Binding Minimum Wage Research Articles

Estimating the employment effect of the minimum wage through variation in compliance: Evidence from five US states

The implications of a binding minimum wage law on employment have been the subject of a lively and ongoing debate. Estimation of employment effects may be hindered by the non-random manner in which minimum wage laws are created. To overcome this, we explore the employment implications of the minimum wage in the US restaurant industry through an approach that exploits variation in compliance, as opposed to legislation. In the five US states without state minimum wages, violations of the US federal minimum wage are shown to be associated with decreased employment in the restaurant industry in the time period around the federal minimum wage increases of 2007 through 2009. The most robust specification shows an elasticity of employment with respect to unpaid wages of -0.233. Robustness checks use earlier time periods to show results do not reflect seasonal trends, vary the group of industries used as controls, and only use 2007 to show estimates are not confounded by a unique effect of the Great Recession on the restaurant industry.

The Effect of the Minimum Wage on Employer-Sponsored Insurance for Low-Income Workers and Dependents

Economic theory suggests that a binding minimum wage increase may reduce the generosity of employer-sponsored insurance (ESI) or other fringe benefits, yet previous empirical studies reach conflicting conclusions about the existence of a trade-off between minimum wages and ESI. We study whether recent state and federal minimum wage increases affect the level or the source of health insurance coverage for low-income families using the 2005–16 Current Population Survey. Our research design uses state and year fixed effects to isolate within-state minimum wage changes while controlling for Medicaid eligibility and other changes in health policy related to implementation of the Affordable Care Act. Because dependent coverage might also be affected by minimum wage hikes, we examine ESI coverage for both low-wage workers and their dependents. We find robust evidence that minimum wage increases lead to reductions in ESI coverage in families below 300 percent of the federal poverty level, with a nominal $1 increase in the minimum wage reducing the probability of ESI coverage by 0.99 percentage points. Reductions in coverage were observed both for workers and for their dependents.

Trade and minimum wages in general equilibrium: Theory and evidence

This paper develops a new model with heterogeneous firms under perfect competition in a Heckscher-Ohlin setting. We derive a novel prediction regarding the effect of minimum wages on selection, namely that a binding minimum wage will raise (or lower) TFP at the firm and industry level depending on whether the capital intensity of entry costs exceeds (falls short of) that of production. Exploiting rich regional variation in minimum wages across Chinese counties and using firm level production data, we find robust evidence in support of causal effects of minimum wages consistent with our theoretical predictions.

Minimum wages in an automating economy

AbstractWe explore the suitability of the minimum wage as a policy instrument for reducing emerging income inequality created by new technologies. For this, we implement a binding minimum wage in a task‐based framework, in which tasks are conducted by machines, low‐skill, and high‐skill workers. In this framework, an increasing minimum wage reduces the inequality between the low‐skill wage and the other factor prices, whereas the share of income of low‐skill workers in the national income is nonincreasing. Then, we analyze the impact of an automating economy along the extensive and intensive margins. In a setting with a minimum wage, it can be shown that automation at the extensive margin and the creation of new, labor‐intensive tasks do not increase the aggregate output in general, as the displacement of low‐skill workers counteracts the positive effects of cost‐savings. Finally, we highlight a potential trade‐off between less inequality of the factor prices and greater inequality of the income distribution when a minimum wage is introduced into an automating economy.

Does public sector employment buffer the minimum wage effects?

This paper studies the impact of a minimum wage policy in a labor market with a private and a public sector. We develop a two-sector search and matching model with minimum wage and heterogeneous workers in their human capital. We structurally estimate the model using data for Chile, a country with a large fraction of employment in the public sector and a binding minimum wage. Counterfactual analysis shows that institutional features of public sector employment reduce labor market frictions and mitigate the negative effect of the minimum wage on unemployment and welfare.

Minimum Wage and Firm Variety

Exploiting minimum-wage variation within multi-state commuting zones, we document a negative relationship between minimum wages and firm variety in the U.S. restaurant and retail trade industries. To explain this finding, we construct a heterogeneous-firm model with a monopsonistic labor market and endogenous firm variety. The decentralized equilibrium underprovides the mass of firms compared to the outcome achieved by a welfare-maximizing planner. A binding minimum wage further reduces the mass of firms, exacerbating the distortion. Workers value employer variety, and thus, by reducing firm variety the minimum wage reduces workers’ welfare even if the average wage increases.

Do minimum wages reduce employment in developing countries? A survey and exploration of conflicting evidence

Evidence from studies of the employment effects of minimum wages in developing countries is mixed. One interpretation is that there is simply no clear evidence of disemployment effects in developing countries. Instead, however, we find evidence that the heterogeneity is systematic, with estimated effects more consistently negative in studies with relatively more features for which institutional factors and the competitive model more strongly predict negative effects. These features include whether studies: (i) focus on vulnerable workers; (ii) use data for the formal sector; (iii) cover countries where minimum wage laws are strongly enforced; and (iv) estimate effects for countries and periods with binding minimum wages.

Minimum Wages in an Automated Economy

We explore the suitability of the minimum wage as a policy instrument for reducing emerging income inequality created by new technologies. For this, we implement a binding minimum wage in a task-based framework, in which tasks are conducted by machines, low-skill, and high-skill workers. In this framework, an increasing minimum wage reduces the inequality between the low-skill wage and the other factor prices, whereas the share of income of low-skill workers in the national income is nonincreasing. Then, we analyze the impact of an automating economy along the extensive and intensive margin. In a setting with a minimum wage, it can be shown that automation at the extensive margin and the creation of new, labor-intensive tasks do not increase the aggregate output in general as the displacement of low-skill workers counteracts the positive effects of cost-savings. Finally, we highlight a potential trade-off between less inequality of the factor prices and larger inequality of the income distribution as a minimum wage is introduced in an automating economy.

Endogenous task-based technical change—factor scarcity and factor prices

This paper develops a static model of endogenous task-based technical progress to study how factor scarcity induces technological progress and changes in factor prices. The equilibrium technology is multi-dimensional and not strongly factor-saving in the sense of Acemoglu (2010). Nevertheless, labour scarcity induces labour productivity growth. There is a weak but no strong absolute equilibrium bias. This model provides a plausible interpretation of the famous contention of Hicks (1932) about the role of factor prices and factor endowments for induced innovations. It may serve as a microfoundation for canonical macro-economic models. Moreover, it accommodates features like endogenous factor supplies and a binding minimum wage.

Endogenous Task-Based Technical Change - Factor Scarcity and Factor Prices -

This paper develops a static model of endogenous task-based technical progress to study how factor scarcity induces technological progress and changes in factor prices. The equilibrium technology is multi-dimensional and not strongly factor-saving in the sense of Acemoglu (2010). Nevertheless, labor scarcity induces labor productivity growth. There is a weak but no strong absolute equilibrium bias. This model provides a plausible interpretation of the famous contention of Hicks (1932) about the role of factor prices and factor endowments for induced innovations. It may serve as a micro-foundation for canonical macro-economic models. Moreover, it accommodates features like endogenous factor supplies and a binding minimum wage.

Worker Heterogeneity and the Popularity of the Minimum Wage Institution

This paper analyzes long run outcomes resulting from adopting a binding minimum wage. The model distinguishes between workers of heterogeneous ability, and capitalists who do all the saving, and it entails – relative to the perfectly competitive benchmark - large output and employment losses (among the lowest-ability workers) from the imposition of moderately binding minimum wages. These effects arise not only because firms respond to the wage increase – relative to the static perfectly competitive benchmark – by moving upwards along a given labour demand curve, but also due to inward shifts of the labour demand curve as savers respond to decreases in the (net of taxes) rate of return on their savings by saving less, thus reducing the economy’s steady-state capital stock. Nevertheless, and despite the large, long-run, declines in aggregate output, consumption, and the capital stock implied by this model, MW legislation can be beneficial for large segments of employed workers, as long as they do not have to provide generous welfare support to the low-ability workers that the MW prevents them from finding employment.

The minimum wage and the Great Recession: Evidence of effects on the employment and income trajectories of low-skilled workers

We estimate the minimum wage's effects on low-skilled individuals' employment and income trajectories following the Great Recession. Our approach exploits two dimensions of the data we analyze. First, we compare individuals in states that were fully bound by the 2007 to 2009 increases in the federal minimum wage to individuals in states that were not. Second, we use variation in the minimum wage's bite across skill groups to separate our samples into “target” and “within-state control” groups. Using the 2008 panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation, we find that binding minimum wage increases had significant, negative effects on the employment and income growth of targeted workers. Although there are important limitations to our research designs, our estimates are robust to adopting a range of alternative strategies to construct our analysis samples and to account for variation in the Great Recession's underlying severity across states. In aggregate, our estimates suggest that this period's minimum wage increases reduced aggregate employment rates by at least half of a percentage point in states that were bound by the federal minimum wage increases. Because our estimates are large relative to what one would infer from past research, we emphasize the relevance of the historical episode we analyze.

Optimal Minimum Wage Policy with Voluntary Participation

This paper considers optimal minimum wage policy in a low-ability labor market in the presence of a subsistence allowance and a participation externality. In a market with heterogenous workers and homogeneous low-skilled jobs, a low ability worker's participation decision has a chilling effect on job creation which the worker does not internalize. Absent a minimum wage, subsistence allowance sets both a lower bound on individual incomes and a threshold ability level for labor market participation. A binding minimum wage acquires the latter role. It helps to address the externality by excluding the least able from the market while the subsistence allowance continues to meet minimal nutritional requirements. Quantitatively, while the externality is shown to be important, the minimum wage is not a very effective means of addressing it.

Wage bargaining, trade and growth

We construct a North-South product-cycle model of trade with fully-endogenous growth and union wage bargaining. Economic growth is driven by Northern entrepreneurs who conduct R&D to innovate higher quality products. Northern production technologies can leak to the South upon successful imitation. The North has two sectors: a tradable industrial goods sector (manufacturing) where wages are determined via a bargaining process and a non-tradable sector (services) where wages are flexible. The South has only a tradable industrial goods sector where wages are flexible.We find that unilateral Northern trade liberalization, in the form of lower Northern tariffs on industrial goods, increases the rate of innovation but decreases both the bargained wage in the industrial sector and the flexible wage in the service sector. The wage effects are relative to the Southern wage rate. We also consider a variant of the model with Northern unemployment, driven by a binding minimum wage in the non-tradable service sector. In this case, Northern tariff cuts decrease the innovation rate and the bargained wage rate. In addition, the Northern unemployment rate increases. The model thus highlights the role of labor market institutions in determining the growth and labor market effects of tariff reductions. We also study the effects of unilateral Southern trade liberalization.

Optimal Design and Quantitative Evaluation of the Minimum Wage

We study a labor market where firms have private information about their ex-ante heterogeneous productivities and search is random. In this environment, a binding minimum wage can be efficiency-enhancing - we show that setting it using a version of the Vickery-Clarke-Groves mechanism delivers full efficiency. In a dynamic, stochas-tic version of the model calibrated to the Routine Manual labor market in the U.S., our proposed mechanism generates sizeable welfare gains. The resulting minimum wage is procyclical, dampening the response of unemployment to aggregate shocks.

Can Minimum Wages Raise Workers’ Incomes in the Long Run?

AbstractUsing an intertemporal model of saving and capital accumulation with two types of agents we demonstrate that it is impossible for any binding minimum wage to increase the after‐tax incomes of workers if the production function is Cobb–Douglas with constant returns to scale, or if there are no differences in ability among workers. Moreover, it is impossible to increase the incomes of employed workers through minimum wage legislation, even under decreasing returns to scale and heterogeneity of ability among workers, unless the support provided to unemployed workers is far below what they would earn in the absence of minimum wages.

Do Wage Subsidies Provide a Stepping-Stone to Employment for Recent College Graduates? Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Jordan

Abstract This study examines the impact of a randomized experiment in Jordan in which female community college graduates were assigned to receive a wage subsidy voucher. The wage voucher led to a 38 percentage point increase in employment in the short run, but the average effect is much smaller and no longer statistically significant after the voucher period has expired. The extra job experience gained as a result of the wage subsidy does not provide a stepping-stone to new jobs for these recent graduates, which appears to be due to productivity levels not rising above a binding minimum wage.

Skills, Tasks and the Scarcity of Talent in a Global Economy

AbstractThe scarcity of talent is a tremendous challenge for firms in the globalized world. This paper investigates the role of labor market imperfection in open economies for the usage of talent in the production process of firms. For this purpose, I set up a heterogeneous firms model, where production consists of a continuum of tasks that differ in complexity. Firms hire low‐skilled and high‐skilled workers to perform these tasks. How firms assign workers to tasks depends on factor prices for the two skill types and the productivity advantage of high‐skilled workers in the performance of complex tasks. I study the firms’ assignment problem under two labor market regimes, which capture the polar cases of fully flexible wages and a binding minimum wage for low‐skilled workers. Since the minimum wage lowers the skill premium, it increases the range of tasks performed by high‐skilled workers, which enhances the stock of knowledge within firms to solve complex tasks and reduces the mass of active firms. In a setting with fully flexible wages trade does not affect the firm‐internal assignment of workers to tasks. On the contrary, if low‐skilled wages are fixed by a minimum wage, trade renders high‐skilled workers a scarce resource and reduces the range of tasks performed by this skill type with negative consequences for the human capital stock within firms. In this case, trade leads to higher per‐capita income for both skill types and thus to higher welfare in the open than in the closed economy, whereas – somewhat counter‐intuitive – inequality between the two skill types decreases, as more low‐skilled workers find employment in the production process.

Monopsony in the Labor Market, Minimum Wages and the Time Horizon: Some Unresolved Issues

This article discusses development of optimal solutions for monopsony in the labour market for the long run (when labour and capital are both flexible). It is shown that binding minimum wages up to a certain degree pushes the monopsonists to choose a high capital intensity of production, just as high as or even higher than that chosen when there is no regulation for minimum wages. Thereby, we demonstrate the existence of re-switching effects in the tradition of Piero Sraffa. The second part of the paper recalculates and analyzes earlier results by making use of the rather general constant elasticity of substitution production function. Based on a numerical solution for optimal monopsony under different regimes (no minimum wage, minimum wages of different values, etc.), we formulate a two-period game between the government and the monopsonistic firm (‘minimum wage game’). Finally, we analyze the relationship between the elasticity of substitution on the one hand and likely levels of employment on the other hand, after introduction of minimum wages.

The Minimum Wage and Crime

Abstract Does crime respond to changes in the minimum wage? A growing body of empirical evidence indicates that increases in the minimum wage have a displacement effect on low-skilled workers. Economic reasoning provides the possibility that disemployment may cause youth to substitute from legal work to crime. However, there is also the countervailing effect of a higher wage raising the opportunity cost of crime for those who remain employed. We use the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 cohort to measure the effect of increases in the minimum wage on self-reported criminal activity and examine employment–crime substitution. Exploiting changes in state and federal minimum wage laws from 1997 to 2010, we find that workers who are affected by a change in the minimum wage are more likely to commit crime, become idle, and lose employment. Individuals experiencing a binding minimum wage change were more likely to commit crime and work only part time. Analyzing heterogeneity shows those with past criminal connections are especially likely to see decreased employment and increased crime following a policy change, suggesting that reduced employment effects dominate any wage effects. The findings have implications for policy regarding both the low-wage labor market and efforts to deter criminal activity.