Bargaining Strategy Research Articles

A Model of Emotional Intelligence and Conflict Management Strategies: A Study in Seven Countries

The study investigated the relationships of the five dimensions of emotional intelligence: self-awareness, self-regulation, motivation, empa-thy, and social skills of supervisors to subordinates' strategies of handling conflict: problem solving and bargaining. Data (N = 1,395) for this study were collected with questionnaires from MBA students in seven countries (U.S., Greece, China, Bangladesh, Hong Kong and Macau, South Africa, and Portugal). Psychometric properties of the measures were tested and improved with exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis and analysis of indicator and internal consistency reliabilities, and the hypotheses were tested with a structural equations model for each country. Results in the U.S. and in the combined sample provided support for the model which suggests that self-awareness is positively associated with self-regulation, empathy, and social skills; self regulation is positively associated with empathy and social skills; empathy and social skills are positively associated with motivation; which in turn, is positively associated with problem solving strategy and negatively associated with bargaining strategy. Differences among countries in these relationships are noted and implications for organizations discussed.

Depression as bargaining: The case postpartum

It was recently hypothesized that depression might function, in part, as a bargaining strategy when cooperation imposes a net cost, but there are social constraints on defection [Evol. Hum. Behav. 20 (1999) 325.]. If so, such social constraints should be associated with depression, and depression in one partner should be associated with increased investment by other partners. Several predictions of this hypothesis were tested using postpartum depression (PPD) as a model for depression in general. The depression levels, abortion attitudes, additional mating opportunities, and investment in childrearing of 240 mothers and fathers with a new child were measured using self-report instruments. Mothers were also asked whether the new child was planned and whether it was wanted. Perceived constraints on abortion correlated significantly with PPD levels, but, as predicted, only for mothers with an unplanned or unwanted child. Contrary to predictions, perceived constraints imposed by family and friends did not correlate with PPD levels. Sexual opportunities correlated significantly with PPD levels, but, as predicted, only for men. As predicted, PPD levels in one spouse correlated significantly with increased investment in childrearing as reported by the other spouse. PPD levels correlated positively with parity for older women with few future reproductive opportunities, as predicted.

A MODEL OF EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES: A STUDY IN SEVEN COUNTRIES

The study investigated the relationships of the five dimensions of emotional intelligence: self‐awareness, self‐regulation, motivation, empathy, and social skills of supervisors to subordinates' strategies of handling conflict: problem solving and bargaining. Data (N = 1,395) for this study were collected with questionnaires from MBA students in seven countries (U.S., Greece, China, Bangladesh, Hong Kong and Macau, South Africa, and Portugal). Psychometric properties of the measures were tested and improved with exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis and analysis of indicator and internal consistency reliabilities, and the hypotheses were tested with a structural equations model for each country. Results in the U.S. and in the combined sample provided support for the model which suggests that self‐awareness is positively associated with self‐regulation, empathy, and social skills; self regulation is positively associated with empathy and social skills; empathy and social skills are positively associated with motivation; which in turn, is positively associated with problem solving strategy and negatively associated with bargaining strategy. Differences among countries in these relationships are noted and implications for organizations discussed.

The Impact of Compulsory Arbitration on Bargaining Behavior - An Experimental Study

A series of experiments compares bargaining behavior in a Rubinstein game under three different settings: no arbitration, conventional and final offer arbitration. Under no arbitration disputes with zero payoffs were around 10%, while the pie was equally split in less than half of the cases. Under conventional arbitration - where the arbitrator is free in choosing his award - every third negotiation ended in dispute giving incidence for a modified chilling effect. Under final offer arbitration - where the arbitrator has to award to the bargainers either one of their final offers - there was only a small increase of disputes while equal split agreements have doubled to 80%, an outcome which can be described as a destiny effect. The experiment shows final offer arbitration, though having lower dispute rates, interferes more with bargaining behavior than conventional arbitration where the bargaining behavior was similar to the no-arbitration treatment. Under final offer arbitration, negotiators adjust their bargaining strategy to the arbitrator's expected award.

Australian Union Strategies Since 1945

The purpose of this article is to advance a model of union strategy and to test it using evidence of Australian unionism in the period since 1945. The model is based on several premises: first, that union practices are not the product of random choices but tend to result from overarching mutually-reinforcing strategies. Second, that the overall strategy of a given union is driven by its choice of bargaining strategy. Choice in this field has a strong if not determining influence on external relations with employers, the state and other unions, as well as internal relations within the union itself, and staffing practices. Finally, the model incorporates a feedback loop, with choices in the area of external relations, internal relations and staffing practices having an influence on bargaining strategy. The article then uses evidence of Australian union practices drawn from a variety of sources to test this model.

Switching the Default Rule

There is a standard analysis of default rules in contract law, including those forms of contract law that fall under the label of employment law. But behavioral economics raises many complications. The default rule can create an endowment effect, making employees value certain rights more simply because they have been granted such rights in the first instance. Similarly, the default rule for savings plans, set by employers or law, seems to have a large effect on employee behavior. When the default rule affects preferences and behavior, conventional economic analysis seems indeterminate; either default rule can be efficient. In employment law, analysis of distributive consequences also suggests the difficulty of deciding which default rule to favor, because any switch in the rule is unlikely to have significant redistributive effects. Nonetheless, switching the default rule can, in certain circumstances, have desirable effects on workers' welfare. A central question is whether the stickiness of the default rule reflects a genuine change in values, or instead employee confusion or bargaining strategy.

Bilateral transaction bargaining between independent utilities under incomplete information

A new approach to designing bilateral power transaction bargaining models between two independent utilities in a deregulated electricity market is proposed. In the paper it is assumed that each utility (a seller or a buyer) knows its own operating costs but does not know those of its opponent. The bilateral power transaction problem is then considered as nonco-operative bargaining under incomplete information. Each participant develops its own bargaining strategy based on estimates of the opponent's operating costs and bargaining strategy. Two bargaining models are developed and examples are employed for demonstration.

Tax Level and Tax Internalization Effects on Union Wage Bargaining

High taxes and generous social benefits are often blamed for causing unemployment. The conventional view is that if taxes on labour are (too) high, jobs will be lost and that generous social benefits will exert an upward pressure on unions' wage claims. In the case where unions co-ordinate their wage bargaining strategy, this need not be the case. A simple model is used to illustrate the effects of the tax rate level and tax internalization on unions' wage bargaining strategy. A high marginal tax rate along with endogeneity of the average tax rate shifts the union's trade-off between wages and employment in favour of the latter. These shifts may have contributed to the success of the so-called ‘polder model’ or ‘tulip model’ of the Netherlands.

Armed Conflict in Colombia: Application of the Game Theory

The document presents an economic model of the insurgency in Colombia like an economically rational illegal activity. The situation is modelled like a dynamic game, whose protagonists are the government, the rebel leader and the farmers. First, the government determines the level of the military spending. After that the insurgent leader studies the situation and makes the decision, what wage will he offer to the rebels. Finally the peasant family decides, what type of activity to choose (legal production, subsistence production at home, military service or the insurgency). The game is solved and the equilibrium strategies are found. Are identified the determinants of the military spending, the volume of the rebel army and the rebel wage. The model explains the bargaining strategy of the rebel leader and offers an analytic view to the cost of the peace agreement. The model shows that the economic growth does not affect the development of the insurgency. It shows a limited role of the peasants in the conflict.

Bargaining efficiency and screening: an experimental investigation

This paper investigates whether information about generosity or fairness can be useful in reducing dispute costs and enhancing bargaining efficiency. Subjects were first screened using a dictator game, with the allocations chosen used to separate participants into two types. Mutually anonymous pairs of subjects then bargained, with a dispute cost structure imposed. Sorting with identification reduces dispute costs; there are also significant differences in bargaining efficiency across pairing-types. Information about types is crucial for these differences and also strongly affects the relative bargaining success of the two types and the hypothetical optimal bargaining strategy.

National Employment Systems and Job Autonomy: Why Job Autonomy is High in the Nordic Countries and Low in the United States, Canada, and Australia

We present evidence that, across countries, similar jobs carry very different levels of autonomy. Workers in Nordic countries have greater discretion than workers in the United States, Canada, and Australia, all else being equal. This suggests that students of job autonomy, who emphasize task complexity and human capital, should heed the role of the wider institutional environment. We examine three explanations of the link between national location and autonomy. The Taylorism/de-skilling thesis suggests that work control is a zero-sum game between workers and managers, such that in countries where managers exercise great control, workers will exercise little. The collective bargaining thesis suggests that union bargaining strategy is the key: unionists will have high autonomy in `co-determination' countries and low autonomy in `job control' countries. We argue more broadly that national management, training, bargaining, and unemployment systems operate according to different logics. Where they are oriented to rule-governed work, autonomy will be low. Where they are oriented to skill-governed work, autonomy will be high. Detailed data on job autonomy from over seven thousand jobs in seven countries support our contention that national employment systems shape job autonomy.

Gender and Negotiator Competitiveness: A Meta-analysis

Although there have been numerous investigations into the relationship between gender and bargaining competitiveness over the past several decades, few conclusions have been reached. The results of 62 research reports on the relationship between gender and competitive behavior in dyadic bargaining interactions were examined by meta-analytic review. The average weighted effect size indicated that women appear to behave more cooperatively in negotiations than men, but this difference is slight. Results suggest that constraints on negotiators (imposed by abstract bargaining paradigms and restrictions on communication) lessen gender differences in negotiation behavior. Women were significantly more competitive than men when competing against an opponent who pursued a “tit-for-tat” bargaining strategy.

Bargaining Efficiency and Screening: An Experimental Investigation

This paper investigates whether information about generosity or fairness can be useful in lowering dispute costs and enhancing bargaining efficiency. Subjects were first screened using a dictator game, with the allocations chosen used to separate participants into two types. Mutually anonymous pairs of subjects then bargained, with a dispute cost structure imposed. Sorting with identification reduces dispute costs; there are also significant differences in bargaining efficiency across pairing types. Information about types is crucial for these differences and also strongly affects the relative bargaining success of the two types and the hypothetical optimal bargaining strategy.

Regulatory Competition and the Politics of Financial Market Reform in Britain and Japan

This article examines the impact that the internationalization of jnance has had on the regulation of domestic securities markets in Japan and Britain. In particular, it seeks to explain the apparent incompatibility of two distinct trends: deregulation (and state retreat) on the one hand, and increased regulation and state involvement in markets on the other.Much of the literature about the efects of internationalization on domestic policymaking has drfjculty explaining these two distinct regulatory frends. First, there has been no uniform “competition in regulatory laxity.” Second, the United States does not appear to have exerted hegemonic influence over outcomes. Finally, domestic‐level explanations which deny the importance of systemic‐level influences on domestic policy choices are unable to explain the similarity of policy choices undertaken by governments with very different regulatory traditions.I argue instead that regulatory reforms have been undertaken primarily for the benefit of a particular set of private economic actors—mobile consumers of financial services, including both holders of liquid investment capital and large multinational borrowers. Internationalization has systematically strengthened their influence over the policymaking process by making “exit” from one political marketplace to another a more realistic and more potent bargaining strategy than the alternative of exercising “voice.”

Moderation in the pursuit of justice: Explaining Japan's failure in the international whaling negotiations

Since 1982, the bargaining tactics and strategy pursued by Japan in the yearly meetings of the International Whaling Commission (IWC), in its attempt to lift a whaling moratorium and prevent the creation of a Southern Ocean sanctuary have been notably unsuccessful. But Japan has persisted and continued using the same approach. The purpose of this article is to analyze and explain Japan's bargaining behavior in the IWC. After explicating the modern history of negotiations within the IWC, the author notes several attributes of Japan's bargaining behavior: moderation or reasonableness, persistence as a strategy, passivity, and legalism. Three possible explanatory variables are advanced: rational choice, cultural molding or a “Japanese way,”; and domestic constraints on the negotiators. After testing these variables, it is concluded that all three are needed to understand Japanese bargaining behavior.

Strategic Bargaining in Brazil's Debt Negotiations

Brazil's relations with its international creditors reached a low point by 1986 with the implementation of a heterodox economic program, the Cruzado Plan. Their relations dropped even further with the declaration of a moratorium on interest payments in February 1987. Both Brazil and international creditors had drawn clear and confrontational lines against each other. Yet, on 22 June 1988, the Brazilian government reached a major debt rescheduling agreement with an international bank advisory group representing the hundreds of commercial banks with outstanding loans to the country. The agreement resulted from a lengthy series of negotiations during which the two sides pressed each other for concessions using their respective power capabilities. They both brought specific power resources into the negotiations in an attempt to constrain the choice selection of the other. The strategic power of banks derives from the maintenance of an international bank regime as defined by its international operations, short-term time perspective, and commercial features. Since all international banks share these influential features, Brazil negotiated not with a few individual banks, but with a community of banks strengthened by their collective action. Brazil also based its bargaining strategy on its own power resources. It used the size of its debt, its moratorium policy, and its important economic relationship with the United States as leverage against the banking community. While both parties initiated the negotiations with conflicting strategies, during the

De la violence paysanne à l'organisation agricole. Les manifestations de juin 1961 en pays bigouden

When they set fire to ballot-boxes one day in june 1961, "bigouden "farmers in southern Drittany won front-page coverage for their highly symbolical action. To the scholar with an interest in recent history who wants to bring into focus the main forces operating within a specifie society, this example shows once more how useful such emblematic events can be. The behaviour of those farmers is closely linked with a political (the decline of parliamentary power), economic (an increasing disillusionment with the second agricultural revolution) and social (the complete metamorphosis off arming trade-unionism) context and thus reveals the conflicting forces which, in the early days of the Fifth Republic, affected the various modes of integration of the peasantry within French society as a whole. First, this form of collective action can be seen as representative of the dual approach adopted by a pressure-group : local officials started using a new strategy in their dealings with the central government, while political and professional bodies began talking about the position and role of the labour force within the new institutional framework. Secondly, this action clearly demons-trates how deeply ambivalent the agrarian violence of the sixties was, since it made use of the ressources of an ancient rationale of corporatist confrontation to further its overall bargaining strategy in dealing with the State. Thus the angy out burst of Pont-Labbé's farmers enables us to test the viability of the neo-corporatist paradigm.

Firm Investment Behavior and Collective Bargaining Strategy

Using survey data on labor union coverage at the firm level, this paper examines union‐nonunion differences in investment activity among 706 U.S. companies during the 1970s. Consistent with a model of union rent seeking, firm‐level collective bargaining is associated with significantly lower physical capital and R&D investment, even after controlling for firm and industry characteristics. Deleterious union effects on investment are considerable throughout the 1972–80 period, but they vary across industries. Without significant changes in collective bargaining power or strategies, diminished investment activity by unionized companies is likely to exacerbate the already considerable decline in U.S. union coverage

The Role of Negotiators in Union-Firm Bargaining

Differences between the objectives of union leaders and those of the rank and file have traditionally been thought the result of political processes or irrationality. This paper shows that such differences will naturally arise as part of a rational bargaining strategy, since delegation of authority to a negotiator permits the union members to achieve advantageous commitment. This use of negotiators leads to revised interpretation of many popular theories of wage and employment determination, such as the efficient bargain and the right-to-manage models, and has implications for the interpretation of econometric modeling of union behavior.

Reciprocity in trade: the utility of a bargaining strategy

Recent works in international relations theory have focused on the value of reciprocity as a means of achieving cooperation in international politics. They argue that even in an anarchic setting in which self-help typifies the behavior of sovereign nation states, the strategy of matching comparable responses to the actions of other nations may educate them over time to cooperate. This article empirically confirms that this assumption is correct. It examines the use of flexible reciprocal bargaining strategies between the United States and its major trading partners in key sectors in which surplus capacity and domestic adjustment difficulties have made commercial conflicts apparent. The outcomes of most of the disputes demonstrate that reciprocity is an effective means of eliciting cooperation from trading partners. Results also illustrate that this cooperation is usually consistent with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) norms of liberal trade and dispute settlement, even when it is inconsistent with the GATT principle of nondiscrimination.