D URING two and one half critical months from late March to midJune 1917, Secretary of War Newton D. Baker helped make three high policy decisions that in a substantial way shaped American industry's part in World War I. The first decision, made on March 28, called for an army of one million men to be raised by selected draft and trained by June 1918. The second, made on May 14, after the arrival of British and French military missions in Washington, directed that an expeditionary force of undetermined size be dispatched to France. The third, made on June 14, declared that those troops should be on the French battle line by the end of July 1918. This army would have to be supplied and equipped, and the country faced a host of difficult if not insurmountable problems in meeting the challenge. Except for government arsenals, usable plant capacity was already committed to producing munitions for the Allies and could not be freed for four to six months. Existing civilian plants had to be converted to war production and new plants had to be built. There was no lead time; weapons had to be approved, in some cases even designed, after American entrance into the war. Traditional military supply procedures also had to be modernized.' Finally, and this is the question toward which this discussion is directed, the business community and the War Department had to be brought together in such a way as to assure prompt delivery of materiel and to avoid unnecessary disruption of civilian production. Just what was Secretary Baker's role in shaping the early policies of the War Industries Board and why after ten months of war were his powers over economic