Bargaining In Germany Research Articles

Kolektivno pregovaranje uz poseban osvrt na pravo Nemačke i Republike Srbije

Collective bargaining is type of dialogue between social partners (representative trade unions and representative employer organization) which lead to conclusion of collective agreement. For success of collective bargaining, it must necessarily be laid on a democratic basis and it must be in accordance with appropriate legal framework that enables the social partners to act autonomously and independently. This means that employees, on the one hand, and employers, on the other, have the right to freely choose to form their own organizations (trade unions and employers' organizations), and to join them under the conditions prescribed by their own statutes or rules. The author considers right to collective bargaining as one of the cornerstone rights adopted by International Labour Organisation and give a special attention to legal framework and situation regarding collective bargaining in Germany and Republic of Serbia.

Works Councils and Collective Bargaining in Germany: A Simple Theoretical Extension to Reconcile Conflicting Empirical Findings

A model by by Hubler and Jirjahn (2003) suggests that redistribution activities of works councils are more limited in establishments covered by collective bargaining. The model predicts that works councils have stronger productivity effects and weaker wage effects in covered than in uncovered establishments. While empirical studies provide supporting evidence for the predicted productivity effects, the results on the wage effects are mixed. This article extends the model to reconcile the empirical findings. It takes into account that collective-bargaining coverage not only limits redistribution activities but also strengthens the effectiveness of performance-enhancing work practices negotiated between employers and works councils.

Contract Innovation in Germany: An Economic Evaluation of Pacts for Employment and Competitiveness

AbstractPacts for employment and competitiveness are an integral component of the ongoing process of decentralization of collective bargaining in Germany, a phenomenon that has been hailed as key to that nation's economic resurgence. Yet little is known about the effects of pacts on firm performance. The evidence largely pertains to employment and is decidedly mixed. This article investigates the association between pacts and six outcome indicators using a framework in which the controls comprise establishments that negotiated over pacts but failed to reach agreement on their implementation. An extensive set of robustness checks are run to test the sensitivity of the key findings of the model. There is no suggestion of pacts negatively impacting any of the selected measures of establishment performance. Rather, the evidence points to some positive short‐ and medium‐run effects on firm average wages and possibly employment and innovation as well.

Plea Bargaining in Germany—Doctoring the Symptoms without Looking at the Root Causes

Plea Bargaining in Germany—Doctoring the Symptoms without Looking at the Root Causes

Foreword: Plea Bargaining in Germany after the Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court

Criminal procedure is most critical for the rights of the accused. It does not surprise that criminal procedural issues often give rise to constitutional complaints by convicted persons. Yet far beyond the ordinary cases, the latest opinion of the Federal Constitutional Justices on the constitutionality of the so-called deal-proceedings according to § 257c of the German Criminal Procedure Code (StPO) has caused much attention. The constitutional complaints, which kicked off the proceedings in Karlsruhe, forced the Justices to address the very basis of criminal procedure, its structure and traditional foundations. The decision of 19 March 2013, however, testifies the disunity amongst the justices and their anxiety not to trigger a stampede in the criminal justice system. Even if the outcome is rather unspectacular, the decision is nevertheless one of the most important and fundamental judicial documents concerning criminal procedure of the last years. Because of the centrality of the issue and its relevance also for comparative criminal law, we have decided to provide this topic with the broad room it deserves and put together a special issue on the “deal-decision” of the German Federal Constitutional Court.

Quo Vadis, German Criminal Justice System? The Future of Plea Bargaining in Germany

For over three decades, plea bargaining has been in the focus of the legal discussion in Germany. Although the German legislature has acted in 2009 by codifying permissible agreements in criminal cases between the court, the prosecutor and the defendant, an end of this debate is not yet in sight. This article reviews the controversy among academics, legal practitioners and politicians in Germany and critically analyzes the relevant legal issues of plea bargaining with special regard to the recent judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court in March 2013.

Export Dependence and Institutional Change in Wage Bargaining in Germany

This article explores the adjustment of wage bargaining institutions to international trade in Germany. Embracing IPE as opposed to CPE lenses yields a novel interpretation of change in the institution of wage bargaining. Export dependence of a sector, we argue, has destabilizing effects for industry-wide bargaining by sparking an intra-sectoral cleavage between domestic- and export-oriented enterprises. Specifically, the greater the degree of export dependence of a sector, the greater the degree to which domestic-oriented enterprises within that sector will abandon collective bargaining. We also explain how workplace employee representation through works councils mitigates this effect, such that the presence of works councils helps domestically oriented firms to hold to collective bargaining agreements in the face of a sector's deepening exposure to export markets. These claims find empirical support in the history of labor relations developments in the metal industry and, especially, in extensive analysis of a cross-section of establishments. Our findings attribute major responsibility to the firms driving globalization for undermining collective bargaining institutions and suggest that economic globalization is a cause of dualization. In all, the article provides fresh ammunition for a version of globalization-induced institutional convergence. [Correction added after online publication on May 28, 2014: �conversion� changed to �convergence� in preceding sentence.]

Union Density and Varieties of Coverage: The Anatomy of Union Wage Effects in Germany

Collective bargaining in Germany takes place at either industry or firm level, and bargaining coverage is much higher than union density. The share of a firm's employees covered can vary between 0% and 100%, suggesting that researchers should distinguish union density, coverage at the firm level, and coverage at the individual level. Using linked employer-employee data, the authors estimate OLS and quantile regressions of wages on these dimensions of union influence. They find that a higher share of employees in a firm covered by industrywide or firm-specific contracts is associated with higher wages but find no clear-cut effect on wage dispersion. Yet, holding coverage at the firm level constant, individual coverage is associated with lower wages and less wage dispersion. Higher union density reinforces the effects of coverage. But for employees in firms without coverage, density's effect is negative and thus compresses the wage distribution in firms without coverage.

Is the Erosion Thesis Overblown? Evidence from the Orientation of Uncovered Employers

It is sometimes claimed that the coverage of collective bargaining in Germany is considerably understated because of orientation, a process whereby uncovered firms profess to shadow the wages set under sectoral bargaining. Yet importantly, at a time when collective bargaining proper has been in retreat, little is known of corresponding trends in the frequency of indirect coverage, still less of the degree to which wages are aligned in practice. Using nationally representative data for 2000–2010, this paper charts the extent of orientation in the uncovered sector, and tracks average wages across bargaining regimes as well as changes in wages from switches in regime. It is reported that orientation is growing with the decline in sectoral bargaining and that orienting firms do pay higher wages than their counterparts in the collective bargaining free zone. Yet in neither case – frequency nor remuneration – is the degree of ‘compensation’ recorded other than partial.

Institutional continuity in German collective bargaining: Do employer associations contribute to stability?

Employer associations’ organizational capacity to extend collective bargaining coverage (CBC) beyond unionization levels is one important factor contributing to the stability of multi-employer bargaining in Germany. Based on a representative sample of 142 German employer associations, this article carries out an empirical examination of the characteristics influencing this capacity. The major results are that a wider political domain and adherence to social partnership positively contribute to associations’ static capacity to extend CBC, as approximated by membership density. Yet, in a dynamic perspective – approximated by membership growth rates – a paradoxical trend is revealed by which organizational stabilization of associations is achieved at the expense of decoupling firms’ membership status from collective bargaining arrangements, weakening employer associations’ future capacity to extend CBC.

Before the crisis, in the crisis, and beyond: the upheaval of collective bargaining in Germany

The explanation of what has been called the ‘German employment miracle’ has much to do with the broad turn in German collective bargaining towards emergency coalitions at firm level, embedded in a larger environment of ‘crisis corporatism’. To understand this recent move, including its lessons and its limits, and to assess potential changes in the near future, it is useful to take into account the upheaval that took place within the collective bargaining system in the pre-crisis period. This article argues that there are good reasons to believe that very soon German collective bargaining will be at the crossroads again. The choice for unions and works councils will be either to return to traditional mixtures of concession bargaining and bargaining on retrenchment measures, or to revitalize their membership base in pursuit of ‘high road’ deals. A corner-stone for any revitalization strategy will include political pressure for a reformed back-up for collective bargaining by a renewal of statutory collective agreement extension procedures.

Paying More than Necessary? The Wage Cushion in Germany

Using a representative establishment data set for Germany, we show that more than 40 percent of plants covered by collective agreements pay wages above the level stipulated in the agreement, which gives rise to a wage cushion between the levels of actual and contractual wages. Cross-sectional and fixed-effects estimations for the period 2001-2006 indicate that the wage cushion mainly varies with the profit situation of the plant and with indicators of labour shortage and the business cycle. While plants bound by multi-employer sectoral agreements seem to pay wage premiums in order to overcome the restrictions imposed by the rather centralized system of collective bargaining in Germany, plants which make use of single-employer agreements are significantly less likely to have wage cushions.

Trade union law in Germany

REPORT□ TRADEUNIONLAWINGERMANY Trade union law in Germany I Particularly political Republic, government the protest went coming Germany democracy way taken the to decisions on in workers Weimar against oppose during by which threat under strike or was the to in theWeimar Republic,workers wenton strike to oppose politicaldecisions taken bythe government orto protestagainst theway inwhich democracy in Germanywas comingunder threat KARIN FLOTHMANN, Ver.di Vereinte Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft Flired The euros Berlin over was a supermarket all couple ittook ofdeposit to cashier seal Emmily's receipts was accused fate . 1.30 euroswas all ittookto seal Emmily's fate. TheBerlin supermarket cashier was accused ofcashing intwodepositreceipts accidentally left behindbya customer. Despitethefactthather employer had no evidencethatshe was actually guilty, 50year-old Emmily was dismissed without notice inFebruary 2008.Attheendoftheday,she had stolen1.30eurosand that, according to her employer, was enoughto justify sackingheron thespot. Emmily turned tohertrade unionver.di tohelp herfight herdismissal. However,inthesummer of2008,theBerlin LabourCourt declaredherdismissaltobe legal.Intheir verdict, thejudgesstated that itwas notthevalueofthedepositreceipts thatmattered. Rather, itwas herdishonesty that had fatally undermined thetrust betweenthe50 year-old cashier andheremployers andthey were therefore perfectly entitled todismiss herwithout notice.Emmily had workedas a cashierforthe samesupermarket chainfor30years. Ver.di rana number ofcampaigns insupport of Emmily who had previously organised a strike at thestore where sheworked. "It's pretty obvious that that istherealreasonshewas fired", according to thetrade union.Twoyears later, inthesummer of 2010,theFederalLabourCourt revoked Emmily's dismissal. Thejudgesfound that herdismissal was notjustified, sinceshewasonlyguilty ofa "serious breachofduty". Sincethiswas theonlyoccasion that Emmily hadbeenintrouble during the30years shehadworked for thecompany, this incident alone was notsufficient tocompletely "destroy" thetrust between herandheremployers. Moreover, inview oftheextremely lowsumofmoney involved, a cautionwouldhavesufficed inthis instance. Emmily's dismissal therefore hadtobe revoked. Emmily's was themostwidelypublicisedcase to be dealtwithbytheGermantradeunionsin recent years, and one oftheir greatest successes. AsEmmily's casedemonstrates, theGerman labour courtsplayan important rolewithregard to the rights ofworkers andindeedthetradeunions. Thebasisofalltrade unionactivity inGermany is thecountry's constitution, knownas theBasic Law.Article 9 3 states that "Theright toform associationsto safeguard and improve working and economicconditions shallbe guaranteed toevery individual andtoevery occupation orprofession. Agreements that restrict orseektoimpair this right shallbe nulland void;measuresdirected to this endshallbe unlawful." Thearticle goes on tosay thatthedeployment ofpolice officers or troops "may notbe directed against industrial disputes ... undertaken in orderto safeguardand improve working andeconomicconditions." Inthis article, theBasicLawthusestablishes the right tofreedom ofassociation andfree collective bargaining inGermany. Itgrants thetrade unions andemployers' associations theright toindependently negotiate and concludecollective agreements without State intervention. Industrial action isone oftheaspectsofthisprocessthat isafforded legalprotection bytheconstitution. TheState hasno desiretointervene inthesedisputes, since employers andtrade unions areabletosettle them faster andmoreflexibly thanwouldbe possibleif theStateweremoreheavily involved. Strikes are relatively rare inGermany compared toother countries , and manypeople pointto thisas evidence that thesystem is a successful one. Another peculiarity oftheGerman modelisthat all tradeunionsareindependent ofpolitical parties .Single, united trade unionshavebeenformed forindividual industries, meaning that, withonly a fewexceptions, itisone largeorganisation that sitsatthebargaining tablerather than several individualtrade unions. Germany's largest unionisIG Metall, whichrepresents allworkers inthemetalworking and electrical tradesas wellas all automotive employees. Thesecondlargest trade union is theunitedservices unionver.di, bornin 2001 out of a mergerbetweenfiveindividualtrade unions. Itrepresents alltheoccupations intheservicessector , from thearts andjournalism through to commerce, thebanking and insurance sectors andpublicsector workers. In Germany, tradeunionslikever.dienjoythe samerights andprotection as employers, andthis alsoappliesasfar as industrial action isconcerned. In 1955, the Federal Labour Courtruled that "Lockouts areequivalent tostrikes, irrespective of whether they areapproved byanemployers' associationand subsequently implemented byindividualemployers orsimply carried outbyone or moreemployers." Furthermore, a FederalLabour Court ruling from 1994entitles employers toclose partorallofa siteintheeventofstrike action. Politicalstrikes Thetrade unions invirtually every country inEurope organiseprotests or generalstrikes from timeto time inorder toprotest against measures taken by thegovernment. Frenchworkers, forexample, staged walkouts toprotest against proposals toraise theretirement age. Meanwhile,Greekworkers downedtoolsinresponse tothetrade unions'call toopposethedraconian austerity measures taken bytheir government to tacklethecountry's debt crisis. InGermany, where political strikes aretaboo, this wouldbeunthinkable. However, itwasn't ever thus. Particularly during theWeimar Republic, workerswenton strike to oppose political decisions takenbythegovernment ortoprotest against the wayinwhichdemocracy inGermany wascoming underthreat. The best-known examplewas the INTERNATIONAL union rights Page 18Volume 18Issue 3201 1 general strike calledtodefeat theattempted coup known astheKappPutsch inMarch 1920. According toGerman case law,workstoppages arepermissibleas a meansofdemocratic resistance in the event ofa threat tothecountry's democratic order that cannot be averted byanyother means. Inactualfact, there isnolegislation inGermany explicitly banning political strikes. Thebanispurelya consequenceofrulings madebytheGerman courts. Theinitial precedent wassetin1952when theprinters' unionIG DruckundPapiercalleda 48-hour...

Exporting the American model? Transatlantic entanglements of industrial relations at Opel and Ford Germany (1948–1965)

Surveys of labour practices in subsidiaries of US-owned firms in Europe often argue that reluctance to join employer associations is a distinct feature of the American approach to industrial relations, entailing tensions with trade unions, particularly in so-called stakeholder economies like Germany. Taking the cases of Fordwerke and Opel, this article demonstrates, however, that this general claim does not always fit the historical pattern of US companies in post-war Germany. When the choice between plant and industry bargaining became a major issue at Opel (1948–58) and Fordwerke (1960–65), there was no significant pressure by Detroit management for decentralized negotiations. The real promoters of plant bargaining were the local works councils and union organizations, whose ideas, however, were controversial within the broader IG Metall union organization. The majority of the union's leadership feared that a decentralization of bargaining could weaken overall organizational strength and solidarity, or even lead to autoworkers splitting from the union. A transatlantic link was important, too – yet on the labour rather than on the management side: The American United Automobile Workers (UAW) trade union, concerned about growing Ford and GM investments in Western Europe, actively supported a shift towards plant bargaining in Germany through bilateral contacts and through a lobby for international collective bargaining coordination under the auspices of the International Metalworkers Federation (IMF). Such a prospect sounded as threatening to IG Metall leaders as to Ford and GM management, and their collusion accordingly ensured that industry bargaining prevailed. From the companies’ point of view the costs and constraints of membership in the German employer association were a drawback more than offset by the advantage of being shielded against a scenario of militant wage pressure by German car workers drawing on international support.

The Extent of Collective Bargaining and Workplace Representation: Transitions between States and Their Determinants - A Comparative Analysis of Germany and Great Britain

Industrial relations are in flux in many nations, perhaps most notably in Germany and Britain. That said, comparatively little is known in any detail of the changing pattern of the institutions of collective bargaining and worker representation in Germany and still less in both countries about firm transitions between these institutions over time. The present paper maps changes in the importance of the key institutions, 1998-2004, and explores the correlates of two-way transitions, using successive waves of the German IAB Establishment Panel and both cross-sectional and panel components of the British Workplace Employment Relations Survey. We identify the workplace correlates of the demise of collective bargaining in Britain and the erosion of sectoral bargaining in Germany, and identify the respective roles of behavioral and compositional change.

Union Density and Varieties of Coverage: The Anatomy of Union Wage Effects in Germany

Collective bargaining in Germany takes place either at the industry level or at the firm level; collective bargaining coverage is much higher than union density; and not all employees in a covered firm are necessarily covered. This institutional setup suggests to explicitly distinguish union power as measured by net union density (NUD) in a labor market segment, coverage at the firm level, and coverage at the individual level. Using linked employer-employee data and applying quantile regressions, this is the first empirical paper which simultaneously analyzes these three dimensions of union influence on the structure of wages. Ceteris paribus, a higher share of employees in a firm covered by industry-wide or firm-level contracts is associated with higher wages. Yet, individual bargaining coverage in a covered firm shows a negative impact both on the wage level and on wage dispersion. A higher union density reinforces the effects of coverage, but the effect of union density is negative at all points in the wage distribution for uncovered employees. In line with an insurance motive, higher union density compresses the wage structure and, at the same time, it is associated with a uniform leftward movement of the distribution for uncovered employees.

Rescaling industrial relations – the spatial dimensions of collective bargaining in Germany

Rescaling industrial relations – the spatial dimensions of collective bargaining in Germany

The Dogs that Sometimes Bark: Globalization and Works Council Bargaining in Germany

This article investigates how international economic openness affects works council bargaining. The focus is on how bargaining over working time, payment systems and non-standard employment in eight German factories is affected by not only various measures of ‘bite’ (exit via trade and FDI flows) but also measures of ‘bark’ (employer threats of foreign production relocation). The main conclusion is that greater foreign investment and trade tend to trigger deeper concessions in works council bargaining. The study also suggests how biting and barking interact. The research suggests that the less studied manifestations of globalization may constrain labour organization more than previous studies focused on flows have suggested.

Decentralizing Wage Bargaining in Germany — A Way to Increase Employment?

Abstract. The area‐wide wage agreement is at the centre of Germany's system of collective bargaining. In recent years, however, there has been a tendency towards the decentralization of collective bargaining. Individual wage agreements have led to more moderate wage developments, whilst collective agreements with individual firms, and agreements at the production unit level, have not had this moderating effect. On the other hand, collective bargaining has become more flexible, leading to greater pay differentiation. The further decentralization of collective bargaining, although desirable, has given rise to objections based in constitutional law and to resistance from employees and employers.

From collective action to institutionalized labor rights: parallel and diverging logics of collective action in Germany and South Africa

An historical narrative emphasizing the “counterrevolution in the social‐economic sphere” of neo‐liberalism's attack worldwide on organized labor and welfare provision since the 1970s distorts or ignores the gains and transformations of collective bargaining in Germany and South Africa during this period. Despite apparent differences between these cases, both labor movements succeeded in transforming narrowly circumscribed workplace rights into broader demands for political and economic change. Migrant or non‐citizen workers played a key role in both cases, and workers gained important reforms in the absence of strong party allies in power. The cases thus draw into question the universality of the Marshallian, liberal path to worker power, from civil rights to political and finally labor and social rights. These examples of the postliberal path suggest instead that gains in labor rights can lead to gains in social and political rights.