INTRODUCTION Measurement often appears far from benign. Close to home we have the systemwide, at times corrosive effects of student evaluations and popular press rankings. Modern medicine exhibits cycles of advances in measurement, e.g., blood chemistry, followed by development of pharmaceuticals designed to improve those measures. Many are the stories of the athlete more interested in personal than team glory. And then there is the unfolding case of earnings, where we encounter developments in financial engineering and organizational arrangements that seem to have no purpose beyond improving the earnings measure. Economically, we are accustomed to measures being simply a source of information, where Bayesian revision in decision making or valuation and optimal contracting in trading arrangements determine the information’s effect on organizational and individual behavior. Although subtleties surface in a multitask setting, and we know ‘‘bad’’ information can drive out ‘‘good’’ information (e.g., Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991), it seems the story is deeper. A commitment to produce a particular set of measures has the potential to affect the organization’s behavior, to affect productivity, in ways that go beyond traditional information effects. Here we put forward and analyze one such setting. Exactly how the act of measurement produces effects beyond mere information effects is an open question. Our approach is to look to the physical sciences, where measurement is far from benign, and to import the natural effect of measurement in that setting to a human organization. We do not claim this