Risk-taking Behavior Of Banks Research Articles

Competition between conventional and Islamic banks in Malaysia revisited

Purpose This paper aims to assess the nature of competition between conventional and Islamic banks operating in Malaysia. It is an effort to enrich the existing literature by offering an empirical compromise on the differences in the results of studies related to competition between the two types of banks. Design/methodology/approach Secondary data on all banks operating in Malaysia’s diversified banking sector is collected from the FitchConnect database for the period 2011-2017. A non-structural measure of competition (H-statistic) as informed by Panzar–Rosse is used to measure the competition between conventional and Islamic banks. Panel data analysis techniques are used to estimate H-statistic. Wald test for the market structure of perfect competition/monopoly is used to affirm the validity and consistency of the results. Findings The findings of this study signify that the Malaysian banking sector operated under monopolistic competition during the period of study. The long-run equilibrium condition holds for the Malaysian banking sector. Competition among conventional banks is more intense than that among Islamic banks. Financial reform endeavours of Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) along with the liberalisation wave of the financial system were successful in promoting competition, rendering the financial system contestable, resilient and dynamic. Practical implications Regulators and policymakers may find the results beneficial in terms of rethinking the number of banks operating in the Islamic sector. The number of banks, however, is not the only determinant of competition in the banking sector. Implications of competition change for stability and risk-taking behaviour of banks should be considered. Originality/value Within the context of Malaysia’s diversified banking system, given the contradictory results reported in studies on competition, this study is an effort to provide a plausible middle ground. It suggests a possible answer as to why competition nature has not changed since the policy change initiatives of BNM, namely, banks merger, expansion of Islamic banking operation scope and liberalisation process.

How language shapes bank risk taking

We analyze the impact of language on risk-taking behavior of banks. Languages that grammatically distinguish between present and future events make the future feel more distant than the present and as thus favor a less future-oriented behavior (Chen, American Economic Review, 2013). Our hypothesis is that these languages lead banks to take more risk since they reduce the perception of potential losses associated with risky activities. We investigate this hypothesis on a sample of 1401 banks from 81 countries over the 2010–2017 period. We perform random effects regressions of bank risk, measured by the Z-score, on the type of language. We find that banks from countries with future tense marking take more risk in accordance with our prediction. This finding is robust to the inclusion of alternative culture indicators, to alternative definitions of bank risk and of future time reference. We also observe that future tense marking is associated with greater occurrence of banking crises. Our conclusion is thus that language contributes to explain the cross-country differences in bank risk-taking.

The role of political patronage in the risk-taking behaviour of banks in the Middle East and North Africa

In light of growing interest in the role of political patronage in banking, several issues are highlighted with regards to the performance and behaviour of politically connected banks that may differ from their non-connected peers. In this article, the effect of political patronage on bank risk-taking is examined ina sample containing 67 banks in several Middle Eastern and North African MENA countries based on a hand collected dataset of political banking connections. Although the study found no evidence that politically connected banks take more risks than their non-politically connected counterparts, which is inconsistent with the moral hazard hypothesis, a nonlinear analysis revealed an indirect effect of political connection. Contrasting results may be related to differences in institutional settings, however, political connections remain an important factor to consider in prudential banking behaviours, either implicitly or explicitly. Overall, this article discusses whether moral hazard is relevant to MENA banks and fills an existing gap in the literature on the MENA region.

Impact of ownership structure on risk-taking behavior of South Asian banks

The implementation of an effective risk management policy is necessary for the survival and success of banks. Ownership structure changes the risk-taking behavior of banks. Therefore, we analyze the impact of the ownership structure on risk-taking behavior of banks in emerging markets (i.e., Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh). We take public, private and foreign ownership of banks in this study. We collect the data from 64 banks of selected countries from 2011 to 2018. We measure risk-taking as capital adequacy, leverage coverage ratio, non-performing loan ratio, and return volatility. We use two-step system dynamic panel estimation for analyzing the results. We find that public and private banks have significant relationship with the risk-taking of banks. Furthermore, public and private banks show more risk-taking behavior as compared to foreign banks in all selected countries.

Ownership structure and bank risk-taking in ASEAN countries: A quantile regression approach

This study examines the effect of ownership structure on the risk-taking behavior of banks in ASEAN countries. Using a sample of 96 commercial banks in ASEAN countries from 2002 to 2018, the study ...

Impact of trade openness on bank risk-taking behavior: Evidence from a developing country

This study investigates the impact of trade openness along with bank size, bank growth, liquidity, deposit insurance, industry centralization, and capital stringency on risk-taking behavior of commercial banks of Bangladesh. To examine the relationships, it considers 32 commercial banks over a period of 2000 to 2017. The main result of this study reveals that trade openness provides ample opportunities in lending activities of commercial banks and aids decreasing credit risk as well as overall bank risk. Hence, it has great implications for the policymakers to promote trade openness and make banks more competitive.

Threshold effect of economic openness on bank risk-taking: Evidence from emerging markets

This paper investigates the non-linear effects of two aspects of economic openness, namely, trade openness and financial openness, on banking system stability. We use a panel of 42 emerging markets from 2000 to 2014 to test whether bank risk-taking behaviour varies with the level of openness. We find that a higher degree of trade openness promotes bank stability linearly. Conversely, the non-linear effect of financial openness on bank risk-taking is evident. When the financial system is not sufficiently open, the impact of financial openness on bank stability is insignificant. However, as the domestic financial market becomes more open, financial openness can help discipline the behaviour of banks, making them more stable. We also find evidence that these effects are transmitted through the market discipline channel. Our findings highlight the importance of strengthening the domestic regulatory framework and transparency as the economy becomes more integrated.

Revisiting the impact of institutional quality on post-GFC bank risk-taking: Evidence from emerging countries

This is the first attempt to address the impact of institutional quality on post-GFC bank risk-taking behavior. This study is conducted on 730 banks from 19 emerging countries covering the period 2011–2016. We used six indicators of good governance as a proxy for institutional quality. Both static panel and Dynamic GMM estimation are used to identify the impact of these variables on bank risk-taking; measured by Z-score. We evidenced that increasing government effectiveness, controlling corruption, and improving agents' confidence and adherence to the rule of law reduce banks' risk exposure and improve banks' stability. Besides supporting the Z-score model, the robustness test using σ(NIM) also provides evidence of the impact of regulatory quality on reducing bank risk. Surprisingly, both models tend to indicate that improving voice and accountability increase bank risk-taking in emerging countries. Furthermore, our study provides an interesting reconciliation to the major debate on the impact of size on bank risk.

How does institutional development shape bank risk-taking incentives in the context of financial openness?

This paper investigates the role of institutional development on the relationship between financial openness and bank risk-taking behavior. In particular, we investigate how institutional improvement can change the impact of financial openness on bank stability. Using a panel of 37 emerging markets and 21 advanced economies over the period 2000–2015, the results show that opening the financial market affects bank risk-taking behaviors differently, depending on the degree of institutional development. Empirical evidence also supports the competition-fragility view in the case of developing countries, while it favors the competition-stability hypothesis in developed economies.

Expected government support and bank risk-taking: Evidence from China

This research examines the impact of expected government support on banks’ risk-taking behaviour and, in particular, how its impact can be stronger on state-owned or listed banks. Using 75 banks in China for the 2007–2016 period, we find that the willingness for and capacity of government support enhance a bank's risk-taking behaviour by increasing non-performance loans as well as doubtful loans and decreasing the Z-score and the liquidity ratio. Furthermore, the moral hazard problem is further enhanced in state-owned banks but mitigated in listed banks. Our analysis enhances our understanding of the willingness for and capacity of government support and finds that more attention should be paid to the impact of market discipline on banks’ risk-taking behaviour.

Loan Loss Provision and Risk-Taking Behavior of Commercial Banks in Pakistan: A Dynamic GMM Approach

The paper analyzes the determinants of the loan loss provision (LLP) of 22 commercial banks in Pakistan from 2010 to 2017. The motive of the research is that LLP is a measure of credit risk as a proxy for bank risk-taking behavior profits and banks’ sustainability. Especially after the occurrence of a global financial crisis. The quantitative research method of data collection from Bureau Van Dijk’s BankFocus portal and the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Other than considering specific bank variables such as capital adequacy ratio, return on average equity, and government securities, the effects of macroeconomic variable inflation and lending interest rates are explicitly studied. The model of pooled ordinary least squares (POLS), fixed effect (FE), panel corrected standard error (PCSE), and panel data estimation in the form of a general method of moments (GMM) two-step system is used to find the risk-taking behavior of banks in Pakistan. The results obtained by the use of inflation (INF) as an instrumental variable of LLP are highly dependable with a negative impact on loan loss provision. Lending interest rate (LIR) has a positive and significant relationship with LLP and contribute in the study of macroeconomic variables for bank risk-taking, excessive amount of interest rate was not beneficial for banks to earn profits especially during the economic crises. Return on average equity (ROAE) significantly moderates LLP with a negative interaction and helped the bank with profitable operations and save bank from solvency. Capital adequacy ratio (CAR) and government securities (GOV) are insignificant to LLP. The result is robust by measure of endogeneity, and highlights the important role of commercial banks’ sustainability to explain risk-taking behavior in Pakistan with the intention to increase profits after the occurrence of financial crises. The study further contributes to future research on managerial policy and decision making. In summary, the paper on loan loss provision has the capacity to forecast commercial banks’ credit risk for risk-taking in an emerging country.

Investor protection, regulation and bank risk-taking behavior

This paper examines whether the influence of investor protection on banks’ risk is channeled through banking regulation, and vice-versa, using panel data from a sample of 567 European and US banks for the 2004–2015 period. As banking regulatory factors, we consider capital stringency, activity restrictions and private monitoring, whereas as investor protection factors, we consider the level of shareholder and creditor protection. We find that banking regulation moderates the positive direct influence of investor protection on banks’ risk, while investor protection reinforces the negative direct influence of banking regulation on risk. Moreover, we show that the negative effect of national regulations on banks’ risk is more pronounced during systemic crisis years. Finally, taking into account market competition, we argue that private monitoring only has a direct effect on banks’ risk, whereas the effects of capital stringency and activity restriction are channeled through market competition.

Identifying credit supply shocks with bank-firm data: Methods and applications

Abstract Current empirical methods to identify and assess the impact of bank credit supply shocks rely strictly on multi-bank firms and ignore firms borrowing from only one bank. Yet, these single-bank firms are often the majority of firms in an economy and most prone to credit supply shocks. We propose and underpin an alternative demand control (using industry–location–size–time fixed effects) that allows identifying time-varying cross-sectional bank credit supply shocks using both single- and multi-bank firms. Using matched bank-firm credit data from Belgium, we show that firms borrowing from banks with negative credit supply shocks exhibit lower financial debt growth, asset growth, investments, and operating margin growth. Positive credit supply shocks are associated with bank risk-taking behaviour at the extensive margin. Importantly, to capture these effects it is crucial to include the single-bank firms when identifying the bank credit supply shocks.

The Impact of Market Power on Bank Risk-Taking: an Empirical Investigation

There has been a great deal of interest in investigating banks’ risk-taking incentives because of their relevant role in the stability of the financial system. Until now, we know relatively little about what gives rise to such risk-taking in the first place. In this paper, we seek to examine the impact of market power on risk-taking behavior of banks in 5 European countries between 2002 and 2015. Our main results suggest that greater competition leads to the instability of the financial system, since the measure of bank competition is significantly positively related to the Z score. In addition, we find that a stronger economic growth is associated with more stabilized bank asset returns, but this stabilizing force is stopped when market power is more pervasive in the economy. During the global financial crisis period, banks in less competitive markets exhibit higher bank credit risk. We also verify that after the implementation of Basel III, market power has a positive impact on bank risk-taking and in a stronger way in comparison with the pre-Basel III.

Risk-taking behavior, earnings quality, and bank performance: A profit frontier approach

After the financial crisis of 2007–2008, some bank performance dimensions have been the subject of debate, two of which are bank efficiency, and bank risk-taking behavior. The literature on bank efficiency and productivity has grown considerably over the last three decades, and has gained momentum in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Interest in bank risk-taking behavior, usually focusing on its links to monetary policy, has been relatively low, but has also increased exponentially in more recent years. This paper combines these two streams of research. Specifically, we test whether more inefficient banks take greater risks when selecting borrowers, charging interests and requiring collateral, and whether these links between inefficiency and risk change according to the type of bank. Our analysis centers on the Spanish banking system, which has been severely affected by the burst of the housing bubble and has undergone substantial restructuring. To test our hypotheses, we created a database with information on banks and savings banks, their borrowers (non-financial firms), and the links between them. The study also contributes to the literature by considering a novel profit frontier approach. Our results suggest that more inefficient banks take greater risks in selecting their borrowers, and that this high-taking behavior is not offset by higher interest rates.

Do Disclosures and Governance Practices Reduce Bank Risk? Evidence from Bangladesh

The scenario of the banking sector is articulated by the theoretical background backed up by practical evidences relying on panel data of thirty-two (32) commercial banks for the period of 2006-2016. The study addressed the problem of endogeneity, heterokedasticity and auto-correlation by selecting the two-stage-least-square (2SLS) method in data analysis. In fact, the study explores its area of concentration in the banking sector and developed models based on bank risk, disclosures, and corporate governance in the developing country context. It is true that good governance can ensure bank transparency and market stability. The study revealed that banks disclosures and corporate governance have a significant effect on bank risk-taking behavior and also found a reciprocal effect in the case of disclosure model and governance model.

An Overconfident CEO VS A Rational Board: The Tale About Bank Risk-Taking

Bank risk-taking behavior is of significant interest for researches and policy makers because financial failures due to excessive risk in this sector can have severe consequences for the bank’s numerous stakeholders and for the macroeconomic system overall. A growing literature investigates the main factors contributing to “well above average” risk. In particular, this study explains risk strategies in firms taking into account the bounded rationality of corporate governance agents. On a panel dataset of 110 listed US banks in the period of 2011-2016 empirical evidence is provided that excessive risk-taking in banks arises from the cognitive bias of the overconfidence of CEO decision-making. The study also presents how the impact of an overconfident CEO on risk-taking is affected considering the interaction of CEO overconfidence with the board of directors. It was revealed that the CEO's positive influence on risk is moderated if the board is an effective monitoring mechanism with the presence of independent directors who are experts in the financial sphere

Do foreign and state banks take more risk?

This paper addresses the impact of foreign ownership, government ownership, efficiency and income diversification on the risk-taking behavior of banks in Indonesia. This research uses Z-Score to measure bank risk-taking behavior. Z-score proxies probability bank’s loss that is greater than its equity. Despite their profit, bank may suffer financial insolvency when taking too much risk. This study used a sample of 44 banks in Indonesia over the 2011–2016 period with purposive sampling method. Based on the result of the research, it can be concluded that foreign ownership can increase bank risk-taking behavior due to the barrier to entry in the form of deficiency of quality information of the borrower so that it has an impact on the increase of non-performing loan ratio. While government ownership can also increase risk-taking behavior, because banks are used by politicians to pursue political goals that cause banks to take high-risk projects with low profits. In addition, the results of this study also show that banks with low efficiency tend to increase the risk-taking behavior.

Risk-taking Channel of Monetary Policy: Evidence from Indian Banking

Some recent articles have studied the link between the central bank’s monetary policy stance and the risk-taking behaviour of banks in the context of advanced economies. Loose monetary policy can encourage banks to reach for yield, which will increase their share of risky assets, and also induce them to use more short-term funding. We empirically examine the existence of this risk-taking channel of monetary policy transmission in India. We find that expansionary monetary policy may increase default risk particularly for foreign banks and new private sector banks. We also find that tightening of monetary policy leads to lower liquidity risk and market risk and the effects are stronger for foreign banks than for other bank groups. In terms of market risk, the effect on foreign banks is weaker in cases of monetary tightening compared to expansion. JEL Classification: G21, G28, G32

Does the shareholding network affect bank's risk-taking behavior? An exploratory study on Chinese commercial banks

The shareholding network provides a new paradigm to describe the relations between banks and their large shareholders. This shareholding network can affect bank performance where social capital embedded in it can be explained as the functioning mechanism and can be quantitatively measured by centrality metrics in network analysis. Specifically, this paper attempts to examine if the shareholding network has impact on banks’ risk-taking behavior in the context of the Chinese commercial banks. Our results show that the degree centralities in the BS Net and BB Net reflect the two-sided effects on banks’ risk-taking behavior.