Behavior In Social Dilemmas Research Articles

The rise of cooperation in correlated matching prisoners dilemma: An experiment

Recently, there has been a Renaissance for multi-level selection models to explain the persistence of unselfish behavior in social dilemmas, in which assortative/correlated matching plays an important role. In the current study of a multi-round prisoners’ dilemma experiment, we introduce two correlated matching procedures that match subjects with similar action histories together. We discover significant treatment effects, compared to the control procedure of random matching. Particularly with the weighted history matching procedure we find bifurcations regarding group outcomes. Some groups converge to the all-defection equilibrium even more pronouncedly than the control groups do, while other groups generate much higher rate of cooperation, which is also associated with higher relative reward for a typical cooperative action. All in all, the data show that cooperation does have a much better chance to persist in a correlated/assortative-matching environment, as predicted in the literature.

The desire to help and behavior in social dilemmas: Exploring responses to catastrophes.

The desire to help and behavior in social dilemmas: Exploring responses to catastrophes.

The desire to help and behavior in social dilemmas: Exploring responses to catastrophes.

The desire to help can exercise a powerful influence on behavior, leading to greater helping in a variety of settings. This research explored people's desire to help in 2 naturally occurring community traumas. Study 1 revealed that this desire led to greater contributions in settings in which people normally loaf. Specifically, participants making unidentifiable contributions exerted greater effort when they believed their contributions would benefit soldiers fighting in the Persian Gulf War. Study 2 revealed greater contributions to a public radio fund drive immediately following the Loma Linda earthquake in California. Ironically, contributions to the radio station increased, even though the station was in Boston and the earthquake victims in California would not benefit from the contributions to the station. A social dilemma consists of any situation in which the choice or behavior that is best for the individual results in undesirable consequences for the group or society should all members behave similarly (Dawes, 1980). The dependence of public radio on voluntary contributions from listeners makes it a classic example of a social dilemma. As with other social dilemmas, the typical listener to public radio faces a conflict between selfish interests and the interests of the collective. Although it is in the best interest of the individual listener to withhold personal contributions from the radio station, thereby listening to the radio programming at the expense of others, it would be disastrous for the radio station and for these individuals if all listeners behaved similarly. Public radio stations cannot survive without contributions from listeners. Moreover, social dilemmas are not just an issue for public radio or television stations but extend to community traumas such as war, famine, or disaster, in which victims re

Testing Various Types of Cooperation Rewards in Social Dilemmas

Research on the rewarding of cooperative behavior in social dilemmas has shown that very different types of reward strategies each seem to be effective at inducing high rates of cooperation in group members. This makes it difficult to determine how a cooperation reward motivates cooperation. This study systematically examined various components of cooperation reward schemes so as to help identify the general properties of an effective cooperation reward. Specifically, three features of a cooperation reward were manipulated: the number of group members who can receive the reward; when the reward is given; and whether reward reception is contingent upon performance. Four major effects emerged. First, performance-contingent, per-trial rewards produced high rates of cooperation. Second, competitive, performance-based rewards effectively maintained cooperation across trials. Next, a competitive, performance-based, per-trial reward scheme outperformed any other reward scheme in terms of rate of cooperation induced. Finally, rewards that were provided for simply participating in the group had an inhibitory effect on cooperation, producing a lesser rate of cooperation than baseline.

Cultural Values in Intergroup and Single-Group Social Dilemmas

Do cultural values influence the manner in which people cooperate with one another? This study assessed cultural characteristics of individuals and then related these characteristics to cooperative behavior in social dilemmas. Participants were assessed for their degree of vertical and horizontal individualism and collectivism, cultural values identified by Triandis (1995). They made choices in either a single-group or an intergroup social dilemma. The single-group dilemma entailed a three-person dilemma; the intergroup dilemma was identical but added subgroup competition, i.e., an opposing three-person group. The results indicated an interaction between cultural characteristics and type of dilemma for cooperation. The single-group versus intergroup effect reported by Bornstein and Ben-Yossef (1994) was replicated, but only for vertical individualists. The vertical individualists were least cooperative in the single-group dilemma but were more cooperative in the intergroup dilemma—where cooperation with the group maximized personal outcomes. The vertical collectivists were most cooperative in the single-group dilemma but were less cooperative in the intergroup dilemma— where group defection resulted in maximum group outcomes. The horizontal individualists and collectivists exhibited an intermediate level of cooperation, with no differences in cooperation between the single-group and intergroup dilemmas. Taken together, the results suggest that the relationship between cultural values and cooperation, in particular with reference to vertical and horizontal components of individualism and collectivism, is more complex than has been suggested in past research.

Group Discussion and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas

Face-to-face discussion has been shown to increase cooperative behavior in social dilemmas. Two general explanations of this effect were tested: group identity (concern for fellow group members' outcomes) and perception of consensus (degree of agreement perceived among group members on how to respond to the dilemma). Undergraduate students participated in four person groups in one of four experimental conditions. The four conditions differed in common fate (interdependent outcome in a lottery), face-to-face discussion of the dilemma, discussion of an important (irrelevant) issue, and no discussion (control). Results indicate that (a) the common fate manipulation neither aroused group identity nor enhanced cooperation, (b) group identity may not be sufficient to elicit cooperation in a social dilemma, and (c) the most plausible explanation of group discussion effects is members' perceived consensus to cooperate.

Altruism: A Review of Recent Theory and Research

The literature on altruism in social psychology, and to a lesser degree in sociology, economics, political behavior and sociobiology since the early 1980’s is reviewed. The authors take the position that in all of these areas, there appears to be a “paradigm shift” away from the earlier position that behavior that appears to be altruistic must, under closer scrutiny, be revealed as reflecting egoistic motives. Rather, theory and data now being advanced are more compatible with the view that true altruism—acting with the goal of benefitting another—does exist and is a part of human nature. Research in social psychology during the 80’s had a decreased emphasis on situational determinants of helping. Rather, it has focussed mainly on the following topics: the existence and nature of the altruistic personality, the debate concerning the nature of the motivation underlying helping behavior, and the nature of the process of the development of altruism in children and adults. During this time there has also been considerable theoretical and empirical work on possible biological bases for altruism, and on the evolutionary processes by which these might have developed. Within economics, politics, and sociology, the issues of behavior in social dilemmas, the provision of public goods, private and corporate philanthropy, and voluntarism (including donation of time, money, and physical parts of the self) are discussed.

Illusions of efficacy: The effects of group size on perceived efficacy in social dilemmas

Several theorists have suggested that group members feel a diminished sense of self-efficacy in larger groups facing social dilemmas. Four experiments were performed to explore this question. In Experiment 1 it was demonstrated that group members correctly perceive that self-efficacy declines with group size for step-level public goods problems. In Experiments 2 and 3, group size was objectively unrelated to the subjects' impact on the group's chances for obtaining a public good. But in both experiments, subjects still felt more self-efficacious when the group was smaller. A final experiment explored the relationship between group size and perceived collective efficacy for obtaining a public good. When the provision point was relatively low (viz., one-third of the group had to contribute to provide the public good), subjects generally perceived smaller groups to be more efficacious than larger groups, even though under certain conditions precisely the opposite was true. These illusions of efficacy were attributed to familiar judgmental heuristics, involving an overgeneralization of experience in groups of varying sizes. Their implications for cooperative behavior in social dilemmas are discussed.

Gender Roles and Behavior in Social Dilemmas: Are There Sex Differences in Cooperation and in Its Justification?

Data from two experimental social dilemmas-a set of 66 nine-person dilemmas and a set of 64 seven-person dilemmas-were used to examine sex differences in cooperation. Women were only slightly more likely than men to cooperate with others, and variables related to the experimental setting were much more important influences on behavior than sex. Whether or not the women cooperated, they were more likely than men to justify their behavior as being altruistic and principled, to believe that they were more oriented toward harmonious group relations, and to be less nervous and upset at the end of the experiment. It is suggested that those who speculate on sex differences in cooperation may have overstated these differences and that the relationship between self-schema and behavior may vary depending on the extent to which the attributes studied relate to gender identity.

The Effects of Decision Framing and Others' Behavior on Cooperation in a Social Dilemma

In a decision situation, the choice alternatives can be described, or framed, with respect to different reference points, such as gains or losses. This study investigates the effects of decision framing in a social dilemma. Subjects, in groups of four or five persons, participated in a simulated social dilemma. Two factors were manipulated: decision framing (either in terms of giving to a collective good or taking from a collective good), and others' behavior (whether other group members had apparently cooperated a little or a great deal on the first trial). Subjects conformed to others' behavior when they could take from a collective good, but they diffused responsibility and acted contrary to others' behavior when they could give to a public good. These results imply that models of choice behavior in social dilemmas should be expanded to include framing effects, as well as other departures from strict rationality. Moreover, the results suggest that findings from social dilemma research in which subjects can contribute to buy a public good may not be consistent with findings from studies in which subjects can take resources from a common pool.

Choice behavior in social dilemmas: Effects of social identity, group size, and decision framing.

Les auteurs ont explore les effets structurant sur des decisions impliquant l'utilisation de ressources communes, en fonction de l'identite sociale, de la taille du groupe de sujets (N=88) et de la structure de decision

The effects of social motives on behavior in social dilemmas in two cultures

Subjects in Santa Barbara, California, and Groningen, The Netherlands, participated in a seven-person social dilemma game, presented in terms of a conservation of resources problem. Prior to their decision making in the social dilemma game, subject's social motive (altruistic, cooperative, individualistic, competitive) was assessed by means of two different classification procedures. On the basis of previous research findings American subjects were expected to display relatively more competitive social motives, and Dutch subjects relatively more cooperative ones. However, no indications of crosscultural differences were found neither with regard to the distribution of social motives nor with regard to the amount of resources taken for self in the social dilemma game. In both locations, competitive subjects took most resources for self, individualistic subjects took next most, cooperative subjects took less than individualists, and altruistic subjects took the least. In addition to predictive validity, indices of the convergent validity of two social motive assessment procedures were described.

Motivation losses in small groups: A social dilemma analysis.

Theory developed to account for behavior in social dilemmas—situations in which - the rational pursuit of self-interest can lead to collective disaster—was applied to the analysis of group motivation losses. Two group motivation loss effects demonstrated in previous research, the social-loafing effect and the free-rider effect, were shown to follow from social dilemma theories. An experiment was performed to empirically demonstrate a third motivation loss effect, termed the sucker effect. It was hypothesized that group members would reduce their efforts if they had a capable partner.who free rode on their efforts, that is, who was capable of contributing to the group but would not. This prediction was confirmed. The effect was particularly strong in males. Potential remedies for such motivation losses were discussed.