Bayesian Persuasion Research Articles

Bayesian Persuasion

When is it possible for one person to persuade another to change her action? We consider a symmetric information model where a sender chooses a signal to reveal to a receiver, who then takes a noncontractible action that affects the welfare of both players. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a signal that strictly benefits the sender. We characterize sender-optimal signals. We examine comparative statics with respect to the alignment of the sender's and the receiver's preferences. Finally, we apply our results to persuasion by litigators, lobbyists, and salespeople. (JEL D72, D82, D83, K40, M31)

Certainty, Probability and the Correction of Evidence

What is certain extends well beyond the a priori, the testimony of our senses and the records of our memory. No one engaged in deciding between alternative courses of action or in determining the correct answer to a given question proceeds without making background assumptions which include universal generalizations, statistical hypotheses and theoretical presuppositions. Nor is this sociological fact an indication of imperfection in the human condition from which an ideally rational man ought to be enjoined to escape. To regard a hypothesis h as certain in the sense I am using, is to be committed to discounting risk of error involved in acting on the truth of h. h is accorded probability 1. h is part of the evidential corpus in the light of which the probabilities attached to nonevidential hypotheses are appraised. Many writers of Bayesian persuasion find the view I am advocating philosophically insupportable. Roughly speaking, they insist that, with the possible exception of observation reports of certain kinds, no empirical judgments can be counted as certain; for the truth of universal generalizations, statistical hypotheses and theoretical assumptions cannot be infallibly secured. I yield to no man in my devotion to the thesis that human knowledge is fallible. Indeed, unlike some Bayesians, I regard observation reports as fallible and hold the same to be true of logical