Basic Emotion Theory Research Articles

Uncertainties of facial emotion recognition technologies and the automation of emotional labour

ABSTRACTAutomated detection and recognition of faces have been implemented in a broad range of media environments. Following that development, what concerns us in this article is the analysis of emotions from facial expressions using computer-based systems, in relation to which we critically investigate the use of theories of basic emotions. We explore in depth the company Affectiva’s attempts to translate, represent and schematize human emotions, as they raise a variety of problems and issues of uncertainty. We analyse the uncertainties concerning the processing of the human face ‘as image’ due to issues concerning temporality and static images as well as polyphony and modulations of the spectrum of expressions. One of our key arguments concerns the temporal character of human emotions, and we address how algorithmically regulated protocols of discretization may be said to prompt specific patterns of emotional responses and expressions based on an ideal of eliminating uncertainty. Through discussions via art pieces by Lauren McCarthy and Kyle McDonald, we question what happens when the protocols of computer systems start to perform aspects of emotional labour for us, making judgments by predicting adequate emotional responses based on the use of the strict metrics criticized in the article.

Basic Emotions in Human Neuroscience: Neuroimaging and Beyond.

The existence of so-called ‘basic emotions’ and their defining attributes represents a long lasting and yet unsettled issue in psychology. Recently, neuroimaging evidence, especially related to the advent of neuroimaging meta-analytic methods, has revitalized this debate in the endeavor of systems and human neuroscience. The core theme focuses on the existence of unique neural bases that are specific and characteristic for each instance of basic emotion. Here we review this evidence, outlining contradictory findings, strengths and limits of different approaches. Constructionism dismisses the existence of dedicated neural structures for basic emotions, considering that the assumption of a one-to-one relationship between neural structures and their functions is central to basic emotion theories. While these critiques are useful to pinpoint current limitations of basic emotions theories, we argue that they do not always appear equally generative in fostering new testable accounts on how the brain relates to affective functions. We then consider evidence beyond PET and fMRI, including results concerning the relation between basic emotions and awareness and data from neuropsychology on patients with focal brain damage. Evidence from lesion studies are indeed particularly informative, as they are able to bring correlational evidence typical of neuroimaging studies to causation, thereby characterizing which brain structures are necessary for, rather than simply related to, basic emotion processing. These other studies shed light on attributes often ascribed to basic emotions, such as automaticity of perception, quick onset, and brief duration. Overall, we consider that evidence in favor of the neurobiological underpinnings of basic emotions outweighs dismissive approaches. In fact, the concept of basic emotions can still be fruitful, if updated to current neurobiological knowledge that overcomes traditional one-to-one localization of functions in the brain. In particular, we propose that the structure-function relationship between brain and emotions is better described in terms of pluripotentiality, which refers to the fact that one neural structure can fulfill multiple functions, depending on the functional network and pattern of co-activations displayed at any given moment.

The Future of Musical Emotions.

Basic Emotion Theory proper (BET) has only recently begun to make an appearance in musical research (see Juslin, 1997, 2013a,b). However, much theory and research in music psychology has been driven by a more general assumption that musical emotions should be investigated in terms of discrete ad-hoc1 categories associated with the ways specific neural mechanisms respond to musical stimuli (see Schiavio et al., 2016). This has been problematized, however, by studies that show that the physiological changes associated with musical emotions do not always align clearly with those exhibited in association with everyday emotion categories (Krumhansl, 1997, p. 351; Scherer and Zentner, 2001). Such concerns have led some scholars to posit that musical emotions may be somehow different (or perhaps “impoverished”) versions of real emotions (Sloboda, 2000). In response to this, other researchers (e.g., Scherer and Coutinho, 2014) have developed models that do away with the notion of basic emotions altogether, preferring instead to describe emotional reactions to music in terms of complex information processing components that combine in various ways to produce relevant outputs (see also Huron, 2006). Still others (Krueger, 2013; van der Schyff, 2013; Schiavio et al., 2016; see also Koelsch, 2013) have suggested that reducing musical experience to a stimulus-response framework—where emotions are thought to be caused in listeners by pre-given stimuli in the environment—may play down the active and creative role living embodied agents play in musical experience. With this in mind, we offer below a brief critique of BET, suggesting that it may not in fact provide the best way forward for research in musical emotions. We then outline an alternative perspective, drawing on research that employs dynamical systems theory (DST) (Lewis and Granic, 2000; Colombetti, 2014). To conclude, we offer some preliminary suggestions for how this approach might be applied in musical contexts. Before we begin, it should be noted that musical research that draws on the idea of basic emotions has indeed produced important insights2. Such studies are carried out in controlled settings that adhere to high scientific research standards—they offer important sources of data that will have to be taken into consideration by any alternative theoretical orientation. To be clear, then, our aim is not to debunk or discredit the work of researchers endorsing BET. Rather, our goal is simply to outline another perspective that could make important contributions to the dialogue3.

Does facial expression recognition provide a toehold for the development of emotion understanding?

The authors explored predictions from basic emotion theory (BET) that facial emotion expression recognition skills are insular with respect to their own development, and yet foundational to the development of emotional perspective-taking skills. Participants included 417 preschool children for whom estimates of these 2 emotion understanding variables and receptive language skills were obtained at 2 time points, separated by 24 weeks. Path results for autoregressive cross-lagged structural equation models revealed support for the BET predictions for younger preschoolers (ages 36 to 48 months). In contrast, results for older preschoolers (ages 49 to 67 months) revealed bidirectional influences between receptive language and emotion understanding consistent with constructionist theories of emotion. Findings support a hybrid model in which associations between receptive language and emotion understanding skills are initially nonsignificant and become significant over time. The implications of emotion expression recognition as an early toehold for the development of more advanced emotion understanding skills are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record

The impact of stimulus arousal level on emotion regulation effectiveness in borderline personality disorder

Basic emotion theory suggests that the effectiveness of different emotion regulation strategies vary with the intensity of the emotionally-salient stimulus. Although findings from studies using healthy samples are concordant with what is proposed by theory, it is unclear whether these relationships hold true among individuals with borderline personality disorder (BPD). Twenty-five individuals with BPD and 30 HCs were exposed to negative images of varying levels of emotional arousal and were instructed to either react as they normally would, distract, or use mindful awareness. Self-reported negativity ratings, heart rate, and skin conductance level (SCL) were monitored throughout. SCL data indicated that increases in image arousal resulted in larger reductions in SCL when distracting but not when implementing mindful awareness. Self-report data suggested that, in HCs, the effectiveness of mindful awareness decreased to a greater extent than distraction when image arousal increased. These findings are consistent with basic emotion research and suggest that some forms of emotion regulation (distraction) are more suited to high emotion arousal contexts than others (mindful awareness) and that, compared with HCs, individuals with BPD may be more resilient to the deteriorating effectiveness of mindful awareness with respect to increasing emotional arousal.

Multivoxel Pattern Analysis Does Not Provide Evidence to Support the Existence of Basic Emotions.

Saarimaki et al. (2015) published a paper claiming to find the neural "fingerprints" for anger, fear, disgust, happiness, sadness, and surprise using multivariate pattern analysis. There are 2 ways in which Saarimaki et al.'s interpretation mischaracterizes their actual findings. The first is statistical: a pattern that successfully distinguishes the members of one category from the members of another (with an accuracy greater than that which might be expected by chance) is not a "fingerprint" (i.e., an essence); it is an abstract, statistical summary of a variable population of instances. The second way in which Saarimaki et al.'s interpretation mischaracterizes their results is conceptual: their findings do not actually meet the specific criteria for basic emotion theory. Instead, their findings are more consistent with a theory of constructed emotion. In our view, Saarimaki et al. is elegant in method and important in that it demonstrates empirical support for a theory of emotion that relies on population thinking; it is also an example of how essentialism-the belief that all instances of a category possesses necessary features that define what is, and what is not, a category member-contributes to a fundamental misunderstanding of the neural basis of emotion.

Mick Power: Madness Cracked

This book is a psychological interpretation of mental disorder proposing a theory-grounded classification system as an alternative primarily to the DSM that became atheoretical with its 3rd edition in 1980. To begin, the author distinguishes objective, subjective, and socially constructed versions of madness and continues with an interesting history of diagnostic classification in psychiatry and clinical psychology. Weaknesses of current DSM and WHO ICF approaches are identified and the author proposes his own theory-grounded alternative based on a schematic, propositional, analogical, and associative representational systems (SPAARS) model of cognitive science. The author then integrates the constructs of drives, emotions, and cognitions (DEC) by how one of these constructs defines primary disorder and the other two affect (and are affected) interactively to produce secondary features of disorder. Chapters are devoted to a description of disorders of biological and social drives with disorders of emotion and cognition in a DEC profile detailing the many ways disorder can individualize drawing on research from cognitive science, most notably Five Factor Personality Theory, Basic Emotion Theory, and Developmental Theories, particularly from the constructs of attachment and temperament. The goal of the book was to ground classification in theory, generating a more thorough understanding of ‘‘madness’’ that is more collectively inclusive of objective, subjective, and socially constructed viewpoints, hence, the title, Cracking Madness. This is a work of extraordinary scholarship drawing on carefully chosen areas of extensive human developmental research supporting a theoretical approach to classification that is vastly more sophisticated than the system used in DSM since 1980. There is no question that a useful diagnostic system based on sound empirical research will generate consistency and validity in classification efforts that improve our ability to understand mental disorder in ways that lead to logically-based treatment decisions. Almost completely, the reader is encouraged to believe that this is a work that will nudge the paradigm shift necessary to re-capture psychological disorder as a primarily psychologic phenomenon producing a proper alternative to today’s dominant and flawed reductionistic, biologic model. The author provides us with an approach that is provocative, complex, and refreshingly comprehensive compared to the over-simplified descriptive approach of a pervasively flawed DSM-5 and its predecessors. Most exciting about this scholarly work is that it provides a groundwork for returning to science-based practices in which well-researched theories feed understanding and decision-making in our attempts to help alleviate suffering of those who are distressed and/or dysfunctional. DEC profiling is truly a potential mechanism for productively enabling a vastly more sophisticated and informative classification system. The approach respects human complexity in a fashion clearly superior to the simple descriptive approach of the medical diagnostic model. This book is recommended as a ‘‘must-read’’ for academicians and clinicians to remind both groups how we profess to function as science-based disciplines. This reviewer finds disappointment only in the unnecessary embracement of the medical model in which the proposed approach is embedded, i.e., an illness-bound one that has failed miserably in producing a safe and effective approach to alleviating suffering in those who are distressed and/or dysfunctional. Nothing in the brilliance of & Fred Ernst fernst@utpa.edu

Intrinsic connectivity in the human brain does not reveal networks for 'basic' emotions.

We tested two competing models for the brain basis of emotion, the basic emotion theory and the conceptual act theory of emotion, using resting-state functional connectivity magnetic resonance imaging (rs-fcMRI). The basic emotion view hypothesizes that anger, sadness, fear, disgust and happiness each arise from a brain network that is innate, anatomically constrained and homologous in other animals. The conceptual act theory of emotion hypothesizes that an instance of emotion is a brain state constructed from the interaction of domain-general, core systems within the brain such as the salience, default mode and frontoparietal control networks. Using peak coordinates derived from a meta-analysis of task-evoked emotion fMRI studies, we generated a set of whole-brain rs-fcMRI 'discovery' maps for each emotion category and examined the spatial overlap in their conjunctions. Instead of discovering a specific network for each emotion category, variance in the discovery maps was accounted for by the known domain-general network. Furthermore, the salience network is observed as part of every emotion category. These results indicate that specific networks for each emotion do not exist within the intrinsic architecture of the human brain and instead support the conceptual act theory of emotion.

Affective Neuroscience and the Causes of the Mutiny of the French 82nd Infantry Brigade

AbstractThis article seeks to demonstrate how some elements of affective neuroscience and basic emotions theory can be used to inform historical reasoning. It begins with an overview of contemporary basic emotions theory. It then provides a case study of the mutiny of the French 82nd Infantry Brigade, which took place on 1–2 June 1917, interpreting the events of the mutiny in the light of some tenets of basic emotions theory. It focuses specifically on how alcohol consumption among mutineers affected their experience of the basic emotions of fear and anger. Finally, it addresses some empirical and theoretical shortcomings of the approach and concludes tentatively that some elements of affective neuroscience and basic emotions theory can be useful to historians.

Comment: What’s Basic About the Brain Mechanisms of Emotion?

While it is common to think that neuroscientists are proponents of basic emotions theory, this is not necessarily the case. My ideas, for example are more aligned with cognitive than basic emotions theories.

More on James and the Physical Basis of Emotion

We first present a reconstruction of James’s theory of emotion (JATE) and then argue for four theses: (a) Despite constructivist elements, James’s views are overall in line with basic emotions theory. (b) JATE does not exclude an influence of emotion on intentional action even in its original formulation; nevertheless, this influence is quite limited. It seems possible, however, to repair this problem of the theory. (c) Cannon’s theory of emotion is a centralized version of JATE that inherits from the latter theory a potentially fatal flaw, the insufficient physiological differentiation of emotions. (d) The core claim of JATE, that emotions are bodily feelings, is very likely false.

Introduction: William James and His Legacy

Several colleagues recently told me that they are rereading William James on emotion. Smart idea. James articulated as yet unanswered questions at the heart of affective science. With the understandable exception of Charles Darwin, William James is the scientist from the 19th century whose ideas most continue to stimulate theoretical debate and empirical research. All theories of emotion today assume Darwinian evolution; only some theories are Jamesian, others anti-Jamesian. James was perhaps the first to spell the word is with all capital letters when he stated what he meant by emotion: Emotion IS a perception. When subsequent writers endorsed or debated James by redefining emotion, controversy ensued. This special section does not resolve the controversies, but does expose them in the clearest form yet. It challenges parts of the received view of James: that he defined emotion as visceral activity, that his definition allowed emotion researchers to abandon the armchair for the physiology laboratory, and that the visceral theory was refuted by Walter Cannon. This special section discusses whether current treatments of James interpret him correctly, whether there are really two Jamesian theories, and whether he proposed basic emotions. Deigh (2014) drops back in history to examine the ideas James simply presupposed and those he sought to overturn. Deigh also moves forward to critique today’s Jamesian revival. Dror (2014) moves forward in history to consider Cannon and the James– Cannon (peripheralist–centralist) debate that dominated emotion research in the first part of the 20th century and continues today. Ellsworth (2014) argues that James proposed an appraisal rather than basic emotion theory. Laird and Lacasse (2014) reply to Cannon’s refutation of James, present a modern version of James’s theory, and review modern evidence supporting that version. Reisenzein and Stephan (2014) critique that modern evidence and comment on each of the other articles. The authors reply.

Some Further Thoughts on Emotions and Natural Kinds

In this brief reply, which cannot do justice to all of the valuable points my commentators have raised, I defend the view that the notion of natural kind I have introduced satisfies the ontological independence criterion and is in keeping with the commitments of realism. I also further clarify the scope of my argument against basic emotion theory, and reiterate that we should stop looking for universal theories of discrete emotions.

Teaching emotion recognition skills to young children with autism: a randomised controlled trial of an emotion training programme

Children with autism have difficulties in emotion recognition and a number of interventions have been designed to target these problems. However, few emotion training interventions have been trialled with young children with autism and co-morbid ID. This study aimed to evaluate the efficacy of an emotion training programme for a group of young children with autism with a range of intellectual ability. Participants were 55 children with autistic disorder, aged 4-7 years (FSIQ 42-107). Children were randomly assigned to an intervention (n = 28) or control group (n = 27). Participants in the intervention group watched a DVD designed to teach emotion recognition skills to children with autism (the Transporters), whereas the control group watched a DVD of Thomas the Tank Engine. Participants were assessed on their ability to complete basic emotion recognition tasks, mindreading and theory of mind (TOM) tasks before and after the 4-week intervention period, and at 3-month follow-up. Analyses controlled for the effect of chronological age, verbal intelligence, gender and DVD viewing time on outcomes. Children in the intervention group showed improved performance in the recognition of anger compared with the control group, with few improvements maintained at 3-month follow-up. There was no generalisation of skills to TOM or social skills. The Transporters programme showed limited efficacy in teaching basic emotion recognition skills to young children with autism with a lower range of cognitive ability. Improvements were limited to the recognition of expressions of anger, with poor maintenance of these skills at follow-up. These findings provide limited support for the efficacy of the Transporters programme for young children with autism of a lower cognitive range.

Emotion expression in body action and posture.

Emotion communication research strongly focuses on the face and voice as expressive modalities, leaving the rest of the body relatively understudied. Contrary to the early assumption that body movement only indicates emotional intensity, recent studies have shown that body movement and posture also conveys emotion specific information. However, a deeper understanding of the underlying mechanisms is hampered by a lack of production studies informed by a theoretical framework. In this research we adopted the Body Action and Posture (BAP) coding system to examine the types and patterns of body movement that are employed by 10 professional actors to portray a set of 12 emotions. We investigated to what extent these expression patterns support explicit or implicit predictions from basic emotion theory, bidimensional theory, and componential appraisal theory. The overall results showed partial support for the different theoretical approaches. They revealed that several patterns of body movement systematically occur in portrayals of specific emotions, allowing emotion differentiation. Although a few emotions were prototypically expressed by one particular pattern, most emotions were variably expressed by multiple patterns, many of which can be explained as reflecting functional components of emotion such as modes of appraisal and action readiness. It is concluded that further work in this largely underdeveloped area should be guided by an appropriate theoretical framework to allow a more systematic design of experiments and clear hypothesis testing.

Faces in Context: A Review and Systematization of Contextual Influences on Affective Face Processing

Facial expressions are of eminent importance for social interaction as they convey information about other individuals’ emotions and social intentions. According to the predominant “basic emotion” approach, the perception of emotion in faces is based on the rapid, automatic categorization of prototypical, universal expressions. Consequently, the perception of facial expressions has typically been investigated using isolated, de-contextualized, static pictures of facial expressions that maximize the distinction between categories. However, in everyday life, an individual’s face is not perceived in isolation, but almost always appears within a situational context, which may arise from other people, the physical environment surrounding the face, as well as multichannel information from the sender. Furthermore, situational context may be provided by the perceiver, including already present social information gained from affective learning and implicit processing biases such as race bias. Thus, the perception of facial expressions is presumably always influenced by contextual variables. In this comprehensive review, we aim at (1) systematizing the contextual variables that may influence the perception of facial expressions and (2) summarizing experimental paradigms and findings that have been used to investigate these influences. The studies reviewed here demonstrate that perception and neural processing of facial expressions are substantially modified by contextual information, including verbal, visual, and auditory information presented together with the face as well as knowledge or processing biases already present in the observer. These findings further challenge the assumption of automatic, hardwired categorical emotion extraction mechanisms predicted by basic emotion theories. Taking into account a recent model on face processing, we discuss where and when these different contextual influences may take place, thus outlining potential avenues in future research.

Affective transfer computing model based on attenuation emotion mechanism

According to the basic emotion theories, this paper defines emotion induced variable, personality space, mood space, emotion space, mood attenuation and emotion attenuation, then induces mood and emotion attenuation cure and builds the mapping relationship among personality, mood and emotion. Emotional decision-making model is also presented according to mood updating equation and emotion updating equation and it is used for facial expression synthesis. The model constructed can reasonably reflect the law of changes of human emotions and the wave process of the mood state and emotion state of people with introversive or extroversive personality under external stimuli of five single-attribute signals and multi-attribute signal. A facial expression robot is built to work as the experiment platform to produce expression outputs. The simulation results demonstrate that the affective model can better simulate the dynamic process of the change of emotion and mood and provide a new mechanism for the affective decision-making of human-computer interaction systems.

Introduction to a Special Section on Basic Emotion Theory

The various emotions we witness or experience can be divided into classes. All languages include words for such classes; English lists joy, grief, fear, love, and on and on. Some theorists—called here basic emotion theorists— propose that there are classes that cut nature at the joints, that capture hardwired centrally organized syndromes of coordinated emotional responses, or at least some theorists propose something along these lines. What exactly do basic emotion theorists propose? We need to have clear and current statements of the various theories included under this umbrella phrase (such is the narrow but important goal of Part 1 of the special section). Additionally, we need to see how basic emotion theory adjusts to or withstands criticisms and alternatives (the goal of Part 2). Such problems motivated the current special section. Basic emotion theory has been and remains the major program for scientific research on emotion. Yet, the phrase basic emotion theory covers a range of theories, different theorists propose somewhat different theories, and theories evolve over time. Basic emotion theory might better be characterized as an evolving program of scientific research that has offered a family of theories, methods, and empirical results. This program is central to discourse on emotion. It has been the object of criticism and the theory against which alternatives are contrasted. Conceptual progress in the field of emotion (which is after all the goal of the journal Emotion Review) requires explications, critiques, and defenses of basic emotion theory. This special section of Emotion Review consists of two parts. In Part 1, we invited four active researchers and their colleagues broadly identified with basic emotion theory; indeed their names are synonyms for basic emotion theorist. We asked these theorists to provide a position article with a focus on their theory today. The central question asked is this: What are the main assumptions and hypotheses of your theory? In order to facilitate comparisons between theories, we also followed in Ekman and Davidson’s (1994) footsteps by providing a list of eight more specific questions. Indeed, the Ekman– Davidson list was the starting point for ours. In this way, the different theorists address the same set of issues. (Each article provides the list of questions.) Theorists were not of course restricted to just these issues. Although our focus was on obtaining clear statements of the theory, we also asked each writer to point briefly to evidence supporting each proposition or to the kind of evidence that would test it. We invited Jessica Tracy and Daniel Randles to compare and contrast the final versions of these four articles. In Part 2, we invited a new set of theorists also broadly identified with basic emotion theory. We asked these theorists to define or extend or revise (or not) basic emotion theory in light of problems, criticisms, and alternatives that have arisen over the years. For example, questions have been raised about the clarity and status of basic emotion concepts and about data that seem inconsistent with some of its assumptions. The theorists were not given specific criticisms or questions to address, but chose those issues they thought most interesting to consider. The aim of Part 2 was not to repeat or even respond to the arguments; rather, it was to improve the clarity and precision of basic emotion concepts, to extend or revise these theories in light of the criticisms, to incorporate new ideas into basic emotion theory, or perhaps even integrate an alternative with basic emotion theory.

Don’t Give Up on Basic Emotions

We argue that there are three coherent, nontrivial notions of basic-ness: conceptual basic-ness, biological basic-ness, and psychological basic-ness. There is considerable evidence for conceptually basic emotion categories (e.g., “anger,” “fear”). These categories do not designate biologically basic emotions, but some forms of anger, fear, and so on that are biologically basic in a sense we will specify. Finally, two notions of psychological basic-ness are distinguished, and the evidence for them is evaluated. The framework we offer acknowledges the force of some of the objections to basic emotion theory whilst demonstrating that the notion of a basic emotion, once properly reformulated, is still of scientific value.

What is an emotion? An introduction to the study of emotions

Human emotions are hypothetic constructs based on psychological and physiological data. According to the psychoevolutionnist theories, all emotions derive from a set of discrete basic emotions, common to human and animals, genetically determined. Basic emotions are thus considered as physiological processes based on specific neuronal circuits. On the contrary, for appraisal and social theories, emotions are psychological processes resulting from the cognitive appraisal of the stimulus-event for the well-being and objectives of the subject, and are of social origin. They develop during life, especially in childhood, from interactions between the individual and his environement. According to the appraisal or constructivist theories, no sharp distinction is to be made between emotions and other manifestations of the affective life. Emotions require the global functioning of the brain, even if more specialized regions are involved. They play a fundamental role in the development of the child's psychological and social life. They mediate the subject's response to the stimulus-event, allowing more appropriate reactions than fixed instinctive ones. Nevertheless, the adaptative function of every emotion or their every component can be questioned. Emotional disturbances are major consequences of psychiatric or neurological disorders. The link between the results of neuropsychological studies of emotions based on the recognition of emotional facal expression according to the basic emotion theory, and the emotional disturbances experienced in daily life is highly questionable on account of the high complexity of human affective life.