Below-replacement Fertility Research Articles

Declining marriage rates and gender inequity in social institutions: towards an adequately complex explanation for childlessness

A recent newspaper report pitted McDonald's and Birrell's explanations for Australia's below-replacement fertility against each other. This article presents data from qualitative research into the experience and understandings of 35 childless women aged 28 to 42. Childless women were best understood as those who were Childless by Choice and those who were Childless by Circumstance. On the basis of their baseline orientation to motherhood - namely, the place, durability and stability of motherhood in their imagined futures and identities - the latter group was categorised as either 'Thwarted Mothers' or 'Waiters and Watchers'. While the applicability of the findings are limited because of the small, self-selected sample, the data shed some light on the relative contributions of gender inequity and declining partnering rates to childlessness, and thus on the dispute between McDonald and Birrell.

The pure relationship and below replacement fertility

Of the many changes which have characterized the second demographic transition, shifts in fertility and union formation have attracted a great deal of interest from demographers. Despite the fact that researchers have extensively modeled recent demographic changes such as skyrocketing divorce rates, rising common-law union formation, delayed childbearing, and the decline to belowreplacement fertility levels, our understanding of the causes of these trends, and the possible connections between them remains theoretically fragmented and incomplete. The goal of this paper is to advance our understanding in this area by exploring the insights on modern family formation of prominent sociologist Anthony Giddens. Specifically, this study examines whether Giddens’ “pure relationship” concept can shed light on the trend toward very low fertility. The results of this inquiry suggest that couples in both marriages and common-law unions who conform to key aspects of Giddens pure relationship are more likely to have uncertain or below-replacement fertility intentions, and less likely to embrace above-replacement fertility goals.

Below-replacement fertility in Thailand and its policy implications

The fertility transition in Thailand has been one of the most rapid among Asian countries that are yet to attain newly industrialized country status. In the early 1960s, the total fertility rate exceeded six births per woman; currently, it stands at 1.9 or slightly below replacement level. At present, it is hard to predict the future trend in fertility as this involves several factors that need much closer study, in particular, fertility preferences, changes in marriage patterns and the wider effects of the current economic crisis in Thailand. Rapid declines in fertility and mortality have had a profound effect on the age structure of the population, notably the increasing elderly proportion. Thailand now faces new challenges and priorities for population policy. Policy responses to concerns arising from below-replacement fertility will be much more complex and involve greater government activism, improved institutional capacities and more resources than in the past. This paper reviews the fertility transition in Thailand and looks at some consequences and policy implications of low fertility, with special reference to the family and the elderly population.

Population Policy Dilemmas in Europe at the Dawn of the Twenty‐First Century

The article discusses issues raised by persistent below‐replacement fertility in Europe. The continent's demographic predicament is highlighted by comparing age structures and relative population sizes between populations in and outside Europe—such as those of Russia and Yemen and those of an enlarged 25‐country European Union and a 25‐country hinterland to the EU in North Africa and West Asia—during the past 50 years and prospectively up to 2050, based on United Nations estimates and projections. Potential geopolitical aspects of the population shifts are considered. European policy responses to them are found largely wanting. With respect to the key demographic variable, fertility, explicit pronatalism is rejected by most European governments. A set of policy measures that commands wide support, with the hoped‐for side effect of raising birth rates, seeks to make women's participation in the formal labor force compatible with childrearing. The effectiveness of such measures, however, is likely to be limited. Continued below‐replacement fertility, higher immigration from outside Europe, negative population growth, and loss of demographic weight within the global population are safe predictions for the Europe of the twenty‐first century.

Below-replacement fertility and prospects for labour force growth in Taiwan

Fertility in Taiwan had declined to replacement level in 1983. In 1986-1997, the total fertility rate dropped to 1.7-1.8, with continuing decreases observed in 1997-2001. Fertility will probably be sustained at the 2001 level of 1.48 or even decline further in the future. If the current fertility and labour-force participation rates persist, the size of the labour force will increase only slightly in the next 15 years and begin to shrink soon after 2015. After 2034, the labour force will fall below the current level and Taiwan will face a labour shortage. Though efficient, the policy option of importing more foreign workers is fraught with political sensitivities, especially given the current economic downturn and rising unemployment. Another policy approach, to increase the participation rates for women and mature men, would lead to growth in the labour supply sometime after 2030 and, combined with a modest increase in fertility, would prevent the labour force from falling below its current size in the next 50 years. Notwithstanding that any increase in fertility will have a delayed effect on labour supply, strong incentives are still required to affect fertility behaviour.

Below-replacement fertility: Determinants and prospects in South Asia

Although 10 countries and two of China’s special administrative areas, totalling 1,528 million people or 44 per cent of Asia’s total population, are now characterized by fertility rates below long-term replacement levels, no such countries are yet found in South Asia. This paper first examines the characteristics of 12 Asian administrations with very low fertility at various stages of their fertility declines and then compares the findings with the present situation in three South Asian countries, Sri Lanka, India and Bangladesh. This allows a prediction of when the South Asian countries will reach replacement fertility in accord with the trends in two key criteria, the percentage of girls in secondary school and the infant mortality rate. These conclusions are then buttressed for each country by the findings of anthropological demographic research programs in which the authors were involved. The predictions are that all three countries will attain a total fertility rate of 2.1 within the next 30 years and that the UN2000 Revision of the medium population projection is plausible in that regard. However, the authors part company with the UN projection in their assessment that the nature of these societies means that they will all subsequently fall to still lower fertility levels.

Below-replacement fertility in east and southeast asia: Consequences and policy responses

Fourteen countries in Asia have total fertility rates at or below replacement level. This is more pronounced in China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Thailand. The implications are far-reaching and profound as they affect the age structure of the population, giving rise to population ageing, labour force shortages, increased elderly dependency ratios and feminization of the aged population. Evidence from European countries suggests that although fertility may rebound, in most countries it is highly unlikely that fertility will recover sufficiently to reach replacement level in the near future. Mortality reduction will continue to be an overriding policy goal, which would further enhance the ageing process. Therefore, the greatest challenge will be to pension systems, old-age care systems, and health systems or health insurance. This paper first examines the fertility transition in five low-fertility countries. It then discusses the policy measures that these countries have adopted in response to low fertility and population ageing. The paper concludes with the policy implications for healthcare, social care, income security and caregiving facility, and the scope for further study.

The proximate determinants of the decline to below-replacement fertility in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Between 1990 and 2000, the total fertility rate (TFR) in Ethiopia declined moderately from 6.4 to 5.9 children per woman of reproductive age. During the same period, the TFR in the capital city of Addis Ababa declined from 3.1 to 1.9 children per woman. Even more striking than the magnitude of this decline is that it occurred in the absence of a strong and effective national family planning program. In this study, the components of this fertility decline are identified using the Bongaarts framework of the proximate determinants of fertility. The results of a decomposition analysis indicate that a decrease in the age-specific proportions of women who are married, followed by an increase in contraceptive use are the most important mechanisms by which fertility has declined in Addis Ababa. Poor employment prospects and relatively high housing costs are likely factors that encourage couples to delay marriage and reduce marital fertility.

The debate over low fertility in the popular press: A cross-national comparison, 1998–1999

Aspects of below-replacement fertility have long been debated among professional demographers. This paper describes the corresponding popular debate about low fertility by analyzing 437 newspaper and magazine articles from eleven developed countries during 1998 and 1999. Despite the diversity in the national debates due to different socioeconomic, political and demographic backgrounds, our study finds important commonalties in the way low fertility is debated: First, countries emphasize consequences and potential interventions rather than causes in their popular debates over low fertility. Second, our study reveals that the popular press discusses low fertility as a serious concern with mostly negative implications, despite the fact that many of the causes of low fertility are associated with social and economic progress. Third, the variety of issues and perspectives revealed in the popular debate, while cohesive in general ways, invites a role for demographers in informing an accurate public discussion of low fertility, which will help form the most appropriate policy outcomes.

R. F. Harrod on Reviving the Birth Rate

Continuing below‐replacement fertility and projected declines in population size are demographic features of many European countries and Japan. They are variously met with complacent acceptance, calls for higher rates of immigration, or—often last and least—proposals for increasing the birth rate. Fertility was also low in the 1930s, and some of the policy debate from that period resonates today. In England and Wales, fertility then had been declining for half a century. Over the decade 1931–40, it averaged 1.8 children per woman—moreover, with net emigration. Worries over this situation and its likely consequences led to the setting up in 1944 of a Royal Commission on Population, charged with considering “what measures, if any, should be taken in the national interest to influence the future trend in population.” In a memorandum submitted to the Commission in that year, the economist R. F. Harrod set out a detailed proposal to encourage childbearing through a scheme of family endowments. Part of the introductory section of Harrod's submission, arguing the case for state intervention and for material rather than ‘spiritual’ measures, is reproduced below.An evident problem in offering economic incentives for childbearing is that, to induce a given behavioral change, well‐off families would require much larger incentives than the poor. Hence child endowments that aspire to effectiveness across the income distribution have to be skewed toward the upper end. Harrod argues that this is as it should be, that policy should establish neutrality between large and small family sizes, and that this is a conceptually separate issue from poverty alleviation. ‘We should seek a re‐distribution of national income favourable to the parents of larger families and the plan should be put into effect whether or not another re‐distribution as between rich and poor is proceeding at the same time.’ He remarks on the implausibility of the government's being able to ‘talk up’ fertility— thereby generating some kind of costless ideational change, a ‘spiritual aufklärung.’Later pans of the submission not reprinted here cover the specific details of the proposal. The proposed annual benefit per child (intended for every child after the second, with half‐rates payable for the second child) is paid for 18 years. It is substantial and increases with the child's age—at ages 13–18, for most of the income range it amounts to 20–30 percent of the father's income (or mother's, if hers is higher). Harrod also discusses further the rationale for making the endowments (and the compulsory contributions—a flat 5 percent of income—that finance them) proportional to income. To make his case Harrod draws on the dysgenic and population‐quality arguments popular at the time: worry about ‘race decline’ and ‘a general lowering of standards and of efficiency if the parents who are best equipped in experience, knowledge and culture are relatively infertile.’In the event, the Commission recommended a flat schedule of family allowances, together with tax exemptions for dependent children calculated to provide some income‐based benefit. These were justified on population as well as equity and welfare grounds, ‘since the handicaps of parenthood have played a large part in the fall of average family size below replacement level.‘ Population quality issues—the subject of several other submissions—were sidestepped by calling for further research. By the time the Commission's report was finally published, in 1949, the baby boom was well underway: average fertility over 1946–50 was 2.4.Roy Forbes Harrod (1900–78) was one of the foremost economists of his day. His career was largely spent at Christ Church College, Oxford. A student and sometime colleague of Keynes, his best‐known early work was centered on identifying a dynamic equilibrium growth path for the economy—building on Keynes's static equilibrium analysis. As stylized (by others), this came to be called the Harrod‐Domar growth model, a formulation basic to growth theory. Harrod was editor of the Economic Journal for the period 1945–66. He was active in politics and as an economic adviser to both Labour and Conservative governments. He was knighted in 1959.The extract is reprinted from volume 5 of the Papers of the Royal Commission on Population (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1950), pp. 80–85.

A study of demographic changes under sustained below-replacement fertility in Hong Kong SAR

The total fertility in Hong Kong SAR fell continuously below replacement in the past two decades and reached a level of 0.98 in 1998. The rate in 1981 was close to replacement at 1.93. In this paper the theoretical outcomes of long-lasting below-replacement fertility are identified with a view to gaining some analytical insight into the situation, where the population is experiencing such a striking demographic trend. In the absence of migration, Hong Kong SAR will see its population start to decline between 2008 and 2038, if the future course of fertility falls within these ‘bounds’. Concurrently, the aging of population will be reaching unprecedented proportions. Should fertility remain at the present below-replacement level, i.e. the worse-case scenario, the proportion of population aged 65 years or older would increase to 44 per cent, and those aged under 15 years would decrease to six per cent, by 2048. As a result, the potential labour supply (those aged 15–64 years) would dwindle to only 50 per cent of the population, suggesting that there would be less than one person potentially working to support one dependent (who is likely to be a person aged 65 years or older). The socio-economic consequences of population aging are discussed. By analysing net immigration in the demographic process in the past, the way in which replacement migration would help alleviate the problem of population decline and population aging is also discussed.

“Replacement Migration” from the Perspective of Equilibrium Stationary Populations

An equilibrium stationary population results whenever a population is projected assuming (constant) below-replacement fertility and annual flow of net migrants whose age-sex composition is also fixed. This framework is useful in interpreting the results in the U.N.'s report on Replacement Migration. It is especially helpful in seeing why the annual volume of immigration must accelerate if the policy goal is to maintain today's relatively youthful age structures. Replacement Migration is largely demographic in nature and ignores a number of potential connections to economics and other social sciences. Had those connections been strengthened, readers might have been more convinced that population aging and population decline are important “problems” that require immigration as a solution.

Below-repiacement fertility in Tropical Africa? Some evidence from Addis Ababa

In the past few years there has been a gradual but progressive shift away from the long held scepticism about the prospect of reproductive change in Tropical Africa. Consequendy, the question is now not so much whether Tropical Africa remains a spectator of fertility transition, but whether and how soon fertility in the region will decline to level attained in other parts of the world. Using data from a series of censuses and surveys conducted in Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia, a country which itself has high fertility, this study explores emerging evidence of fertility levels below two children per woman in an African city. Postponement of marriage and increased incidence of non-marriage, as well as a decline in marital fertility recorded across all birth orders and all age group, are the routes by which the observed transition to below-replacement fertility has been achieved. The paper outlines some tentative institutional and cultural factors that may have contributed to these changes.

Family Transformations across the Canadian/American Border: When the Laggard becomes the Leader

Family Transformations across the Canadian/American Border: When the Laggard becomes the Leader CELINE LE BOURDAIS and NICOLE MARCIL-GRATTON The United States and Canada, like other developed countries, have experienced similar demographic trends over the past 50 years. The of the post-war period has given way to progressive decline in fertility, leading some observers to speak of baby-bust; the golden age of nuptiality has fallen upon darker days, and increases in divortiality and common-law marriages have significantly altered the conjugal and familial trajectories of individuals. While these changes began to occur later in certain countries like Canada, they have often progressed much more rapidly in the late-starters, thus resulting in convergence of demographic indicators across countries. In spite of these similar trends, certain national differences remain apparent. Canada and the United States, although very close geographically and demographically, have taken fairly different paths in recent years in terms of family life and several underlying demographic indicators. Ryder, one of the most knowledgeable American (Canadian by birth, American by career track) researchers, has frequently expanded on comparisons of such indicators between the US and Canada, helping to settle debate as to whether traditionally Canada could be said to have been lagging 10 years the US, as far as such indicators as fertility, nuptiality, divorce and contraception were concerned. He bluntly declared Canada to have been not ten years but behind the US, at least concerning the trends in fertility up to the baby-boom (Ryder, 1992). The aim of this article is to show that, to certain extent, several of Canada's family life indicators have reversed the traditional trends, with surge forward which may bring them closer to being a generation ahead of those in the US. We shall also point to the fundamental role of trends in French-speaking Quebec in distinguishing Canadian demographic indicators; without Quebec's specific conservatism in the past and today's tremendous reversal of its marital and fertility behaviors, Canada's kinship with the US would be far more obvious. CANADA AS LAGGARD: AN IMPRESSIONISTIC INTERPRETATION1 As Ryder (1992) suggested, the fertility differences between Canada and the US were largely attributable to diverging paths of relevant behaviors on the part of both countries' minorities. This was true when fertility decrease in Canada was in fact slowed down by Quebec's maintenance of its traditional high birth rate. It remained true when rapid drop in fertility signaled Canada's rise to modernity, with the result that its fertility level dropped below that of the US; this reversal was primarily due to Quebec's jump onto the bandwagon of below-replacement fertility, on the one hand, and the still high level of fertility among the US black population, on the other hand. The underlying different use of contraception again demonstrates the minorities' role in shaping both countries' profile in fertility and matrimony; however, apparently similar indicators such as low fertility or high proportions of out-of wedlock births do call for very different interpretations in the domain of evolving family structures as we will point out. But first, let us rapidly identify the characteristics of Canada's French-speaking minority. Canada's French-speaking population, of which 90 % reside in Quebec, is minority which has always considered itself to be majority, and behaved accordingly. Such an attitude is largely due to the perception of Quebeckers of being founding people of Canada, which was left fairly free to grow and prosper rather than be fully integrated into the British Empire after France lost its ground in the New World to England in 1763. Prosper they did, in numbers at least, with phenomenal growth from 60,000 survivors after the last battle proliferating at surprising rate to nearly 7 million, still forming 25 % of Canada's population, at the last census (1991). …

Some patterns and social impacts of external migration on a below-replacement population: Denmark by the turn of the millennium

As with many other nations in Europe, Denmark has experienced below-replacement fertility over the past three decades. The impact on population growth of the recent fertility decline to a large extent has been offset by a positive net balance of external migration. To provide a factual basis for a wide range of policy issues and social and cultural impacts we start by studying external migration, differential fertility, naturalization of foreign nationals, and population growth in the framework of multidimensional life models. Migrants and naturalized citizens tend to have reproductive behavior and sex/age profiles that differ significantly from those of the remaining population. To study some concerted demographic and social impacts of such differentials, we construct a number of midterm projections based on existing and expected development of fertility, mortality, and migration.

From Childbearing to Childrearing: The Link Between Declines in Fertility and Changes in the Socialization of Children

THERE IS WIDESPREAD agreement among scholars, laypersons, and policymakers that the family in Europe and North America has been experiencing fundamental changes in its makeup and functioning. Social and demographic shifts that have been occurring systematically during the post-World War 1I era demonstrate how profound these changes are. Birth rates have reached an all-time low throughout the industrialized world, with many European countries now experiencing levels of fertility that are below replacement. Fertility declines have, of course, been occurring throughout most of this century and before, so the post-baby boom readjustments to lower birth rates were not so much revolutionary as they were a continuation of a long-term trend (Teitelbaum and Winter, 1985). From a historical perspective, however, below-replacement fertility levels are an anomaly in human evolution. As Davis (1986: 48) put it, Never before in recorded history-not in the Great Depression, not in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and not in ancient times-has fertility been so low for whole societies as it is now in the industrial world. In addition, patterns of marriage formation have undergone major alterations in the past several decades, with systematic trends toward the delay in age of first marriage and the increase in cohabitation in most Western countries (e.g., Buck and Scott, 1994; Bumpass and Sweet, 1989; Kielman, 1987; Kiernan and Estaugh, 1993; Thornton and Freedman, 1982, 1983). There has also been a major increase in rates of marital dissolution through divorce. Although not everyone agrees on the causes of these patterns, many point to the women's movement, the sexual revolution, and the growing economic independence of women in modern life (e.g. Cherlin, 1992). How

The modern shift to below-replacement fertility: has Israel's population joined the process?

Fertility has declined to below replacement levels in many of the modern industrialized countries during the last three decades. This decline has been explained by various modern socio-economic characteristics, such as the change in women's status, their increased participation in non-familial activities, modern consumption patterns, and increasing costs of raising ‘quality’ children. The Jewish population of Israel is a modern society with such characteristics. Yet, total fertility in Israel during the 1980s was at least one child higher than in most European countries. It is shown that social heterogeneity makes this an over-simplified comparison. Indeed, it is the high fertility of the orthodox population among the two major ethnic groups, combined with the decline towards below-replacement fertility of the non-orthodox, which produces the high mean fertility of the entire population. While during the 1950s and 1960s the major explanations of fertility variation were concerned with ethnicity and socio-economic status, these were replaced by religiosity in the 1970s and the 1980s.

Immigrants’ ages and the structure of stationary populations with below-replacement fertility

A sustained regime of low fertility plus immigration yields an unusual kind of stationary population. The author demonstrates that all stationary populations have a common structure, and that the familiar replacement-level fertility population is the youngest among the many stationary populations corresponding to a particular life table. This finding has important consequences for policy because although fertility increase and immigration are equally effective at halting population decline, immigration is inferior as a means of rejuvenating low-fertility populations. In fact, an immigration-based policy could make a low-fertility population older rather than younger. The paper includes examples using U.S. and West German vital rates.

Re-linking fertility behaviour and old age economic security: A delayed note on demeny

Recently Paul Demeny proposed a policy to solve the problem of below-replacement fertility. His proposal is to link the old age economic security of parents to their fertility behaviour, strengthening the material position of those aged persons who have carried the financial burden of childraising by assigning some proportion of the social security contributions of children directly to their parents. I argue that in the course of constructing his proposal, Demeny undermines the fertility-facilitating effect of conventional welfare policies and ignores the class-specific effects of existing pronatalist policies. I suggest that the adoption of additional welfare policies, apart from strengthening and correcting existing measures, would not only foster the achievement and maintenance of a socially adequate fertility level but also foster social justice for the individuals more directly involved in generational reproduction.

Micro-consequences of low fertility in Singapore

When below-replacement fertility was reached in Singapore due to the decline in female marriage rates and the reduction in average family size, economic resources were no longer needed to support a dependent population. Funds were used for developmental projects which increased per capita income and the economic base. But manpower needs were unmet because the younger cohort size was too small and the population was aging. Besides these changes in age and economic structure, some of the impact on family and occupational structure is described. For instance, there was a delay in marriage age from 23.7 years in 1970 to 26 years in 1989. This means daughters remain living with parents in Chinese and Indian households and in Malay households were this has been the practice. Consequently, daughters prevent married sons from sharing a parental home. Daughters assume the responsibilities for parental care. It is suggested that if inheritance patterns change to reflect a greater inheritance to daughters, daughters may choose greater independence from parental control. Social service for single women may require more flexibility and acceptance of lifestyles of single women living along. The smaller family size of 2.6 children also means a contraction of the childbearing period to age 35. Women 25-29 years in the labor force in 1989 constituted 74% and 50.2% for ages 40-44 with an overall rate of 48.4%. Rising educational attainment and opportunities available created this situation. With the changes in work priority comes the change in child care arrangements such that grandparents and relatives (30% in 1989) were used. Demand has increased for day care centers. Foreign household domestics are being recruited (7% of all households). Husband and wife relationships have placed the women in greater control over decision making particularly on the number of children. Daughters are not as discriminated against because of the economic returns. The rising status is reflected in educational attainment where 61% in 1989 have a secondary education or higher. Economic changes in the labor supply created a need for 10-15% of foreign workers in all sectors but not to exceed 50%. Levies on foreign workers were introduced to deter overreliance. Women have expanded most in clerical positions. It is expected that the 20-24 year cohort will continue to decline affecting the labor shortage.