Bidder's Information Research Articles

On the necessity of solving the free rider problem in takeover bids

Previous analysis of the free rider problem in takeover bids has concluded that complex takeover strategies, nonprice taking behavior, taxes, or exogenous exclusion of minority shareholders are necessary for the bidder to profit from a takeover bid. In contrast, in this study, costs of disclosure and the fungible nature of the bidder's information mitigates the detrimental consequences of the free rider problem. The absence of the free rider problem in takeover bids has important implications for optimal bidding strategies, the interpretation of mechanisms posed as solutions to the free rider problem, and the analysis of regulation of takeover activity.

The value of information in a sealed-bid auction

In this paper, we explore bidders' incentives to gather information in auctions, when there is one bidder with only public information and another with some private information. We find that the bidder with only public information makes no profit at equilibrium, while the bidder with private information generally makes positive profits. Moreover, the informed bidder's profits rise when he gathers extra information, and the increase in greater when the information is collected overtly than when it is collected covertly. When the uniformed bidder can observe some of the better-informed bidder's information, he prefers to make his observations covertly. If the seller has access to some of the better-informed bidder's information, or if he has affiliated information of his own, he can raise the expected price by adopting a policy of making that information public. However, there are cases where a policy of publicizing his information would lower the expected price. The distinguishing feature of these latter cases seems to be that the seller's information is complementary to the information of the better-informed bidder.