Baseball Owners Research Articles

Major League Rebels: Baseball Battles over Workers’ Rights and American Empire by Robert Elias and Peter Dreier

Reviewed by: Major League Rebels: Baseball Battles over Workers’ Rights and American Empire by Robert Elias and Peter Dreier Mark McGee Robert Elias and Peter Dreier. Major League Rebels: Baseball Battles over Workers’ Rights and American Empire. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2022. 336 pp. Cloth, $38.00. Any book with the word “rebel” in its title is going to attract my attention, as people who have not been happy with the way things are and fight for change are fascinating to me. With a foreword written by former Major League pitcher Bill “Spaceman” Lee I was further convinced I was going to like this book before I ever started a chapter. Authors Robert Elias and Peter Dreier didn’t disappointment me with their book Major League Rebels: Baseball Battles over Workers’ Rights and American Empire. This is an extensive examination of the often-dark side of baseball from a business standpoint with players in battles over low pay, overall treatment, and racism. The authors skillfully show how baseball owners in the late 1800s mimicked the businessmen of the day, who took advantage of their workers in every way possible in order to fill their pockets. The revolt of players during [End Page 120] the era known as the “Gilded Age” sets the stage for future dissent among baseball players. Labor issues, the way pro baseball deals with events such as wars, patriotism, and segregation are all examined under a harsh light. But into the light they thrust many players a reader may not have heard about before. Every baseball fan knows, or should know, Curt Flood unsuccessfully fought the reserve clause through legal channels. But as the authors point out, players across all pro leagues received an education in how the reserve clause worked with players being treated as property rather than human beings. Flood saw his baseball career end as a result of his beliefs, but he laid the foundation for the multimillionaire players of today. Marvin Miller, the executive director of the Major League Baseball Players’ Association, is legendary for making the union successful after years of false starts. But Elias and Dreier also give readers in- depth looks at players like Jim O’Rourke, Tim Keefe, Danny Gardella, and Tony Lupien, to name a few rebellious players profiled in the book whose names aren’t in the mainstream. One of the more interesting parts of the book is how the Mexican League, which provided a safe haven for Black players, attracted several major league players through higher salaries. Jorge Pasquel owned the league and was a thorn in the side of major league owners for many years with some big- name players making the move south of the border. His challenge to Major League Baseball would end as his money eventually ran out. Any book about baseball rebels has to include pitcher Jim Bouton, author of the infamous book Ball Four. Bouton, already known as a player who didn’t mind challenging the New York Yankees, his first major league team, was banned from old-timers’ day at Yankee Stadium. Bowie Kuhn, the commissioner of baseball at the time the book was published, tried to influence Bouton to say publicly his stories in the book were more imaginative than accurate. A threat throughout the book is how baseball purists— including owners, executives, sports writers, and even some players—tried to protest the sport as being untarnished in any way. Elias and Dreier dedicate their book to Terry Cannon, Bouton, Flood, and Miller. All were true rebels in the eyes of the baseball establishment, so it was fitting they were chosen. The only complaint about the book is the authors often let their political views and beliefs show through instead of merely letting the facts tell the story. They destroy the myth that baseball is as American as apple pie. Some baseball purists may not enjoy what Elias and Dreier have to say, but I found the book to be well researched and interesting on many levels. [End Page 121] Copyright © 2023 University of Nebraska Press

Hairs vs. Squares: The Mustache Gang, the Big Red Machine, and the Tumultuous Summer of '72 by Ed Gruver

Reviewed by: Hairs vs. Squares: The Mustache Gang, the Big Red Machine, and the Tumultuous Summer of '72 by Ed Gruver Brian E. Campbell Ed Gruver, Hairs vs. Squares: The Mustache Gang, the Big Red Machine, and the Tumultuous Summer of '72. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2016. 408 pp. $29.95 (cloth). Journalist Ed Gruver's Hairs vs. Squares chronicles the 1972 Major League Baseball season. In doing so, he provides a window for exploring broader tensions in national culture and identity in the United States following the turbulent 1960s. Gruver shows how the media framed the 1972 World Series matchup between the Cincinnati Reds and Oakland Athletics as a contest between conservative midwestern values and emerging liberal politics on the West Coast. Citing how the media portrayed differences in style, dress, and appearance, Gruver's book shows that by studying the Reds/A's series, we can trace the origins of contemporary debates over culture in public discourse. Each chapter moves the story forward chronologically, beginning with baseball's off-season in February and culminating in the Reds/A's series in November. Along the way, Gruver stops to comment on pivotal moments during the spring and summer months. He is at his best in this regard when describing the 1972 labor strike that occurred during the opening week of the season—the first of its kind in MLB history. Gruver rightly argues that while brief, the April strike "set the stage for future labor disputes in each of America's four major sports" (53). It would still be two years before MLB abolished the reserve clause, finally giving players the opportunity to negotiate contracts with other teams in free agency. But in 1972, players realized their labor power in an unprecedented way: Baseball owners would have to contend with a powerful players' union moving forward. The Cincinnati media responded to the labor strike with great animosity towards the ballplayers. Gruver explains that Reds owner Francis Dale—who also owned [End Page 188] the Cincinnati Enquirer—used his newspaper to undermine the players' strike and generate the sentiment among fans that greedy athletes were cheating hard-working, blue-collar fans out of their national pastime (63). Throughout Hairs vs. Squares, Gruver suggests that differences in style and dress were central to media depictions of the Reds and A's. He writes that in an "era in which one's personal appearance was oft en a political statement, the free-spirited, long-haired, and mustachioed A's represented the California youth movement, campus protests at UCLA, and the counterculture" (3). The team's anti-establishment look and attitude "conjured up images of Berkeley students taking on the military-industrial complex," according to Gruver (301). In contrast, the Cincinnati Reds embodied the conservative history of baseball as the team of traditional values and midwestern sensibility. Conservative sportswriters in Cincinnati negatively referred to Oakland's ballplayers as "hippies and Yippies" in contrast to the home team's more straight-laced, traditional appearance (3). The World Series, then, became more than just a sporting event—it represented a drama played out in public discourse about differences in regional cultural identity. Hairs vs. Squares also examines how baseball's demographics changed as Latino stars like Tony Pérez, César Gerónimo, and Dave Concepción emerged as key players for the Reds in 1972. Latino ballplayers made up 9 percent of major leaguers that year, and that number was estimated to rise to 11 percent by the end of 1973 (132). The 1972 season represented a turning point as Latinos changed the racial makeup of baseball in the U.S. for good. In chapter 12, Gruver elaborates on the Latino experience by profiling former Pittsburgh Pirates catcher Manny Sanguillén. Sanguillén was born in Panama and broke into professional baseball with the Columbus, Ohio, minor league team in the late 1960s. Sanguillén spoke little English when he first arrived in Columbus, but he soon met other Spanish-speaking players who helped him navigate life in the Midwest (261). Hairs vs. Squares reminds us that by 1972, Latino players were living and working in various midwestern cities, creating a network that...

A History of Baseball and Paper Mills [History

On Saturday night, 22 October 2016, I witnessed the Chicago Cubs clinch a place in baseball's 2016 World Series after capturing the pennant during the National League Central Division playoffs with the Los Angeles Dodgers. Not since 1945 had this baseball club been able to accomplish this extraordinary feat. It was on 28 May 1957, at a National League baseball owners midseason meeting in Chicago, that the decision was made to move the Brooklyn Dodgers franchise to Los Angeles. Chicago, of course, has always been known as a baseball town, and the young Cubs players, in their early 20s, magically captured the hearts of their devoted fans in winning their place in history once again.

Smooth Operators: Recent Collective Bargaining in Major League Baseball

In late 2011, at a time when other leagues such as the National Football League and the National Basketball Association had engaged in work stoppages, Major League Baseball owners and the MLB Players Association harmoniously agreed on a new five-year collective bargaining agreement. This article focuses on the reasons why MLB as an industry has maintained labor peace after decades of work stoppages. The primary aspects of the new MLB CBA, such as changes to the revenue sharing system, competitive balance tax, salary arbitration, and the amateur draft are addressed. The manner in which these economic mechanisms affect areas such as competitive balance will be analyzed. Lastly, a comparison was undertaken of the collective bargaining environment in MLB versus other professional sports leagues and other non-sports industries.

Horace Stoneham and the Breaking of Baseball’s Second Color Barrier

Horace Stoneham and the Breaking of Baseball’s Second Color Barrier Robert F. Garratt (bio) Baseball history has not been kind to Horace Stoneham.1 The owner of one of the most storied major-league franchises during a time when New York dominated the baseball world, who shocked that world when he moved his team to California in 1958, he has become nonetheless almost a forgotten man by those who chronicle the game. On those rare occasions when he is mentioned, it is usually to underscore his reputation as a hard-drinking, friendly yet plodding owner whose shortcomings prevail over his strengths, rather than to comment on his achievements or contributions to the game.2 The course of this reception runs in large part because of Stoneham’s personality. A shy and reticent type, he never sought the public stage as did his fellow owners at the time; Jacob Ruppert, Larry MacPhail, Branch Rickey, and Walter O’Malley were outgoing men at ease with writers and journalists. For most baseball historians, Stoneham was affable but uninteresting, someone playing second or third fiddle in the music of New York City baseball, behind the Yankees and the Dodgers. Once he came to San Francisco, his Giants always seemed to finish second best, usually to the Dodgers, who, along with Walter O’Malley, became the darlings of the West Coast media.3 The last thorough discussion of Stoneham as a baseball man was written over thirty-five years ago by Roger Angell, when he paid a visit to Candlestick Park in 1975, Stoneham’s last year as the owner of the San Francisco Giants. Aware that after fifty-seven years of family ownership Stoneham was selling the team (indeed, the chief reason for the writer’s visit), Angell views him rather nostalgically, as if granted a fleeting glimpse of a vanishing species, “the last of the pure baseball men, the owners who owned nothing but their team and cared for nothing but the game.”4 Angell’s account is largely an affectionate one, stressing Stoneham’s congenial company, his shy somewhat reclusive nature, his well-known kindness and generosity, his sentimentality and loyalty toward his players and those who work in the franchise’s organization, and above all else, his deep love for baseball history, especially the [End Page 42] Giants’ history, evident in his extraordinary recall of past games and previous greats, such as John McGraw, Frank Frisch, Mel Ott, and Carl Hubbell. Once the regular season started, Stoneham rarely missed a Giants home game but never ventured onto the field or into the clubhouse, preferring instead the isolation of his centerfield office in the Polo Grounds or his solitary perch in Candlestick Park’s owner’s box, high above the action, which is where he sat on the day of Angell’s visit, reminiscing about the game he was leaving.5 In his focus on Stoneham’s character and personality, Angell follows the lead of Bill Veeck, a former baseball owner who dealt with Stoneham on many schemes and transactions. Veeck’s portrait of Stoneham, different from Angell’s in its sarcastic and irreverent slant, appeared almost ten years earlier in 1966 and portrays the Giants owner as one of the shrewdest operators in the game. Veeck was characteristically blunt in his assessment of Stoneham. “The two men I least cared to match myself against during my days of free wheeling hustling were Branch Rickey and Horace Stoneham.”6 Veeck catalogues Stoneham’s many victims, himself included, who have wandered into negotiations with Stoneham, hoping to take advantage of his reputation as a notorious drinker and strip him of a player or two, only to end up drunk themselves, giving old Horace exactly what he wanted all along.7 In 1958, according to Veeck, Phillies general manager Roy Hamey talked Stoneham into trading Ruben Gomez for the journeyman Jack Sanford, not knowing that Stoneham had lost faith in Gomez as a starter and had secretly yearned for a stalwart right-handed pitcher like Sanford. Sanford went on to great things for San Francisco, including winning twenty-four games in their pennant year of 1962; Gomez, on the other hand, won only...

Fantasy baseball: A new way to gamble or just another game?

The controversy over whether fantasy sports should be considered a new form of gambling was investigated. The predominance rule was used to operationally define gambling. This rule states that an activity is gambling if outcomes are due more to chance than to skill. Individuals active in a fantasy baseball league (commonly referred to as "owners") and individuals who had never entered any type of fantasy league ("non-owners") participated. Perceptions of skill-to-chance ratios were assessed and a content analysis of the specific skill and chance features involved in fantasy baseball was conducted. The results showed that fantasy baseball owners and non-owners judged outcomes to be more the result of skill. In an attempt to determine whether these results were supported by actual outcomes, a second study analyzed the records of a fantasy baseball league over an extended period. The findings of this additional study also suggest that skill may predominant over chance.

The Baseball-Radio War, 1931-1935

The Baseball-Radio War, 1931-1935 James R. Walker (bio) The emergence of radio in the 1920s as a significant new medium of mass communication was greeted by most Major League Baseball (MLB) owners with suspicion and apprehension. Owners feared the new medium would reduce attendance and compromise their symbiotic relationship with the newspaper industry. East Coast and American League teams were especially antiradio, while some clubs in the Midwest, especially the Chicago Cubs, were proradio. Initially, teams received limited, if any, rights fees to allow the broadcasting of their games, so there was little economic incentive to let radio in the ballpark gate. However, a few forward-thinking owners saw radio as a positive promotional device that could sell baseball to new customers, including women working in the home. It might also charm children, spawning the next generation of fans. Since the games were played during the day, women and children were the major groups in the radio audience. As the 1930s dawned, the Great Depression forced owners to consider new options for replacing revenues lost from declining attendance. At the same time, some sponsors, General Mills in particular, aggressively promoted the sponsorship of baseball on the radio to sell breakfast cereal (e.g., Wheaties) to children. The growing war between some baseball owners and radio came to a head at a series of league meetings in the 1930s. These pivotal confrontations between the lords of America's national pastime and the medium that millions used every day to pass the time would change the relationship between baseball and radio, establishing a blueprint that would carry over to television. As wars go, even metaphoric ones, the baseball-radio war of the 1930s was a minor skirmish. Unlike the war on poverty, the war on drugs, or the war on terrorism, the baseball-radio war would not receive much national attention. A few articles in the New York Times, Broadcasting, and the Sporting News would suffice to cover the conflict. But like many actual wars, the baseball-radio war was never officially declared and was part of a larger confrontation. [End Page 53] Newspapers vs. Radio The baseball-radio war of the early 1930s was a minor battle in the larger press-radio war. Newspapers owned the news prior to the emergence of radio in the 1920s. Competition among local papers was fierce, but limited to members of the daily print club. Radio news grew slowly in the 1920s. NBC's news bureau consisted of one reporter as late as 1933. Radio news was generally part of a station's "sustaining time," unsponsored programming typically offered to please federal regulators, and provided programming to maintain the station's signal and presence in the market. But newspapers were still afraid of the new voices from the ether. Radio could cover news as it happened from the scene and certainly before a print version, even an extra, could appear. Radio could always scoop the printed word. In December 1933, the newspaper industry (AP, UP, INS, American Newspaper Publishers Association) and the radio industry (NBC, CBS, National Association of Broadcasters) all but shut down radio news when they signed the Biltmore Agreement at the hotel of the same name in Washington, DC. The agreement was decidedly one-sided, with major concessions from the radio industry. In the future, radio news would have to be unsponsored (therefore unprofitable), supplied by the newspaper industry's Press-Radio Bureau, and limited to times that would insure that morning and evening newspapers would always present the news first. The radio industry agreed to this outlandish restraint of trade because news was not seen as profitable and newspapers controlled the major wire services. The Biltmore Agreement began to unravel almost immediately; by the end of 1934, independent (non-network) stations, who had not signed the agreement, began to program news extensively and profitably.1 Within this context, baseball's radio-coverage restrictions were clearly supported by newspapers and were part of the print media attempts to control its competition. Owners were aware of the value of newspaper publicity in selling tickets, while, in a classic symbiotic relationship, newspapers sold more papers by extensively covering the national pastime. This...

One man out: Curt Flood versus baseball

When Curt Flood, all-star center fielder for the St. Louis Cardinals, refused to be traded to the Philadelphia Phillies in 1968, he sent shock waves throughout professional baseball that ultimately reached the Supreme Court. Flood challenged the game's reserve clause system that bound players to teams as if they were property; and while others had previously spoken out against this arrangement, protected by Congress and the courts for a century, he was the first to pursue his grievance as doggedly or as far.Robert Goldman now offers a new look at Flood's efforts to shake the foundations of major league baseball. One Man Out takes readers back to the pre-steroid era when baseball was as much a passion as a pastime - and when race was often still a factor - to focus on decisions made in the courtrooms rather than the dugouts.Flood claimed that the prevailing system was illegal because it violated the Sherman antitrust laws by allowing teams to monopolize the sport in a way that impeded players' freedom and financial gain - and was even unconstitutional because it, in effect, imposed a form of slavery. Baseball owners countered that players owed their success to the reserve system because it maintained competitive balance among teams and heightened interest in the game, which helped fund their high salaries.Although the Supreme Court ruled against Flood, it left the door open to legislation that would remove baseball's special exemption from antitrust regulation and to future collective bargaining. With its credibility enhanced, the players' union continued negotiations until it finally won a version of free agency very similar to Flood's, with his final vindication coming in the form of the Curt Flood Act of 1998.In replaying the confrontation between Flood and baseball commissioner Bowie Kuhn, Goldman demonstrates that even a lost lawsuit, with its game-like competition, can be a landmark. And by telling the inside story of the case, he highlights a key labor relations issue in America's most popular sport. Concise and balanced, and written in a fast-paced narrative style, One Man Out reminds students, general readers, and fans that Flood holds a unique and important place in both baseball and American law.

Baseball and Dissent: The Vietnam Experience

Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the Sporting News, speaking for the baseball establishment, editorialized that the sport would do its part the war effort, asserting that in all the history of baseball there never was a conscientious objector or a slacker the ranks. During the early 1950s, Commissioner of Baseball Ford Frick proclaimed that organized baseball would the ideological Cold War as well as the shooting war Korea. Frick insisted that the national pastime would indoctrinate youth on the virtues of democracy and a proud part of our ideal way of life. (1) Such patriotic rhetoric made the case for baseball's inclusion within the national consensus. In a similar fashion, professional baseball embraced the flag after the tragic events of September 11, 2001. Rallying to the refrain of support the the baseball establishment endorsed American military action Afghanistan and Iraq. Games often begin with salutes to the troops, and telecasts often include shots of soldiers the war zone watching their favorite teams. Baseball is portrayed as providing an essential morale function for the troops. Well-compensated professional baseball players are reluctant to challenge this nationalistic hegemony. First baseman Carlos Delgado, however, is a notable exception. During the 2004 season, sportswriters began to notice that Delgado, then playing for the Toronto Blue Jays, disappeared into the clubhouse when Irving Berlin's God Bless America was played. After 9/11, Berlin's tune replaced Take Me Out to the Ball Game many parks, especially Yankee Stadium. Delgado took exception to this practice, arguing that the song was being used to justify American military intervention Iraq rather than to honor the victims of 9/11. Terming the invasion of Iraq as the stupidest war ever, Delgado stuck to his principles, despite jeering and chants of U-S-A, U-S-A when he played Yankee Stadium. (2) Delgado's dissent, however, did not prevent him from signing a four-year, fifty-two million dollar contract with the Florida Marlins 2005. While some Florida complained about Delgado's politics, his new teammates welcomed the acquisition, which they hoped would lead to another World Series appearance for the franchise. The baseball establishment did not appear overly threatened by Delgado's lone dissent. The 1960s and the Vietnam War, however, were another time and place. With dissent permeating the culture, the sport was less tolerant of those who questioned authority or military policy. Baseball officials embraced the Vietnam War, but there was a considerable gap between their rhetoric and actions. Before addressing baseball and dissent during the Vietnam era, it is necessary to briefly examine how the sport responded to World Wars I and II, as well as the conflict Korea. The United States entered World War I the spring of 1917, but the conflict did not immediately impact the sport. Lacking the drama of a triggering event such as Pearl Harbor, ballplayers did not flock to the colors. It is often forgotten that there was considerable opposition to the war and conscription among working-class Americans. Baseball owners attempted to demonstrate their patriotism by raising funds to purchase athletic equipment for servicemen. But any expectation that the game might remain exempt from manpower needs was crushed May 1918 when the government issued a work or fight order. The order established July 1 as the deadline by which young men nonessential industries, such as baseball, would become eligible for the draft. To complete the season, baseball officials were able to get Secretary of War Newton Baker to extend the deadline until the first of September. Major League Baseball concluded its 1918 season on Labor Day, followed by the World Series between the Boston Red Sox and Chicago Cubs. After the season, players either obtained jobs factories producing war-related products or joined the military. …

Financial Incentives and League Policy: The Example of Major League Baseball's Steroid Policy

This paper illustrates possible changes in revenue from league drug policies. We argue that there were perceived financial incentives for Major League Baseball (MLB) to not have a steroid policy. MLB did not begin testing players for steroids in earnest until the 2005 season although the league office acknowledged use a decade and a half earlier. Only after outside pressure did the league implement a policy with specific, enforceable penalties. This paper uses regression analysis to assess whether the absence of a true steroid policy prior to 2005 affected scoring, then quantifies the amount of revenue baseball owners lost as a consequence of the updated steroid policy.

Burying the Black Sox: How Baseball's Cover-Up of the 1919 World Series Fix Almost Succeeded (review)

Reviewed by: Burying the Black Sox: How Baseball’s Cover-Up of the 1919 World Series Fix Almost Succeeded Bill Swanson Gene Carney. Burying the Black Sox: How Baseball’s Cover-Up of the 1919 World Series Fix Almost Succeeded. Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2006. 303 pp. Cloth, $26.95. Whatever we know about the "Big Fix," author Gene Carney instructs us to leave at the door as we enter his treatment of this tragic baseball event. Having read numerous books and articles on the topic, I found this difficult to do. The instruction, however, has merit. Through his extensive research, Carney has determined that the Black Sox [End Page 143] scandal of 1919 was far more complicated than we have traditionally believed. The title of Eliot Asinof's 1963 book, Eight Men Out, is really a misnomer. True, eight members of the Chicago White Sox were banned from baseball for life by newly appointed commissioner Kenesaw Mountain Landis for throwing the 1919 World Series, but the fingers of guilt extended far beyond these eight ballplayers. Carney states, If baseball reflects America, then in this story we see corporate America, reflected in the White Sox and Major League Baseball, silencing whistle-blowers, keeping real investigators off the trail, controlling the damage and the spin, and finally, when the lid is blown, keeping the focus on eight employees, as if they alone had "guilty knowledge." (xv) This seems to be supported by the fact that only select parts of the accused players' testimonies were reported in the papers, which, in turn, were controlled by the owners. Carney's perspective is that the lords of baseball knew what was going on during and after the fact, yet tried desperately to cover it up and retain public favor so baseball would not go the way of boxing and horse racing. Even Landis's attribution of equal guilt to all eight players may have served to cover the roles of the owners in this sordid mess. The setting for the "Big Fix" was a different scene from today's. In 1919 baseball and gambling were strongly connected. It was not unusual to see Arnold Rothstein, a big-time New York City gambler, in the luxury box of Charles Stoneham, owner of the New York Giants. For years, baseball owners had closed their eyes to the gambling problems plaguing baseball. Carney states, Baseball was in the stranglehold of gamblers, and had been for some time. Gambling and cheating in baseball were not isolated . . . nor were these activities indulged in only by players. The Black Sox scandal was more like the tip of an iceberg. But Major League Baseball could not let that become widely known, or the sport would collapse. (237) Carney's book raises more questions than it answers. He presents conflicting testimony, confessions and subsequent denials, and the "disappearance" of grand jury testimonies. Carney states, There was too much monkey business—competing syndicates double-crossing each other, stiffing players, players stiffing players, players telling other players who's in and who's not, but lying, perhaps. Then there's the problem of the players who were in on the fix changing their minds—possibly at different times, maybe even during games. (270) Did some of the players who were initially in on the fix want out, but couldn't remove themselves for fear of reprisal from gamblers? And is it that obvious when a player isn't doing his best? Mistakes—errors and strikeouts, for instance—happen even when people are really trying. [End Page 144] Over the years, some have claimed that the idea of fixing the 1919 World Series came from one or more of the players on the White Sox. Others believe the plot was hatched by gamblers. Establishing exactly what happened more than eighty years after the fact is a very difficult, if not impossible, task. Carney quotes Louis Hegeman, an Illinois attorney, in a presentation on the case of Joe Jackson at the 1992 Convention of the Society for American Baseball Research: "No two historians have agreed on what occurred in the World Series of 1919 and its aftermath" (286). Rather than answering questions, Carney presents the evidence...

Ownership Structure between Major and Minor League Baseball

Some Major League Baseball (MLB) owners own a portion of their minor league affiliates while other owners have a player development contract or working agreement with all of their minor league affiliates. Even though MLB teams always own the rights to the players and coaches in their minor league system, there are many other aspects of their operations that might be outsourced. This study attempts to explain differences in minor league ownership. It is hypothesized that the relationship between major and minor league teams depends upon the MLB owners’ other businesses and the minor league affiliates’ level or classification. This study analyzes a cross-sectional data set from the Nation League using a probit model. The study finds that media providers that own MLB teams are more likely to own their minor league affiliates and MLB owners are more likely to own lower classified minor league teams.

Rocky Point: A Lone Outpost of Sunday Baseball in Sabbatarian New England

Rocky PointA Lone Outpost of Sunday Baseball in Sabbatarian New England Charlie Bevis (bio) Baseball games played on Sunday at Rocky Point, Rhode Island, from 1891 through 1917 illustrate the dichotomy that Sunday baseball once presented in New England society. The term Sunday baseball was once as divisive a term as abortion is today, during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when the nation struggled with Sunday changing from a day of rest to a day of leisure and ultimately to a day of recreation. Many citizens, particularly the more prosperous and influential ones, held a deep religious conviction that baseball detracted from the sanctity of the biblically specified day of rest. Where Puritan influence was reflected in the statutes, such as the laws of most states in the eastern portion of the country, Sunday laws were used to prohibit professional baseball games. Before 1900 the Sunday laws posed a huge problem for many people who desired to view a match of the increasingly popular game of professional baseball. At the turn of the century the typical workweek for most working people was at least six days of ten-hour days, with Sunday and the infrequent holi-day the only time off. "Sunday stood in opposition to relentless work for the majority of nineteenth century Americans," Alexis McCrossen wrote in Holy Day, Holiday: The American Sunday. "The six working days blended into one unit—the workweek—in contrast to Sunday, the day of rest."1 Patrons of ballgames played on Monday through Saturday needed to have the flexibility in their work schedules to find the time to attend an afternoon contest, since baseball was then played exclusively during the daytime. Baseball owners appealed to middle-class patrons to fill seats in their ballparks, not only because the middle class had the time and money to attend games but also because they helped deem baseball as respectable recreation. Workers in the burgeoning industries of America generally were excluded from the opportunity to observe a ballgame. As one historian wrote: "The result of an onerous work load was that it was difficult for craftsmen and almost impossible [End Page 78] for unskilled personnel to attend a ball game unless they worked unusual hours like a baker, took time off from work, were unemployed, had a rare holiday, or lived in a city that permitted Sunday baseball."2 In the 1890s the unavailability of Sunday baseball within a 150-mile radius made Rocky Point, Rhode Island, a popular destination for many New England citizens seeking to watch regular games of the Providence Minor League club, as well as exhibition matches with Major League teams. For a quarter century until World War I, Rocky Point was a tiny island of illicit professional baseball on Sunday within the vast New England ocean of strict Puritan observance of a Sunday day of rest. Open Air and Sunshine "The same set of laws govern both Providence and Rocky Point and by statute Sunday baseball is illegal," the Washington Post described the situation in 1918. "But the latter happens to be under the jurisdiction of a set of county officials who do not believe that healthful recreation in the open air and sunshine will corrupt the public morals just because it is taken on the first day of the week."3 While Massachusetts law prior to 1929 prohibited the Boston Major League teams in the National and American Leagues from staging games on their home grounds on Sunday, Rhode Island officials permitted a Minor League team in Providence to conduct Sunday games at the Rocky Point resort located fifteen miles south of Providence in Warwick, Rhode Island. Providence played more than 100 Sunday games at Rocky Point in Eastern League competition (which was renamed the International League in 1912) as well as dozens of exhibition games against Major League teams. "The New England descendants of the Puritans looked down upon the little state of Rhode Island as a sort of annex to Satan's hideout, because the lax officials of that state made it possible for the baseball fans of Providence and vicinity to revel in professional games on Sundays by traveling on crowded excursion boats...

Whatever Happened to Synergy? MLB as Media Product

The years 2003 and 2004 were years of divestiture. In a reversal of since mid-1990s, news focused on unlinking of media and sports ownership. In a short period of time, Major League Baseball owners approved Frank McCourt as new majority owner of Los Angeles Dodgers after he purchased team from News Corp. (i.e., Rupert Murdoch). In 2003 Walt Disney Company, one of News Corp.'s primary rivals in global media business, sold reigning world champion Anaheim Angels to Arturo Moreno. Time Warner put Atlanta Braves on seller's block and cut team's payroll to attract a buyer. (1) This new trend away from joint ownership of media and sports is not limited to baseball. Time Warner, for example, has sold Atlanta Hawks (NBA) and Thrashers (NHL). Disney, currently fighting a hostile takeover by Comcast cable television giant, is attempting to sell Mighty Ducks of Anaheim (NHL). Even in nation's largest and most lucrative media market, YankeeNets, brainchild of George Steinbrenner (and another source of millions of dollars of revenue for Yankees), has sold New Jersey Nets to a Brooklyn developer. (2) In this article we will offer an analysis of these recent moves. Why has there been a reversal of what seemed a logical trend: joint media/sports ownership? Does this signal a return to individual ownership mythologized by mainstream media and most baseball fans? Or do these deals reflect new kinds of relationships between corporate media and sports franchises? Whatever reasons for recent divestures, how will they affect operation of teams and their relationships with changing media landscape? THE LOGIC OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION Vertical integration (VI) is one of oldest operational goals in capitalist economics. VI essentially is control of all levels of supply chain from ownership to consumer. For media corporations this means control of (1) production, (2) distribution, and (3) exhibition (P-D-E). Despite conventional wisdom of current multinational corporations that VI is necessary for companies to compete, until quite recently vertical integration was regarded as something to be avoided because of its negative effects on consumer. (3) For decades U.S. government based many of its policies on assumption that a vertically integrated market structure is bad for public because of its anticompetitive nature. The control of each element of P-D-E chain leads to a market structure with high barriers to entry for new competitors. The negative implications of VI have been rationale for antitrust actions against many corporate schemes. In 1948 Paramount decision, motion picture studios had to divest their ownership of theaters. (4) In 1960s Justice Department refused to allow International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT) to acquire ABC. (5) Today such decisions look like ancient history as vertical integration is often seen as necessary for large corporations to compete in a global marketplace. The rhetoric of corporate consolidation has replaced the public interest as mantra for government regulators. Professional sports leagues and their member teams were exempt from many antitrust regulations, even before market mania of last twenty to twenty-five years. MLB has had an explicit exemption from most antitrust concerns since 1922. (6) The Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961 granted an antitrust exemption for all professional leagues in developing policies on television and radio. (7) These longstanding exemptions and new tolerance of vertical integration encouraged sports leagues, a legalized cartel, and media firms, a semilegalized cartel, to make a series of deals to enhance their relationships. One of key differences in media and sports combinations is toward backward vertical integration. …

Baseball Competitiveness and the Free Agency Era

Major League Baseball owners have fired the first shot over the bow in their perpetual war with the players association concerning the financial health of the sport and the need for financial reforms that might slow down the growth of player salaries. The owners' salvo comes wrapped in a Blue Ribbon Commission Report that is clearly an owners' document, as the commissioner's office authorized the study and no labor representative was invited to be part of the commission. (1) For baseball fans fearing a repeat of the shutdown of the sport that occurred in 1994 and into the 1995 season, there is reason for both optimism and pessimism. The optimism rests with the fact that the owners have apparently recognized that the implementation of a salary cap is not a realistic possibility; the commission notably refrained from recommending such a cap as a solution to what it sees as the growing financial crisis affecting the sport, in recognition of the power and resilience of the players association in opposing such a c ap and in the belief that other remedies short of the cap can combat the financial inequities identified by the commission. The pessimistic side is that the commission, and many of the baseball owners, contend that there is a serious crisis of competitiveness in baseball that requires controversial reforms, including a luxury tax of 50 percent on all team payrolls exceeding $84 million. (2) The commission argues that such a tax--along with a series of other measures, including wider distribution of radio and TV revenue--is necessary to overcome the substantial disparities of revenue that make it increasingly difficult for all but a handful of teams to compete. The players association has stated publicly that it sees such a high luxury tax as representing a drag on players' salaries and therefore unacceptable as a concession in bargaining negotiations. (3) The rival positions of the owners and players have their roots in two separate but interrelated issues. First, each side reaches opposite conclusions regarding the financial health of the sport as measured by the financial stability and profitability of franchises. Second, the owners and players disagree about whether or not the sport faces a crisis of competitiveness that relegates all but the richest franchises to having no hope of competing for the playoffs. The commission uses financial data to bolster the owners' position that most franchises have been facing a serious financial crisis since the last work stoppage of 1994, even claiming that only three franchises have made money since that time. The players association, along with other critics of the Blue Ribbon. Report, counter that the commission exaggerates the financial losses by not including a variety of sources of revenue and tax deductions available to Major League teams, such as merchandising revenue, licensing agreements, and generous federal and state tax deductions, which allow a club to write off significant expenditures. (4) At this point, we simply don't have the data to confirm the reliability of the commission's claims of financial losses, but it's worth noting that business publications such as Financial Week and Forbes have used information available to reach conclusions very different from the Blue Ribbon Commission's. According to these publications, most Major League franchises have been making money, and the values of franchises have continued to rise across the board, as demonstrated by the escalating sale prices of Major League franchises. (5) FINANCIAL INEQUALITY AND COMPETITIVENESS The competitiveness issue is perhaps even more important to this debate because, if the owners are correct, only a narrow range of teams can hope to compete in today's financial environment, relegating most fans to having no hope that their teams can reach the postseason even before the season starts. Just how true are the commission's and owners' claims? …

Shoeless Joe Jackson's Bat and the Invention of Baseball History

Joe Jackson, one of the most talented baseball players ever, has figured more prominently in newspaper and magazine articles, books, and movies than most great ballplayers. Sadly for his reputation, the interest in Jackson is due less to his achievements as a hitter and fielder than to his alleged participation in the so-called Black Sox scandal, a scheme to throw the 1919 World Series. Jackson’s story is a Horatio Alger narrative turned on its head. Jackson was born in a textile town in South Carolina and raised in poverty. He played baseball for a local textile mill team, entered the Major Leagues, rose to fame as a powerful hitter for the Chicago White Sox—and then lost it all by purportedly entering into a conspiracy to let the Cincinnati Reds take the 1919 baseball championship. Found not guilty in a court of law along with seven of his teammates, he and the others were nevertheless thrown out of professional baseball by the baseball commissioner Kenesaw Mountain Landis. As details of the prosecution emerged, public opinion became divided on the question of Jackson’s guilt. Some saw his punishment as the just reward for his betrayal of the great American pastime and the boys who worshiped him. Others, particularly those who viewed Jackson as a small-town boy, saw him as an innocent victim of city slickers, a greedy baseball owner, and a baseball commissioner in need of a scapegoat. These views of Jackson are reflected in two kinds of narratives that offer histories of the man and his role in the gambling conspiracy. These books tend Shoeless Joe Jackson’s Bat and the Invention of Baseball History

Roman Mejias: Houston's First Major League Latin Star and the Troubled Legacy of Race Relations in the Lone Star State

During 1999 baseball season, businessman and owner of Houston Astros Drayton McLane was involved in a controversy with Texas Hispanic community. According to Marco Comancho, general manager of KTMD Television and a subsidiary of Telemundo, and Rod Rodriguez, station's sales manager, McLane made disparaging and belittling comments regarding Mexicans and Mexican Americans shortly before a dinner honoring businessman with Houston Advertising Federation's Trailblazer Award for service to community. An outraged McLane vehemently denied having uttered any remarks that might be construed as racist. Following an investigation of incident, Telemundo's chief executive, Roland Hernandez, apologized to McLane, stating that he found no evidence of racially biased comments being made by baseball owner. In a prepared statement, a relieved McLane insisted, Having spent a lifetime honoring values of integrity and honesty, this episode has been unsettling. Despite a rush to judgment by some, this action by Telemundo, hopefully, will help to speed healing process. (1) But if McLane devoted his life to values of integrity, honesty, and community service, why were so many in Hispanic community so quick to question baseball executive's motives? The answer to this question may lie in troubling history of race relations in Lone Star State of Texas, where, in words of Carey McWilliams, have always been 'gringos' to Hispanos while Hispanos have been 'greasers' to Anglos. (2) In Occupied America: A History of Chicanos, Rodolfo Acuna asserts that racial animosities in Texas are a result of Anglo economic domination of Mexican community enforced by official state violence, such as that perpetuated by Texas Rangers, an organization so much admired by dean of Texas historians, Walter Prescott Webb. (3) Jose Angel Gutierrez, as well as other Chicano activists, argues that education in Texas is presented from an Anglo perspective, ignoring fact that the land of West and Southwest, beginning with Texas, was stolen from Mexica ns. (4) While less confrontational and more scholarly in its approach, David Montejano's study of Anglos and Mexicans in Texas, Anglos and Mexicans in Making of Texas, 1836-1986, which received 1988 Frederick Jackson Turner Award from American Historical Association, maintains that history of Texas has been Anglo economic control perpetuated by cultural, political, and social Jim Crow legislation, hegemony of which has been challenged by Chicano civil rights movement. (5) It is within this historical context that alleged racist remarks of Astros owner McLane must be placed. While Houston organization has produced such talented Latin players as Jose Cruz and Joaquin Andujar, it should be noted that Astros management, unlike Los Angeles Dodgers with marketing and pitching success of Fernando Valenzuela, has tended to maintain an Anglo identity, building team around such stars as Nolan Ryan. Jeff Bagwell, and Craig Biggio. While it is impossible to deny athletic achievement of these ballplayers, failure to develop and especially market more Latin star players flies in face of southwestern demographics. From a 1980 base of 8.7 million people of Mexican origin, there was an increase of 4.7 million to a 1990 total of 13.4 million, a 54 percent intercensual increase. And Mexican-origin people constitute approximately two-thirds of Latins, who, in turn, comprise more than 8 percent of U.S. population. Nearly 75 percent of all Mexican-origin per sons live in California and Texas, both of which have populations in excess of 25 percent with Mexican roots. (6) Yet, Major League Baseball establishment in Houston has historically failed to capitalize on these demographics by consistently developing and marketing Latin talent. While perhaps operating on an unconscious level, this policy, nevertheless, may be reflective of city's conservative to reactionary political traditions. …

Baseball and Television Origins: The Case of the Cubs

Baseball and Television OriginsThe Case of the Cubs Robert V. Bellamy Jr. (bio) and James R. Walker (bio) The purpose of this paper is to continue our analysis of the long and often troubled relationship between television and Major League Baseball (MLB). Central to our analysis will be MLB's economic problems, including the revenue disparity among teams caused by the dramatic differences in local and regional television rights fees. We will argue that baseball's problems with television are best understood through local and regional models of team-media relations. We will introduce three local/regional models: (1) the Pinned-In Model used by teams unable to expand their market due to proximity to other clubs (for example, Milwaukee and Pittsburgh); (2) the Hinterlands Model, which featured the development of a strong regional radio and then television network that extended a small-market team's fan base (for example, Cincinnati and St. Louis); and (3) the Embracers Model used by teams that viewed television as a force that would build fan interest, increasing box office receipts. The Chicago Cubs best exemplify this model. The importance of television to MLB and most all sports is difficult to overstate. There is no exaggeration in saying that through television, sports truly became a vital part of the national culture. Baseball Weekly recently listed television as second only to Jackie Robinson's signing in its feature on the "Top 100 Things That Impacted Baseball in the 20th Century." Television was cited for exposing MLB to a much larger audience, generating a financial windfall for owners, increasing the value of franchises exponentially and, with the development of cable, "chang[ing] the way Americans followed the game."1 Zimbalist argues that to understand the economic condition of MLB one must look at the "ongoing technological revolution in telecommunications and the ever more concentrated and interlocked structure of the broadcast industry."2 We would add that even in a time of rapid change in the global telecommunications and entertainment industries, in many instances history continues to matter just as much as the "ongoing revolution." [End Page 31] Major League Baseball's Trouble With Television Baseball has had the most difficult and interesting relationship with television of any major sport.3 In 1998, MLB, fueled by the McGwire-Sosa home run record chase, had increased regular season national ratings. This is quite an accomplishment in an era of so much television choice. However, the 1998 World Series received its all-time lowest ratings despite the presence of a record-setting Yankees team from the largest U.S. television market. World Series ratings were up a healthy 13 percent in 1999, reflecting the national following of both the Yankees and the Braves and the strength of NBC's ability to reach more of the country with a strong signal than Fox could. Regular season ratings were stable in 1999, and All-Star Game ratings were down 10 percent.4 These mixed results indicate a relationship that can be described as dysfunctional. Several explanations have been advanced for the relative decline of MLB as a national television attraction. These explanations can be grouped into the overlapping structural categories of aesthetic, marketing, economic, and historic. On the aesthetic level, the large playing field with a wide dispersion of players makes baseball a difficult sport to televise because the cameras have difficulty following all the action. One popular historian of baseball and broadcasting, Curt Smith, argues that baseball is perhaps the worst sport for television because the breaks in the action are boring for viewers. However, the same breaks, when used by fans at the game, are seen as opportunities to engage in interpersonal communication, go to the bathroom, or buy concessions.5 Major League Baseball owners have been accurately accused of not understanding modern-day marketing and particularly the concept of integrated marketing: the coordinated combination of advertising, promotion, and public relations.6 Baseball has also been criticized for not developing a fan base among the young and among African-Americans and for not promoting its star players effectively.7 Although aesthetics and marketing are concerns, MLB's primary structural problems are economic and historical. Baseball has always been...

Regulating the national pastime: baseball and antitrust

Major League Baseball, alone among industries of its size in the United States, operates as an unregulated monopoly. This 20th-century regulatory anomaly has become known as the baseball anomaly. Major League Baseball developed into a major commercial enterprise without being subject to antitrust liability. Long after the interstate commercial character of baseball had been established and even recognized by the Supreme Court, baseball's monopoly remained free from federal regulation. Duquette explains the baseball anomaly by connecting baseball's regulatory status to the larger political environment, tracing the game's fate through four different regulatory regimes. The constellation of institutional, ideological, and political factors within each regulatory regime provides the context for the survival of the baseball anomaly. Duquette shows baseball's unregulated monopoly persists because of the confluence of institutional, ideological, and political factors which have prevented the repeal of baseball's antitrust exemption to date. However, both the institutional and ideological factors are fading fast. Baseball's owners can no longer claim special cultural significance in defense of their exemption. Nor can they credibly claim that the commissioner system approximates government regulation effectively. Both of these strategies have been discredited by the labor unrest of the 1980s and 1990s. Duquette provides a unique perspective on American regulatory politics, and by explaining a complicated story in comprehensive prose, he has given researchers, policy makers, and fans a fascinating look at the business of baseball.

Chris Von der Ahe and the St. Louis Browns

Chris Von der Ahe emigrated from Germany to the United States in 1867, and settled in St. Louis, Missouri. Starting out as a clerk in a grocery store, he succeeded quickly in buying the grocery store and establishing a saloon in the back. Although Von der Ahe had no special interest in sports, he did notice that fans liked to drop by after a ball game and have a beer. This initial perception launched Von der Ahe on a rollercoaster ride through early American baseball, contributing to his story of luck, pluck, and bravado. Seeing a natural link between baseball and his saloon, Von der Ahe sponsored an American Association baseball team called the St. Louis Browns, the head of a lineage that includes the present-day St. Louis Cardinals. The American Association only lasted for ten years, but through this period Von der Ahe's Browns captured the pennant four years in a row. After a raucous pennant race in 1889 and a full-scale player revolt, the American Association sank into bankruptcy and dissolved. Such a financial disaster is only one of many bizarre and unique events discussed in this insightful and utterly readable biography of one of America's early baseball owners. Bearing uncanny similarity to the iron-willed personas of contemporary baseball owners, Von der Ahe was embroiled in legal battles and baseball disputes for nearly a decade that culminated in his own kidnapping and his stadium being burned to the ground. After being bought out in 1899, Von der Ahe disappeared and died in obscurity in 1913, without a baseball team. With bibliography.