Relative Bargaining Research Articles

Dual-Level Cooperative Game Approach for Energy-Aware Resource Allocation in Data Centers

Cloud computing is the next major paradigm shift in information and communication technology. Today, data center (DC) is pivotal to the effective implementation of the cloud computing paradigm. To deliver the necessary cloud services, the DC faces major reliability and robustness challenges. In this study, we concentrate upon the efficient DC resource allocation technique by considering the synergy of the performance and energy efficiency. To achieve the maximum system efficiency, thermal-aware control mechanism is developed based on the dual-level cooperative game. Proactively, we adaptively assign the workload among different servers using the concept of relative utilitarian bargaining solution. Reactively, we maintain a thermal equilibrium according to the characteristics of τ-value. The main advantage of our dual-level game model is to provide an axiom-based strategic solution for the DC resource allocation problem while dynamically responding to the current workload and thermal conditions. The effectiveness of our proposed protocol is verified through simulation evaluations under different workload scenarios. Results demonstrate that the proposed approach significantly outperforms the existing state-of-the-art DC control schemes from energy consumption and load balancing perspectives. Last, some open problems are identified and we summarize possible research issues for the future study.

Labor History and the Clash of Capabilities

This chapter in an edited volume on labor law and the Capabilities Approach (CA) argues that the congruity between the CA and the American labor movement’s ambitions and tactics has shifted over time. In the early twentieth century, labor activists embraced strong forms of social and economic pressure, rejected minimalism, and disavowed state intervention. Over the course of the twentieth century, however, the American administrative state actively structured the bargaining relationship between unions and employers, and unions surrendered much of their coercive power. In the new legal landscape, it may be plausible to ground labor law in the CA, which combines an emphasis on full equality of freedom of speech and association with support for a strong social safety net. This compatibility, however, is premised on the labor movement’s relinquishment of its most effective historical weapons. That is, the same modifications that have accommodated labor law to the CA have also eroded labor’s strength and accelerated its decline.

Pareto-Optimal Insurance Contracts With Premium Budget and Minimum Charge Constraints

In view of the fact that minimum charge and premium budget constraints are natural economic considerations in any risk-transfer between the insurance buyer and seller, this paper revisits the optimal insurance contract design problem in terms of Pareto optimality with imposing these practical constraints. Pareto optimal insurance contracts, with indemnity schedule and premium payment, are solved in the cases when the risk preferences of the buyer and seller are given by Value-at-Risk or Tail Value-at-Risk. The effect of our constraints and the relative bargaining powers of the buyer and seller on the Pareto optimal insurance contracts are highlighted. Numerical experiments are employed to further examine these effects for some given risk preferences.

Low carbon strategy analysis under revenue-sharing and cost-sharing contracts

This paper investigates the impact of revenue-sharing and cost-sharing contracts offered by a retailer on emission reduction efforts and firms' profitability. To encourage the manufacturer (he) to participate in the low-carbon supply chain, the retailer (she) offers some incentive schemes, such as cost-sharing contract (CS), revenue-sharing contract (RS), both two contracts (RC) or neither of them (NC). Under such incentive schemes, this work develops a basic model to examine channel members’ equilibrium decisions under a Stackelberg game approach. Extending from the basic model, this work further discusses the equilibrium solutions under Nash bargaining model, in which the retailer and the manufacturer bargain on a cost-sharing rate (CSB) or a revenue-sharing rate (RSB). Somewhat counterintuitively, the findings suggest the supply chain coordination and the range of sharing rate depend critically on parameters, such as the relative bargaining status (symmetric or asymmetric bargaining power) and consumer environmental awareness. For instance, Scenarios CS and RS can coordinate the supply chain, whereas Scenarios CSB and RSB do not work well. Further, the cost-sharing rate under Scenario CSB is not higher as that of previous studies, and Scenario RSB is nonexistence with asymmetric bargaining power.

A Merger Paradox: Proposal Right and Price Discrimination

This article studies merger incentives in a two-sided Bertrand oligopoly market. Either buyers or sellers receive a proposal right with a probability proportional to their relative bargaining powers. Each buyer or seller, if chosen, offers a payment schedule, or contract, to every opponent. We show that if there is a separable efficient allocation, the post-merger contracts exhibit a higher level of price discrimination than the pre-merger contracts. Thus, the horizontal merger to monopoly is harmful if their bargaining power is weak enough, i.e. the merger of buyers (sellers) decreases their joint profit if buyers (sellers) are responders with a high probability. The proposal right in vertical bargaining determines the horizontal merger incentive through price discrimination. We further show that this merger paradox is likely to emerge when goods are substitutes.

Subcontracting bargaining power and the trade policy

ABSTRACTIn this paper, we consider that the split of surplus from a subcontracting deal depends on the relative bargaining powers of domestic and foreign firms. The finding shows that a domestic optimal export policy is a tax (subsidy) if the bargaining power of the domestic firm is sufficiently small (large). We also demonstrate that a domestic firm’s higher bargaining power increases (may decrease) domestic profit if the export policy is exogenous (endogenous). In the presence of an outsider option, the domestic optimal export policy will be threatened by the outsider option if the domestic firm’s bargaining power is sufficiently small, and thus a large bargaining power increases the optimal export tax. At the same time, the foreign firm may still subcontract to the domestic firm even if the domestic firm has a higher total marginal cost of the intermediate good than the outsider option.

Information creates relative bargaining power in vendor negotiations

PurposeThis paper aims to examine how libraries can create relative bargaining power and presents a methodology for analyzing collections and preparing for negotiations.Design/methodology/approachA brief literature review of the current state of collection budgets and electronic resource prices is presented prior to proposing a methodology based on business analysis frameworks and techniques.FindingsElectronic resource subscription prices are increasing at a rate significantly higher than inflation, while collection budgets grow slowly, remain stagnant or decrease. Academic libraries have the ability to counteract this trend by creating relative bargaining power through organizational efforts that take advantage of size and concentration (e.g. consortia), vertical integration through practices such as library publishing and open access and through individual efforts using information. This paper proposes metrics and methodologies that librarians can use to analyze their collections, set negotiation priorities and prepare for individual resource negotiations to create relative bargaining power.Practical implicationsThe proposed methodology enables librarians and buyers of information resources to harness the information available about their electronic resource collections to better position themselves when entering negotiations with vendors.Originality/valueThis paper presents metrics, some not commonly used (i.e. average annual price increase/decrease), that aid in understanding price sensitivity. Pareto analysis has been traditionally used to analyze usage, but this paper suggests using it in relation to costs and budgets for setting negotiation priorities.

Overhead labour costs in a neo-Kaleckian growth model with target return pricing

본 연구는 관리노동비용이 성장 체제에 미칠 수 있는 영향을 규명하려는 것이다. 이를 위해 본고에서는 목표수익률 가격결정과 갈등 인플레이션 구조를 포함하며 장기에 정상이윤율의 조정을 통해 균형성장경로로 수렴하는 새로운 네오 칼레츠키언 성장 모형을 제시하고 자본과 노동의 상대적 교섭력 및 관리노동과 직접노동 간 임금 격차의 변화가 모형 경제에 미치는 영향을 분석하였다. 그 결과, 관리노동비용의 존재를 고려하면 선행 연구에서 지적된 바와 같이 이윤몫이 설비 가동률 변화에 의존하는 것으로 나타났다. 이는 이윤몫을 설비 가동률로부터 독립된 외생변수로 가정해온 기존의 실증분석 방법론이 재검토될 필요성이 있음을 의미한다. 한편 모형의 장기 이행 동학에 대해 수치 분석을 수행한 결과, Weisskopf (1979)의 조정된 이윤몫과 직접노동의 소득 몫이 설비 가동률 및 자본 축적률과 각각 음(-)과 양(+)의 상관관계인 점에서 임금 주도 성장의 가능성이 뒷받침되었으며, 수준효과를 기준으로 할 때 노동의 교섭력 약화나 임금 격차의 확대는 성장에 부정적인 영향을 미치는 것으로 드러났다. 특히 임금 분포가 균등할수록 성장 체제의 임금 주도성이 강화되는 것으로 분석되었다. 이는 균등한 소득분배가 성장 친화적일수 있음을 시사하는 것이다.This study introduces overhead labour costs into a neo-Kaleckian growth model with target return pricing, and explores their effects on the growth regime. The model features conflict inflation and classical convergence to a balanced growth path. This convergence is achieved by the adjustments in the normal rate of profit. The ramifications of changes in (1) the relative bargaining position of capital and labour and (2) the wage gap between direct labour and overhead labour are analyzed. Numerical computations for long-run transitional dynamics support the feasibility of wage-led growth since the corrected share of profits is negatively correlated with the rate of utilization and the rate of accumulation while the income share of direct labour is positively correlated with them. The negative consequences on the average growth rate and hence the level of output brought about by either weakening of labour’s bargaining power or widening wage gap turn out to be significant. It is evident that the more equitable is the wage income distribution, the more strong the wage-led nature of economic growth.

Fighting for a name on the ballot: constituency-level analysis of nomination violence in Zambia

ABSTRACTWhat factors increase the likelihood of nomination violence? Nomination violence can be an expression of both horizontal conflict, between local political elites, and vertical conflict, between national and local elites. We theorize about factors that may increase the risks of vertical and horizontal conflict and leverage a unique dataset of constituency-level nomination violence obtained from surveys with 464 domestic election observers active in the 2016 Zambian general election. Our statistical analyses show constituencies with an incumbent standing for re-election were more likely to experience nomination violence. Also, contrary to previous research on general election violence, we theorize and find that more rural constituencies had a higher propensity for nomination violence than urban constituencies. Our findings highlight the importance of intra-party power relations and the bargaining relationship between the centre and periphery.

Arbitration Clauses: The Louisiana Supreme Courtts Flawed Decision in Duhon v. Activelaf, LLC. And Why the Doctrine of Unconscionability Should Be Adopted in Louisiana

Louisiana should give credit where credit is due and recognize the doctrine of unconscionability. Louisiana is the only civil law jurisdiction in the United States. In order to preserve its unique heritage, Louisiana has been reluctant to adopt common law concepts. Because of this reluctance, some beneficial concepts have been rejected or overlooked, such as the doctrine of unconscionability. Common law states use the doctrine of unconscionability to analyze contracts of adhesion, or determine the enforceability of arbitration clauses. Louisiana, on the other hand, utilizes a four-factor test outlined in Aguillard v. Auction Management Corp. The four factors are: (1) the physical characteristics of the arbitration clause, (2) the distinguished features of the arbitration clause, (3) the mutuality of the arbitration clause, and (4) the relative bargaining strength of the parties. The Louisiana Supreme Court used these factors in its decision of Duhon v. Activelaf, LLC. The court failed to use all of the factors and conducted a faulty analysis. This Article discusses how an analysis of all four leads to the conclusion that the disputed arbitration contract is not adhesionary and is valid. This Article also discusses how the doctrine of unconscionability is quite compatible with the Louisiana Civil Code. The doctrine helps fill in the gaps of existing law, which is inadequate when dealing with mass, standard-form contracting.

Forest conflicts and the informal nature of realizing indigenous land rights in Indonesia

Despite a widening legal scope for indigenous rights, the invocation of indigeneity to claim land rights rarely empowers marginalized communities. This article develops an explanation for why this formal recognition of community rights actually has little substantive impact on local struggles over land in Indonesia. Employing almost two years of fieldwork on how rural communities employ indigeneity-based land claims in South Sulawesi, it argues that claims for land rights on the basis of indigeneity are settled not simply on the basis of law, but also on that of the relative bargaining positions and the character of informal linkages between communities, their mediators and local authorities. Indigenous status therefore must be understood as a privilege most likely to be obtained by those groups with relatively strong connections to influential state actors. In contrast, communities that are in conflict with local state actors tend be excluded from obtaining the status of indigeneity and hence the state is likely to deny them their land rights claims.

Core Stability and Core Selection in a Decentralized Labor Matching Market

We propose a dynamic model of decentralized many-to-one matching in the context of a competitive labor market. Through wage offers and wage demands, firms compete over workers and workers compete over jobs. Firms make hire-and-fire decisions dependent on the wages of their own workers and on the alternative workers available on the job market. Workers bargain for better jobs; either individually or collectively as unions, adjusting wage demands upward/downward depending on whether they are currently employed/unemployed. We show that such a process is absorbed into the core with probability one in finite time. Moreover, within the core, allocations are selected that are characterized by surplus splitting according to a bargaining solution such that (i) firms and workforce share total revenue according to relative bargaining strengths, and (ii) workers receive equal workforce shares above their individual outside options. These results bridge empirical evidence and provide a rich set of testable predictions.

What determines the outcome of licensing deals in market for technology? Empirical analysis of sellers and buyers in biotechnology alliances

This paper empirically investigates factors affecting the relative bargaining strength of sellers and buyers in biotechnology markets, using transaction-level data for alliances between 1993 and 2008. Specifically, a two-tier stochastic frontier model is applied to our dataset for estimating the advantage of sellers and buyers, separately, and the advantage difference between them is regressed on possible determinants, such as scope of technology, stage of pharmaceutical R&D process, previous experience forming technology alliances, seller and buyer characteristics, and financial market conditions at the time of agreement. The results show that buyers were greatly advantaged over sellers in many alliances. However, a seller's bargaining position tended to improve significantly after the clinical research phase, as did repeating transactions with previous partners. US sellers also enjoyed an advantage over non-US buyers.

Ongoing Royalties for Patent Infringement

Section 283 of the Patent Act provides that, to prevent the ongoing infringement of a patent, courts “may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity.” If the court decides that the issuance of an injunction is not appropriate, it may direct the parties to negotiate a royalty for the infringer’s future use of the patented technology. When such a negotiation fails, the court will impose an ongoing royalty that the infringer must pay. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has clarified that the calculus for an ongoing royalty differs from the calculus for a reasonable royalty typically awarded for past infringement, but it has not prescribed any particular methodology for a court to apply when determining an ongoing royalty. I conduct an empirical analysis of the courts’ decisions on ongoing royalties, which shows that a court-awarded ongoing royalty typically exceeds the jury determined reasonable royalty imposed for past infringement. However, my analysis does not identify any single variable that affects the court’s determination of an ongoing royalty, which suggests that the courts have not yet developed a consistent methodology for determining an ongoing royalty. This article aims to fill that gap in the existing legal guidance by providing a simple yet rigorous economic methodology that courts can apply when determining an ongoing royalty. Because an ongoing royalty is an equitable remedy, awarded in lieu of a permanent injunction, no jury needs to be involved in determining the ongoing royalty. Consequently, Daubert and its progeny are not implicated (or, at the very least, the role of Daubert differs from its role in cases in which a jury acts as the finder of fact). In addition, the rationale for the entire market value rule (EMVR) — namely, avoiding jury confusion because of a large damage base — is inapplicable when calculating an ongoing royalty. When determining an ongoing royalty for the prospective use of a patented technology, courts can apply a methodology similar to that used to calculate a reasonable royalty. Courts need to consider the changes in economic circumstances from the time of first infringement to the time of the jury’s verdict and then determine how those changes affect the hypothetical negotiation for an ongoing royalty. In economic terms, courts should examine how the information that became available after the first infringement affects the bargaining range for the use of the patent or patent portfolio. That is, courts need to identify any changes in the patent holder’s minimum willingness to accept and the infringer’s maximum wiliness to pay. Next, courts need to examine whether the parties’ relative bargaining positions have changed (compared to their bargaining positions at the time of first infringement) to determine a point royalty within the bargaining range. I show that, although the court’s determination of an ongoing royalty will be fact specific and will vary on the basis of the specific circumstances of each case, the changes in the economic conditions between the time of first infringement and the time of the hypothetical negotiation for an ongoing royalty will typically support the award of an ongoing royalty that exceeds the reasonable royalty for past infringement. An ongoing royalty that exceeds the reasonable royalty for past infringement should not be confused with an award of enhanced damages for willful infringement, which courts rarely award.

The effects of immigration in frictional labor markets: Theory and empirical evidence from EU countries

Immigrants are newcomers in a labor market. As a consequence, they lack host-country-specific labor market knowledge and other country-specific and not directly productive valuable assets affecting their relative bargaining position with employers. We introduce this simple observation into a search and matching model of the labor market and show that immigrants increase the employment prospects of competing natives. To test the predictions of our model, we exploit yearly variations between 1998 and 2004 in the share of immigrants within occupations in 13 European countries. We identify the impact of immigrants on natives׳ employment rate using an instrumental variable strategy based on historical settlement patterns across host countries and occupations by origin country. We find that natives׳ employment rate increases in occupations and sectors receiving more immigrants. Moreover, we show that this effect varies depending on immigrants׳ characteristics and on host country labor market institutions which affect relative reservation wages.

A Quantitative Assessment of the Effect of First Contract Arbitration on Bargaining Relationships

This article investigates first contract arbitration's (FCA) capacity to foster bargaining relationships and deter misconduct by analyzing its effect on decertifications. Using time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) analysis with data from nine Canadian provinces over a four-decade period, it shows: (1) FCA correlates with 20 to 37 percent fewer decertifications in provinces that have an FCA provision relative to those that do not; (2) of the various types of FCA, the automatic and fault forms have the most robust effect on decertifications while the mediation-arbitration form may have the largest effect on decertifications; and (3) the effect of FCA is heightened in the presence of card-check certification such that the best results for fostering bargaining relationships may be found in the presence of both policies

Single versus multiple sourcing and the evolution of bargaining positions

The size and importance of global contract manufacturers has risen along with the volume and pervasiveness of global subcontracting activities. Many contract manufacturers now equal or even dominate their customers in size and power, ending the historical dominance of original equipment manufacturers in subcontracting relations. We study a manufacturer׳s (or buyer׳s) single-versus-multiple sourcing decision under specific consideration of the effects on the evolution of power between the buyer and its supply base. Motivated by the trend towards less hierarchical sourcing relationships, we use the generalized Nash bargaining framework to model contract negotiations. Being awarded a contract allows suppliers to progress on their learning curves, leading to lower future production costs. The buyer׳s primary trade-off between single and multiple sourcing then is as follows. Whereas single sourcing leads to more pronounced learning effects and thus more drastic cost reductions, it increases the active supplier׳s relative bargaining position, as the buyer׳s outside option becomes comparatively less competitive. Considering this trade-off, we find that the buyer׳s optimal sourcing strategy depends on both its bargaining capabilities and the rate at which learning by doing reduces production costs. A powerful buyer might indeed prefer single sourcing, but weaker buyers will generally be better off splitting their volume between different suppliers to maintain a viable alternative source. While splitting the volume maximizes a weak buying firm׳s profit, it always leads to inefficiencies, since the highest possible system profit would be achieved by concentrating learning effects at one supplier (single sourcing).

Frontiers of change and governance in contractual agreements: The possible role of exploitation - Uniting Reformed Church De Doorns v President of the Republic of South Africa 2013 5 SA 205 (WCC)

In the South African common law of contract there appears to be support for the open norm of public policy as a general clause to ameliorate the effects of unfair contracts and terms which are contrary to public policy. The courts have on several occasions held that contracts or terms would be regarded as contrary to public policy had they come about where the parties were in an unequal bargaining relationship and this inequality was linked with another factor(s). In this case note it is argued that the element of unequal bargaining position may be contrary to public policy if it is linked with exploitation as the other factor. The element of exploitation was highlighted in the recent court decision of Uniting Reformed Church, De Doorns v President of the Republic of South Africa 2013 5 SA 205 (WCC). In this case the applicant church owned three properties on which were three schools under the control of the State. The church and the State had concluded 20-year notarial leases in respect of each of the properties. A term in the contract provided that after the expiration of the lease period the church would transfer the properties to the State free of charge. After the expiration of the leases the State demanded the transfer of the properties. The church disputed the claim, averring that the term was unenforceable because the parties had been in an unequal bargaining position and that the enforcement of the term constituted expropriation in contravention of the property clause of the Constitution. It is submitted that expropriation without compensation is not only contrary to section 25 of the Constitution but constitutes exploitation. It is suggested that where exploitation results from an unequal bargaining relationship it provides the "further factor" that, together with the inequality in bargaining power, is sufficient to establish that the term or contract is in conflict with public policy. This contributes to giving meaning to the term "public policy". To support this argument, reference is made to the German Civil Code, the Swiss Civil Code, consumer protection legislation and the philosophy of Wertheimer.

The Power Game between Division Managers and CEOs in Internal Capital Market

Scharfstein and Stein (2000) propose a two-tiered agency model where division managers rent-seek to maximize their own utilities; the CEO being an agent of shareholders may use preferential capital allocation to retain division managers. We build our study on this two-tiered agency model and show empirically that: factors that improve division managers’ bargaining power (such as segment profitability or segment requires specific human capital) or increase productivity imbalance (such as variation in segment productivities) among segments tend to aggravate distortion in internal capital allocation; while factors that contribute to stronger CEO power (such as high CEO ownership), easy segment evaluation (such as segment asset tangibility) tend to improve the efficiency in internal capital market. We also find that segment financial opacity and equity-based CEO compensation distort capital reallocation decisions when there are changes in segment investment opportunities. Overall, our results indicate that the relative bargaining positions of conglomerate CEOs and segment managers play an important role in determining the efficiency of internal capital market.

Some (Don't) Like it Hot: The Use of the Hot Goods Injunction in Perishable Agriculture

I. INTRODUCTIONSince its creation in 1938, Department of Labor (DOL) has used Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to improve working conditions and maintain a competitive marketplace by preventing produced under unfair labor practices from entering interstate commerce.1 Under FLSA, one mechanism DOL can use to prevent these from entering marketplace is hot a device that prohibits movement or sale of hot goods in interstate commerce.2 A hot good is a product that a grower intends to place into interstate commerce that grower made or produced using unlawful labor practices, such as paying below minimum wage or using child labor.3 Although DOL historically used this injunction against textile industry, today DOL uses injunction for more diverse products, including perishable agriculture.4The DOL's use of hot goods injunction in perishable agriculture creates unique problems because can spoil while being held, pending resolution of labor issue.5 At same time, most workers who produce perishable agricultural products-migrant farmworkers-face unique challenges in enforcing their legal labor rights, including their transient presence in area and various immigration issues.6 This Note considers whether DOL's use of hot goods injunction in perishable agriculture is justified. Part II discusses history of FLSA hot goods injunction. Part III discusses DOL's use of hot goods injunction in perishable agriculture, focusing on relative bargaining strength of growers against government and migrant farmworkers against farm owners. Part IV concludes that despite inherent risk of economic duress that DOL's use of a hot goods injunction causes, DOL should continue to use hot goods injunction to protect migrant farmworkers because migrant farmworkers face unique obstacles that complicate their ability to enforce their rights and growers have adequate procedural protections. Part IV also concludes that DOL's use of a hot goods objection-a threat of an injunction-is unwarranted because it imposes equally severe hardships on growers without affording them adequate legal protections.II. THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT'S HOT GOODS INJUNCTIONCongress enacted FLSA in 1938 to address various problems with labor market, including employers' use of unfair labor practices, such as child labor and insufficient pay to gain a competitive advantage in interstate commerce.7 One of methods Congress created to enforce FLSA was hot goods injunction, which allows DOL to prevent produced in violation of FLSA from entering interstate commerce.8 Under FLSA, Secretary of Labor can use a hot goods injunction after investigating production of and attempting to negotiate a settlement with an employer.9 Although DOL does not use hot goods injunction frequently, in past hot goods injunction has served as a powerful tool to halt unfair labor practices.10 This Part discusses overall aims of FLSA, hot goods injunction as an enforcement mechanism of wage and hour provisions of FLSA, and how DOL has successfully used hot goods injunction to fix unfair labor practices. Part II.A of this Note discusses Congress's goals in enacting FLSA. Part II.B examines complexities of hot goods injunction. Part II.C analyzes how DOL has used hot goods injunction in an attempt to end unfair labor practices. Part II.D details primary example of DOL's use of hot goods injunction in garment industry. Part II.E explains how DOL has used hot goods injunction outside of garment industry.A. GOALS OF THE FLSAThe FLSA's declaration of policy states that Congress seeks to remedy the existence, in industries engaged in commerce or in production of for commerce, of labor conditions detrimental to maintenance of minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers. …