Big Tech Firms Research Articles

Google news initiative innovation challenge in Latin America: business models between path dependence and power relations

ABSTRACT In response to growing regulatory pressures, tech companies have partnered with media organizations to support news production through programs, grants, and financial aid for journalism. Notably, the Google News Initiative (GNI) Innovation Challenge has invested millions in Latin American news projects. This study explores the characteristics of these projects and their impact on the business models of Latin American media organizations. By examining project descriptions, a typology clarifies the connection between these initiatives and their effects on publishers’ business models. This analysis is complemented by 20 semi-structured interviews conducted from January 2020 to March 2023 with key regional informants. Results show three types of projects emerging through the GNI Innovation Challenge: audience-building, revenue generation, and technological innovation. It becomes evident that these media organizations are trapped in a dependent cycle, significantly contributing to their challenges in establishing sustainable business models. Furthermore, the study suggests that media organizations perceive these grants as a temporary financial resource, enabling them to hire additional staff and implement technological advancements within their newsrooms for a short time. Meanwhile, Google exerts its influence across the media industry by promoting cutting-edge technologies, which increases media dependence on its infrastructure. Ultimately, this research highlights the complex dynamics between big tech firms and the news industry, raising questions about the journalism sustainability and the potential consequences of its path dependence and capture by platforms.

Listening to regulators about the challenges in regulating emerging disruptive technologies

Purpose This study aims to investigate the regulatory challenges of emerging disruptive Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) in Brazil and the strategies regulators use to address them. Design/methodology/approach It is an empirical qualitative research on Brazil’s three administrative levels, focusing on the legislative houses’ specialised Science and Technology Committees. It combines archival analysis of public meeting records with elite interviews of parliamentarians and technocrats who participated in Public Hearings in 2019, which results in this paper analysed through the Theory of Communicative Action with a critical stance. Findings The research reveals that regulatory challenges gain new dimensions by involving discussions about emerging ICT. Factors such as time constraints, rapid technological evolution and widespread adoption compound these challenges, straining the preference for the incremental pace of regulation and the traditional model of specialised regulatory agencies. The research captures some regulators’ values, underlying concerns and perceived necessities for surmounting these challenges. It also outlines the preferred process for ICT regulation, revealing parliamentary assistants and executive intermediate-level specialists as gateways for interest groups’ action. Social implications The study's findings highlight the crucial role of specific actors as gateways to the covert action of interest groups, particularly Big Tech firms. This contribution is significant as it empowers civil society and academia to monitor and mitigate the risk of regulatory capture, thereby promoting a more transparent and equitable regulatory environment. Originality/value This research is original in directly engaging with the key figures (lawmakers, legislative assistants and specialised bureaucrats) involved in the critical and timely issue of regulating emerging disruptive technologies.

New Sites of Accumulation? Why Intangible Assets Matter for Energy Transitions

ABSTRACT Energy transitions break geographic monopolies on fossil fuel resources and are expected to redistribute economic benefits to new actors, from local communities to developing countries. At the same time, basing energy systems around renewables increases the importance of intangible assets such as data and artificial intelligence (AI). As different IPE approaches have shown, such intangibles can be monopolized by lead firms and especially Big Tech, which increasingly provide crucial digital infrastructures. This paper therefore asks what role Big Tech firms may play in energy systems, and whether their access to intangibles enables them to expand to the energy sector. The case study of Amazon illustrates that data-driven intellectual monopolies are well-positioned to expand into energy, benefitting from their position as providers of data infrastructures, and capacities in data harvesting and analysis. Amazon is both developing and marketing its own innovations, and investing in energy systems businesses. As intangibles gain importance in energy systems, possible implications for the IPE of energy include power and economic value flowing towards Big Tech, rather than countries or communities.

FINANCIAL SERVICES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BIGTECH ECOSYSTEM

The Covid-19 pandemic has transformed the needs of consumers of goods and services. As a result, there was an increase in the volume of BigTech activity. At the same time, BigTech took into account the expectations of consumers in obtaining complementary services. This led to the growth of BigTech's offerings of financial services to its clients. The purpose of the article is to clarify the place of financial services in the BigTech ecosystem and to identify the priority areas of activation of the provision of financial services by BigTech firms. The article describes the BigTech ecosystem from an institutional point of view. The study presents the composition of participants of the BigTech ecosystem, which are connected by a digital platform and the use of information technologies that contribute to the sale of goods and the provision of services, including financial ones. The technical, economic, legal, and marketing prerequisites for providing BigTech financial services have been identified. This made it possible to substantiate the influence of consumer needs on the formation of the policy of providing BigTech financial services. It has been confirmed that BigTech implements a policy of providing financial services that meet customer expectations. The weaknesses and strengths of BigTech financial services are identified. The threats and opportunities of providing BigTech financial services are substantiated. The conducted research made it possible to formulate geographical, product, and client directions for the development of the provision of BigTech financial services.

FinTech services from BigTech companies

AbstractThe so‐called BigTech companies Amazon, Alphabet, Apple and Meta and are constantly attempting to grow into new business areas. Due to their expertise in data analysis, they have managed to quickly establish themselves in many industries as digital ecosystems and, as part of this strategy, are also expanding their footprint in financial services. However, the biggest challenge that BigTech companies are facing in financial services is customer acceptance. This paper contributes to the emerging field of digital ecosystems and the acceptance of sensitive services by users. Although the BigTech firms have gained much attention, only little empirical analysis is available. This paper aims to shed light on the determinants of customer acceptance of BigTech banking services. Based on a survey in Switzerland this research develops an analytic model to identify and test the relevant determinants. The results indicate that the strongest significant influences were found in subjective risk and trust which clearly demonstrates the still‐existing incumbents' advantage over the BigTech companies.

Disintermediation of consumer services through blockchain? The role of intermediary brands, value-added services, and privacy concerns

This paper explores the dynamics between value-added services, intermediary brands, and consumer privacy concerns in shaping attitudes toward blockchain-enabled consumer services. Grounded in the Antecedents-Privacy Concerns-Outcomes (APCO) framework, we develop a theoretical model that we test in three experimental studies with a total of 1613 participants, utilizing verbal scenarios featuring blockchain applications for international money transfer and hotel booking. Our research reveals that complete disintermediation via pure peer-to-peer blockchain transactions is unlikely. Consumers prefer blockchain applications offering supplementary services like call centers, password assistance, and cancellation options. As consumers become familiar with blockchain technology, privacy concerns intensify due to its distributed and immutable storage. The fears of data breaches are more pronounced when blockchain applications are offered by unknown startups as opposed to well-known Big Tech companies. However, privacy-conscious consumers also value the prospect of distancing themselves from big-data ecosystems by embracing blockchain solutions from startups. Our research extends the APCO framework by clarifying how privacy concerns, brand-based heuristics, and technological attributes interact. For managerial implications, blockchain applications necessitate re-intermediation to meet consumer preferences. Potential intermediaries, including Big Tech firms, startups, and industry incumbents, face unique challenges in developing and marketing blockchain-enabled consumer services.

Re-infrastructuring higher education

Higher education is undergoing ‘digital transformation’ through the introduction of new digital platforms in processes and practices of research and teaching. This brief forum article explores how research and teaching in many regions are being ‘platformised’ by a combination of academic publishers, the edtech industry, and Big Tech firms. Together, these processes of platformising research and teaching are integrating universities into complex digital infrastructures for many of their central operations. Universities are being re-infrastructured. They are also being ‘assetised’ as control of platforms and infrastructures allows their proprietors to extract value from the HE sector. These developments call for concerted dialogue on the conditions and prospects of academic labour in the digital university, and close attention to how emerging technological devices and systems are integrated into, challenged or transformed by scientific and pedagogic practice.

As Hype Fades, LLMs Gaining Acceptance in Upstream as New Age Research and Coding Tool

After using ChatGPT-4 for more than a year, Clinton Lott has made familiarity with the large language model (LLM), a requirement for new software programming hires. The director of Houston-based Spotter Tech gave this reasoning: “Taking 2 hours to do something that ChatGPT can do in 15 seconds is unacceptable today.” It’s a line you’re likely to hear from the most ardent champions of LLMs which have simultaneously reignited the world’s interest in and ire for artificial intelligence (AI). And while Spotter Tech, a small hydraulic fracturing data specialist, may be an exception with its hiring practices, it is far from the only upstream company embracing the new technology. Both BP and Shell have recently given thousands of employees access to Microsoft’s new cloud service called Copilot, which at its core is powered by GPT-4, OpenAI’s latest and most capable LLM. Others including ExxonMobil have placed use of LLMs under lockdown while still signaling a long-term interest in their embrace. As chair of SPE’s Data Science & Engineering Analytics Technical Section, Pushpesh Sharma has spent the past several months speaking with peers in the industry about how and where LLMs are being used. The product manager for field automation firm Aspen Technology told JPT that it’s clear from those conversations that a good number of energy firms are interested in tailoring the technology to their needs, albeit many are doing so quietly as it remains early days. “The big focus right now is on what they call fine tuning,” he said. “You take an existing base model that one of the big tech companies have created and make it more of a fit for your business. It’s kind of like taking a graduate student and then letting them work on their PhD with very specific subject matter.” While OpenAI’s ChatGPT has become the popular symbol of LLMs, there are a growing number of alternatives in the mix. In February, Google introduced its latest model called Gemini 1.5 which seeks to rival GPT-4. There are also open source LLMs that oil and gas companies can use as templates for internal projects. Or they may turn to other big tech firms such as NVIDIA and Amazon Web Services (AWS) which are in the business of helping industrials build and train their own private, custom LLMs. SPE joined the trend after inking a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in October with AI firm i2k Connect and Aramco Americas. The collaboration is expected to result in a new domain-specific LLM that industry engineers and researchers can use to answer questions with more technical depth than can be done with the current slate of commercial offerings. One enabling aspect of this current phase of experimentation with LLM technology is retrieval-augmented generation (RAG). The method is considered essential for models to provide more-accurate and actionable responses by extending their scope beyond initial training datasets to include more authoritative and even real-time data.

The Societal Impacts of Generative Artificial Intelligence: A Balanced Perspective

The discourse surrounding the societal impacts of generative artificial intelligence (GAI), exemplified by technologies like ChatGPT, often oscillates between extremes: utopian visions of unprecedented productivity and dystopian fears of humanity’s demise. This polarized perspective neglects the nuanced, pragmatic manifestation of GAI. In general, extreme views oversimplify the technology itself or its potential to address societal issues. The authors suggest a more balanced analysis, acknowledging that GAI’s impacts will unfold dynamically over time as diverse implementations interact with human stakeholders and contextual factors. While Big Tech firms dominate GAI’s supply, its demand is expected to evolve through experimentation and use cases. The authors argue that GAI’s societal impact depends on identifiable contingencies, emphasizing three broad factors: the balance between automation and augmentation, the congruence of physical and digital realities, and the retention of human bounded rationality. These contingencies represent trade-offs arising from GAI instantiations, shaped by technological advancements, stakeholder dynamics, and contextual factors, including societal responses and regulations. Predicting long-term societal effects remains challenging due to unforeseeable discontinuities in the technology’s trajectory. The authors anticipate a continuous interplay between GAI initiatives, technological advances, learning experiences, and societal responses, with outcomes depending on the above contingencies.

Accounting for the “harms” of social media firms: dialogic accountability and discursive contestation in public hearings

PurposeExisting literature has begun to identify the agonistic and contested aspects of the ongoing development of accountability systems. These “contests” are particularly important during periods of change when an accountability “deficit” has been identified, that is, when existing accountability systems are deemed inadequate and requiring revision. The purpose of this paper is to explore one such set of contests in the case of large technology and social media firms: the so-called “big tech”. The authors focus specifically on “big tech” because of increasing societal concerns about the harms associated with their products, services and business practices.Design/methodology/approachThe authors analysed four US Congressional hearings, in which the CEO of Facebook was held to account for the company's alleged breaches and harms. The authors conducted a discourse analysis of the dialogue between the account giver (Mark Zuckerberg) and account holders (Members of Congress) in the oral testimony at the four hearings.FindingsTwo areas of contestation in the dialogue between the account giver and account holders are identified. “Epistemic contests” involved contestation about the “facts” concerning the harms the company had allegedly caused. “Responsibility contests” involved contestation about who (or what) should be held responsible for these harms and according to what standards or criteria.Originality/valueThe study advances critical dialogical accountability literature by identifying two areas of contestation during periods of change in accountability systems. In so doing, they advanced the theory by conceptualising the process of change as underpinned by discursive contests in which multiple actors construct and contest the “problem” with existing accountability systems. The outcomes of these contests are significant, the authors suggest, because they inform the development of reforms to the accountability system governing big tech firms and other industries undergoing similar periods of contestation and change.

Evolving consumer expectations and the future of digital banking

The financial services industry has a long history of deploying new technology to respond to evolving customer expectations. The rise of digital banking in recent years represents a significant acceleration of technological change, fuelled by factors like the COVID-19 pandemic and shifting demographics. In the vanguard of sweeping industry changes are the FinTech providers. Advances such as cloud computing APIs and machine learning are being deployed to deliver seamless, 24/7 finance and banking services to consumers who now expect immediate, accessible digital solutions that provide both safety and convenience. Banks need to keep up with the incredible pace of change but face challenges in the form of entrenched legacy systems, siloed operations, a vast beachfront of propositional enhancements and compliance with regulations — issues that typical single-minded FinTechs are less burdened with. Many banks, however, are seeking to overcome these challenges, knowing that otherwise they face diminished market relevance. For many, the answer lies in partnering with existing FinTechs in mutually beneficial engagements that can deliver for increasingly digitally savvy users, such as a partnership between Barclays and TransferMate to deliver advanced cross-border payment services. Regulatory developments like Open Banking have set the scene for increased market competition as well as integrated disparate systems between multiple providers for the benefit of the end user. Onto this stage have entered traditional big-tech firms like Apple, Amazon Google and Meta, seeking opportunities to reshape the digital payments space. In parallel with these developments has emerged decentralised finance (DeFi) offerings that leverage concepts like Blockchain technology, smart contracts and distributed ledgers to provide solutions outside of the centralised processes of traditional finance. This paper explores the changing shape of digital banking; the potential for both competition and collaboration between banks, FinTechs and traditional tech companies; and examines how consumer demands are driving innovation.

Information advantages, excessive risk-taking, and capital regulation for BigTechs in financial intermediation

This paper establishes theoretical models to study capital regulation of BigTech firms (BigTechs hereafter) providing financial intermediation services. In our models, BigTechs borrow debts to invest between socially efficient prudent assets and socially inefficient risky assets. Limited liabilities imply that with a higher capital adequacy ratio, BigTechs are more risk averse and favor the prudent asset more. Then we examine how better information of BigTechs will affect BigTechs' incentive for excessive risk-taking, welfare, and capital regulation. The major results produced by our models are as follows: (1) Better information of BigTechs does not eliminate and could in some circumstances exacerbate their excessive risk-taking behavior. (2) Better information of BigTechs does not necessarily improve welfare. BigTechs could employ better information to more precisely identify the socially inefficient risky asset to invest in, causing more severe resource misallocation. (3) Capital regulation is an effective tool to curb BigTechs' excessive risk-taking and to ensure that better information of BigTechs will improve welfare.

Data, Big Tech, and the New Concept of Sovereignty.

Despite the massive amount of data and sophisticated computing capacity, Big Tech has evolved into the new data sovereigns that governments must accept in the data era. Data mining and application determine the true value of data; in this regard, Big Tech is tough to replace. The so-called "Fourth Industrial Revolution" is reshaping the emerging global order, and at its core are Big Tech firms. They not only express their concerns and spread their values and ideologies but also make their strong presence felt in international affairs, as Big Tech appears to be transforming into a new type of Leviathan. With access to significant amounts of data, the rise of Big Tech poses a challenge to sovereignty's exclusivity and superiority, assuming the position of de facto data sovereign. The article holds that the Big Tech firms, by virtue of their technical advantages, have not only deconstructed the traditional concept of sovereignty, but also formed a complex symbiotic relationship.

Smart Facial Emotion Recognition With Gender and Age Factor Estimation

Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) in an intelligent way, which aims at creating scalable and flexible solutions. Big tech firms and businesses believe in the success of HCI as it allows them to profit from on-demand technology and infrastructure for information-centric applications without having to use public clouds. Because of its capacity to imitate human coding abilities, facial expression recognition and software-based facial expression identification systems are crucial. This paper proposes a system of recognizing the emotional condition of humans, given a facial expression, and conveys two methods of predicting the age and gender factors from human faces. This research also aims in understanding the influences posed by gender and age of humans on their facial expressions. The model can currently detect 7 emotions based on the facial data of a person - (Anger, Disgust, Happy, Fear, Sad, Surprise, and Neutral state). The proposed system is divided into three segments: a.) Gender Detection b.) Age Detection c.) Emotion Recognition. The initial model is created using 2 algorithms - KNN, and SVM. We have also utilized the architectures of some of the deep learning models such as CNN and VGG - 16 pre-trained models (Transfer Learning). The evaluation metrics show the model performance regarding the accuracy of the Recognition system. Future enhancements of this work can include the deployment of the DL and ML model onto an android or a wearable device such as a smartphone or a watch for a real-time use case.

The Systemic Risks and Regulation of BigTech : “Too Big(Tech) to Fail?

When it comes to systemically important financial institutions, people usually think of banks, insurers or financial holding companies, but large technology firms (socalled BigTech) are increasingly part of this category. This paper examines regulatory approaches with which the systemic importance of BigTech firms in financial services could be addressed. According to the analysis, of the three regulatory frameworks identified in the literature (“restriction”, “segregation”, “inclusion”), when a balanced approach is used, the segregation of financial and non-financial activities seems to be the most promising regulatory solution, as this model works best for taking account of the practical aspects of operation, regulation and supervision.

The changing face of anti-trust in the world of Big Tech: Collusion versus Monopolisation

Abstract This paper presents new evidence on two key developments in worldwide anti-trust in the last decade: (i) a downturn in the number of cartels detected by competition authorities and (ii) exponential growth in cases of monopolisation/abuse of dominance. Big Tech firms have been, undoubtedly, the main focus of the latter but almost totally absent in the former. These two developments offer perspectives on the description of Monopoly Capitalism as set out by Keith Cowling 40 years ago. Superficially at least, this seems to deny the prediction of ever-widening collusion, but, on the other hand, it resonates with the prediction of increasingly unassailable dominant firms. We suggest that the two trends can best be understood by the emergence of the Big Tech giants who have established dominance by exceeding tipping points in many markets. In turn, this leads to an alternative form of collusion—‘mutual forbearance’ in which firms back away from aggressive competition in the other giants’ areas of strength. Given this dominance, they do not need collusion—put simply, no sizeable rivals are remaining with whom they need to collude.

Platform-Based Business Models and Financial Inclusion: Policy Trade-Offs and Approaches

AbstractThree types of digital platforms are expanding in financial services: (i) fintech entrants; (ii) big tech firms; and (iii) increasingly, incumbent financial institutions with platform-based business models. These platforms can dramatically lower costs and thereby aid financial inclusion—but these same features can give rise to digital monopolies and oligopolies. Digital platforms operate in multisided markets and rely crucially on big data. This leads to specific network effects, returns to scale and scope, and policy trade-offs. To reap the benefits of platforms while mitigating risks, policy makers can: (i) apply existing financial, antitrust and privacy regulations, (ii) adapt old and adopt new regulations, combining an activity and entity-based approach, and/or (iii) provide new public infrastructures, such as digital identity and retail fast payment systems. These public infrastructures, as well as ex ante competition rules and data portability, are particularly promising. Yet to achieve their policy goals, central banks and financial regulators need to coordinate with competition and data protection authorities.

Trade policy with FANG's (aka trade policy and multi-sided platforms)

The recent and rapid rise to prominence of the big-tech firms, collectively known as FANG's, owes much to their multi-sided approach. As economic activity shifts toward these business models, trade-agreements are being extended to ensure free trade in platform based products, guided by the logic and practice familiar from standard models (one-sided markets). Does this prescription automatically carry over to two-sided markets? We show that a world with FANG's can look and behave very differently from the more familiar one-sided setting, it's even possible for tariffs to lower prices, raise consumption and increase global welfare; the opposite of the one-sided result. We empirically explore the conditions for such outcomes and show they arise for a set of products recently added to the WTO's ITA, raising the possibility that policy errors are creeping into international-agreements from following one-sided logic in an increasingly two-sided world.

Asserting Europe's technological sovereignty amid American platform finance: Countering financial sector dependence on Big Tech?

Spearheaded by major technology companies (Big Tech), digital platforms have rapidly become key infrastructures for accumulation under global financialized capitalism, with consumer convenience and underlying practices of data collection, control and analysis giving rise to platform finance. While financial institutions are partnering with financial technology (FinTech) start-ups to digitally enclose customers, American and Chinese Big Techs increasingly mobilize their platforms to offer payment services, next to expanding their platformed services to financial incumbents. Observing the growing dependence of finance on American Big Tech platforms, this paper investigates how the shift toward platform finance in the European Union (EU) unfolds as a state-mediated and power-laden process between mostly ‘domestic’ (EU) financial incumbents and ‘foreign’ (non-EU) Big Tech firms. The starting point of the analysis is the European Strategy for Data launched by the European Commission in 2020. Through document analysis, we reconstruct the circulation of code words within ‘the Brussels Bubble’ in anticipation of- and in direct response to the proposal. We find that, despite its implication in the global financial crisis, incumbent EU finance presents itself as a fix for non-EU platform domination by Big Tech. The ‘technological sovereignty’ of the EU is marshalled by incumbent finance to defend market share as would-be pan-European digital financial champions. The Big Tech ‘threat’ is thereby transformed into an argument for strategic deregulation and forced data sharing by Big Tech for the sake of maintaining a ‘level playing field’. The outcome of these processes of strategic coupling is an alignment between the interests of EU data protection and the commercial interests of platformizing European banks.

The future of data ownership: An uncommon research agenda

Responding to the current data monopoly by Big Tech firms, there is increasing interest in the potential for collective ownership of data in a ‘data commons’. This article aims to introduce the topic to non-specialists, highlight the broader social significance of data ownership, and reframe the data commons as a problem of social interaction rather than regulatory design. It critically engages with existing work on the data commons to suggest alternative directions for research which draw on humanities and interpretive social science approaches. It recommends the addition of research that (1) includes knowledge from non-Western legal traditions to overcome objections to the possibility of data ownership, (2) studies existing social relations of data governance rather than seeks to design ideal regulations, (3) prioritises a focus on the social and communicative practices involved in a data commons rather than seeing it as a solution to a specific problem, and (4) analyses the meaning-making practices of people as they engage in their own data governance, and the evolving narrative around what constitutes a data commons. The purpose of this alternative research agenda is to provide discursive scaffolding for the ongoing regulatory work on the data commons, while ensuring that its full potential remains imaginatively open.