Big War Research Articles

“Dear D”: Sophie Treadwell's 1915 Correspondence from the “Big War Theatre”

Although she is best known as the author of the Expressionist drama Machinal, Sophie Treadwell was also a journalist. In 1915, she traveled to France to cover World War I for the San Francisco Bulletin and Harper's Weekly. This paper examines her published and unpublished war correspondence, consisting of articles for the Bulletin framed as letters to “D,” a hypothetical friend back home in California, and a Harper's Weekly article emphasizing women's experience. The paper argues that because Treadwell did not focus on soldiers and fighting, but instead looked at daily life in “the big war theatre,” her work was an effort to develop a female-centered journalistic voice.

Most Wars in American History Were Unnecessary and Undermined the Republic

War frequently leads to large increases in taxes, regulation, and government spending—both for the military and ostensibly unrelated domestic programs. Conservatives should not ignore that war is the most prominent cause, directly or indirectly, of the massive welfare state that has been erected in the United States. Many conservatives today might argue that despite the conflict-induced ill effects of ballooning government, war is sometimes necessary for US security. However, this analysis shows that even most of the nation’s big wars were unneeded, foolish, or counterproductive—particularly the post–World War II prosecution of small imperial brushfire wars and nation building.

Forgetting the Last Big War

This article reports the results of a study of coverage of the 65th anniversary of the liberation of Paris published in French newspapers, newsmagazines, and online news media in 2009. Building on a previous study of images of the liberation in Parisian newspapers at the 60th anniversary in 2004, it provides empirical evidence for the conventional wisdom that less anniversary journalism is produced in non-decennial than decennial anniversaries. In addition, the article shows that visual coverage of the 65th anniversary of the liberation was even more reductive than coverage of the 60th, concentrating almost exclusively on images of French joy and authority and forgoing more problematic representations of German occupiers, French collaborationists, and U.S. troops. Finally, the article argues that this sparse and reductive view of the liberation of Paris has the potential to affect collective memories of the event as it recedes into the past and the number of living French citizens who remember it firsthand declines.

The Reasons for the collapse of the Old Choson

After the disturbance of the ruling order in the 5th to 4th century B.C., the Old Choson was eventually divided into many polities in the 1st century B.C. Its division occurred simultaneously both in the south and north, as reflected by the establishments of Puyo in 59 B.C. and Silla in 57 B.C., respectively. The collapse of the Old Choson was caused by internal and external factors. The internal factors were the collapse of the social order followed by the changing economical conception from the expansion of bronze metallurgy and the widespread use of iron. The external factors were the wars against the Yan state, Weiman Choson and the Western Han which resulted in the loss of the state power. In the later period of the Old Choson, local powers began to share the bronze metallurgy. This means the formation of the local polities against the central power. The transition coincided with the widespread use of iron which increased labor forces and, in turn, stimulated land possessions. The change of economic conception about the land caused the competition toward lands, and this essentially swayed the existing social order. Under this circumstance, the Old Choson had to engage in the big wars against the Yan state, Weiman Choson and the Western Han. These three wars critically affected the existence of the state to the extent that it no longer sustained its ruling system. This marked the end of the Old Choson and the beginning of the multi-state period.

Kennedy and the Berlin Wall: "a hell of a lot better than a war."

Chapter 1: Ich Bin Ein Berliner Chapter 2: A Bone in My Throat Chapter 3: Let the Word Go Forth Chapter 4: Alas, Mr. Ambassador, Shall Die Together Chapter 5: I never Met a Man like That Chapter 6: Is the Answer! Chapter 7: The East Germans Have Done Us a Favor Chapter 8: I Am Not Afraid of Escalation Chapter 9: The Game Continues Chapter 10: We'll Talk the Problem to Death Chapter 11: May End in a Big War Chapter 12: Treaties Are like Maidens and Roses Chapter 13: We'll Never Have another Day like This Chapter 14: Our Hope is the Ami Chapter 15: We Are the People

「午前4時」の戦い！

「午前4時」の戦い！

The Koralm‐Line as a Part of Wider European Railway Connections – Integrated in the Baltic‐Adriatic‐Axis

AbstractSince antiquity, the land connection between Baltic and Adriatic Seas has been used for trading and cultural exchange. In medieval times, this “amber route”, passing east of the Alps, was shifted to a line following intra‐Alpine valleys orientated southwest – north‐east, the so called “Diagonal Passage”. The historical “Südbahn”, however, lead partly through the Alps, crossing Semmering, but then continuing to Trieste further south‐east, via Graz and Laibach, today Ljubljana. Cut through after the big wars of the 20th century, the railway connection Vienna‐Italy follows now the “Diagonal Passage” at all its length, leaving Graz offside, in a basin separated by mountain ranges to the north and west and open to the east and south.Koralm railway will integrate Graz into the “Baltic‐Adriatic Corridor” which together with its second key element, Semmering base tunnel, will be an attractive trans‐continental rail axis with adequate technical parameters, following the “Diagonal Passage” in its general orientation. The improvement of accessibility and transport conditions, especially in the Southern parts of Austria, will lead to a considerable increase of the regional product and a measurable modal shift, in favour of environment and sustainable mobility. “Baltic‐Adriatic Corridor”, the future axis of welfare from “Poland to Po‐Land (Padania)” or – in Italian language – “from Polonia to Bologna”, will decisively contribute to the re‐integration of Central Europe, enhancing cultural exchange and economic development across the former Iron Curtain.

Small Powers Learn from Big Wars

Small Powers Learn from Big Wars

The society of biochemistry and molecular biology of Uruguay (SBBM)

Uruguay is a small country, geographically, but also in population (about 3,000,000 people). It was born as an independent country at the beginning of the 19th century, so it is also young. It was conceived as a buffer state between the two giant neighbors that came to be Argentina and Brazil. It was born and developed as a consequence of several local civil wars that destroyed the unity of the Spanish speaking community. In addition, unity was also spoiled by the tough imperial policy of two European countries (UK and France) against the decadent Spanish Empire, because they extended the Napoleonic wars across the ocean into South America. The 20th century began with the last big civil war in Uruguay and the country became divided into the capital (Montevideo) and the remainder, with an agronomical economy, constituting what was a major drawback until now, with half of the population living in Montevideo and the other half dispersed in small cities with very few people, living from cattle rearing and agriculture with an economy based on ‘latifundio’ (large, run-down landed estates that can reach 100,000 hectare or more in size). But, the geographical location between Argentina and Brazil permitted this little country also to gain some advantages from both, especially from the cultural point of view. Biological research began, mostly, as a result of visionary persons’ individual efforts. Professions, like medicine, veterinary or agronomical sciences, were developed as a necessity to solve practical problems to improve the main production of the country. They became the seed for the development of science and research. We will mention the initiative of a selfmade man directed exclusively to basic sciences, Clemente Estable, a primary school teacher, interested not only in biology but in philosophy, art and education. He obtained a Fellowship to learn neurobiological research with the master of his time, Santiago Ramon y Cajal (a Spanish Nobel Price Laureate). After several years of profitable study he returned to Uruguay with a self-imposed mission: to introduce basic science to his people and to found an institution devoted to basic biological research. This institution, now known as the Instituto de Investigaciones Biologicas Clemente Estable (IIBCE, Clemente Estable Institute for Biological Research), was born in the third decade of the 20th century as a small laboratory, but in 1950 was moved to its present position, and one of its former Departments became the Department of Biochemistry directed by a woman named M. I. Ardao (which was also pioneering for this time). It was an official demonstration of the interest of the country in so modern and profitable a discipline, because in the School of Medicine and the School of Chemistry there were movements that also finally developed similar biochemical education and research departments. In the 1950s, the School of Chemistry developed a two-month full-time biochemistry course for professors interested in this discipline. They invited Professor Guzman Barron (a Peruvian biochemist living in Chicago, USA) to develop the course. This was the seed of what later became the Department of Biochemistry of the School of Chemistry. The School of Medicine in a similar move invited Professor Totter (USA) who shared research with the Uruguayan Professor E. Prodanov, one of the founders of the School of Medicine Biochemistry Department. Almost simultaneously, in 1960 some of the attendees of this course founded the first Uruguayan Society of Biochemistry and were thereafter destined to be the leaders of several biochemistry laboratories in different Schools of the University, or the IIBCE. We will mention some of them: E. Prodanov, C. Scazzocchio, C. Estable Puig, W. DeAngelis, A. de Betolaza, M. Calcagno, G. Martinez, G. Freire, E. Lasalvia, I. Korch C. M. Franchi and M. I. Ardao. Other important contributors to biochemical research were R. Caldeiro-Barcia and J. Brovetto. The first Uruguayan Society of Biochemistry had almost 50 members who developed several events related with its constitutional goals. But when, in 1973, a dictatorship was installed in Uruguay, the University was closed and several professors went abroad, not only to continue their work but Received 11 January 2007; accepted 11 January 2007 Address correspondence to: Jose Roberto Sotelo, President SBBM, Head of the Department of Proteins & Nucleic Acids, Instituto de Investigaciones Biologicas Clemente Estable, Av. Italia 3318, C.P.11600, Montevideo, Uruguay. E-mail: sotelo@iibce.edu.uy IUBMBLife, 59(4 – 5): 219 – 220, April –May 2007

Big Wars and Small Wars: The British Army and the Lessons of War in the 20th Century (review)

Big Wars and Small Wars: The British Army and the Lessons of War in the 20th Century (review)

Outfitting a Big-War Military with Small-War Capabilities

It is a never-ending challenge for defense planners to develop the strategy and policies required to ensure American security when threatened by an enemy. Unfortunately, it took the tragedy of the 9/11 attacks and the challenges posed by an adaptive enemy for the United States to realize it was not prepared to fight war on terms other than its own choosing. Looking back now, four years into the Global War on Terrorism, one can plainly see the US military was blinded by its preference for conventional war and failed to recognize the threat posed by irregular enemies. The military culture has long been convinced that technological overmatch was the prescription for security--a continuation of the traditional American way of war. However, the character of warfare is changing. Interstate wars, while not obsolete, are now less prevalent than direct threats from irregular forces. The US military's conventional dominance has forced its enemies to seek other methods to challenge American hegemony. While conventional might is still necessary in an uncertain world, the American invasion and subsequent operations in Iraq have exposed the US military's limitations and instigated changes that will make it more prepared to meet the growing irregular threat. Only by creating a force that is just as adept at conducting small wars against irregular enemies as it is at conducting big wars against conventional foes will the United States be able to ensure security in the 21st century. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has had to adjust to its role as the world's only superpower. The Pentagon, while espousing a new world order, remained fixated on extending its conventional superiority and focused on an emergent China as the next near-peer competitor that could threaten US interests and security. Although events in Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, and Haiti served as clear examples of the unconventional and uncertain challenges the United States would face in the new century, defense planners disregarded their significance. The US military was conditioned by decades of preparation for conventional interstate war, as well as by its searing experiences in Vietnam and Beirut. (1) Emerging threats to American interests posed by ethnic and tribal rivalries, religious zealotry, transnational terrorism, and illegitimate or brutal governments were seen as nuisances, and humanitarian operations, peacekeeping, and nation-building were considered as lesser included missions. (2) This tunnel vision prevented defense planners from recognizing the US military's vulnerabilities against potential adversaries who could threaten American interests asymmetrically with irregular forces. The attacks on 9/11 changed that internal calculus, and military planners quickly recognized the need to face a more adaptive enemy. Irregular enemies are not new to American forces. But today, the US military is embroiled in Iraq and elsewhere facing a complex global insurgency where it finds itself struggling to prevail in a type of war in which the enemy employs irregular warfare approaches to achieve its political aims. (3) Why, then, is the United States, a country with the most highly skilled, best equipped, and most professional military in history, having such difficulty in Iraq? According to one military analyst, it is because American forces have a culture that seeks to ignore the requirements and challenges of irregular warfare, resulting in a requirement to relearn appropriate techniques with each new experience with this phenomenon. (4) The US military has long equated conventional military operations as the acme of the professional art, ignoring more unconventional approaches. One analyst even castigated the American way of war as a Way of Battles. (5) Overcoming this institutional preference for big wars and a preoccupation with high-technology conventional warfare are paramount for ensuring American military readiness in the future. …

Neo-conservatives and their American critics

This review article examines four recent American books relating, in very different ways, to the rise of unilateralism and neo-conservatism in the United States. Richard Perle and David Frum, former advisors to George W. Bush robustly present the ‘neo-conservative’ case. Max Boot, another unilateralist, argues from the experience of American history that small wars have often been as important as big wars in projecting American power; and he suggests that this experience has a present-day relevance. Ivo Daalder (who served in the Clinton administration) and his co-author James Lindsay, set out to explain the ‘Bush revolution’ in foreign policy and put it in context. They insist that Bush is not a mere tool of his advisors, who are in any case not homogenous. His foreign policy strategy is indeed new, although it has given rise to certain unresolved problems. Robert McNamara (a former US Defense Secretary) and James Blight, share the fear of nuclear terrorism but argue that it can only be contained through the universal elimination of weapons of mass destruction, under the supervision of a possibly reformed UN. They oppose the unilateral use of force by the US except when America itself is attacked. They also argue that the US must change its posture from ‘deterrence’ to ‘reassurance’ and show more empathy in addressing the concerns of other countries and communities. The review concludes that America is now deeply divided over its foreign policy and that events, rather than arguments, may decide the outcome of the debate.

Air Power: The Men, Machines, and Ideas that Revolutionized War, from Kitty Hawk to Gulf War II (review)

Reviewed by: Air Power: The Men, Machines, and Ideas that Revolutionized War, from Kitty Hawk to Gulf War II Kenneth P. Werrell Air Power: The Men, Machines, and Ideas that Revolutionized War, from Kitty Hawk to Gulf War II. By Stephen Budiansky. New York: Viking, 2004. ISBN 0-670-03285-9. Photographs. Illustrations. Figures. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. x, 518. $27.95. This is an ambitious book on a difficult subject. Budiansky's aim, in his words, is "to tell the story of air power—of the revolutionary transformations that the airplane has brought to . . . war" (p. ix). He states that he is not offering a complete history and gives us a descriptive overview of a century of military air power, covering both engineering and operations. Air Power is a survey text based mostly on secondary sources, which is to be expected for such a broad topic, although surprisingly it does tap primary materials in a number of places. Budiansky sticks close to these sources, which are first rate, thus insuring there are few errors of fact or questions of interpretation. This is a narrative with no analysis, little opinion, and nothing new. Air Power is well written and does not get bogged down in details despite its 440 pages of text. Budiansky picks and chooses the events and people he discusses with a fine eye and skillfully summarizes the often complex and voluminous materials. This probably is due to the author's training as a journalist, his experience in writing eight other books (six on natural history), and not being a specialist in the field. He includes a bibliography of about four hundred items that gives a fair overview of the field. There are several criticisms. First, the author uses a strange and frustrating system of endnotes that cites by page numbers, using words and phrases. While certainly better than no citations at all, it is an inadequate substitute for the time proven and accepted system used by historians. As in any such sweeping study, the author is vulnerable to criticism regarding the balance (or lack of balance) of his work. Specifically, while Budiansky devotes 121 pages to the years from the beginning through World War I (less than two decades), he uses the same amount of space for World War II, and but 100 pages for the almost six decades since the big war. Some important topics get little or no attention such as airlift, airborne operations, guerrilla war, reconnaissance, and air-sea rescue operations. And while the British and Israeli air forces receive some coverage, Budiansky centers on the USAF. Coverage of topics varies from good (Wright Brothers, Trenchard, Douhet, Mitchell, Battle of Britain, Taranto, and Midway) to poor (Chennault, Pearl Harbor, Russian front, Korean War, and Linebacker II), to nonexistent (V-weapons, Linebacker I, and the Falkland Islands campaign). The basic thread of the book is strategic air power. Budiansky highlights the problems of such operations and indicates the influence of precision guided munitions and stealth upon the airmen. However, the author does not discuss or comment on the fact that while it is now easier to get through the defenses and hit, if not destroy, the target, it is still no easier to determine if it is the proper target. Airmen continue to be bedeviled by problems of intelligence and targeting. In addition, increased accuracy has heightened expectations that collateral damage will be minimal and "innocent" casualties few. [End Page 1321] Omni-present observers armed with video cameras, 24/7 newscasts hungry for exciting footage, open access to the internet, and heightened political concerns confront the airmen with considerable problems. Further, the author does not emphasize, apparently does not appreciate, the significance of AWACS for the air battle. Although strategic bombing is his focus, Budiansky does not neglect other aspects of the subject such as naval and tactical aviation. In fact, he concludes the book, literally the last sentence, with the observation that in the Gulf War II "it was on the battlefield where air power finally achieved not merely equality, but its claim to ascendancy" (p. 441). More than most books, the value of Air Power depends on the reader's background and purpose...

Prophets or Praetorians? The Uptonian Paradox and the Powell Corollary

[military] philosophy grows from the minds and hearts, social mores and customs, traditions and environment of a people. It is the product of national and racial attributes, geography, the nature of a potential enemy threat, standards of living and national traditions, influenced and modified by great military philosophers, like Clausewitz and Mahan, and by great national leaders like Napoleon. (1) The major risk of a big-war predilection is that the US Army will retain the thinking, infrastructure, and forces appropriate for a large-scale war that may not materialize while failing to properly adapt itself to conduct simultaneous smaller engagements of the type that seem to be occurring with increasing frequency. (2) Those quotations highlight the salience of military culture as an influence on how military institutions perceive and conduct war. Military culture as an explanation of behavior may be particularly relevant to the US Army now because the Army is transforming, is still engaged in a small counterinsurgency war in Afghanistan, and is currently engaged in stability operations to counter terrorist and subversive paramilitary elements and thugs who use guerrilla hit-and-run tactics against coalition forces in Iraq. In short, military culture comprises the beliefs and attitudes within a military organization that shape its collective preferences toward the use of force. These attitudes can impede or foster innovation and adaptation, and military culture sometimes exhibits preferences for big wars in favor of small wars. This article discusses one characteristic of US military culture that since the end of the 19th century has had a profound influence on how the American military views the nexus between politics and war. This characteristic is the Uptonian paradox, named so because Emory Upton's influence on American military thought contributed to the following contradiction: the US Army has embraced Clausewitz as the quintessential oracle of war, but it has also tended to distance itself from Clausewitz's overarching theme--the linkage of the military instrument to political purposes. To be sure, the propensity of 19th- and early 20th-century Western militaries to divorce the military sphere from the political sphere was not solely Uptonian--this inclination stemmed at first from the widespread influence of Jomini, whose work was more influential than Clausewitz's for most of the 19th century. In Upton's writings, however, he strengthened the tendency to separate the civil and military spheres by advocating minimal civilian control to maximize military effectiveness. (3) A similar phenomenon, engendering similar tendencies, manifested itself after the Vietnam War. In the late 1970s and 1980s, the US military underwent an intellectual and professional renaissance after hitting its nadir at the end of the Vietnam War. This renaissance displayed an Uptonian character because it refocused the Army exclusively on the big-war paradigm, eschewed several studies that captured the true lessons of Vietnam, and embraced a book sponsored by the Army War College that asserted the US military failed in Vietnam not because it didn't adapt to counterinsurgency, but because it didn't fight that war conventionally enough. Consequently, the big-war-only school was ultimately codified in the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine--a prescription for the use of force that essentially proscribes anything other than conventional war. This article postulates that the Uptonian paradox remains an important influence on the US military and is shown in two tendencies: the inclination to separate the military and political domains after a war begins, and the tendency of the US military to prescribe its preferred paradigm for war to its civilian leadership. Regular Army officers of the late 19th and early 20th centuries viewed Emory Upton, whose ideas included an unconcealed contempt for civilian control of the military, as a warrior prophet. …

Comfort and Community

JUST A month before America's most tragic day, I stood on a corner of the main street in Gallup, New Mexico, watching an Inter-Tribal Ceremonial parade with my 7-year-old granddaughter and some friends from the East Coast. Before the colorful dancers came by, American Legion posts of Native Americans from throughout the Southwest marched solemnly behind their flags. Most of the revered Navajo code talkers, who became heroes in World War II, rode on open-bed trucks, wearing their signatory yellow shirts and red caps with flag insignias. Few were still able to walk in the parade, but they all saluted an adoring crowd. Native Americans sent a larger percentage of foot soldiers to the wars of the last century than any other ethnic group, and they are rightly proud. Still, such displays of patriotism seemed quixotic on that August morning, perhaps even somewhat out of place for peoples who might have more reason to question America's brand of nationalism than most of us. Many weeks later, suburban high school students in my area exhibited the same pride. Accustomed to sitting out the Pledge of Allegiance, they were standing up and reciting the words with an unfamiliar fervor. Theirs is the first generation in a long time to connect so visibly with the patriotism of America's past - if one discounts the hundred hours' war in the Persian Gulf. The connection has always been there to nurture and make stronger because young people tend to be idealists. Granted, for a long time it was cool to show an appreciation of country and flag. Once the big wars of the last century were over and the civil rights movement had lost its glow as a clear action against wrongs, the idealism of youth had nowhere to go. Many young people internalized too much of the cynicism and disengagement of adults, who were struggling with unpopular wars and chicanery and scandals at the highest levels. The young decided that their votes didn't count for much. Still, underneath it all and despite the fact that it is the young who are sent to fight when the old can find no other solutions, our young people have remained believers. They are not interested in political parties, but two-thirds to three-fourths of them trust such political institutions as local government, the courts, and the national government. Their belief in a reasoned role for government was revealed in an international study of civic education, released last spring. …

Small Wars, Big Wars: Security Debates During Israel's First Decade

DESPITE CONSIDERABLE CRITICISM LEVELED AT Benny Morris's book about the inception of the Palestinian refugee problem during the War of Independence, the impression remains that the work was a breakthrough in the fundamental reorientation of all facets of this subject.' The general, factual, detailed picture that Morris expansively relates had been previously outlined by a number of earlier historians.2 Morris's book, however, signaled a turning-point, because it was the first time an Israeli historian attacked the standard denial version and presented a balanced portrait of the conflicting views surrounding the refugee problem and the question of forced expulsion. Morris devoted his second work to the state's first years after the War of Independence, when Israel struggled to stabilize the borders and extend its authority over vacated areas seized in the course of the 1948 fighting. This work, like his earlier one, contained a detailed and comprehensive description of the facts and their analysis that provides the reader with valuable insights. In his astute and precise manner, Morris presents a broad, in-depth survey of Arab infiltration into Israeli territory, the violent activity along the borders and in peripheral areas, and Israel's efforts to counter these incursions. At the same, time he furnishes the reader with important observations for understanding the dynamics of the continuous foundering of Israel's relations with her neighbors that eventually led to the Sinai Campaign in the autumn of 1956. However, in contrast to Israel's denial and silence over its role in creating the refugee problem, which were treated in his first study, most of the issues that Morris raises in his second book were publicly challenged at the time by policy-makers and became part of the contemporary political discourse.

Small Wars, Big Wars: Security Debates during Israel's First Decade

Small Wars, Big Wars: Security Debates during Israel's First Decade

An Inverstigation‘OLD BRIDGES’in Sri Lanka

In Sri Lanka, many bridges constructed in the colonial period are still remained. It is very fortunate like Southeast Asia and South American countries that Sri Lanka avoid big war, so that it become a very few area in the world where have many old bridges. I have investigated many old bridges while I stayed in Sri Lanka for the JICA gratuitous work connected with reconstruction of bridges last year. Up to now, there is few discussion on the viewpoint of civil history even if investigations for maintenance and repairs of bridges almost finish. This report expresses the present situations of OLD BRIDGES and some beautiful old bridges in Sri Lanka

Canada and the Security Problem

THE CONTEXTBROADLY DEFINED, THE CIRCUMSTANCES that we all face as we approach the millennium are well known (or at least widely assumed) and those most commonly cited can be reduced to a series of recurrently trumpeted propositions. Most are blindingly obvious. Some may be a trifle vacuous. And a few are probably misleading or even dead wrong. But to set a context for the discussion that follows it may be useful to run quickly through them nonetheless.Proposition 1: The cold war, as we are usually (although not always) happy to observe, is dead, and for the time being at least its demise may have brought to an end (or so the optimists like to think) any serious prospect of having to cope in the foreseeable future with big wars between big states - or certainly with big wars between fully developed states. The latter have discovered at last that in the world they have engineered for themselves big wars do not pay. Their domestic populations, moreover, show signs here and there - although not consistently and not everywhere - of having learned the same lesson. Hence they feed it back as a tacitly reinforcing instruction to government.Proposition 2: At the same time, however, the removal of the ordered discipline that came from the cold war's bipolar structure, buttressed as it was by the ominous rattling of nuclear sabres, has made it possible for the lesser, but much older, demons of the human condition to renew their mischief. The conflicts of competing religions, cultures, and ethnicities have returned with a vengeance. Subordinated to forces larger than themselves, they had gone for a time unnoticed, while the practitioners of international politics focused on other things. But now their manifestations are as ugly and brutish as ever. They work their death and destruction not so much in wars between states as in wars within them (although they do a bit of the former, too, as recent events in the Balkans have reminded us yet again). And the slaughters to which they lead are often lightly, if frenziedly, done - with machetes, axes, clubs, handguns, and automatic rifles. The latter, it should be recalled, often originate as left-overs from the contracting armies of the greater powers. Surplus military debris, they have been re-cycled into black markets through the exotic, even the desperate, transactions of shadowy merchants of death.But the slaughters, as we have all come to see, are no less deadly for being delivered by primitive instruments. Nor does it help the cause of proportionality - of bringing at least some measure of reason to the matching of practical means to political ends - that the killings are so often executed by mindless adolescents, by role-playing youngsters whose childish motives would in Canada place them immediately under the protection of the Young Offenders Act.Proposition 3: Notwithstanding these displays of darkness in the heart, or perhaps in part because of them, there is abroad the further observation that the threats to our welfare as a species have been greatly multiplied in our time by modernity itself. The list is familiar enough. Among its more prominent and persistent components are 'basket case' poverty in the non-developing world; famine, torture, and pandemically infectious disease; environmental decay; the depletion of resources; the diffusion of weapons, some conventional and some not, among the disorganized, the excited, and the deeply aggrieved; the ruthless exploitation of women and children for purposes of work and pleasure alike; and the sundry predations of prejudice, superstition, and autocratic rule. In some parts of the world - certainly in our own parts of the world - we think we can see progress in the human condition. The Whigs are winning. But elsewhere the Horsemen of the Apocalypse are multiplying, and some of them brandish their spears at Canada's gates.In what measure these phenomena are really new, and to what extent they are really 'products of modernity,' are debatable questions. …

Small Powers Learn from Big Wars

Small Powers Learn from Big Wars