Players can engage in repeated games, and each player may be interested in not only their own payoffs but also those of their rivals. For example, scholars compete repeatedly to publish papers, caring about their own achievements as well as those of their rivals. Tullock conjectured that rent-seeking efforts would increase in repeated games. In contrast, previous research has shown that rent-seeking efforts decrease in repeated games. This study expands on existing rent-seeking literature by analyzing rent-seeking behavior of players with dependent preferences in repeated games. To accomplish this, the study adopts the logit contest proposed by Tullock and analyzes repeated games between two players with interdependent preferences. That is, this study investigates situations where each player experiences emotions of altruism and spite towards their competitor and plays games repeatedly. There are two types of games with interdependent preferences: repeated games considering exogenous interdependent preferences and repeated games considering endogenous interdependent preferences. This research demonstrates the equilibrium result that 'altruism and co-movement reduce rent-seeking efforts' when interdependent preferences are exogenous. Next, when considering endogenous interdependent preferences, the equilibrium results are as follows. First, repeated games induce spite, meaning repeated rent-seeking excludes altruism. Second, the higher the intensity of co-movement between players, the greater the spite that arises. Third, players' spite increases rent-seeking efforts and reduces their payoffs. This study presents spite as the primary rationale for the increase in rent-dissipation in repeated games, as speculated by Tullock.
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