The Language of War

Abstract

INTRODUCTIONMichael Walzer begins his seminal Just and Unjust Wars with a linguistic claim: ordinary language use provides evidence about the nature of war.1 This paper explores this claim and the linguistic method as applied to just war theory.I begin with Walzer's central thesis about the language of war, which I call the Adjectival-Adverbial Distinction or the A-A Distinction. This is a two-part claim. Roughly, Walzer first claims that ordinary language distinguishes between adjectival and adverbial claims about just war. Specifically, adjectival uses indicate jus ad bellum considerations, while adverbial uses indicate jus in bello considerations: for instance, ?that was a just declaration of war' versus ?that war was fought justly.' The second part of Walzer's claim is that this language use indicates a deep distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello.In the first section of the paper I attack Walzer's A-A distinction; I argue there is no tight or deep connection between adjectival usage and jus ad bellum considerations and adverbial usage and jus in bello considerations. I begin by arguing that Walzer's own use of war language does not indicate any rigid connection between adjectival jus ad bellum and adverbial jus in bello. I then argue that any adjectival jus ad bellum claim can be redescribed as adverbial and any adverbial jus in bello claim can be redescribed as adjectival.From this first section I conclude that ordinary language use does not support the A-A distinction; as an empirical fact about language use, it appears adjectival and adverbial use does not track a distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello. In the second section of the paper, I argue for a different usage pattern that tracks the seeming distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello: the former involves primarily considerations about the decisions and actions of groups or individuals of greater status (e.g., President, Legislature, Country), while the latter involves primarily considerations about decisions and actions of groups or individuals of lesser status (e.g., soldiers). I argue ordinary language use provides evidence for this ?Hierarchical Distinction.'In the third section I argue that the Hierarchical Distinction suggests a theoretical distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello. On this account, jus ad bellum acts and decisions have a positive role; they change the sociopolitical status from peace to war (and perhaps into even more finely individuated event types). Jus in bello acts and decisions, on the other hand, are framed by the event status that is first determined by jus ad bellum acts and decisions. I also argue that although the A-A Distinction is false in practice (actual language use does not support it), this proposed conception of just war theory makes sense of why some think the A-A Distinction should apply: we tend to think of jus ad bellum in static terms, best described adjectivally, while we tend to think of jus in bello in dynamic terms, best described adverbially.These conclusions imply that the positive power of jus ad bellum acts is fundamental to the ethics of war, and I conclude by arguing for a jus ad bellum requirement of declaration of war. The results of the previous sections imply that jus ad bellum involves an implicit or explicit status-articulation. I argue that declaring war is a paradigm performative speech act: one which itself can change the social-political landscape and ethical considerations of war and one that ought to accompany any jus ad bellum decision to enter war.I. THE ADJECTIVAL-ADVERBIAL (A-A) DISTINCTIONEarly in Just and Unjust Wars, Michael Walzer claims that a feature of ordinary language use maps onto a deep distinction about the nature of war. Specifically, Walzer claims that our linguistic expressions of jus ad bellum (right of war) principles are adjectival in character. On the other hand, our linguistic expressions of jus in bello (right in war) principles are adverbial in character:The first kind of judgment is adjectival in character: we say that a particular war is just or unjust. …