Behavioral Remediation Research Articles

Breaking Up Big Tech: Separation of its Data, Cloud and Intelligence Layers

Big Tech is seen to have become too powerful, and causing many economic, social and political problems. But there still has hardly been any real challenge to its apparently unstoppable march. Piecemeal efforts – from huge fines and sanctions to disallowing platforms from competing with dependent businesses – have failed to make any significant dent on the dominant digital economy model, which is getting entrenched as the ‘new normal’. The problem here may be that the regulators are trying industrial era remedies on digital age problems. Digital economy paradigm must be understood in its significant discontinuities with the industrial age. Regulation of digital economy needs to focus on the central role of data and data-derived intelligence. Competition regulators either ignore these key factors, or simply take a superficial view. A relatively better understanding about them is developing in the somewhat distant realm of technology governance; with its new focus on data sharing, data infrastructures, cloud neutrality, open digital ecosystems, domestic AI competencies, and public interest AI. Technology governance, however, normally does not have the enforcement teeth of competition regulators. Bringing together these two governance or regulatory traditions – about competition and technology, the paper proposes a composite new regulatory framework for the digital economy. Digital ecosystems are presented as the key new structural feature of the digital economy, increasingly superseding IP firms led industrial value chains. The focus is then drawn on the effective economic governance of data, cloud computing and AI – the building blocks of these digital ecosystems. Considering data and cloud computing as infrastructural elements, with open and equitable access for digital businesses, will ensure the greatest digital productivity. AI based global power concentration can be addressed by models that adequately distribute society’s digital intelligence in space and ownership. While behavioural remedies have their role, the paper also presents a regulatory ideal-type of structural separations between the four key functional layers of digital value chains; data layer, cloud computing layer, intelligence layer and consumer facing intelligent services layer. The paper concludes that any successful regulation of the digital economy will require a new legislation and a separate digital economy regulator.

Unfair Pricing and Standard Essential Patents

Technical standards that are agreed within a Standard Development Organization (SDO) often cover several ‘essential’ patents for the implementation of a standard (i.e., Standard Essential Patents, SEPs). In order to allow for the standard implementation, the SEP holder commits to license its patents to any potential licensee on the basis of Fair and Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) conditions. In view of the recent ruling of the UK Supreme Court in Unwired Planet and the judgement of the German Bundesgerichtshof in Sisvel v. Haier, the paper assumes that the FRAND commitment implies a ‘range’ rather than a ‘single’ royalty rate. On the other hand, a royalty rate ‘beyond the outer boundary of the range’ should be considered ‘unfair’, and thus incompatible with the FRAND commitment. Besides representing a breach of the FRAND commitment, an ‘unfair’ royalty rate might also be considered an abuse of a dominant position by the SEP holder, in breach of Art. 102(a) TFEU. This paper analyses whether, and under what circumstances, Art. 102(a) TFEU can be relied upon by a competition authority in Europe to sanction a case where an ‘unfair’ royalty rate has been set by the SEP holder. To this regard, the paper provides a detailed analysis of the EU Court of Justice’s jurisprudence on Art. 102(a) TFEU. In particular, the latter jurisprudence is relied as a ‘yardstick’ to assess ‘when’ competition policy should sanction a request of unfair royalty rate by the SEP holder, ‘how’ a competition agency should assess the case and, eventually, ‘what’ remedies the competition authority might adopt. Economists have elaborated a number of ‘filters’ to define ‘when’ EU competition policy should sanction unfair pricing cases. In particular, antitrust intervention would be justified only in markets that are characterized by high and stable entry barriers, in which a firm enjoys a super-dominant position. Due to the phenomenon of over-declaration, not every SEP is indeed ‘essential’; the market power of the SEP holder thus requires a case-by-case analysis of the ‘essentiality’ of every SEP. A number of authors have also argued that excessive pricing cases should not be sanctioned in industries characterized by dynamic efficiencies. The paper argues that innovation considerations could be considered as efficiency defences in the context of antitrust investigations, rather than in excluding a priori competition policy enforcement in this field. The paper argues that a competition agency should rely on the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on Art. 102(a) TFEU to analyse a case of unfair royalty rate. In particular, United Brands cost/price test is not suitable for assessing an unfair royalty rate requested by the SEP holder, since it is de facto impossible to determine the ‘costs of production’ of individual SEPs. On the other hand, in accordance with the CJEU case law, the competition agency might rely on a number of benchmark methods with which to assess the alleged unfairness of the rate. In particular, the agency should verify its findings under multiple benchmark tests, in order to minimize the risk of false negative errors. Finally, the SEP holder could argue that the requested royalty rate is justified by its past R&D investments. In terms of remedies, the paper argues that a competition agency could require the SEP holder to license its ‘essential’ patent; such behavioral remedy is well established in the practice of the European Commission. In light of the recent Broadcom interim decision, if the competition authority was confident about its preliminary findings of unfair pricing, the agency might require the SEP holder to license its ‘essential’ patents via an interim decision; the scope, duration and exact obligations of such a duty would later be refined in the final commitment decision.

Exploitative Conducts in Digital Markets: Time for a Discussion after the Facebook Decision

- The recent interim ruling of the Dusseldorf Higher Regional Court in the Facebook case shows the difficulties that a competition authority might face when it comes to sanctioning exploitative abuses in digital markets. - Rather than adopting infringement decisions, competition agencies should conclude behavioural commitments with the dominant online platform. - Competition authorities may borrow from the European data protection regime a number of behavioural remedies to tackle forms of privacy degradation unilaterally imposed by online platforms.

Remediating Cognitive Impairments in Dementia of Alzheimer's Type Through Concurrent Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation and Cognitive Training: A Case Report

Objectives: Dementia of Alzheimer Type (DAT) is associated with progressive cognitive impairments. Such a clinically significant condition is known to affect approximately 9.5% of people over 70 years of age. However, it is accepted as a more challengeable medical entity because of its increasing atypical presentation, rarity of efficient treatments, and diagnostic and prevention challenges. Materials & Methods: we present a case who referred with 5 months history of cognitive decline following Medial Temporal Lobe (MTL) atrophy upon neuroimaging. Following cognitive and neurophysiological assessments, she underwent 21 consecutive sessions of transcranial Direct Current Stimulation (tDCS) 3 times per week. Concurrently, a media-rich computer platform was administered for cognitive and behavioral remediation. Results: Based on the evidence regarding the use of tDCS in dementia, we aimed at stabilizing the cognitive profile and halting or slowing down the process of progressive cognitive decline in the present case. The outcome of our neuromodulatory intervention using tDCS supported the beneficial impact of such an approach in not only stabilizing but also ameliorating cognitive functions. This is especially important when rapid progression of cognitive symptoms in DAT is of concern. Conclusion: The promising clinical course of this specific case supports the possible beneficial effects of tDCS in halting the progression of symptoms in DAT. Sham-controlled clinical trials would get momentum to highlight clinical impact of such an intervention in DAT.

Exploitative Conducts in Digital Markets: Time for a Discussion after the Facebook Decision

- The recent interim ruling of the Dusseldorf Higher Regional Court in the Facebook case shows the difficulties that a competition authority might face when it comes to sanctioning exploitative abuses in digital markets. - Rather than adopting infringement decisions, competition agencies should conclude behavioural commitments with the dominant online platform. - Competition authorities may borrow from the European data protection regime a number of behavioural remedies to tackle forms of privacy degradation unilaterally imposed by online platforms.

On the Consistency of the European Commission’s Remedies Practice

The European Commission’s remedial practice displays important differences in the type of remedies accepted in merger versus antitrust cases. This paper provides a review of the Commission’s remedies practice over the last 14 years highlighting the differences and discussing inconsistencies. In particular, it raises the question why predominantly behavioural remedies are chosen in antitrust cases and how this practice is in line with the approach in merger control where the risks to effective competition are viewed as deriving from changes in the structure of the market and where therefore structural remedies are typically considered necessary.

Challenges and Prospects for Merger Control in China in the Digital Economy

Internet brings not only efficiency and convenience, but also challenges to competition authorities all over the world. In obvious contrast to vibrant concentrations in the digital economy in China, the Chinese competition authority has only officially reviewed few cases, due to the variable interest entity structure, incompetence of the turnover-based notification threshold, and lack of experiences in solving new competition concerns brought by access to certain data set, privacy protection, innovation competition and leveraging effect. With establishment of the State Administration for Market Regulation, due attention has been and will continue to be paid to specific characteristics of digital economy from perspectives of both legislation and enforcement. Whether the SAMR would keep open to behavioral remedies deserves further observations. In order to facilitate the SAMR applying anti-monopoly laws and regulations to concentrations in the digital economy more properly and efficiently, the authors of this paper would suggest empowering qualified local competition agencies to review certain concentrations, amending anti-monopoly rules, strengthening knowledge management, establishing independent technical expert group and maintaining international communications.

Impact of cognitive behavioral remediation program for children with academic dishonest behaviors at preparatory school in Assiut city

Impact of cognitive behavioral remediation program for children with academic dishonest behaviors at preparatory school in Assiut city

The Impact of Behavioral and Structural Remedies on Electricity Prices: The Case of the England and Wales Electricity Market

During the liberalization process the UK regulatory authority introduced a behavioral remedy (through price-cap regulation) and structural remedy (through divestment series) in order to mitigate an exercise of market power and lower the influence of incumbent producers on wholesale electricity prices. We study the impact of these remedies on the dynamics of the wholesale electricity price during the peak-demand period over trading days. An extended autoregressive and autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (AR–ARCH) model with a novel skew generalized error distribution is used. This distribution allows one to capture the features of asymmetry, excess kurtosis, and heavy tails. The model is extended to include individual incumbent producers’ market shares and other explanatory variables reflecting seasonal patterns and regulatory regimes. We find that the structural remedy was more successful than the behavioral remedy because the effect of market share of the previously larger incumbent producer on the wholesale price is statistically insignificant. Moreover, after the second series of divestments, price volatility reduced.

Antitrust Analysis of Vertical Mergers: Recent Developments and Economic Teachings

The generally well-accepted belief motivating modern antitrust analysis of vertical mergers — i.e., acquisitions that combine companies in different levels of the same supply chain — is that they are generally procompetitive or neutral. That belief is based upon a significant body of empirical evidence. Indeed, as former U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Bureau of Economics head Francine Lafontaine and Margaret Slade concluded, “[c]onsistent with the large set of efficiency motives for vertical mergers . . . the [empirical] evidence on the consequences of vertical mergers suggests that consumers mostly benefit from mergers that firms undertake voluntarily.” That view of the empirical evidence is consistent with other meta-studies of the empirical evidence by leading industrial organization economists from academia and the U.S. antitrust agencies. Consistent with this evidence, the U.S. antitrust agencies typically have rarely challenged vertical mergers. When they have challenged vertical mergers, they have tended to resolve concerns with narrowly tailored behavioral remedies, such as firewalls to prevent the sharing of rivals’ competitively sensitive information, non-discrimination clauses to eliminate incentives to disfavor rivals, and requirements to supply and/or license competitors. This Article is organized as follows: Section I sets forth the empirical evidence supporting the widespread understanding that vertical integration is generally procompetitive or neutral, and responds to the major critiques of these studies. Section I also discusses typical justifications for vertical integration, namely avoiding the costly and risky processes of forming, administering, and enforcing contracts with independent suppliers and customers. Section II lays out the economic approach to antitrust analysis of vertical mergers, briefly addressing calls for the U.S. antitrust agencies to update their 1984 Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines. Section III discusses remedies. The final section offers closing thoughts focusing on the relative expertise of agencies and courts as compared to merging parties in evaluating the costs and benefits of vertical integration.

Behavioral vs. Structural Remedies in European and Slovak Competition Law

Market economy presupposes a proper functioning of competition. Identification of situations potentially harmful for competition is a task for competition authorities. However, how to handle the situation at stake is an issue in itself. Although there is regulation of remedies in EU competition law and a partial regulation in Slovak competition law, especially merger regulation, the question is in what manner, if at all, are remedies applied in practice. This paper deals with these questions in relation to merger as well as antitrust cases. It looks into theoretical background followed by an outline of the European Commission’s cases. On top of that, the paper inquiries into the employment of remedies in broader sense in the practice of the Slovak Republic. After presentation of the Slovak regulation of remedies, three recent cases are addressed. The first one is represented by a merger case from the health services sector which was cleared only upon conditions. The situation which triggered the need for remedies is elaborated on, as well as the structural and partially behavioural remedies which were employed. The second one is represented by a case from car industry sector where behavioural obligations were imposed by a decision on commitments in order to solve possible vertical restrains. Although it is less usual to impose remedies in antitrust cases, the case shows how competition law’s concerns on vertical market can be solved by obligations of behavioural type. The third one deals with a cartel case in which a behavioural remedy in form of prohibition of participation in tendering procedures was imposed. Therefore, the paper shows how obligations to act in certain manner or to undergo structural change can be employed in practice at Union and national level in order to solve competition law issues.

Consolidation in Provider and Insurer Markets: Enforcement Issues and Priorities

Consolidation in Provider and Insurer Markets: Enforcement Issues and Priorities

Federative Republic of Brazil, Before the Administrative Council for Economic Defense ((CADEE), Draft Guidelines Concerning Antitrust Remedies, Comment of the Global Antitrust Institute, Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University

This comment provides recommendations to the Brazilian Administrative Council for Economic Defense (CADE) on Draft Guidelines Concerning Antitrust Remedies, which describe CADE's policies and practices for ordering relief in cases involving structural transactions. The comment commends CADE for publishing the guidelines and for adopting best practices based extensively on accepted international standards. The comment describes why economic analysis suggests flexibility in regard to relief policies, given the wide range of factual possibilities, so that competition is preserved or restored with minimum compliance, administrative, and enforcement costs, and with minimum loss of efficiencies. The comment then identifies several areas where the guidelines could benefit from improved flexibility. These include: (a) a preference for structural remedies, even though behavioral remedies might be preferable in vertical cases; (b) a presumption in favor of an upfront buyer requirement, although such a requirement is usually unnecessary where an effective divestiture package is well defined and qualified buyers are identifiable; (c) a critical stance on remedies requiring monitoring, even though firewalls and other conduct remedies are often successful where circumstances favor them; and (d) a strong presumption against mix-and-match divestiture packages, although such divestiture may be the preferable option in some cases involving multiproduct firms. The comment concludes by encouraging ex-post empirical analysis of merger remedies.

A Behavioral Remedy for the Censorship Bias

Existing evidence suggests that managers exhibit a censorship bias: demand beliefs tend to be biased low when lost sales from stockouts are unobservable (censored demand) compared to when they are observable (uncensored demand). We develop a non‐constraining, easily implementable behavioral debias technique to help mitigate this tendency in demand forecasting and inventory decision‐making settings. The debiasing technique has individuals record estimates of demand outcomes (REDO): participants explicitly record a self‐generated estimate of every demand realization, allowing them to record a different value than the number of sales in periods with stockouts. In doing so, they construct a more representative sample of demand realizations (that differs from the sales sample). In three laboratory experiments with MBA and undergraduate students, this remedy significantly reduces downward bias in demand beliefs under censorship and leads to higher inventory order decisions.

A Retrospective Analysis of Vertical Mergers in Multichannel Video Programming Distribution Markets: The Comcast-NBCU Merger

Using data on the prices paid by multichannel video programing distributors (“MVPDs”) for basic cable networks, I conduct a retrospective analysis of the price effects of the Comcast-NBCU merger. Estimates from both the difference-in-differences and lagged-dependent variable models indicate no systematic increase in the prices for Comcast’s networks following the merger, including general interest programming, news channels, and national and regional sports networks. Programming costs, however, exert a potent influence on affiliate prices, with full pass through in many cases. The evidence suggests either that there was no net positive effect on incentives to raise prices above competitive levels following the vertical merger, or else that the behavioral remedies placed on the Comcast-NBCU merger have been effective. Accordingly, excessive concern about the prices of programming following a vertical merger in the MVPD market appear unwarranted, at least when addressed by behavioral remedies.

What Past U.S. Agency Actions Say About Complexity in Merger Remedies, With an Application to Generic Drug Divestitures

We consider merger remedies of the U.S. Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division and the U.S. Federal Trade Commission between 2008 and 2017. Traditionally one distinguishes between structural and behavioral remedies—and structural remedies are generally considered to be more effective and easier to implement. Our analysis suggests that over time this distinction has become somewhat blurred and a better gradation of remedies may be tied to the complexity of the proposed remedy. Divestitures in the market for generic drugs, in particular, are particularly complex, even though the remedies are of a structural, and so their efficacy is hard to ascertain.

Invigorating Vertical Merger Enforcement

This Feature summarizes why and how vertical merger enforcement should be invigorated. In our modern market system, vigorous vertical merger enforcement is a necessity. Strong enforcement is particularly important in markets where economies of scale and network effects lead to barriers to entry and durable market power. Even when there are parallel vertical mergers, the result may well be an anticompetitive reciprocal dealing, coordinated equilibrium rather than intense competition among efficient integrated firms. Stronger enforcement would involve several steps, including recognition that claims of elimination of double marginalization do not deserve to be silver bullets and that behavioral remedies are generally unable to prevent anticompetitive effects.

Microsoft/LinkedIn: What the European Commission Said on the Competition Review of Digital Market Mergers

The European Commission has approved the Microsoft acquisition of LinkedIn under the condition of the implementation of two sets of behavioral remedies. By its decision in Microsoft/LinkedIn the Commission dealt with many issues concerning the competition review of merger operations in digital markets. It defined for the first time the relevant market for professional social networking services. It clarified in which circumstances the concentration of datasets in the hands of the merging parties may conduce to the finding that a notified merger ma significantly impede competition. It acknowledged that when privacy protection is an important competition parameter it should be taken into account in the competition assessment of mergers. It also found that the merger might cause anti-competitive conglomerate effects which were addressed by the remedies offered by the merging parties tabled suitable remedies. Lastly, the article compares Microsoft/LinkedIn with the previous decisions made by the Commission for the appraisal of digital market mergers.

Impact of knowledge oriented leadership on knowledge management behaviour through employee work attitudes

Despite the acknowledged importance of knowledge management (KM), many employees avoid practicing KM at the individual level. This avoidance often leads to loss of the intellectual capital due to employee turnover. Many potential behavioural remedies are still untapped in the existing literature. This study extends the construct of knowledge oriented leadership (KOL) and examines its role in predicting KM behaviour among employees of the hospitality sector, at the individual level. It also investigates the mediating effect of employee work attitudes including affective commitment, creative self-efficacy and work engagement, by using partial least square for structure equation modelling. This study finds that KOL positively affects KM behaviour, affective commitment, creative self-efficacy and employee work engagement. Work attitudes (affective commitment, creative self-efficacy, work engagement) mediate the relationship of KOL and KM behaviour. Furthermore the direct positive effect of employee affective commitment, creative self-efficacy and work engagement on KM behaviour is also significant. This study contributes to the body of knowledge by extending the construct of KOL, and by investigating the connection between KOL, work attitudes, and KM behaviour among hospitality employees, at the individual level.

Cognitive-behavioral rehabilitation vs. treatment as usual for bipolar patients: study protocol for a randomized controlled trial

BackgroundBipolar disorder (BD) is commonly associated with cognitive and functional impairments even during remission periods, and although a growing number of studies have demonstrated the benefits of psychotherapy as an add-on to pharmacological treatment, its effectiveness appears to be less compelling in severe presentations of the disorder. New interventions have attempted to improve cognitive functioning in BD patients, but results have been mixed.MethodsThe study consists of a clinical trial comparing a new structured group intervention, called “Cognitive-Behavioral Rehabilitation,” with treatment as usual (TAU) for bipolar patients. The new approach is a combination of cognitive behavioral strategies and cognitive remediation exercises, consisting of 12 weekly group sessions of 90 min each. To be included in the study, patients must be diagnosed with BD type I or II, aged 18–55 years, in full or partial remission, and have an IQ of at least 80. A comprehensive neuropsychological battery, followed by mood, social functioning, and quality of life assessments will occur in three moments: pre and post intervention and 12 months later. The primary outcome of the study is to compare the time, in weeks, that the first full mood episode appears in patients who participated in either group of the study. Secondary outcome will include improvement in cognitive functions.DiscussionThis is the first controlled trial assessing the validity and effectiveness of the new “Cognitive-Behavioral Rehabilitation” intervention in preventing new mood episodes and improving cognitive and functional impairments.Trial registrationClinicaltrial.gov, NCT02766361. Registered on 2 May 2016.