Bargaining Game Approach Research Articles

Efficiency decomposition and measurement in two-stage fuzzy DEA models using a bargaining game approach

Abstract In this paper, a fuzzy two-stage Game-DEA (FTSGDEA) approach is proposed using a bargaining game model. Each decision-making unit (DMU) consists of two serially connected sub-DMUs. The first sub-DMU uses several inputs to produce several outputs. The outputs of the first sub-DMU, called intermediated measures, are the inputs of the second sub-DMU. Intermediate measures are used by the second sub-DMU to produce the final output of the main DMU. In standard TSGDEA settings, the product of the distance of the efficiency scores of each sub-DMU, which defines its breakdown payoff, is maximized. This approach leads to the overall enhancement of the efficiency scores through a cooperative game environment. We extend this setting to a fuzzy environment where the uncertainty of inputs, intermediate measures, and outputs is accounted for using linguistic terms parameterized via fuzzy sets. The proposed FTSGDEA associates an interval efficiency score to each DMU and sub-DMU, which allows the model to handle real-life problems involving uncertainties. We apply FTSGDEA to a case study involving the assessment of sixty branches from the Saman bank in Iran.

Resource Allocation in Wireless Powered Relay Networks: A Bargaining Game Approach

Information and power transfer in mobile relay networks have recently emerged simultaneously, where the relay can harvest the radio frequency (RF) energy and then use this energy for data forwarding and system operation. Most of the previous works do not consider that the relay may have its own objectives, such as using the harvested energy for its own transmission instead of maximizing transmission of the network. Therefore, in this paper, we propose a Nash bargaining approach to balance the information transmission efficiency of source–destination pairs and the harvested energy of the relay in a wireless powered relay network with multiple source–destination pairs and one relay. We analyze and prove that the Nash bargaining problem has several desirable properties such as the discreteness and quasi-concavity, when it is decomposed into three subproblems: the energy transmission power optimization, the power control for data transmission, and the time division between energy transmission and data transmission. Based on the theoretical analysis, we propose an alternating power control and time-division algorithm to find a suboptimal solution. Simulation results clearly show and demonstrate the properties of the problem and the convergence of our algorithm.

An information congestion control scheme in the Internet of Vehicles: A bargaining game approach

In VANETs (Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks), the information exchange plays an important role for context awareness. However, at intersections, a channel congestion is likely occurring if no control scheme is applied for the exchange especially when the vehicle density is high. To solve this problem, a congestion control scheme is proposed based on the non-cooperative bargaining game. First, vehicles approaching intersections are divided into clusters. By introducing a simple channel-load estimation scheme, our bargaining game is presented by which the cluster leaders could negotiate an optimal combination of the transmitting power and packet generation rate for their members. When the Nash Equilibrium of our game is reached, the utility of each player will be maximized without making the channel congested. Numerical results show that our scheme could alleviate the possible packets collisions thus reducing the average experienced delay and increasing the packets delivery ratio on the receiver side.

A Novel Routing Scheme for Resource-Constraint Opportunistic Networks: A Cooperative Multiplayer Bargaining Game Approach

Routing is a challenging issue in opportunistic networks (OPPNETs). Existing routing schemes in OPPNETs can be classified into two categories: single-copy schemes and multicopy schemes. Single-copy schemes can save network resources but cannot guarantee transmission delay and packet delivery ratio. Multicopy schemes can increase network robustness and reduce average delay and, at the same time, consume a large amount of network resources and induce large overhead. Therefore, it is critical to design an efficient routing scheme that can make a better tradeoff between the performance of multicopy and single-copy schemes in resource-constraint OPPNETs. Inspired by this, in this paper, we propose a novel routing scheme based on a Nash bargaining solution in resource-constraint OPPNETs called GameR. In GameR, we map the distributed message dissemination to a multiplayer bargaining model by constructing a proper utility function based on estimated resource utilization ratio and history delivery predictability. GameR can efficiently utilize the network resources, achieving higher delivery ratio and lower overhead in resource-constraint OPPNETs. Extensive simulation results show that GameR performs better compared with existing classical routing schemes in terms of message delivery ratio, average delay, overhead, goodput, and overall performance.

Group bargaining based bitcoin mining scheme using incentive payment process

AbstractBitcoin is a digital cryptocurrency that has generated considerable public interests through a fully decentralised network with an inherently independence from governments or any central authorities. Although its short history has been volatile, the Bitcoin maintains a core group of committed users. In this study, we look at the Bitcoin complex structure and design a new Bitcoin mining protocol while developing a novel incentive payment process. To effectively implement an incentive payment mechanism, we adopt the concept of the group bargaining solution by considering a peer‐to‐peer relationship, and it is practically applied to a distributed computation network system. Based on the cooperative game model, we explore an efficient solution that can maximise Bitcoin users' rewards. Through system level simulations, the proposed scheme is evaluated and compared with other existing schemes. The simulation results show that our group bargaining game approach outperforms the existing Bitcoin schemes in providing a better fair‐efficient system performance. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Fair Network Bandwidth Allocation in IaaS Datacenters via a Cooperative Game Approach

With wide application of virtualization technology, tenants are able to access isolated cloud services by renting the shared resources in Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) datacenters. Unlike resources such as CPU and memory, datacenter network, which relies on traditional transport-layer protocols, suffers unfairness due to a lack of virtual machine (VM)-level bandwidth guarantees. In this paper, we model the datacenter bandwidth allocation as a cooperative game, toward VM-based fairness across the datacenter with two main objectives: 1) guarantee bandwidth for VMs based on their base bandwidth requirements, and 2) share residual bandwidth in proportion to the weights of VMs. Through a bargaining game approach, we propose a bandwidth allocation algorithm, Falloc, to achieve the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution (NBS) in datacenter networks, which exactly meets our objectives. The cooperative structure of the algorithm is exploited to develop an online algorithm for practical real-world implementation. We validate Falloc with experiments under diverse scenarios and show that by adapting to different network requirements of VMs, Falloc can achieve fairness among VMs and balance the tradeoff between bandwidth guarantee and proportional bandwidth sharing. Our large-scale trace-driven simulations verify that Falloc achieves high utilization while maintaining fairness among VMs in datacenters.

Service provider competition and cooperation in cloud-based software defined wireless networks

Software-defined wireless networking (SDWN) is an emerging paradigm in the era of the Internet of Things. In cloud-based SDWNs, resource management is seperated from the geo-distributed cloud, forming a virtual network topology in the control plane. Thus, a centralized software program is able to control and program the behavior of the entire network. In this article, we focus on resource management in cloud-based SDWNs, and discuss the competition and cooperation between cloud service providers. We present a Nash bargaining game approach to process the resource trading activity among cloud service providers in cloud-based SDWNs. Utility functions have been specifically considered to incorporate operation cost and resource utilization. Illustrative results indicate that cooperation is able to generate more benefits than competition. Moreover, resource sharing among cloud service providers has great significance in efficiently utilizing limited resources and improving quality of service.

Joint Channel Bandwidth and Power Allocation Game for Selfish Cooperative Relaying Networks

Resource-exchange-based incentive mechanisms are investigated for both selection cooperation (SC) and selection relaying (SR) networks using the cooperative bargaining game approach. Consider a user node that can act as a source as well as a potential relay for other nodes, and it is selfish to share an own resource with others only if the data rate achieved through cooperative relaying is not lower than that achieved without the cooperation by consuming the same amount of the resource. In the SC scenario, only one relay is allotted to a source. Then, a two-person SC game (SCG) is formulated to address the joint bandwidth and power allocation problem for two cooperative nodes. In the SR scenario, a set of relays is allotted to a source. Hence, we propose a one-to-many SR game (SRG) to address the multinode cooperation case. For both SCG and SRG, specific data frame structures are designed to accommodate both the bandwidth resource (in the form of transmission time) and the energy resource (in the form of transmission power) for a cooperative node. To achieve the system efficiency and per-node fairness objectives simultaneously, the Nash bargaining solution (NBS) method is used to solve both SCG and SRG. The existence and uniqueness of the NBS are proved. Moreover, theoretical analysis and simulations are provided to testify as to the effectiveness of the proposed SCG and SRG for efficient and fair resource allocation in the SC and SR scenarios, respectively.

Fair and Efficient Relay Selection and Spectrum Allocation for Multi-User and Multi-Relay Cooperative Cellular Networks

This letter studies the joint relay selection (RS) and spectrum allocation (SA) problem for the multi-user and multi-relay (MUMR) cellular networks. Regarding the amount of spectrum resource that a relay is willing to contribute for a particular user as the cooperative strategy of the relay, the joint RS and SA problem can be formulated as a cooperative bargaining game. Since there exists a unique Nash bargaining solution (NBS) to the game, a Langrangian relaxation with iterative search approach is proposed to find the NBS. By comparing with the maximal-rate and the max-min based RS and SA schemes, simulation results show that the proposed bargaining game approach achieves a fair and efficient rates distribution among the competitive users in the Pareto optimal sense.

INtERCEDE: An algorithmic approach to networked control system design

Networked Control Systems (NCS) are distributed control systems where the sensor signals to the controllers and the control data to the actuators are enclosed in messages and sent over a communication network. On the one hand, the design of an NCS requires ensuring the stability of the control system and achieving system response that is as close as possible to that of an ideal system which demands network resources. On the other hand, these resources are limited and have to be allocated efficiently to accommodate for future system extensions as well as applications other than control purpose. Furthermore the NCS design parameters for the control system messages and the message transmission over the network are interdependent. In this paper, we propose “Integrated NCS Design (INtERCEDE: Integrated NEtwoRked Control systEm DEsign)” a novel algorithmic approach for the design of NCS which ensures the stability of the control system, brings system response to that of an ideal system as close as desired and conserves network bandwidth at the same time. The core of INtERCEDE is a bargaining game approach which iteratively calculates the message parameters and network service parameters. Our experimental results demonstrate the operation of INtERCEDE and how it computes the optimal design parameters for the example NCS.

A bargaining game model for measuring performance of two-stage network structures

Data envelopment analysis (DEA) is a method for measuring the efficiency of peer decision making units (DMUs), where the internal structures of DMUs are treated as a black-box. Recently DEA has been extended to examine the efficiency of DMUs that have two-stage network structures or processes, where all the outputs from the first stage are intermediate measures that make up the inputs to the second stage. The resulting two-stage DEA model not only provides an overall efficiency score for the entire process, but also yields an efficiency score for each of the individual stages. The current paper develops a Nash bargaining game model to measure the performance of DMUs that have a two-stage structure. Under Nash bargaining theory, the two stages are viewed as players and the DEA efficiency model is a cooperative game model. It is shown that when only one intermediate measure exists between the two stages, our newly developed Nash bargaining game approach yields the same results as applying the standard DEA approach to each stage separately. Two real world data sets are used to demonstrate our bargaining game model.

Beyond network power? The dynamics of formal economic integration in Northeast Asia

At the turn of the new millennium, the traditional institutional equilibrium of East Asian economic integration – the embrace of the WTO at the multilateral level and a focus on market-driven, informal integration at the regional level – is under heavy strain. A growing number of Northeast and Southeast Asian countries are pursuing greater institutionalization at the sub-multilateral level, actively weaving a web of preferential trading arrangements. To examine this development, we focus on the likely new institutional equilibrium in Northeast Asia and its implications for East Asia and beyond. We first examine the various political and economic arguments that have been advanced to explain states' desire to pursue ‘regionalism’. From our perspective, most conventional explanations fail to adequately differentiate various forms of trading arrangements, thereby impairing both theoretical and empirical analysis of trading arrangements. To remedy this lacuna, we develop a more fine-grained typology of different modes of trade management – unilateral, bilateral, minilateral and multilateral. We then discuss an institutional bargaining-game approach focusing on goods, countries' individual situations and the fit with existing arrangements. This approach is used to analyze how trade arrangements evolved in East Asia in the 1990s, particularly after the Asian financial crisis. We then explore several paths that might lead to formal economic integration in Northeast Asia. Finally, we consider other possible outcomes beyond Northeast Asia.

The Evolution of APEC and ASEM: Implications of the New East Asian Bilateralism

AbstractThe traditional institutional equilibrium in East Asia—the embrace of the WTO at the multilateral level and a focus on market-driven, informal integration at the sub-multilateral level—is under heavy strain. Increasingly, East Asian countries are pursuing greater institutionalisation at the sub-multilateral level, weaving a web of preferential arrangements in response to similar strategies pursued by the US and the EU. This article examines the likely path of trading arrangements in Northeast Asia, its implications for East Asia and the future of APEC and ASEM. We propose an institutional bargaining game approach, focusing on goods, countries' individual bargaining situations and the fit with existing arrangements, and allowing an exploration of the evolution of trading arrangements in East Asia. An East Asian trading bloc has both benign and pernicious elements, depending on the ideas and beliefs held by regional actors. The contribution of a prospective East Asian bloc to APEC and ASEM primarily depends on the balance of interests between the US and the EU concerning East Asia. In view of the tremendous political and economic uncertainty in the global economy, the path to freer trade in Northeast Asia, East Asia and the world system is likely to be a bumpy one.