Belief Change Operators Research Articles

BeliefFlow: A Framework for Logic-Based Belief Diffusion via Iterated Belief Change

This paper presents BeliefFlow, a novel framework for representing how logical beliefs spread among interacting agents within a network. In a Belief Flow Network (BFN), agents communicate asynchronously. The agents' beliefs are represented using epistemic states, which encompass their current beliefs and conditional beliefs guiding future changes. When communication occurs between two connected agents, the receiving agent changes its epistemic state using an improvement operator, a well-known type of rational iterated belief change operator that generalizes belief revision operators. We show that BFNs satisfy appealing properties, leading to two significant outcomes. First, in any BFN with strong network connectivity, the beliefs of all agents converge towards a global consensus. Second, within any BFN, we show that it is possible to compute an optimal strategy for influencing the global beliefs. This strategy, which involves controlling the beliefs of a least number of agents through bribery, can be identified from the topology of the network and can be computed in polynomial time.

Relevance, recovery and recuperation: A prelude to ring withdrawal

In this paper, we introduce recuperative withdrawals, belief change operators that satisfy recuperation, a postulate weaker than recovery, all the AGM postulates for contraction except recovery and another postulate which is a slightly stronger condition than conjunctive inclusion. Furthermore, we present a constructive definition for a class of operators —named ring withdrawals— which are such that the outcome of a ring withdrawal of a belief set K by a sentence α is obtained by adding to the set of most plausible models ‖K‖ all the worlds which are as close to ‖K‖ as its closest ¬α-worlds. Ring withdrawals satisfy the Lindström and Rabinowicz's interpolation thesis. We show that the classes of recuperative withdrawals and of ring withdrawals are identical. Additionally we show that the class of ring withdrawals is not contained in and does not contain the class of AGM contractions or the class of severe withdrawals. Finally we present methods for defining an operator of ring withdrawal by means of a severe withdrawal operator and by means of an AGM contraction operator, and vice-versa.

Finite Based Contraction and Expansion via Models

We propose a new paradigm for Belief Change in which the new information is represented as sets of models, while the agent's body of knowledge is represented as a finite set of formulae, that is, a finite base. The focus on finiteness is crucial when we consider limited agents and reasoning algorithms. Moreover, having the input as arbitrary set of models is more general than the usual treatment of formulas as input. In this setting, we define new Belief Change operations akin to traditional expansion and contraction, and we identify the rationality postulates that emerge due to the finite representability requirement. We also analyse different logics concerning compatibility with our framework.

Mixed Iterated Revisions: Rationale, Algorithms, and Complexity

Several forms of iterable belief change exist, differing in the kind of change and its strength: some operators introduce formulae, others remove them; some add formulae unconditionally, others only as additions to the previous beliefs; some only relative to the current situation, others in all possible cases. A sequence of changes may involve several of them: for example, the first step is a revision, the second a contraction and the third a refinement of the previous beliefs. The ten operators considered in this article are shown to be all reducible to three: lexicographic revision, refinement, and severe withdrawal. In turn, these three can be expressed in terms of lexicographic revision at the cost of restructuring the sequence. This restructuring needs not to be done explicitly: an algorithm that works on the original sequence is shown. The complexity of mixed sequences of belief change operators is also analyzed. Most of them require only a polynomial number of calls to a satisfiability checker, some are even easier.

Four Approaches to Supposition

Suppositions can be introduced in either the indicative or subjunctive mood. There are also two types of judgments that may be initiated by suppositions of either sort: qualitative (binary) judgments and quantitative (numerical) ones. The former are judgments about whether a given proposition is acceptable and the latter are about how acceptable it is. We systematically explicate the relationships between canonical representatives of each of the four available types of theories. For the qualitative accounts, our representative theories of indicative and subjunctive supposition are based on the belief change operations given by AGM revision and KM update respectively; for the quantitative ones, we consider those given by conditionalization and imaging. This choice is motivated by the familiar approach of understanding supposition as ‘provisional belief revision’ wherein one temporarily treats the supposition as true and forms judgments by making appropriate changes to their other opinions. To compare the numerical judgments recommended by the quantitative theories with the binary ones recommended by the qualitative accounts, we appeal to a suitably adapted version of the Lockean thesis. Ultimately, we establish a number of new results that we interpret as vindicating the often-repeated claim that conditionalization is a probabilistic version of revision, while imaging is a probabilistic version of update.

An Axiomatic Approach to Revising Preferences

We study a model of preference revision in which a prior preference over a set of alternatives is adjusted in order to accommodate input from an authoritative source, while maintaining certain structural constraints (e.g., transitivity, completeness), and without giving up more information than strictly necessary. We analyze this model under two aspects: the first allows us to capture natural distance-based operators, at the cost of a mismatch between the input and output formats of the revision operator. Requiring the input and output to be aligned yields a second type of operator, which we characterize using preferences on the comparisons in the prior preference Prefence revision is set in a logic-based framework and using the formal machinery of belief change, along the lines of the well-known AGM approach: we propose rationality postulates for each of the two versions of our model and derive representation results, thus situating preference revision within the larger family of belief change operators.

Belief contraction and erasure in fragments of propositional logic

Abstract Recently, belief change within the framework of fragments of propositional logic has gained attention. In the context of revision, it has been proposed to refine existing operators so that they operate within propositional fragments and that the result of revision remains in the fragment under consideration. Later, this notion of refinement was generalized to belief change operators. Whereas refinement allowed one to define concrete rational operators adapted to propositional fragments in the context of revision and update, it has to be specified for contraction and erasure. We propose a specific notion of refinement for contraction and erasure operators, called reasonable refinement. This allows us to provide refined contraction and erasure operators that satisfy the basic postulates. We study the logical properties of reasonable refinement of two model-based contraction operators and two model-based erasure operators. Our approach is not limited to the Horn fragment but applicable to many fragments of propositional logic, like Krom and affine fragments.

Relevance in Belief Update

It has been pointed out by Katsuno and Mendelzon that the so-called AGM revision operators, defined by Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson, do not behave well in dynamically-changing applications. On that premise, Katsuno and Mendelzon formally characterized a different type of belief-change operators, typically referred to as KM update operators, which, to this date, constitute a benchmark in belief update. In this article, we show that there exist KM update operators that yield the same counter-intuitive results as any AGM revision operator. Against this non-satisfactory background, we prove that a translation of Parikh’s relevance-sensitive axiom (P), in the realm of belief update, suffices to block this liberal behaviour of KM update operators. It is shown, both axiomatically and semantically, that axiom (P) for belief update, essentially, encodes a type of relevance that acts at the possible-worlds level, in the context of which each possible world is locally modified, in the light of new information. Interestingly, relevance at the possible-worlds level is shown to be equivalent to a form of relevance that acts at the sentential level, by considering the building blocks of relevance to be the sentences of the language. Furthermore, we concretely demonstrate that Parikh’s notion of relevance in belief update can be regarded as (at least a partial) solution to the frame, ramification and qualification problems, encountered in dynamically-changing worlds. Last but not least, a whole new class of well-behaved, relevance-sensitive KM update operators is introduced, which generalize Forbus’ update operator and are perfectly-suited for real-world implementations.

Belief base change as priority change: A study based on dynamic epistemic logic

AGM's belief revision is one of the main paradigms in the study of belief change operations. In this context, belief bases (prioritised bases) have been primarily used to specify the agent's belief state. While the connection of iterated AGM-like operations and their encoding in dynamic epistemic logics have been studied before, few works considered how well-known postulates from iterated belief revision theory can be characterised by means of belief bases. Particularly, it has been shown that some postulates can be characterised through transformations in priority graphs, while others may not be represented that way. This work investigates the expressive power of prioritized bases, employing priority graphs as a representation for an agent's belief state and of transformations on such bases as representations for iterated relational belief change operators. As such, we propose a new representation for an agent's belief state, which we show can be used to characterize different iterated belief change postulates not previously representable using transformations on priority graphs.

Dynamic Preference Logic meets iterated belief change: Representation results and postulates characterization

AGM's belief revision is one of the main paradigms in the study of belief change operations. Recently, several logics for belief and information change have been proposed in the literature and used to encode belief change operations in rich and expressive semantic frameworks. While the connections of AGM-like operations and their encoding in dynamic doxastic logics have been studied before by the work of Segerberg, most works on the area of Dynamic Epistemic Logics (DEL) have not, to our knowledge, attempted to use those logics as tools to investigate mathematical properties of belief change operators. This work investigates how Dynamic Preference Logic, a logic in the DEL family, can be used to study properties of dynamic belief change operators, focusing on well-known postulates of iterated belief change.

Belief change and 3-valued logics: Characterization of 19,683 belief change operators

In this work we introduce a 3-valued logic with modalities, with the aim of having a clear and precise representation of epistemic states, thus the formulas of this logic will be our epistemic states. Indeed, these formulas are identified with ranking functions of 3 values, a generalization of total preorders of three levels. In this framework we analyze some types of changes of these epistemic structures and give syntactical characterizations of them in the introduced logic. In particular, we introduce and study carefully a new operator called Cautious Improvement operator. We also characterize all operators that are definable in this framework.

Iterated Belief Base Revision: A Dynamic Epistemic Logic Approach

AGM’s belief revision is one of the main paradigms in the study of belief change operations. In this context, belief bases (prioritised bases) have been largely used to specify the agent’s belief state - whether representing the agent’s ‘explicit beliefs’ or as a computational model for her belief state. While the connection of iterated AGM-like operations and their encoding in dynamic epistemic logics have been studied before, few works considered how well-known postulates from iterated belief revision theory can be characterised by means of belief bases and their counterpart in dynamic epistemic logic. This work investigates how priority graphs, a syntactic representation of preference relations deeply connected to prioritised bases, can be used to characterise belief change operators, focusing on well-known postulates of Iterated Belief Change. We provide syntactic representations of belief change operators in a dynamic context, as well as new negative results regarding the possibility of representing an iterated belief revision operation using transformations on priority graphs.

Syntax-Preserving Belief Change Operators for Logic Programs

Recent methods have adapted the well-established AGM and belief base frameworks for belief change to cover belief revision in logic programs. In this study here, we present two new sets of belief change operators for logic programs. They focus on preserving the explicit relationships expressed in the rules of a program, a feature that is missing in purely semantic approaches that consider programs only in their entirety. In particular, operators of the latter class fail to satisfy preservation and support, two important properties for belief change in logic programs required to ensure intuitive results. We address this shortcoming of existing approaches by introducing partial meet and ensconcement constructions for logic program belief change, which allow us to define syntax-preserving operators for satisfying preservation and support. Our work is novel in that our constructions not only preserve more information from a logic program during a change operation than existing ones, but they also facilitate natural definitions of contraction operators, the first in the field to the best of our knowledge. To evaluate the rationality of our operators, we translate the revision and contraction postulates from the AGM and belief base frameworks to the logic programming setting. We show that our operators fully comply with the belief base framework and formally state the interdefinability between our operators. We further compare our approach to two state-of-the-art logic program revision methods and demonstrate that our operators address the shortcomings of one and generalise the other method.

Belief Update within Propositional Fragments

Belief change within the framework of fragments of propositional logic is one of the main and recent challenges in the knowledge representation research area. While previous research works focused on belief revision, belief merging, and belief contraction, the problem of belief update within fragments of classical logic has not been addressed so far. In the context of revision, it has been proposed to refine existing operators so that they operate within propositional fragments, and that the result of revision remains in the fragment under consideration. This approach is not restricted to the Horn fragment but also applicable to other propositional fragments like Krom and affine fragments. We generalize this notion of refinement to any belief change operator. We then focus on a specific belief change operation, namely belief update. We investigate the behavior of the refined update operators with respect to satisfaction of the KM postulates and highlight differences between revision and update in this context.

A Knowledge Level Account of Forgetting

Forgetting is an operation on knowledge bases that has been addressed in different areas of Knowledge Representation and with respect to different formalisms, including classical propositional and first-order logic, modal logics, logic programming, and description logics. Definitions of forgetting have been expressed in terms of manipulation of formulas, sets of postulates, isomorphisms between models, bisimulations, second-order quantification, elementary equivalence, and others. In this paper, forgetting is regarded as an abstract belief change operator, independent of the underlying logic. The central thesis is that forgetting amounts to a reduction in the language, specifically the signature, of a logic. The main definition is simple: the result of forgetting a portion of a signature in a theory is given by the set of logical consequences of this theory over the reduced language. This definition offers several advantages. Foremost, it provides a uniform approach to forgetting, with a definition that is applicable to any logic with a well-defined consequence relation. Hence it generalises a disparate set of logic-specific definitions with a general, high-level definition. Results obtained in this approach are thus applicable to all subsumed formal systems, and many results are obtained much more straightforwardly. This view also leads to insights with respect to specific logics: for example, forgetting in first-order logic is somewhat different from the accepted approach. Moreover, the approach clarifies the relation between forgetting and related operations, including belief contraction.

An extension-based approach to belief revision in abstract argumentation

Argumentation is an inherently dynamic process, and recent years have witnessed tremendous research efforts towards an understanding of how the seminal AGM theory of belief change can be applied to argumentation, in particular to Dung's abstract argumentation frameworks (AFs). However, none of the attempts have yet succeeded in solving the natural situation where the revision of an AF is guaranteed to be representable by a single AF. Here we present a solution to this problem, which applies to many prominent argumentation semantics. To prove a full representation theorem, we make use of recent advances in both areas of argumentation and belief change. In particular, we use the concept of realizability in argumentation and the concept of compliance as introduced in Horn revision. We also present a family of concrete belief change operators tailored specifically for AFs and analyze their computational complexity.

Kernel Contraction and Base Dependence

The AGM paradigm of belief change studies the dynamics of belief states in light of new information. Finding, or even approximating, those beliefs that are dependent on or relevant to a change is valuable because, for example, it can narrow the set of beliefs considered during belief change operations. A strong intuition in this area is captured by Gärdenfors’s preservation criterion (GPC), which suggests that formulas independent of a belief change should remain intact. GPC thus allows one to build dependence relations that are linked with belief change. Such dependence relations can in turn be used as a theoretical benchmark against which to evaluate other approximate dependence or relevance relations. Fariñas and Herzig axiomatize a dependence relation with respect to a belief set, and, based on GPC, they characterize the correspondence between AGM contraction functions and dependence relations. In this paper, we introduce base dependence as a relation between formulas with respect to a belief base, and prove a more general characterization that shows the correspondence between kernel contraction and base dependence. At this level of generalization, different types of base dependence emerge, which we show to be a result of possible redundancy in the belief base. We further show that one of these relations that emerge, strong base dependence, is parallel to saturated kernel contraction. We then prove that our latter characterization is a reversible generalization of Fariñas and Herzig’s characterization. That is, in the special case when the underlying belief base is deductively closed (i.e., it is a belief set), strong base dependence reduces to dependence, and so do their respective characterizations. Finally, an intriguing feature of Fariñas and Herzig’s formalism is that it meets other criteria for dependence, namely, Keynes’s conjunction criterion for dependence (CCD) and Gärdenfors’s conjunction criterion for independence (CCI). We prove that our base dependence formalism also meets these criteria. Even more interestingly, we offer a more specific criterion that implies both CCD and CCI, and show our base dependence formalism also meets this new criterion.

Liar liar, pants on fire; or how to use subjective logic and argumentation to evaluate information from untrustworthy sources

This paper presents a non-prioritized belief change operator, designed specifically for incorporating new information from many heterogeneous sources in an uncertain environment. We take into account that sources may be untrustworthy and provide a principled method for dealing with the reception of contradictory information. We specify a novel Data-Oriented Belief Revision Operator, that uses a trust model, subjective logic, and a preference-based argumentation framework to evaluate novel information and change the agent’s belief set accordingly. We apply this belief change operator in a collaborative traffic scenario, where we show that (1) some form of trust-based non-prioritized belief change operator is necessary, and (2) in a direct comparison between our operator and a previous proposition, our operator performs at least as well in all scenarios, and significantly better in some.

A belief revision approach for argumentation-based negotiation agents

Abstract Negotiation is an interaction that happens in multi-agent systems when agents have conflicting objectives and must look for an acceptable agreement. A typical negotiating situation involves two agents that cannot reach their goals by themselves because they do not have some resources they need or they do not know how to use them to reach their goals. Therefore, they must start a negotiation dialogue, taking also into account that they might have incomplete or wrong beliefs about the other agent’s goals and resources. This article presents a negotiating agent model based on argumentation, which is used by the agents to reason on how to exchange resources and knowledge in order to achieve their goals. Agents that negotiate have incomplete beliefs about the others, so that the exchange of arguments gives them information that makes it possible to update their beliefs. In order to formalize their proposals in a negotiation setting, the agents must be able to generate, select and evaluate arguments associated with such offers, updating their mental state accordingly. In our approach, we will focus on an argumentation-based negotiation model between two cooperative agents. The arguments generation and interpretation process is based on belief change operations (expansions, contractions and revisions), and the selection process is a based on a strategy. This approach is presented through a high-level algorithm implemented in logic programming. We show various theoretical properties associated with this approach, which have been formalized and proved using Coq, a formal proof management system. We also illustrate, through a case study, the applicability of our approach in order to solve a slightly modified version of the well-known home improvement agents problem. Moreover, we present various simulations that allow assessing the impact of belief revision on the negotiation process.

How to make up one's mind

The operation of making up one's mind about a sentence phi is a belief change operation that takes the agent to a belief state in which either phi or phi is believed. Apart from being practically important, this operation is technically interesting since the standard approach of intersecting a set of optimal outcomes is not workable. A construction based on descriptor revision is provided in which the operation can be modelled. This construction is axiomatically characterized with a set of plausible postulates, and additional postulates that correlate with properties of the construction are investigated.