Beatific Vision Research Articles

What an Apophaticist Can Know in advance

The doctrines of divine ineffability and of the beatific vision seem to contradict each other. According to the former, we cannot know the divine essence. But, according to the latter, we will know God fully. To reconcile these doctrines, we first distinguish between propositional and personal knowledge, that is, between knowing about a person and knowing a person, and, following from this distinction, we then distinguish between propositional and personal ineffability, that is, between it being impossible to know about a person and it being impossible to know a person. We then argue God is propositionally ineffable but personally effable.

Nezadostnost premoženja pri doseganju večne blaženosti – »visio Dei«: Akvinčev pogled na problem premoženja in vloga Cerkve

In the present article we seek to show and proof the insufficiency of wealth in achieving the blessedness, according to the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas. Beatitude is twofold: imperfect which is achievable by ethical way of life, and perfect which represents – through the love for God and neighbor – a completion of the human life and leads to the beatific vision of God. The Church has a mission of helping her faithful to obtain that blessedness, firstly by her magisterium, but also by liturgy and moral example. For her mission, the Church after all needs some wealth, although wealth should not become her aim and goal or telos, but solely a tool for her pastoral and charitable work.

“You Spoke in a Vision” (Ps 89:19): Iconoclasm, the Incarnation, the Aspiration of Christian Art

“You Spoke in a Vision” (Ps 89:19)Iconoclasm, the Incarnation, the Aspiration of Christian Art Anthony Giambrone OP (bio) Among the aphoristic fragments of Leonardo da Vinci’s brilliant and tantalizing Notebooks appear the scattered makings later gathered as his multivolume treatise on painting.1 After an extensive treatment in which one might learn everything from botany to the effects of aging, to the most arcane principles of perspective—even the moral precepts for a young boy’s proper discernment whether to follow a painter’s career—Leonardo speaks finally of the supremacy of his craft: “Poetry is superior to painting in the presentation of words and painting is superior to poetry in the presentation of facts.” Yet words, da Vinci insists, are weak. They lack, at least, some potent force found only in a picture. “Write up the name of Christ in some spot and set up His image opposite,” he says, “and you will see which will be most reverenced.”2 The visual surpasses the verbal through the icon’s potent magnetism. Without entering into this interesting debate about the relative excellence of the arts—on da Vinci’s measure, the film reel would surpass the brush, by pure power to captivate and attract—we may, nevertheless, agree on the unique allure addressed to our sense of sight. It is not by accident that Scripture warns against concupiscence [End Page 16] of the eye, not of the ear (1 Jn 2:16). A reflection on the implications of the Incarnation on art might take this lust of vision as a profitable starting point. The manuals of the post-Tridentine period generally identified concupiscentia oculorum as an impulse to acquire, the first movement of greed, leaving libidinous sensuality entirely to the so-called concupiscence of the flesh. Augustine, however, is a surer guide, I think, when he finds concupiscence of the eyes in the public’s insatiable eagerness for spectacles and shows, i.e. violence and erotic thrills.3 A glance at modern movie culture (I make a distinction here from cinema) is enough to confirm the timeless insight of Augustine’s analysis and to indicate that greed is, undoubtedly, not enough. The desire of the fallen human eye is coupled with some deeper, more dangerous lust: that primal cupidity that lured our first parents into their rebellion. Sin itself first enters the world through the eye. “The woman saw that the tree was good for food and a delight to the eyes and was desirable to make one wise” (Gen 3:6). The irresistible promise the fruit held was, moreover, in the Tempter’s words, that in eating it, “Your eyes will be opened.” With our first mother, our whole race profoundly longs, even to its own destruction, to have its vision satisfied and ever more expanded. Now, in itself, this urge to see, to have our eyes opened beyond what we now behold, is very good. It belongs to the order of prelapsarian creation and sets the trajectory of our final destiny. We are intended, specifically, to enjoy a beatific vision: a sight of such ravishing beauty and delight that we will be divinized in the beholding. The Creator himself is the term of this avid lust at the base of our being, and such cupidity in its perfection is experienced as contemplative love. It is for this vision that Eve pined, that her eyes might be further opened. We are meant to be made wise, by beholding Wisdom itself, and finally thereby to become like gods. Scotists and Thomists will, of course, disagree (as is their habit) on the essentially supernatural character of the human desire to behold [End Page 17] God; and, though I’d rather not wade into this difficult controversy, I (as is my habit) prefer the Thomist line. We naturally desire to look upon God, for we innately recognize that, like the trees in paradise—like all the glory that still shimmers even through our damaged and dimmed creation—God too is supremely delightful to behold. We are naturally dissatisfied, however, with all those created analogies and images that keep our knowledge of God ever at a distance. This simultaneous...

A Theology of Grace in Six Controversies by Edward T. Oakes, S.J.

Reviewed by: A Theology of Grace in Six Controversies by Edward T. Oakes, S.J. Christopher J. Malloy A Theology of Grace in Six Controversies. By Edward T. Oakes, S.J. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2016. Pp. xxii + 248. $28.00 (paper). ISBN: 978-0-8028-7320-0. In each of these six essays, Edward Oakes nobly endeavors to resolve a seemingly intractable dispute. He contends that “antinomies” beset each side of each dispute and then strives towards a higher viewpoint that integrates the truths of competing theses without correlative drawbacks. Methodologically, Oakes offers a well-rounded approach, employing a wide variety of resources. He grounds his claims in Scripture in light of recent scholarly advances and canvasses various theological and secular usages of salient words (“grace,” “sin,” “justification,” “righteousness,” etc.). He traces key, sometimes rival, theological traditions. He employs literature, history, widely acknowledged scientific findings, and words of saints. In each essay, he develops his thesis systematically upon these foundations, following such luminaries as John Henry Newman, Matthias Scheeben, Karl Barth, and Hans Urs von Balthasar. Of course, it is common to seek the middle between extremes. Success requires accurate identification of “thesis” and “antithesis.” Precision and wisdom must work hand in hand for this task and for the construction of viable alternative syntheses. To evaluate Oakes’s achievement, I highlight two chapters and touch on others, noting features running through the essays. Chapter 1, “Nature and Grace,” constitutes a remarkable effort to achieve balance between the concerns in a significant dispute. Henri de Lubac claimed that there is an innate desire for the beatific vision, while certain twentieth-century Thomists claimed that the innate desire is for a naturally attainable happiness. Lawrence Feingold’s noteworthy dissertation/book (The Natural Desire to See God according to St. Thomas Aquinas and His Interpreters [2001, 2010]) rekindled this discussion. Oakes recognizes that the slogans “extrinsicist” and “intrinsicist” are clumsy: no extrinsicist severs creation from [End Page 609] Christ, and no intrinsicist makes eternal life something God “owes” (7). Still, Oakes indicates, one can “veer” toward views that the slogans indicate, some stressing the continuity of nature and grace in the one will of God to deify and others stressing the discontinuity between man’s sinful state and God’s saving initiative (12). Oakes appreciates the extrinsicist desire to preserve the gratuity of grace and the loftiness of our calling. Still, he submits, the denial of a natural desire for grace, if it “becomes too one-sided,” cannot cope with Paul’s teaching that creation “does indeed ‘groan’” (23). Oakes briefly conducts the reader through “two sets” of texts in Aquinas’s corpus, each supportive of either extreme. As Oakes makes clear, at stake is not simply Aquinas’s text but the truth of things. Following Andrew Swafford’s lead, Oakes alights on Scheeben as providing principles for a resolution. The move is surprising: of all people, Scheeben starkly distinguished nature and grace. Notwithstanding, Scheeben agreed with de Lubac that people are moved not by arguments from natural reason but by the manifestation of faith’s supernatural beauty. More, Scheeben proposed that grace and nature enjoy a “nuptial union,” an image more intimate than that of a second story topping off a perfectly good first story. Scheeben grounded this marital imagery in the effect of the Incarnation, whereby the human race is caught up in the hypostatic prerogatives of Christ. Accordingly, just as it is right that “this man, who is the Son,” receives an abundance of grace, so it is right that those who through baptism are stamped with Christ’s character and brought into his sonship receive sanctifying graces. Distinction is in service of union. This sketch should indicate the valiant nature of Oakes’s undertaking. Perhaps the project succeeds; it does have weaknesses. First, Oakes presents the “extrinsicist” tradition as regarding the relationship between sinful man and grace. This description fails to identify the issue; primordially at stake is the relationship of man qua man, considered as such and apart from sin, to grace. This slip and others signal imprecision in Oakes’s account. There is a delightful character to his broad brushstrokes, but this breadth is...

The “Grand Medium”: An Edwardsean Modification of Thomas Aquinas on the Beatific Vision

AbstractJonathan Edwards's understanding of the beatific vision, which draws on Neoplatonist metaphysics, marks a modification of views that became dominant in the Western Church through the rise of Aristotelian anthropology as articulated in the theology of Thomas Aquinas. Edwards's account treats the resurrection of the body as significant, even indispensable for the deifying vision of God. It is also an account that regards Christ—the “grand medium” of the visio dei—as the consummate theophanic appearance of God. And it is, finally, an account that takes seriously the infinite progress of the vision of God, beginning in this life, continuing in the intermediate state, and on into the eternity of the resurrection.

“With my Body I Thee Worship”: New Creation, Beatific Vision, and the Liturgical Consummation of all Things

“When our flesh, made glorious at the Judgment Seat, dresses us once again, then shall our persons become more pleasing in being more complete.” “Thereby shall we have increase of the light Supreme Love grants, unearned, to make us fit to hold His glory ever in our sight.”1

El intelecto agente según Teodorico el Teutónico

<p>En este trabajo se estudia la concepción de Teodorico el Teutónico sobre el nivel cognoscitivo superior humano: el intelecto agente. De él este pensador medieval (ss. XIII-XIV) indica que es siempre activo, distinto en cada persona humana, superior al alma humana, imagen de Dios y abierto a él, pues la visión beatífica depende del intelecto agente.</p><p>Palabras clave: Teodorico el Teutónico, conocer humano superior, intelecto agente, visión beatífica.</p><p> </p>

Thomas Aquinas and John Owen on the beatific vision: A Reply to Suzanne McDonald

AbstractIt has been shown that the thirteenth-century Dominican friar, St Thomas Aquinas, was an important theological influence on John Owen, the seventeenth-century English puritan theologian, chaplain to Oliver Cromwell, and Vice-Chancellor of Oxford University, especially in the areas of the divine being, grace and Chalcedonian Christology. Suzanne McDonald has argued that, while Aquinas is unmistakably a source for Owen's doctrine of the beatific vision, Owen surpassed Aquinas's doctrine in a manner she judges to be correct, theologically speaking, and which exposes the deficiency of Aquinas's account. Owen achieved this particular ‘Reforming’ or rather ‘re-forming’ of Aquinas's doctrine, she argues, by way of a ‘Christological re-orientation of the doctrine’ in terms of what is seen in the beatific vision and how it is seen, that is, its content and means. This article replies to McDonald from a Catholic and Thomist perspective, in response to her suggestion that Owen's account of the beatific vision opens up possibilities for ecumenical dialogue. The article attempts to achieve this first by reassessing the Christological contrasts McDonald draws between Owen and Aquinas in terms of content and means, and then by offering several suggestions as to why one might want to prefer Aquinas's account over Owen's.

Could there be Suffering in Paradise? The Primal Sin, the Beatific Vision, and Suffering in Paradise

Paradise is often conceived as a place where suffering is not possible, so much so that the possibility of suffering in paradise has been used by various philosophers as a defeater for the possibility of paradise.[1]Employing a “reverse-engineered-theodicy,” I use Eleonore Stump’s morally-sufficient-reason for why God allows suffering in this earthly world to explore one condition that must obtain for suffering to remain impossible in paradise, namely, that internal fragmentation is not possible in paradise. After developing an intellectualist explanation of the primal sin (an alleged prior instance of internal fragmentation in a paradisiacal environment), I suggest one reason to believe that the internal fragmentation of redeemed humans in paradise is not possible. However, this reason does not extend to other non-human inhabitants of paradise, and so I suggest that it remains possible that these other inhabitants might yet become internally fragmented. Given that Christ-like consensual suffering that aids a third party’s internal integration is presumably morally justifiable (How else can we justify God allowing Christ to suffer?), I conclude by suggesting that the suffering of the redeemed in paradise is in fact possible (although quite unlikely). Therefore, even in paradise, there is a place for hope that the redeemed do not suffer, and for trust in others that they do not bring such suffering into being.[1] For one example see (Talbott 1990, 32).

Neuronauki a zagadnienie wiedzy Jezusa

Neurosciences and the Question of the Knowledge of JesusRapidly developing neurosciences provide greater and greater insight into human cognitive processes. In this context one may formulate a hypothesis that the current reception of their research findings by theological anthropology can serve as a turning point in the discussion over the question of the human knowledge of Jesus, which is held within dogmatic christology. Classical christology is open to adopt the data from neurosciences, particularly thanks to the conviction, upheld by the Chalcedonian dogma, that the characteristics of natures in Christ do not undergo any changes after the Incarnation. It is especially in the reflection upon the characteristics of human nature that the results of natural sciences should be taken into account as they can indicate some intransgressible limits of human cognitive abilities. One of the results of this reception is a more and more clearly noticeable need for the revision of a common belief in theological anthropology stating that all the “higher” acts of human cognition take place in the soul; thus they have a nonmaterial character. This has, in turn, its key significance for the discussion over the knowledge of Jesus, since the neo-Scholastic theory of human triple knowledge in Christ (the knowledge coming from the beatific vision, the infused knowledge, the acquired knowledge), drawing its inspiration from the hypotheses of St. Thomas Aquinas, was to a great extent based on the assumption that the soul is the center of cognition, which can be gained in a way independent of the body. Given the new perspective of understanding human cognition, open to us by neurosciences, the attempts to sustain this theory may result in material heresy consisting in attributing Christ some characteristics which can by no means be regarded as belonging to human nature (in the pre-Paschal state).

Predication or Participation? What is the Nature of Aquinas’ Doctrine of Analogy?

Predication or Participation? What is the Nature of Aquinas’ Doctrine of Analogy?

Ocalenie jakby przez ogień (1 Kor 3,15). Czyściec z perspektywy Biblii i w refleksji teologicznej

Apart from the two final states after death, heaven and hell, there is a third transitional state called “purgatory”. The Church believes in it, though this term does not occur in the Bible. The aim of this paper is to present scriptural sites relating to purification after death. There are only a few texts that concern purgatory and in addition they do not point directly to it: 2 Macc 12:38-45 (prayers and atonement can help the dead), Matt 12:31-32 (certain offenses can be forgiven in the age to come) and 1 Cor 3:10-15 (there is a cleansing fire after death – different from the punishment of the damned). The message of these texts is clear: the lot of a man may be changed even after death. One can also find in the Sacred Scripture some metaphors applying to purgatory: whipping (Lk 12:47-48), imprisonment for debts (Matt 5:25-26) and leaving the netherworld (Matt 12:4). Some scholars think, the Jesus’ parable of the rich man and Lazarus (Lk 16:19-31) also reveals the mystery of the final purification. Although the Church believed in purgatory from the very beginning, she formulated her doctrine of faith on purgatory especially at the Councils of Florence (1439) and Trent (1547). What the Church teaches is that there is a purification that occurs after death for all who die in God’s friendship but who have not been sufficiently purified for the glory of heaven. The purification can involve some kind of pain or discomfort ( poena damni – punishment of temporary rejection and poena sensus – punishment of the senses). Martin Luther and the Protestants reject the doctrine of purgatory. They argue that if a man had to suffer in purgatory, the sacrifice of Jesus Christ would be incomplete and insufficient. The Catholic answer to the dilemma is that salvation assumes two steps: forgiveness of sins and transformation of life. The former occurs immediately, the latter needs time. God changes people and actually makes them righteous. Only when they are entirely sanctified and fully perfected, they are truly fit to enjoy the beatific vision of heaven. And what about people who die before they have been thoroughly transformed? The Catechism of the Catholic Church (1032) encourages the faithful on earth to assist those being purified and to offer prayers, above all the Eucharistic sacrifice, almsgiving, indulgences, and works of penance undertaken on behalf of the dead.

Richard FitzRalph on the Beatific Vision: Delectatio and Beatitudo in his Oxford Lectures on the Sentences (1328–29)

Richard FitzRalph was one of the most influential thinkers from Oxford to emerge in the 14th century and was regularly quoted as an authority down to the 16th century. He has been credited as one of several theologians who had an influence on Benedict XII in drawing up his apostolic constitution Benedictus Deus (29 January 1336). Indeed, FitzRalph was asked by the previous Pope, John XXII, to bring a copy of his Oxford Commentary on the Sentences to Avignon at the time of the controversy on the beatific vision. This article focuses on how FitzRalph discussed the topic in his Oxford commentary, given in 1328–29.

The Role of Humor in Reforming the Imagination in St. Thomas More’s The Sadness of Christ and A Dialogue of Comfort

This essay analyzes More’s use of humor in The Sadness of Christ and A Dialogue of Comfort Against Tribulation, and finds that rhetorical devices such as satire, parody and the telling of merry tales play an integral role in engaging the reader’s imagination. In these two late works, dealing with the most serious of subjects, the humanist More embraces the rhetorical tradition of Antiquity which assigned a creative function to the imagination and recognized mockery, irony and humor as means of rational persuasion. The essay finds that More provokes laughter for three interrelated aims—to correct and inform the understanding, to strengthen communal bonds, and ultimately to express the joyful hope of the beatific vision.

Becoming Human in the Face of God: Gregory of Nyssa's Unending Search for the Beatific Vision

AbstractThis article seeks to effect a ressourcement of the theology of the beatific vision through reflection on Gregory of Nyssa's engagement with biblical passages that he believes speak of this vision. Through attention to Nyssen's sixth homily on the Beatitudes, commentary on The Life of Moses and Homilies on the Song of Songs, I argue that, for him, human persons find their telos when in union with Christ they become ever purer, in an ever‐increasing growth in the beatific vision. Gregory maintains that the perfection of human personhood consists of the soul always remaining in search of greater fulfilment of its desire to see God in Christ.

Jessica Rosenfeld Ethics and Enjoyment in Late Medieval Poetry: Love after AristotleEthics and Enjoyment in Late Medieval Poetry: Love after Aristotle. Jessica Rosenfeld. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. Pp. vii+245.

<i>Jessica Rosenfeld</i> Ethics and Enjoyment in Late Medieval Poetry: Love after Aristotle<i>Ethics and Enjoyment in Late Medieval Poetry: Love after Aristotle</i>. Jessica Rosenfeld. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. Pp. vii+245.

The Visibility of the Invisible God

This article addresses the potential theological impact that the beatific vision might have regarding the (in)visibility of the triune God. First, we will consider the roots of the doctrine of divine invisibility within the classical theological tradition. Second, we should turn to the biblical promise of the beatific vision and the ways in which its scriptural exposition touches upon the divine character. Third, we will unpack the Trinitarian shape of God’s (in)visibility. Fourth, then, we will be in a position to reflect upon the claims that God is invisible and visible, their theological merits, and their synthetic relations.

Happiness, Contemplative Life, and the tria genera hominum in Twelfth-Century Philosophy: Peter Abelard and John of Salisbury

As Christians, all twelfth-century Latin thinkers identified true happiness with the happiness God promises in the afterlife. This happiness was believed to be entirely spiritual, consisting in the endless vision of God. Nevertheless, along with this beatitudo in patria we also find in some twelfth-century authors the idea of a beatitudo in via as the philosophical life. This life can be characterized either as completely contemplative and solitary, or as one that remains partially attached to material circumstances and (political) action in society. Within this broad framework, this paper emphasizes three points: a. the ascetic and almost purely contemplative character of the ideal of the philosophical life as we find it in twelfth-century authors like Peter Abelard and John of Salisbury; b. the role played by philosophers in some twelfth-century triads of human types; c. the fact that, in spite of the monastic touch which often color them, many theses held by twelfth-century defenders of the philosophical life are common to those later university masters who were once called ‘Averroists’ or ‘radical Aristotelians’. The first section of this article provides an outline of the substantial discussion about true happiness as beatific vision as is found in Peter Abelard’s Collationes or Dialogus inter philosophum, iudaeum et christianum. The following sections present some twelfth-century triads of genera hominum, in which the ideal of the philosophical life plays a significant role. These triads are extracted from the following texts: Moralium dogma philosophorum, William of Conches’s Glosae super Macrobium, the Florilegium morale oxoniense, John of Salisbury’s Policraticus, Bernard of Clairvaux’s De consideratione, Hugues of Saint Victor’s De sacramentis.

Frui essentia non fruendo persona. Die Lehre des Johannes Duns Scotus über die Trennbarkeit von Wesenheit und Personen in der Gottesschau und ihre Kritik bei Wilhelm von Ockham

The paper argues that the doctrine of John Duns Scot concerning the possibility that one can enjoy the divine essence apart from the persons in the beatific vision, is a consequent application of important metaphysical principles on trinitarian theology. This judgment can be confirmed by taking into account William of Ockham’s rejection of the scotistic view.

The coherence of creation in the word: The rhetoric of lines 1–34 of Chaucer’s General Prologue

Geoffrey Chaucer’s introduction of the pilgrimage motif in lines 1–34 of the General Prologue to The Canterbury Tales combines the pursuit of the beatific vision with an evident interest in life in this world. Participation in God as coherence in Christ, who addresses and sustains the created order, informs the rhetorical structure and intensifying themes and playfulness of these lines. Resonant with the first sentence, the second performatively displays an obediential quality and emergent self and sociality, as Chaucer responds to the demands that the Incarnation places on the Christian poet.