EU Banking Research Articles

DOES REVENUE DIVERSIFICATION STILL MATTER IN BANKING? EVIDENCE FROM A CROSS-COUNTRY ANALYSIS

Banks have been revising their business models since the financial crisis, diversifying income sources to pursue profitability and stability in a rapidly evolving environment. The effectiveness of this strategy is still debated. We investigate if revenue diversification of 1250 EU and US banks improved performance or its stability between 2008 and 2016. We adopt a broad econometric approach and define diversification as the share of non-interest revenue and the HH index of the net operating income. We find that diversification is not clearly associated with performance or its volatility, that benefits change remarkably over time and, where present, show significant variability. Our results support recent evidence on the limitations of diversification in banking, raising potential concerns on converging supervisory practices and general calls for revenue diversity. The variability of business models and the impacts of different economic and institutional environments matter.

Global systemically important banks regulation: Blessing or curse?

Do market participants believe that recent regulations will curb moral hazard at global systemically important banks (G-SIBs)? We analyze market returns to three events: the 2011 designation of certain banks as G-SIBs, the November 2014 identification of banks subject to additional capital surcharges, and the November 2015 announcement of Total Loss Absorption Capacity (TLAC) requirements. We find that reaction to the “designation event” fits the profit-based-reaction hypothesis, reaction to the “additional capital surcharges event” fits the regulatory burden hypothesis, and reaction to the “TLAC event” fits the irrelevance hypothesis. Weaker banks benefited more from being designated as G-SIBs, while EU banks suffered more from the additional capital surcharges.

What Are the Determinants of Mrel- Eligible Debt Yields? Evidence From the EU Banking Sector

We examine the risk sensitiveness of minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL)‐eligible debt yields in a sample of 63 European banking groups during the period 2009Q3–2019Q2 in 14 European countries. We conclude that MREL‐eligible debt is risk sensitive, as investors closely monitor indicators related to individual banks, issuance characteristics, market risk variables and the features of the banking system potentially affecting MREL‐eligible debt default risk. Our results, however, are not homogeneous across banks, time periods or types of debt product. In particular, we find evidence of higher risk sensitiveness in other systemically important institutions and non‐ systemic banks. We also identify higher levels of risk sensitiveness after the entry into force of the first Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive. However, we observe less risk sensitiveness during periods when targeted longer term refinancing operations were under way, in particularregarding bank and marketrisk variables. Our model also suggests that investors closely monitor senior non‐preferred issuers. This means that the market discipline that has traditionally been exercised through subordinated debt is currently exercised through senior non‐preferred issuances. Credit ratings are seen as a high‐credibility tool, helping investors in the market to better exercise market discipline.

Direct and indirect impacts of European banks’ regulation

This paper examines whether bank regulation and supervision have independent effects on the capital buffer and insolvency risk or their effects are channelled through the business cycle and income diversification. The findings show that regulatory capital index and supervisor power index have both the direct effect on bank capital buffer as well as bank risk and indirect effects via business cycle, whereas restriction on bank activities indirectly channels its effects through income diversification. Economic downturn with tighter capital regulation diminishes the benefit of the capital buffer. The restriction on bank activities policy is not effective for EU banks that highly involve in risk-taking activities. Increasing official supervision related to the change in the business cycle only brings benefit to capital buffer but harms banks' stability. Regulators should adjust capital regulation on the business cycle, introduce the tighter restriction on bank activities and an appropriate supervision control to reduce bank risk-taking behaviour.

EU Bank Insolvency Law Harmonization: What Next?

After the COVID-19 crisis has subsided, the (further) harmonization of bank insolvency law will again be high on the agenda of EU regulators and policy makers. On the basis of an analysis of the status quo pain points, the paper advocates the extension of the BRRD resolution regime to all bank failures, regardless of their systemic relevance. This could be achieved by removing the public interest requirement as part of the resolution trigger. The ensuing consolidation would significantly reduce complexity and enhance the transparency and legitimacy of the EU crisis management framework.

Forecasting Credit Ratings of EU Banks

The aim of this study is to forecast credit ratings of E.U. banking institutions, as dictated by Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs). To do so, we developed alternative forecasting models that determine the non-disclosed criteria used in rating. We compiled a sample of 112 E.U. banking institutions, including their Fitch assigned ratings for 2017 and the publicly available information from their corresponding financial statements spanning the period 2013 to 2016, that lead to the corresponding ratings. Our assessment is based on identifying the financial variables that are relevant to forecasting the ratings and the rating methodology used. In the empirical section, we employed a vigorous variable selection scheme prior to training both Probit and Support Vector Machines (SVM) models, given that the latter originates from the area of machine learning and is gaining popularity among economists and CRAs. Our results show that the most accurate, in terms of in-sample forecasting, is an SVM model coupled with the nonlinear RBF kernel that identifies correctly 91.07% of the banks’ ratings, using only 8 explanatory variables. Our findings suggest that a forecasting model based solely on publicly available financial information can adhere closely to the official ratings produced by Fitch. This provides evidence that the actual assessment procedures of the Credit Rating Agencies can be fairly accurately proxied by forecasting models based on freely available data and information on undisclosed information is of lower importance.

Financing the Transition to Sustainability: SMART Reform Proposals

Financial markets are fundamental to a successful transition to sustainable market activity. Addressing unsustainable financial practices is vital to realizing the EU’s commitments on sustainability, as expressed for instance in the European Green Deal of December 2019. Yet, investments in unsustainable projects – routinely funded by large EU banks – have not been addressed sufficiently by EU financial regulators, in spite of the introduction of the EU Sustainable Finance Initiative (SFI) in 2018. The SFI lacks a systematic integration of sustainability factors in the actions proposed, limiting focus on selected environmental issues, especially climate change. It also relies too much on the existing incentive structures for private actors in financial markets. Such reliance is unlikely to deliver sufficient sustainable investments. On the other hand, the EU has made considerable progress regarding to prevent ‘greenwashing’ of financial products, and the development of consultative processes and expert groups speaks of a genuine commitment to deliver, which may be realized in the present EU Parliament and Commission. However, the legitimacy and effectiveness of this EU action needs to be assured, and there is a danger the SFI will not achieve its goals, due to limitations in the proposals under it. In this Report the SMART Project presents its analysis and reform proposals on regulation governing the funding of investments both in the EU and between the EU and third countries. The regulation discussed concentrates firstly on the banking system, including central banks and private banks but also private and public institutional investors, as much of the short-term and narrow pressure for maximization of returns to investors comes from the investment supply chains of financial markets and institutional investors. The SMART Project also proposes revision of the European Central Bank mandate and operations, guidelines for bank risk assessment, and regulation of banks. Secondly, the SMART Project proposes broadening and strengthening the SFI with proposals of amendments in the recent Taxonomy, Disclosure and Benchmarks Regulations to cover all economic activities and financial instruments and all market actors, both public and private, obliging them take into consideration sustainability in their investment decisions as well as benchmarks provided by index and benchmarks providers. In the final part of the Report the increased focus on foreign investments outside the EU is discussed.

New kid on the block: leverage ratio and its implications for banking regulation

ABSTRACT The capital regulation reform package (CRR2) proposed for the EU banking sector introduces a minimum leverage ratio as a (non-risk-weighted) prudential backstop. In this paper, we use Czech bank-level data to explore the implications of introducing a leverage ratio into the capital regulatory framework. Specifically, we create an artificial ‘laboratory’ environment where we study the relationship between the two regulatory tools and selected bank-specific variables. We identify channels through which the capital and leverage ratios might be affected and test the functionality of those channels. Our results confirm that the capital and leverage ratios complement each other and that the leverage ratio is far less procyclical than the capital ratio. We also demonstrate an over-the-cycle functionality of our proposed channels of interaction between the capital and leverage ratios. We show that the leverage ratio (or similar microprudential backstops, such as an output floor) could be an important tool for maintaining resilience, especially for banking sectors with a high share of banks using the internal rating-based approach to risk weight setting.

Bank specific determinants of EU banks profitability after 2007 financial crisis

The basic purpose of the paper is to research determinants on profitability indicators of the banks in the European Union. Analysed bank profitability indicators considered as a standard are: the return on total bank assets (ROA) and return on total bank equity (ROE). The research model of bank profitability determinants is developed by analysing the systemically important, quoted banks in the European Union, in the 2007–2019 period, by using an adequate panel data analysis technique. The empirical evidence is in line with the initial assumptions: the efficiency of the banking firm, measured by the cost to income ratio and the non-performing loans ratio, has a significant influence on bank profitability, both on ROA and ROE. In the post-crisis period, banking firms ask for efficient cost management in achieving performance objectives. Additional important empirical results of research are the absence of impact of assets size and regulatory capital ratio on profitability indicators. The most important contribution of the paper is related to the sample definition, variable selection and explanatory power of the presented model in explaining global banking tendencies.

Extending ‘environment-risk weighted assets’: EU taxonomy and banking supervision

ABSTRACT Changing the economy to meet the goals posed by the Paris Agreement implies a financial system aligned to this end. This debate also involves a reconsideration of aims and tools of banking regulation although, for now, the discussion is still not very operational. In a previous work we introduced the ‘environment-risk weighted assets’ to internalize the pollution risk of the borrower that here we expand empirically to calculate the ‘external costs footprint’ of Italian corporate lending and to cover virtually every part of banks’ business. Moreover, we analyse whether our proposal is aligned to the European Union taxonomy on environmentally sustainable activities. We show that our framework can help to put on a working track the discussion on banking regulation for sustainable finance.

The Need for Improvement of External Audit Reports of Banks (The Case of Banks in Albania Which Mainly Belong to EU Banks)

The financial crisis of 2008 highlighted weaknesses in risk management, control and governance of banks, auditing, and financial supervision. This led to increased consideration of the respective roles and interactions of banking supervisors with external and internal auditors, who are key contributors to market discipline. Auditors ensure that financial information is transparent and reliable while supervisors provide confidence in financial systems. On the other hand, auditors enable market players to make decisions based on this information and contribute to financial stability. In 2014, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision considered the interaction between supervisors and external auditors by enabling their relationships to improve the quality of banks' audits, financial statements, and effective supervision of the banking system. Since 2015, the Bank of Albania has adopted its regulatory framework almost fully compliant with these principles. This paper analyses the typology of issues identified in the external audit reports of the 10 largest banks in Albania for 2018 and needs for their improvement.

Private Law Duties Deriving From EU Banking Regulation and its Individual Protection Goals

AbstractEU regulation both affects private law and increasingly relies on private law mechanisms to ensure its proper enforcement. Prominent examples are competition and capital markets regulation. In contrast, EU prudential regulation of commercial banking predominantly relies on public enforcement via supervisory authorities. This is astonishing given that the protection of individual bank customers emerges as a leitmotiv of EU banking regulation. CRD IV and CRR as the main legislative acts of EU commercial banking regulation strongly promote the goals of depositor and investor protection. More explicitly, the Consumer Credit Directive and the Consumer Mortgage Credit Directive introduced the duty of responsible lending towards consumers. Where the individual bank customer enjoys regulatory attention, but is not protected by public supervisory authorities, private law is best placed to fill the enforcement gap. In light of CJEU guidance, this contribution argues that the current EU banking regulation is open for and even requires private law remedies to enforce individual protection goals. Suitable instruments are contract interpretation, contract nullity and damages.

EU Banking in the COVID-19 Crisis: Time for a 'New Deal'

The current COVID-19 sanitary and economic crisis requires a “New Deal” between EU governments and EU banks: EU banks agree to partner with governments in enabling the effective transmission of the government’s vital financial support to the real economy in exchange for a transformation of the EU banking sector. This deal consists of a quid pro quo: governments condition the transmission via the banking sector of considerable monies to the real economy on a rationalization of the EU banking sector, which thus would become part of the post-COVID-19 “new normal.”To be successful, this unparalleled support of the EU economy will come with governmental guarantees and fees for banking services. Banks partnering in the salvage operation would be required to review and render their business models “fit for purpose.” A three-layered banking ecosystem in the EU should thus emerge one serving large corporates across the EU and also abroad, a second serving particular geographies and industries, and a third one more focused on retail clients and communities. Given the EU's openness and size, the region should host several banks of global standing and reach. The COVID-19 crisis is also an opportune time to enhance EU capital markets as a complement to the banking sector, especially with London's departure as a European financial center. The necessity of this project has been stated by many; COVID-19 has made it imperative to act. If this “New EU Banking Deal” deal does not materialize, the EU saga will include one more lost opportunity. More importantly, the consequences for both the banking sector and the entire EU financial and economic systems risk being dire. EU and banking authorities will have added to the costs of the economic and health catastrophes unfolding in front of us. Effective EU governance has never been more necessary in the face of major global issues such as COVID-19, climate change, and North-South migration. Now is the time for EU nations and their leaders in the public and private sectors to agree to a more robust financial union serving the EU population and its corporations. In doing so, the EU leadership will have met the growing concerns of an impatient EU public querying the purpose and value of the EU project.

Insolvency of Significant Non-Financial Enterprises: Lessons from Bank Failures and Bank Resolution

In the aftermath of the global financial crisis the EU bank resolution regime went through fundamental changes that seek to preserve financial stability and ensure continuity of critical functions. The same cannot be said of insolvency rules applicable to non-financial enterprises. Unlike bank resolution with its macroprudential and proactive focus, insolvency law has largely remained microprudential and reactive. Admittedly, unlike bank failures, corporate insolvencies usually do not pose systemic risk. However, in practice this may not hold true for significant non-financial enterprises (SNFEs). Such enterprises oftentimes play a major role in national economies and serve important public functions. Their failure may trigger contagion and cause disruptive consequences. Insofar as insolvency of SNFEs raises concerns common to bank failures, the question arises whether certain strategies and tools embraced within the EU bank recovery and resolution framework should be extended to regulate SNFE insolvency. This article explores the feasibility of such an extension.

Government Support and Bank Wholesale Funding Costs: Evidence from the EU Banking Union

In the wake of the financial crisis, many governments intervened to rescue banks. Between 2007 and 2009, numerous State Aid schemes were notified to the European Commission by different Member States; only 11 were blocked. Since the crisis, European authorities have reformed their safety nets to avoid taxpayers having to step in to save banks and out of fear that bailouts may be distorting competition. We investigate whether this fear is warranted in relation to long-term wholesale funding since the EU reforms. Using an original cross-section of nearly 2,500 senior bonds issued by systemic European banks, we find that nationalized banks do not benefit from lower bond spreads compared to their peers. Our findings are identical when we instrument bail-out expectations, consistent with these expectations having dropped since the crisis. We conclude that, in good times, the new EU bank safety nets appear to have achieved their stated goals.

An Analysis of Bank Fee and Commission Income in the EU and in the Czech Republic in a Low Interest Rate Environment

This paper deals with the European banking sector fee and commission income, with a special emphasis on the Czech Republic, in the 2007-2018 period. During this time span, net interest income was declining due to low nominal growth and a long period of low interest rates. We contribute to the literature when comparing the magnitude of fee income across the EU banking sectors. We come to the following key findings. First, we conclude that there is no single optimal fee income strategy. Second, we argue that Czech banks are not abnormally dependent on fee income and their outstanding profitability is rather connected with sound risk management as well as with sufficient liquidity and capital buffers. Third, we find that in the EU, fee income share followed an increasing trend after the 2007-2009 global financial crisis which might be connected with an effort to maintain desired profitability in a low interest rate environment.

Divulgence of Additional Capital Requirements in the EU Banking Union

The European Central Bank, as a supervisory authority, set additional to the European level one capital requirements known as Pillar 2 for 118 significant credit institutions. Disclosure of Pillar 2 requirements is not compulsory, although many credit institutions choose to inform about them. We estimate a logit model to investigate if being listed on stock exchange, size, profitability and credibility have impact on the probability of divulgence. We estimate sixteen specifications of our model to compare the explanatory power of different measures of size, profitability and credibility. The legal form and the size are statistically significant in all specifications, while profitability and credibility are significant only in some of them.

The Deviations in Financial Risk Correlations, and Some Analyses to the Banking Risk Governance after 2015

In this study, we aimed to discuss the institutional risk dimension of financial risk elements within the global process on the basis of both EU banks as primary financial institutions and structural global financial risk correlations. In this context, determining the institutional risk impact levels of banks, which are important financial risk sources for EU and the other countries, has revealed the primary purpose of our study. On the other hand, the analyses of the structural-institutional management effects of financial crisis management on a global ground express the unique aspect of our study. Structural institutional arrangements and the analysis of international financial activities in the financial risk management process have also revealed important criteria for determining corporate performances. In addition, the developments in bank loans since the crisis have been found meaningful in terms of our study, which's as an impact level of the corporate financial structures and how it creates a component balance in terms of financial crises. Although it has an indirect impact on our work, it has been understood that also the financial developments in the overall bank credits since the crisis have been taken as a meaningful part in our analyses intended to put forth institutional financial risk governance. Keywords : EU Countries, Financial Developments, Financial Risk, Financial Rask Governance, Institutional Standards. JEL Codes: G01, G14, G15. DOI: 10.7176/RJFA/11-10-12 Publication date: May 31 st 2020

The Impact of Fee Income Share on EU Banks' Performance and Its Implications for Drivers of Banks' Business Model Changes

This paper contributes to the current literature dealing with drivers of bank business model changes. We analyse the relationship between fee and commission income share and banks' performance in terms of profitability, risk and risk-adjusted profitability in the European Union. We applied the System Generalized Method of Moments to a unique data set of 329 EU banks in the period 2005-2014, which resulted in three key findings. First, we did not find any diversification benefits by increasing the fee income share. Therefore, we can conclude that the increase in fee income share observed in recent years in EU banks was driven mainly by external factors, such as increased competition, rather than by internal reasons. Second, higher reliance on equity financing and better quality of provided loans enhance banks' performance. Third, bank business strategies and macroeconomic factors are crucial determinants of banks' performance.

Potential Regulatory Obstacles to Crossborder Mergers and Acquisitions in the EU Banking Sector

Over the past decade, cross-border merger and acquisition (M&A) activity in the EU banking sector has remained far below its pre-crisis levels, despite the regulatory reforms implemented after the financial crisis. While the EU equipped itself with the Single Rulebook, convergent supervisory practices, a common crisis management framework and the creation of the Banking Union, ring-fencing and limits to the circulation of funds across borders are still present and the EU still does not reap the full benefits of the Single Market. The purpose of this paper is to map and analyse the elements of the current EU prudential framework that create obstacles to banking groups operating across borders. The results highlight the existence of a number of potential issues at both regulatory and supervisory levels. First, policy reviews, cases and survey-based evidence suggest that the current regulatory framework relies on a territorial approach (cross-border waivers for capital and minimum requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL), inefficient intra-group financial support arrangements, a multiplicity of macroprudential tools and the existence of options and national discretions within the Single Rulebook), favours pre-positioning resources with the subsidiaries and entails market fragmentation. Ultimately, this may endanger the comparability of institutions across countries and reduce the incentive to conduct cross-border consolidation. Second, despite the progress made in achieving convergence of supervisory practices across the EU, a number of approaches are not yet fully consistent, in particular with respect to the link between prudential requirements and restrictions on distributions, and to a more transparent approach when setting risk-by-risk requirements. The absence of common and fully transparent EU practices for prudential assessment of M&A transactions, including the determination of capital requirements, further adds to the complexity. Finally, it is also suggested that the completion of the Banking Union, by further strengthening the institutional cooperation among Member States and national authorities, has a fundamental role to play in freeing up the potential of enhanced financial integration. There should also be no further delay in the progress made towards the Banking Union’s achievement of single jurisdiction status.