, but the OPCW publishes virtually nothing about the topics of the consultations or their frequency, findings, or conclusions. An exception, perhaps, is the OPCW’s work regarding Syrian use of chemical weapons (CW). Moreover, thus far, no treaty party has called for a challenge inspection to officially investigate perhaps the most serious allegations of treaty violations: Syrian and Russian alleged use of CW. The BWC states parties conducted one formal consultation raised by Cuba, alleging that the United States dropped biological agents on the island nation from airplanes to cause an animal epidemic. The consultation reached no official conclusion. The article goes on to praise the work of Raymond Zilinskas debunking the allegations through a careful scientific review of the Cuban claims. The article discusses the consequences of secrecy surrounding the CWC consultation process and laments that the BWC does not have the institutional capacity to carry on the type of analysis that Zilinskas undertook discrediting the Cuban allegations.

Engaging scientists in biosecurity: lessons from the Biological Weapons Convention

ABSTRACT Major efforts to engage scientists in issues of biosecurity in the United States and internationally began in the early 2000s in response to growing concerns about terrorists using weapons of mass destruction and the mailing of anthrax-laced letters in October 2001. This article draws on the literature about the “science of science communication,” including research on framing, to examine the strategies used to try to raise awareness and create support for policies and practices to address public concerns about biosecurity issues within scientific communities. Engagement strategies framed as an inherent part of the broader social responsibilities of the scientific community have shown the promise of being more effective than those framed in terms of legal and regulatory requirements and an emphasis on security alone. The article draws on the case of the InterAcademy Partnership (IAP), the global network of academies of science and medicine, and its relationship with the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), with additional examples from other national and international scientific organizations.

Preserving the norm against chemical weapons: A civil society initiative for the 2018 4th review conference of the chemical weapons convention

Acceleration of the applications of cutting edge science is often most likely in situations involving conflict and warfare between different groups. That is the focus of this paper. It asks what we know of the past, present and possible future applications of advances in our understanding of the brain in the development of chemical weapons, and what might best be done to moderate the most dangerous aspects of that process at the present time, particularly by members of civil society. The paper therefore begins by examining this possibility of hostile manipulation of the brain in some detail. It then briefly reviews the current state of the chemical and biological arms control and disarmament regime as embodied in the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) following the 2016 8th Five Year Review Conference of the BTWC and in the lead up to the 2018 4th Five Year Review Conference of the CWC. Finally, our civil society initiative to assist in achieving a successful outcome of the 2018 CWC Review Conference is described. This initiative involves the production of a multi-authored edited book, to be published in advance of the Review Conference by the UK Royal Society of Chemistry that explores many of the critical issues facing the CWC States Parties as they seek to agree effective measures to prevent the development and use of chemical weapons, as the life and chemical sciences advance.

Biological Weapons Allegations: A Russian Propaganda Tool to Negatively Implicate the United States

ABSTRACTIn recent years, biological weapons issues have repeatedly been raised by Russian officials and state-controlled media. Considering that biological weapons development and the use thereof are banned by international law, to insinuate that another state is engaged in activities with offensive signatures is politically sensitive. What are the underlying motives for raising these issues? Is Russia using anti-American propaganda in the biosecurity arena as a tool to discredit the United States for general political reasons, or is it used as a means for internal purposes to motivate increased funding for advanced biodefense research and development? A need for additional funding is also in line with views of the Russian military and security doctrines where the threat from biological weapons is explicitly addressed. Russian discrediting is related to the US support of biosafety/biosecurity upgrades at biological laboratories in the former Soviet republics. This Russian stance toward the United States was also reflected in the run-up to the 8th Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) in 2016, supported by statements of officials indicating that Russia is threatened by US activities in the biological weapons area. This type of unsubstantiated accusations has not been helpful when attempts were badly needed to make progress in the BTWC context. Russian disinformation campaigns, in relation to biological weapons and possible underlying causes, are presented and discussed.

Preventing intangible technology transfer (ITT) on the Internet and telecommunications for bioterrorism through Malaysia's Strategic Trade Act 2010 (STA 2010)

Malaysia's Strategic Trade Act 2010 (STA 2010) was drafted to address export controls and associated trade controls such as transit, transhipment and brokering in the fulfilment of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1540, which broadly address the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Terrorists have been known to utilise websites and emails to place manuals, instructions, blueprints and other documents, known as Intangible Technology Transfer (ITT), to incite and encourage their peers to create biological weapons; subsequently, to launch an attack of bioterrorism. Simultaneously, terrorists may camouflage their identity and attend oral and visual exchanges such as teleconferences, virtual meetings and skills training sessions that disseminate relevant information on biological weapons. This makes it possible for terrorists who already possess some background knowledge of biological weapons to further their interests in creating these weapons. The objective of this study is to analyse Malaysia's STA 2010 concerning relevant provisions that are able to address the threat of ITT over the internet and telecommunications by terrorists in the context of disseminating knowledge of biological weapons to perpetuate bioterrorism. The results show that the provisions of Sections 2, 4, 9 and 10 of STA 2010 are relevant in addressing the ITT of individuals using the internet to encourage creating biological weapons abroad by involving extraterritorial jurisdiction, extradition and mutual assistance in criminal matters. This study concludes that Malaysia's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission (MCMC), implementers of the STA 2010, must deliberate on these unclear matters and draft detailed guidelines to direct Malaysian researchers and academics, learning from the examples of other countries.

Time for structural changes to make the biological and toxin weapons convention more effective

The Eighth Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), which totally prohibits the use of biological agents and toxins to cause harm to humans, animal or plants, is in Geneva on 7–25 November 2016. This article outlines the development of the BTWC since entry into force in 1975 and its evolution to the present.In the intersessional periods between the recent Review Conference (from 2003to 2005, then 2007–2010 and most recently 2012–2015) States Parties have been less successful in producing concrete actions with results. Substantive paragraphs have been agreed by using the approach of consensus by deletion rather than recognizing that an objective can be achieved by various alternatives. It is timely – and necessary – that States Parties prepare for the Eighth Review Conference by considering the structural change needed to be agreed to actually strengthen the Convention and enhance its effectiveness and implementation.