Bello Principles Research Articles

Concurrent application and artificially intelligent target selection

ABSTRACT This article explores the alleged use by Israel of its controversial AI targeting system, ‘Lavender,’ to frame a broader research question as to whether such a system complies (or not) with both the ad bellum and the in bello frameworks. Though this article does not seek to address the sensitive issues in Gaza directly, it instead examines how such a system could operate within both realms. The authors emphasise the importance of concurrent application, where ad bellum and in bello principles are simultaneously implemented in target selection. They argue that for an in bello system like Lavender it is crucial to integrate ad bellum considerations to ensure compliance with ad bellum proportionality and necessity under the UN Charter & customary international law. The authors underline that any in bello AI system used in self-defence must incorporate ad bellum factors, and maintain that concurrency is essential and non-negotiable where ambiguity exists.

The Role of International Law and Diplomacy in Inter-State Relations: Implications for Afghanistan and American War Relations

This study examines the role of international law and diplomacy in interstate relations, with implications for American-Afghanistan relations. Specifically, the study sets out to interrogate whether US war relations on terror in Afghanistan has reduced terrorism in the country; ascertain how US counter-terrorism strategic relations in Afghanistan undermined jus in bello principles of proportionality and discrimination; and determine how US strategy failure in its Afghanistan’s relations undermined its reconstruction and peace-building efforts. By adopting the Just War Theory (JWT), the paper analysed the dynamic nature of US-Afghanistan relations, following the 9/11 attacks, with findings revealing that the US had an incoherent strategy in its war relations in Afghanistan, which ultimately led to its failure to restore peace, promote democracy and human rights.

Returning the War to Russia: Drones and Discrimination in the Defense of Ukraine

AbstractThis essay assesses the morality of Ukraine's use of drones to attack targets inside Russia. Following its invasion by Russian forces, Ukraine has had a just cause to wage a war of self-defense. However, its efforts to achieve that cause remain subject to moral limits. Even a state that has been unjustly attacked may not, for example, respond by deliberately targeting the attacking state's civilian population. To do so would violate the jus in bello principle of discrimination. The essay first describes how drone technology has frequently enabled long-range strikes against Russian military assets as well as other targets inside cities. It then explains why it would be morally wrong for Ukraine to attack its enemy's population centers. First, Russian civilians are not liable to attack, and this nonliability is undiminished by the injustice of Russia's invasion or by any in bello wrongs committed by the Russian military. Second, attacking Russian cities with drones would arguably achieve little or no self-defensive benefit for Ukraine, and it could even be counterproductive.

Can Just Wars Be Fought Proportionately? A Critique of In Bello Proportionality

ABSTRACT Proportionality has long been considered a pillar of just war theory, requiring that the goods achieved in an action outweigh the collateral harms it causes. In this article, I argue that the in bello principle of proportionality cannot serve its intended function of limiting the destructiveness of actions during war. I illustrate the features of war that make the in bello proportionality constraint not merely impossible to follow, but perhaps even self-defeating. I conclude by suggesting ways in which theorists and policymakers concerned with justice in war might attempt to respond to this dilemma.

Excessive Force or Armored Restraint? Government Mechanization and Civilian Casualties in Civil Conflict

Does increasing counterinsurgent mechanization result in higher levels of unintentional civilian casualties? Existing research on unintentional civilian victimization in recent conflicts has focused on air strikes, but this question remains unexplored in research examining counterinsurgent force structure for ground units. However, a host of counterinsurgency practitioners in Iraq have cited the mechanized forces’ effectiveness in delivering precision fires that limit civilian casualties. We propose an armored restraint theory, suggesting that mechanized crews’ armored protection enhances soldiers’ decision space when making the consequential choice to employ lethal force. When this enhanced decision space is combined with units that systematically respect jus in bello principles and non-combatant immunity norms, it results in armored restraint, which may reduce government-caused civilian casualties in civil conflicts. We test this theory using micro-data from Iraq and find mechanized units are associated with significantly lower civilian casualty levels compared to dismounted units.

Autonomous Weapons and Just War Theory

As wars today involve the use of sophisticated weapons such as autonomous ones, this paper aims to address the moral permissibility of using autonomous weapons systems (AWS) in wars. In the debate on autonomous weapons, advocates argue based on AWS’s precision of targets (Arkin 2018) and it not being clouded by emotional judgments (Marchant, et.al 2011) and prohibitors who comment on the ethical and legal implications of autonomous weapons (A. Sharkey 2019; Blanchard 2022). However, there has been relatively little development of compliance of the autonomous weapons with all the principles of jus in bello, amongst the scholarship as well as its engagement with the just war framework broadly. To assess the moral compliance of AWS, the paper focuses on just conduct or the jus in bello principles. It closely examines all the three principles of necessity, discrimination, and proportionality that makeup just conduct as well as the legal body of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Through a close analysis of all the principles of jus in bello against the use of autonomous weapons, this paper will result in the incompatibility of such weapons with the ethical framework of just war theory that gives out the norms for just and fair conduct during wars. It will thereby lead to a further reflection on the compliance of autonomous weapons as per jus in bello and the IHL to have greater restrain and ethical conduct during wars.

Jus in bello Necessity, The Requirement of Minimal Force, and Autonomous Weapons Systems

ABSTRACT In this article we focus on the jus in bello principle of necessity for guiding the use of autonomous weapons systems (AWS). We begin our analysis with an account of the principle of necessity as entailing the requirement of minimal force found in Just War Theory, before highlighting the absence of this principle in existing work on AWS. Overlooking this principle means discounting the obligations that combatants have towards one another in times of war. We argue that the requirement of minimal force is an important requirement for considering ethical uses of force. In particular, we distinguish between lethal and non-lethal purposes of use of force and introduce the prospect of non-lethal AWS before reviewing a number of challenges which AWS pose with respect to their non-lethal use. The challenges arise where AWS generate unpredictable outcomes impinging upon the situational awareness required of combatants to ensure that their actions meet the requirement of minimal force. We conclude with a call for further research on the ethical implications of non-lethal uses of AWS as a necessary contribution for assessing the moral permissibility of AWS.

Why reciprocity prohibits autonomous weapons systems in war

This paper presents the argument that there ought to be a categorical ban on autonomous weapons systems (AWS) in warfare. First, I provide a foundational argument that international humanitarian law (jus in bello) is deontological. Following the argument shared by Peter Asaro and Robert Sparrow, I then argue that AWS lack the ability to properly acknowledge its target and consequently, breaches jus in bello principles. I, however, go further than Asaro and Sparrow by emphasizing the necessity of reciprocity for deontological law. Because AWS lack a constitutive symmetry with human combatants, humans and AWS cannot coexist in warfare if they are to respect the existing international principles. After addressing foreseeable objections, including arguments for reducing deaths and the prohibition of other weapons, I conclude that a categorical ban of AWS remains a reasonable consideration. The benefit of this paper is that it avoids complex and hypothetical considerations of future developments of AWS capabilities. It also shows that if the moral underpinnings of jus in bello principles are respected, then categorically banning AWS from warfare is already an accepted position.

Public war and the requirement of legitimate authority

This paper offers a non-reductivist account of the requirement of legitimate authority in warfare (RLA). I first advance a distinction between private and public wars. A war is private where individuals defend their private rights with their private means. A war is public where it either aims to defend public rights (e.g., a people’s right to self-governance) or relies on public means (e.g., conscription and taxation). I argue that RLA applies to public war but not private war. A public war waged by a belligerent without legitimate authority involves a form of illegitimate domination of the people. Contra the conventional wisdom that RLA is only an ad bellum principle, I show that RLA is also a vital in bello principle. Relying on the Kantian non-voluntarist account of political authority, I argue that only legitimate states have the right to wage public wars. However, I also contend that RLA is not an absolute requirement, even regarding the justice of public war. Under extremely unfavorable conditions, this requirement may be overridden by weighty considerations in favor of resorting to public war without legitimate authority. In sum, my account of RLA protects ordinary people from illegitimate coercion involved in guerrilla warfare in general yet generates proper permission for responsible, aspiring state founders to secure social justice by coercive means under extraordinary situations.

Just and Unjust Proliferation

Political theorists had vigorous debates about nuclear weapons in the 1980s but have been largely silent about them recently. This article seeks to reopen those discussions. It evaluates the main justifications for nuclear proliferation since 1945: arguments from consistency, nationalism, democratic legitimacy, self-defense, peaceful effects, and supreme emergency. Most of these arguments are badly flawed, as are the arguments for retaining the nuclear arsenals of many of the established nuclear powers. Instead, this article proposes a first cut at a stringent standard for judging the acquisition of strategic nuclear weapons, drawing on jus ad bellum and jus in bello principles.

Tort Liability for Belligerent Wrongs

Abstract Most legal systems deny civilians a right to compensation for losses they sustain during belligerent activities. Arguments for recognising such a right are usually divorced, to various degrees, from the moral and legal underpinnings of the notion of inflicting a wrongful loss under either international humanitarian law or domestic tort law. My aim in this article is to advance a novel account of states’ tortious liability for belligerent wrongdoing, drawing on both international humanitarian law and corrective justice approaches to domestic tort law. Structuring my account on both frameworks, I argue that some of the losses that states inflict during war are private law wrongs that establish a claim of compensation in tort. Only in cases where the in bello principles are observed can losses to person and property be justified and non-wrongful. Otherwise, they constitute wrongs, which those who inflict them have duties of corrective justice to repair.

INTERVENSI KEMANUSIAAN NATO DI LIBYA : ANALISIS JUS IN BELLO

The Arab Spring is a term for the revolutions of countries in the Middle East. The Arab Spring has a purpose to overthrow a dictatorial government. The series of Arab Spring began with protest in Tunisia on December 18, 2010. This protest started with Mohamed Bouazizi, a Tunisian street vendor, who set himself on fire as a protest against corruption. The success of the protest in Tunisia gave a domino effect to the surrounding countries. The impact of the Arab Spring also occurred in Libya in 2011. Libyan leader, Muhammar al-Gaddafi who has been in power for 42 years, refused to resign. This triggered protest from the Libyan people. Civil war happened in Libya between the pro-Gaddafi group and the opposition. NATO conducted humanitarian intervention in Libya under the official UN mandate. This article provides a humanitarian intervention analysis conducted by NATO using just war theory, especially the principle of jus in bello. The purpose of this article is to find out whether the intervention was in accordance with the jus in bello principle or not. This article used the literature study method by collecting data related to NATO intervention in Libya. This article shows that there are crimes against humanity committed by NATO in Libya. But, NATO intervention in Libya can reach the goal if viewed with proportionality principle in jus in bello. Keywords: Libyan conflict, humanitarian intervention, jus in bello.

Ethiek voor Cyberkrijg en Cyberkrijgers

Abstract Ethics for Cyber War and Cyber Warriors Although some claim that the term cyber war is merely metaphorical, there are good reasons to see cyber war as a form of warfare – even if it is not war as we have hitherto known it. This poses the question whether the principles of the Just War Tradition, which claims to offer an alternative for pacifism and realism, apply to this specific kind of war too. This article argues that the jus in bello principles of discrimination and proportionality are applicable, and that actually applying them would limit the harm cyber-attacks currently cause. Most cyber-attacks of recent years wrongly target civilians, and this amounts to a serious breach of these principles. The final part of this article looks at those who actually conduct the cyber-attacks, the cyber soldiers – how do they fit into the military profession, and to what extent can we expect them to uphold the principles of Just War?

Corrective justice for the civilian victims of war: compensation and the right to life

The civilian right to life is a central concept in just war theory and international law. It plays an important role in restraining wars, as it is the basis for the principle of civilian immunity and the jus in bello principle of discrimination; yet, it is generally interpreted as only establishing a first-order duty, according to which belligerents must avoid harming civilians. In this essay, we argue that, in addition to this duty, the right to life also entails a second-order duty to compensate civilians whose right to life has been breached. We propose that states should have to pay compensatory damages to individual civilians harmed by their military actions and we discuss the standards of liability that can be used to determine when payment is owed.

Political Authority and Unjust Wars

Just war theory is currently dominated by two positions. According to the orthodox view (Walzer), provided that jus in bello principles are respected, combatants have an equal right to fight, regardless of the justice of the cause pursued by their state. According to “revisionists” (McMahan, Fabre) whenever combatants lack reasons to believe that the war they are ordered to fight is just, their duty is to disobey. I argue that when members of a legitimate state acting in good faith are ordered to fight, they acquire a pro‐tanto obligation to obey which does not depend for its validity on the justice of the cause being pursued. However, when the war is unjust, this obligation may be overridden, under certain conditions, by the obligation not to contribute to the unjustified killing of innocents. This is because (contra Raz) the pro‐tanto force of the duty to obey the law is best understood in terms of “presumptive”, rather than “exclusionary” reasons for action. This approach captures the insights of both the orthodox and the revisionist view, while avoiding the problems that afflict each of them.

The Language of War

INTRODUCTIONMichael Walzer begins his seminal Just and Unjust Wars with a linguistic claim: ordinary language use provides evidence about the nature of war.1 This paper explores this claim and the linguistic method as applied to just war theory.I begin with Walzer's central thesis about the language of war, which I call the Adjectival-Adverbial Distinction or the A-A Distinction. This is a two-part claim. Roughly, Walzer first claims that ordinary language distinguishes between adjectival and adverbial claims about just war. Specifically, adjectival uses indicate jus ad bellum considerations, while adverbial uses indicate jus in bello considerations: for instance, ?that was a just declaration of war' versus ?that war was fought justly.' The second part of Walzer's claim is that this language use indicates a deep distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello.In the first section of the paper I attack Walzer's A-A distinction; I argue there is no tight or deep connection between adjectival usage and jus ad bellum considerations and adverbial usage and jus in bello considerations. I begin by arguing that Walzer's own use of war language does not indicate any rigid connection between adjectival jus ad bellum and adverbial jus in bello. I then argue that any adjectival jus ad bellum claim can be redescribed as adverbial and any adverbial jus in bello claim can be redescribed as adjectival.From this first section I conclude that ordinary language use does not support the A-A distinction; as an empirical fact about language use, it appears adjectival and adverbial use does not track a distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello. In the second section of the paper, I argue for a different usage pattern that tracks the seeming distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello: the former involves primarily considerations about the decisions and actions of groups or individuals of greater status (e.g., President, Legislature, Country), while the latter involves primarily considerations about decisions and actions of groups or individuals of lesser status (e.g., soldiers). I argue ordinary language use provides evidence for this ?Hierarchical Distinction.'In the third section I argue that the Hierarchical Distinction suggests a theoretical distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello. On this account, jus ad bellum acts and decisions have a positive role; they change the sociopolitical status from peace to war (and perhaps into even more finely individuated event types). Jus in bello acts and decisions, on the other hand, are framed by the event status that is first determined by jus ad bellum acts and decisions. I also argue that although the A-A Distinction is false in practice (actual language use does not support it), this proposed conception of just war theory makes sense of why some think the A-A Distinction should apply: we tend to think of jus ad bellum in static terms, best described adjectivally, while we tend to think of jus in bello in dynamic terms, best described adverbially.These conclusions imply that the positive power of jus ad bellum acts is fundamental to the ethics of war, and I conclude by arguing for a jus ad bellum requirement of declaration of war. The results of the previous sections imply that jus ad bellum involves an implicit or explicit status-articulation. I argue that declaring war is a paradigm performative speech act: one which itself can change the social-political landscape and ethical considerations of war and one that ought to accompany any jus ad bellum decision to enter war.I. THE ADJECTIVAL-ADVERBIAL (A-A) DISTINCTIONEarly in Just and Unjust Wars, Michael Walzer claims that a feature of ordinary language use maps onto a deep distinction about the nature of war. Specifically, Walzer claims that our linguistic expressions of jus ad bellum (right of war) principles are adjectival in character. On the other hand, our linguistic expressions of jus in bello (right in war) principles are adverbial in character:The first kind of judgment is adjectival in character: we say that a particular war is just or unjust. …

Just war theory and private security companies

This article examines the ethics of using private security companies to undertake combat operations in modern conflict zones. Previous studies on this topic, including those that have drawn on the principles of just war theory, have, out of necessity, been highly speculative because they lacked a strong empirical basis on which to evaluate the behaviour of private security personnel during their operations. Indeed, most scholarship on the ethics of private security companies has relied on a handful of anecdotal examples that happened to receive extensive media coverage. In contrast, this article undertakes the first quantitative analysis of how well the employees of a dozen private security companies adhered to the jus in bello tenets of just war theory and also how their degree of adherence to these tenets affected their tendency to suffer friendly casualties during their security operations in Iraq. It finds that the employees of most of the firms under study exhibited a moderate or high level of adherence to the jus in bello principles of proportionality and discrimination during their security operations in Iraq. Moreover, it also finds that close adherence to these principles did not necessarily expose private security personnel to greater risk of suffering harm

Competence and Just War

This article argues that the Just War tradition would do well to consider the importance of competence – and that doing so would invigorate debates about the use of organized violence. The article defends this argument through several moves. First, inspired by Aristotle’s thoughts on phronesis and chance, we view competence as a practice among those who, as a matter of course, engage in practical reasoning that takes into account the contingency of political action. Second, following from Arendt, competence can be considered that which foregrounds means over ends. Third, because competence is a continuous and more vigilant consideration of justice within war, it extends through both jus ad bellum and jus in bello principles, including the ‘proper authority’ and ‘reasonable chance for success’ conditions of the former, and the ‘double effect’ doctrine discussed in the latter. The article concludes by acknowledging the challenges presented by an overemphasis on competence, before ultimately restating its purchase for Just War debates in the twenty-first century.

Rethinking the Criterion for Assessing Cia-targeted Killings: Drones, Proportionality and Jus Ad Vim

According to US government statements, drones succeed in killing terrorists while minimizing the risk to noncombatants, thus suggesting that they satisfy the jus in bello proportionality criterion. Scholars, however, are divided on whether drones are truly proportionate. What does it really mean to say drones are, or are not, proportionate? How are we to judge the proportionality of the CIA's drone program? We expose the fallacy of drone proponents who claim they are proportionate by repudiating what we call proportionality relativism – the use of impertinent comparisons to argue that drones are proportionate because they cause less collateral damage than other uses of force. We then analyze the existing data on drone strikes to expose problematic differences in how the US military and the CIA understand proportionality balancing. Finally, we employ what Walzer calls the category of jus ad vim – the just use of force short of war – to assess the ethics of drones. Jus ad vim demands a stricter relationship between the use of force short of war and the jus in bello principles of proportionality and discrimination, as well as human rights concerns of civilians not usually considered in the proportionality calculus, that severely restricts the scope of proportionality balancing. Assessing the CIA's use of drones in Pakistan according to this standard casts a dark shadow on claims that CIA drones are proportional.

JUST WAR, NONCOMBATANT IMMUNITY, AND THE CONCEPT OF SUPREME EMERGENCY

The supreme emergency exemption proposed by Michael Walzer has engendered controversy because it permits violations of the jus in bello principle of discrimination when a state is faced with imminent defeat at the hands of a very evil enemy. Traditionalists among just war theorists believe that noncombatants should never be deliberately targeted in war whether or not there is a supreme emergency. Pacifists, on the other hand, reject war as immoral even in a supreme emergency. Unlike Walzer, neither just war traditionalists nor pacifists make a special case for supreme emergencies. In this paper, I borrow Walzer's concept to provide support for a different ethics of war that limits war to supreme emergencies. In non-supreme emergency situations, I agree with pacifists in rejecting war even if just war requirements are satisfied. But in supreme emergencies, I agree with just war traditionalists that war can be legitimately fought provided that moral constraints that protect noncombatants are respected.