Chaos and Clinical Theory Douglas W. Heinrichs (bio) In considering the specific issues raised by these three very thoughtful commentaries, it is helpful to reflect on the status of a theory or model for a specifically clinical discipline—what is it trying to accomplish and how might it proceed to do so? Kellert (2005) sees my proposal in terms of "borrowed knowledge"—the metaphorical application of a theory established in one field of inquiry to another field—and views my application of chaos theory as a "nonliteral use of knowledge from the natural sciences" (p. 239). He likens it to attempts to explore consequences of relativity theory or quantum mechanics for areas other than those for which they were developed. He notes the rhetorical functions—including appeal to the disciplinary prestige of natural science—of such metaphorical borrowings. Although clearly there are significant metaphorical aspects at work here, there are at least two factors that distinguish this model from, say, the metaphorical application of quantum mechanics to a field other than subatomic physics. First, quantum mechanics purports to say something specific about the behavior of the subatomic world. Its development is wed to that specific content area. On the other hand, nonlinear dynamics, including chaos theory, is a formal mathematical model intending to characterize the behavior of any system of elements that possess certain formal relational properties. It does not start out as field or discipline specific. In fact it is not uniquely tied to the natural sciences at all, beyond the fact that it may be easier to obtain the sort of detailed repeated measures needed to demonstrate chaotic behavior in physical systems. So it is not just a question of whether chaos theory is a useful intuitive device for thinking freshly about clinical psychiatry. Rather, it is the quite literal and nonmetaphorical question as to whether some of the observable aspects of persons that are relevant to their psychiatric care behave chaotically, and if so what are the implications. Now it is quite true that direct, mathematically rigorous demonstrations of chaos in clinically relevant data sets is currently limited. In fact, one hoped for consequence of presenting this model is to encourage just such studies, and I suggest several promising directions for doing so. However, there are good reasons for thinking the presence of such chaotic behavior to be likely, and this relates to the notion of a clinical theory. One of the consequences of what Globus (2005) calls "triumphalist biological psychiatry" (p. 229) is the frequent assumption that the model or paradigm of psychiatry—an applied clinical practice, a techne—is synonymous with the paradigm of neuroscience—a basic science or episteme. This is clearly not so for many reasons, including the fact that the former has to incorporate the comprehensive treatment of discrete individuals in a way that the latter does not. Yet the respective theories are related more than metaphorically. [End Page 243] The paradigms of neuroscience and those of other relevant basic sciences, such as psychology, substantially inform the clinical paradigm and the clinical model must be at least compatible with those of the relevant basic sciences. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that if chaotic processes are demonstrable in the nervous system, for which significant evidence already exists, there is good reason to expect them to be reflected in clinically relevant domains. The clinical paradigm should make room for it and its consequences, rather than thinking within an outmoded neuroscience model that makes no room for the implications of nonlinear dynamics. And when this generates a picture more compatible than the old model with our usual sense of what it is to be human, the odds that we are on to something is further enhanced. Of course until such time that enough clinical research based on this model is completed, considerable speculation—indeed aided by metaphorical devices—is involved in generating a concrete sense of how the model would be applied to specific clinical problems, such as the treatment of depressed persons. One clear task of the clinical paradigm is the methodologic integration of interventions growing out of different informing basic sciences. Because chaotic modeling can be applied across various content domains and...
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Apr 1, 2008
F Mukhamedov 
Open Access