Bicameral System Research Articles

Temporal Strategies: Governments Alter the Pace of Legislation in Bicameralism Depending on Electoral Expectations

Does a government in a bicameral system strategically alter the length of the legislative process in the first chamber in anticipation of future majorities in the second chamber? Drawing on an existing formal model of dynamic policymaking, we argue that governing majorities strategically accelerate or delay their agenda when a potential majority change in the second chamber is imminent. If the government fears losing control over the second chamber, then the government accelerates their agenda. By contrast, if the government hopes to gain control over the second chamber, the government decelerates their agenda. We test our argument in Germany's symmetric and asymmetric bicameralism by analyzing 1,966 governmental bills from 1998 to 2013. The analyses confirm our expectations for symmetric bicameralism, thus suggesting that the synchronicity of election cycles should be taken into account both in the analysis of bicameral systems and in institutional design of such systems.

FUNCTIONS AND ROLES OF THE REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVE COUNCILS (DPD) OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA IN STRENGTHENING REGIONAL AUTONOMY IN THE BICAMERAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEM

Since the amendment of the 1945 Constitution, the Indonesian parliamentary system has changed from a unicameral system to a bicameral system. The manifestation of this institution has awakened the hopes of local people that regional problems can be fought for at the national level. However, if we pay attention to the functions, powers, and tasks that have been regulated in Article 22 D of the 1945 Constitution and Law Number 22 of 2003 concerning the composition and position of the in the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), the House of Representatives (DPR), the Regional Representative Council (DPD) and Regional People's Representative Assembly (DPRD), there are many assumptions that whether the functions of the Regional Representative Council can be representing regional interests. The Regional Representative Council (DPD) does not only function as counseling for the regional autonomy council, it does not serve the legislative body as a country that adopts a bicameral system. Amendments to the 1945 constitution are the main way to strengthen the position of this institution as a companion to the DPR.

무술시기 강유위 「제5차상서」에 나타난 國會와 憲法에 대한 재검토

The article focused on tracing the origins and functions of the parliamentary system, including the National Assembly, Constitution and political system, which appeared on the Fifth Memorial, and presenting a rough outline of establishing the National Assembly and enacting the Constitution during the Reform Movement of 1897-1898. To this end, I first tracked Kang You-wei"s perceptional changes of Western political ideas through the Japanese Meiji Restoration and Japanese books, which are the backgrounds of knowledge in the submission of the Fifth Memorial, and reviewed Kang You-wei"s new progress in his perception of the National Assembly and the Constitution.<BR> Based on this, I closely tracked the origins of the National Assembly and the Constitution in the Fifth Memorial, relations with Bibliography of Japanese Books(日本書目志), as well as the commonality and differentiation of Reform issues in the Fifth Memorial, and re-examined in-depth issues such as the structure and function of the bicameral National Assembly, civil constitution, and civil rights (human rights and political rights of public citizens) and so on. Lastly, in order to overcome the limitation of excessively compressive description of the National Assembly-related narratives in the Fifth Memorial, referring to “a memorial to imitate west’s parliamentary establishment for Reform and Self-Strengthening(變法自強宜仿泰西設議院摺)”, which was drafted by Kang You-wei in period of The Hundred Days" Reform(1898), I presented Kang"s concrete design for establishment of bicameral National Assembly during Reform Movement of 1897-1898.<BR> Through this study, if I present a Kang you-wei’s rough blueprint of establishing the National Assembly and the enactment of the Constitution which appeared in the Fifth Memorial, it can be summarized into following five things. 1) The establishment of the National Assembly, a legislative body based on the separation of powers within 3 months, 2) The National Assembly adopts the Prussian-style bicameral system, 3) The Emperor’s convocation of the National Assembly and participation in the opening ceremony, 4) Relationship setting between the legislative power and voting rights of the bicameral National Assembly, 5) Enactment of constitution and reflection of human rights and political rights of citizens in the Constitution.

Legislature by Lot : Focusing on Design of a Hybrid Bicameral Legislature

선거원과 추첨원의 양원으로 구성된 하이브리드 양원제를 옹호하는 사람들은 추첨원의 숙의적 문제해결과정과 선거원의 협상과정에 의해 하이브리드 양원제가 원만하게 추동될 수 있다고 믿는다. 그러나 추첨이 대의정치 영역에 점차 자리를 잡아감에 따라, 장차 구성될 수 있는 하이브리드 양원 사이에 서로 상충되는 정당성 문제를 해결하고 서로의 권한을 배분하는 문제가 순탄치 않을지도 모른다는 우려가 제기되고 있다. 선거제를 유지하는 것의 이점이라고 거론되는 것이 단지 허상일 뿐이고 선거원이 추첨원에 끼치는 나쁜 영향은 실재하는 것이라면, 애초의 의도와는 달리 하이브리드 양원제에서 선거원의 경쟁적 측면은 살아남고 추첨원의 잠재적 가치는 사라지게 될 것이다. 설령 하이브리드 양원제를 과도기적 제도로 여긴다고 할지라도, 근본적으로 과두제적 장치인 선거제가 민주주의 심화에 필수적인 것으로 간주되어서는 안 된다.Advocates for a hybrid bicameral legislature with the two chambers, one consisting of elected representatives and the other a sortition assembly of randomly selected citizens, believe that a bicameral legislative processes could be driven by a creative tension between deliberative problem-solving in the sortition body and adversarial negotiation in the elected chamber. But, in the period of transition toward a widely accepted use of sortition in political representation, it is very important to address the issue of conflicting legitimacies and to distribute power between the two chambers. If it is true that the supposed benefits of elections prove illusory but their harmful effects on a sortition body would be all too real, a hybrid bicameral system would maintain the aspects of competitive elections while sabotaging the potential benefits of sortition. Although a bicameral legislature can be regarded as a transitional system, but as a fundamentally oligarchic tool, elections should not be championed as necessary for deepening democracy.

New perspectives on the Europeanization of National Parliaments

See Rozenberg (2012). Auel, Katrin, and Oliver Hoing. 2015. National Parliaments and the Eurozone Crisis: Taking Ownership in Difficult Times? West European Politics 38 (2): 375–395. Article Google Scholar Bergman, Torbjorn. 1997. National Parliaments and EU Affairs Committees: Notes on Empirical Variation and Competing Explanations. Journal of European Public Policy 4 (3): 373–387. Article Google Scholar Buller, J., and A. Gamble. 2002. Conceptualising Europeanisation. Public Policy and Administration 17 (2): 4–24. Article Google Scholar Council Directive No. 79/409/EEC of 2 April 1979 on the conservation of wild birds [Online]. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM%3Al28046. Accessed 3 June 2020 Exadaktylos, Theofanis, and Claudio M. Radaelli. 2009. Research Design in European Studies: The Case of Europeanization. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 47 (3): 507–530. Google Scholar Karlas, Jan. 2011. Parliamentary Control of EU Affairs in Central and Eastern Europe: Explaining the Variation. Journal of European Public Policy 18 (2): 258–273. Article Google Scholar Ladrech, Robert. 1994. Europeanization of Domestic Politics and Institutions: The Case of France. JCMS : Journal of Common Market Studies 32 (1): 69–88. Google Scholar Ladrech, Robert. 2010. Europeanization and National Politics. The European Union Series. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. Google Scholar Olsen, Johan P. ‘The Many Faces of Europeanization’. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 40, no. 5 (December 2002): 921–52. Radaelli, Claudio M. 2000. Whither Europeanization?Concept Stretching and Substantive Change. European Integration Online Papers (EIoP) 4, no. 8. http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000-008a.htm. Raunio, Tapio. 2009. National Parliaments and European Integration, What We Know and What We Should Know. ARENA Working Paper (online), No. 02, ARENA Centre for European Studies. Risse, Thomas, Maria Green Cowles, and James Caporaso, eds. 2001. Europeanization and Domestic Change: Introduction. In: Transforming Europe—Europeanization and Domestic Change, 1–20. Cornell Studies in Political Economy. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. Romaniello, Maria. 2017. The Italian Symmetrical Bicameral System in EU Affairs (Chapter 16). In The Italian Parliament and the European Union, ed. Nicola Lupo, and Giovanni Piccirilli, 285–304. Oxford: Hart Publishing. Google Scholar Rozenberg, Olivier. 2012. The Emotional Europeanisation of National Parliaments: Roles Played by EU Committee Chairs at the Commons and at the French National Assembly. OPAL, OPAL Online Paper Series, no. 7. Download references University of Luxembourg, 12-14 Rue Michel Rodange, 4660, Differdange, Luxembourg Estelle Badie You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar Correspondence to Estelle Badie. Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Reprints and Permissions Badie, E. New perspectives on the Europeanization of National Parliaments. Fr Polit (2020). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41253-020-00125-7 Download citation Published: 20 June 2020 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/s41253-020-00125-7

SHOULD THE DPD REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA BE PRESERVED?

The DPD never carried-out its task of double-checking the legislation process. DPD membership is also connected with political parties. This study aimed to reexamine the need for the DPD and determine whether the DPD should be preserved or dissolved. This study was limited and focused on the 2004-2019 period and used the literature study and the descriptive method in collecting relevant information. The approach used in this study was a qualitative approach, which was appropriate since the existence of DPD was considered to be multidimensional. The results of the study showed the importance of revitalizing the authority of the DPD. There were a significant gap and inequality of authority between the DPR and the DPD, which was not in line with the bicameral system in other countries. The DPD's affiliation with political parties was very strong, due to multiple interpretations of Law No. 7 of 2017 concerning Elections on the requirements for DPD membership. As such, it is very urgent to optimize the DPD role. The role of the DPD, as a channel for the region's political and economic aspirations and needs in the national policy, should be repositioned according to the demands of the law. However, if this role is not achieved, this nation should decide to dissolve the DPD. Of course, it should be conducted through a constitutional mechanism, via amendment of the 1945 Constitution.

ANALISIS PERUBAHAN STRUKTUR LEMBAGA NEGARA DAN SISTIM PENYELENGGARAAN KEKUASAAN NEGARA REPUBLIK INDONESIA BERDASARKAN UNDANG-UNDANG DASAR 1945 SEBELUM DAN SESUDAH AMANDEMEN

The amendment to the 1945 Constitution after the 1998 reform is based on the experience of the practice of state administration by the old and new order governments which are often referred to as authoritarian government systems, both overt and covert. The 1945 Constitution indeed gives enormous power to the President, both Sukarno and Suharto. Weaknesses contained in the 1945 Constitution that triggers the birth of the demands of the reformists to make amendments to the 1945 Constitution, especially concerning the power and term of office of the President. It is important to realize that after the 1945 Constitution is amended, it has very basic implications for the structure of the Republic of Indonesia. Before the amendment to the 1945 Constitution the existing state institutions are the People's Consultative Assembly, the President, the People's Representative Council, the Supreme Consultative Council, the Supreme Audit Board and the Supreme Court, whose titles are divided into two, namely the highest state institutions which are embedded in the People's Consultative Assembly, and the other is a high-level state institution. After changes or amendments to the 1945 Constitution from 1999 to 2002 have implications for changes in the structure of existing state institutions and the number becomes more than before the change. The state institutions after the change are explicitly mentioned in the nomenclature such as: the People's Consultative Assembly, the House of Representatives, the Regional Representative Council, the Regional People's Representative Council, the President and Vice President, the Minister (Specially the Minister of the Interior, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defense ) Governor, Regent, Mayor, Indonesian National Army, Republic of Indonesia National Police, Supreme Court, Constitutional Court, Judicial Commission and Supreme Audit Board. While there are other state institutions whose nomenclature is not mentioned explicitly namely; Advisory Council, Election Commission and Central Bank. As a consequence of the amendment to the 1945 Constitution, the constitutional system adopted has also changed. If before the change to the constitutional system adopted is the cameral union representative system, but after the change into the bicameral system, some even called it tri kameral

Bicameralism in Lesotho: A review of the powers and composition of the second chamber

ABSTRACT Lesotho has a bicameral parliamentary system based on the British model. While the National Assembly is clearly a representative House elected by the citizenry, the purpose, structure and legislative powers of the Senate as the Second Chamber have been a matter of considerable controversy throughout the history of parliamentary democracy in the country. The National Assembly generally has the upper hand not only in the legislative process but also in the broader parliamentary system - it chooses the Prime Minister, it places its confidence in the government and it can withdraw such confidence. The fact that the model generally gives the National Assembly the upper hand is a matter of common cause. What is in question, though, is the nature and extent of the limitation of the powers of the Senate in terms of the Constitution. This article investigates this question and contends that the composition of, and restrictions on, the Senate need to be reviewed in order to enable the Chamber to play a meaningful role in Lesotho's parliamentary democracy . Key words: Constitution of Lesotho, Bicameralism, Senate, National Assembly, Powers of the Second Chamber

DPD (REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVE COUNCIL), AS A STATE AGENCY OF INDONESIAN STATE SYSTEM, RUNS THE AUTHORITY OF ITS ROLE AND FUNCTION TO CREATETHE EXISTENCE OF BICAMERAL SYSTEM IN INDONESIA

DPD (Regional Representatives Council) which is the representative of the region can be a counterweight in strengthening the parliamentary system in Indonesia. Since the amendment begun, the Indonesian parliamentary system has changed from a unicameral system to a bicameral system. However, if noticed, the functions, powers and duties set forth in Article 22 D of the 1945 Constitution and Law No.22 of 2003 on the composition and position of MPR (People’s Consultative Assembly), DPR (House of Representatives), DPD (Regional Representatives Council) and DPRD (Regional People’s Representatives Council), there are many assumptions that whether the function of Regional Representative Council can represent regional’s interests. DPD does not only serve as a counselor of regional autonomy board, and does not serve the legislature, as a country that embraces bicameral system. Bicameral is a term of representation system consisting of two chambers, which in Indonesia are known as DPR RI (House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia) and DPD RI (Regional Representatives Council of the Republic of Indonesia) which aims to achieve good government and the achievement of checks and balances between institutions, particularly in the legislature, which is one of the most important elements in the constitutional of the State.

Legislature by Lot: Envisioning Sortition within a Bicameral System

In this article, we review the intrinsic democratic flaws in electoral representation, lay out a set of principles that should guide the construction of a sortition chamber, and argue for the virtue of a bicameral system that combines sortition and elections. We show how sortition could prove inclusive, give citizens greater control of the political agenda, and make their participation more deliberative and influential. We consider various design challenges, such as the sampling method, legislative training, and deliberative procedures. We explain why pairing sortition with an elected chamber could enhance its virtues while dampening its potential vices. In our conclusion, we identify ideal settings for experimenting with sortition.

Why Hybrid Bicameralism Is Not Right for Sortition

Structural problems are examined with pairing two chambers, one selected by election and the other by sortition, into a traditional bicameral system. It is argued that an all-purpose legislative chamber modeled on existing elected chambers is a mismatch for sortition and that purported benefits of maintaining partisan elections alongside sortition are illusory. Alleged benefits of a hybrid bicameral system are shown to be outweighed by a variety of harmful effects. Furthermore, even if those harms are not substantiated, the continued existence of an elected chamber will likely result in the delimitation of the sortition chamber. Combining many different sorts of minipublics with different characteristics and functions is preferable, and a possible multibody sortition legislative system is presented. Finally, an alternative way forward for sortition is proposed by peeling away individual topic areas from elected bodies and transferring them to sortition bodies.

Intercameral Relations in a Bicameral Elected and Sortition Legislature

The idea of a hybrid bicameral system combining election and sortition is investigated. More precisely, the article imagines how an elected and a sortition chamber would interact, taking into account their public perception and their competing legitimacies. The article draws on a survey of a representative sample of the Belgian population and Belgian members of parliament assessing their views about sortition in political representation. Findings are combined with theoretical reflections on election’s and sortition’s respective sources of legitimacy. The possibility of conflicting legitimacies and mutually detrimental interactions leads to considerations of the effects of different possible distributions of power between the chambers as a crucial determinant of their interactions and perceived legitimacy.

Las enmiendas en el procedimiento legislativo del Senado

La regulación de las enmiendas en el procedimiento legislativo en el Senado es una cuestión clave si se tiene en cuenta, por un lado, la posición constitucional de la Cámara en el sistema bicameral español y, por otro, los plazos de dos meses en el procedimiento ordinario o de veinte días en los supuestos de urgencia con que cuenta la Cámara para enmendar los textos legislativos que envía el Congreso de los Diputados.&#x0D; Los problemas más importantes se producen en el momento de decidir sobre la admisibilidad de las enmiendas atendiendo al cumplimiento de requisitos formales y materiales, de congruencia con el texto legislativo, y también se derivan de la posibilidad de introducir modificaciones en las diversas fases del procedimiento legislativo.

Identifying voter preferences for politicians’ personal attributes: a conjoint experiment in Japan

AbstractAlthough politicians’ personal attributes are an important component of elections and representation, few studies have rigorously investigated which attributes are most relevant in shaping voters’ preferences for politicians, or whether these preferences vary across different electoral system contexts. We investigate these questions with a conjoint survey experiment using the case of Japan’s mixed-member bicameral system. We find that the attributes preferred by voters are not entirely consistent with the observed attributes of actual politicians. Moreover, voters’ preferences do not vary when asked to consider representation under different electoral system contexts, whereas the observed attributes of politicians do vary across these contexts. These findings point to the role of factors beyond voters’ sincere preferences, such as parties’ recruitment strategies, the effect of electoral rules on the salience of the personal vote, and the availability of different types of politicians, in determining the nature of representation.

Political reform in the organization of the Congress of the Republic: is it necessary to restitute the bicameral system in the Peruvian congress?

En el desarrollo del presente articulo, se analiza la posicion institucional del Congreso de la Republica en el sistema constitucional peruano. Para ello, se explica en que consiste el principio de democracia representativa y sus caracteristicas principales en los sistemas de representacion “unicameral” y “bicameral” del Congreso de la Republica. Posteriormente, se analizan los proyectos de ley que proponen restituir el sistema bicameral en el Congreso actual y se exponen los posibles efectos juridicos y politicos que podria causar su retorno en la politica peruana actual.

DPD (REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVE COUNCIL), AS A STATE AGENCY OF INDONESIAN STATE SYSTEM, RUNS THE AUTHORITY OF ITS ROLE AND FUNCTION TO CREATETHE EXISTENCE OF BICAMERAL SYSTEM IN INDONESIA

DPD (Regional Representatives Council) which is the representative of the region can be a counterweight in strengthening the parliamentary system in Indonesia. Since the amendment begun, the Indonesian parliamentary system has changed from a unicameral system to a bicameral system. However, if noticed, the functions, powers and duties set forth in Article 22 D of the 1945 Constitution and Law No.22 of 2003 on the composition and position of MPR (People’s Consultative Assembly), DPR (House of Representatives), DPD (Regional Representatives Council) and DPRD (Regional People’s Representatives Council), there are many assumptions that whether the function of Regional Representative Council can represent regional’s interests. DPD does not only serve as a counselor of regional autonomy board, and does not serve the legislature, as a country that embraces bicameral system. Bicameral is a term of representation system consisting of two chambers, which in Indonesia are known as DPR RI (House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia) and DPD RI (Regional Representatives Council of the Republic of Indonesia) which aims to achieve good government and the achievement of checks and balances between institutions, particularly in the legislature, which is one of the most important elements in the constitutional of the State.

Infrared radiation and interference on bicameral pacing system

Infrared radiation and interference on bicameral pacing system

Infrared radiation and interference on bicameral pacing system

Infrared radiation and interference on bicameral pacing system

The Frontiers of Australian Federalism

The frontiers of Australian federalism are potentially as numerous as the many ways in which federalism infuses Australian law and politics. There are frontiers about how we understand the very foundations of the federation, about what makes the federal constitution legally binding, and about how it can be altered in the future. There are frontiers in the practical working of our bicameral system of parliamentary representation – especially the Senate – and ongoing questions about its reform. There are also frontiers in the use by the Commonwealth of its legislative, executive and financial powers – a longstanding issue that has seen the scope and volume of federal legislation and administration grow in virtually every decade since federation. And there are frontiers in the relations between the federal, state and territory governments – a murky landscape, in which not all that happens is open to public view or democratic accountability. In each of these respects the Australian federal system displays a kind of path dependency. Patterns of behavior and institutional decisions settled in the past have had a tendency to lock-in particular institutional pathways in Australian federalism that cannot easily be overcome. This paper, which was presented at the 2018 Public Law Conference held at Melbourne Law School, analyses some of the ways in which Australian federalism is path dependent and discusses the prospects of its reform. It is concluded that without an understanding of the path dependent nature of the system our attempts to reform it are unlikely to be successful and could easily prove to be counter-productive.

Three-valued simple games

In this paper we study three-valued simple games as a natural extension of simple games. We analyze to which extent well-known results on the core and the Shapley value for simple games can be extended to this new setting. To describe the core of a three-valued simple game we introduce (primary and secondary) vital players, in analogy to veto players for simple games. Moreover, it is seen that the transfer property of Dubey (1975) can still be used to characterize the Shapley value for three-valued simple games. We illustrate three-valued simple games and the corresponding Shapley value in a parliamentary bicameral system.