Bank Rescue Research Articles

Responding to Banking Crises: Lessons From Cross-Country Evidence

A common legacy of banking crises is a large increase in government debt, as fiscal resources are used to shore up the banking system. Do crisis response strategies that commit more fiscal resources lower the economic costs of crises? Based on evidence from a sample of 40 banking crises we find that the answer is negative. In fact, policies that are riskier for the government budget are associated with worse, not better, post-crisis performance. We also show that parliamentary political systems are more prone to adopt bank rescue measures that are costly for the government budget. We take advantage of this relationship to instrument the policy response, thereby addressing concerns of joint endogeneity. We find no evidence that endogeneity is a source of bias.

Extraordinary Measures in Extraordinary Times: Public Measures in Support of the Financial Sector in the EU and the United States

The extensive public support measures for the financial sector have been key for the management of the current financial crisis. This paper gives a detailed description of the measures taken by central banks and governments and attempts a preliminary assessment of the effectiveness of such measures. The geographical focus of the paper is on the European Union (EU) and the United States. The crisis response in both regions has been largely similar in terms of both tools and scope, and monetary policy actions and bank rescue measures have become increasingly intertwined. However, there are important differences, not only between the EU and the United States (e.g. with regard to the involvement of the central bank), but also within the EU (e.g. asset relief schemes).

Responding to Banking Crises: Lessons from Cross-Country Evidence

A common legacy of banking crises is a large increase in government debt, as fiscal resources are used to shore up the banking system. Do crisis response strategies that commit more fiscal resources lower the economic costs of crises? Based on evidence from a sample of 40 banking crises we find that the answer is negative. In fact, policies that are riskier for the government budget are associated with worse, not better, post-crisis performance. We also show that parliamentary political systems are more prone to adopt bank rescue measures that are costly for the government budget. We take advantage of this relationship to instrument the policy response, thereby addressing concerns of joint endogeneity. We find no evidence that endogeneity is a source of bias.

Preventing Bank Insolvencies in the Financial Crisis: The German Financial Market Stabilisation Acts

The Financial Market Stabilisation Act of 2008 and the Supplementary Financial Market Stabilisation Act of 2009 allow the German state to gain unlimited control over banks of systemic importance. The emergency character of both acts is to be understood against the background of the turbulences of the financial crisis and the short time span available for bank rescue. Prior to the Acts, neither German insolvency law nor company law nor capital market law provided the means to safely restructure troubled banks. The content and evaluation of these state interventions in the banking sector under the pressure of the financial market crisis are relevant not only for Germany, but in a broader international context.

United States Bank Rescue Politics, 2008–2009: A Business Historian's View

First I describe my background in American historical scholarship. Thereafter, I assess the efforts of Presidents George W. Bush and Barack H. Obama and their senior advisors to stabilize American financial institutions during the period 2008–2009. My fundamental contention is that state actors such as Bush and Obama structured financial industries and markets. Despite the ubiquitous presence of these state actors, however, American business and political leaders maintained the fiction that state and business were, and properly ought to remain, separate entities. In Part III, I return to my scholarly background and to a proposed scaffolding for historical scholarship focused on the political economy of U.S. financial institutions since 1970.

United States Bank Rescue Politics, 2008–2009: A Business Historian's View

First I describe my background in American historical scholarship. Thereafter, I assess the efforts of Presidents George W. Bush and Barack H. Obama and their senior advisors to stabilize American financial institutions during the period 2008–2009. My fundamental contention is that state actors such as Bush and Obama structured financial industries and markets. Despite the ubiquitous presence of these state actors, however, American business and political leaders maintained the fiction that state and business were, and properly ought to remain, separate entities. In Part III, I return to my scholarly background and to a proposed scaffolding for historical scholarship focused on the political economy of U.S. financial institutions since 1970.

Time to Buy or Just Buying Time? The Market Reaction to Bank Rescue Packages

This paper reviews the market reaction to bank rescue packages announced in six countries between October 2008 and January 2009. The study distinguishes the impact on creditors as seen in the change of CDS spreads from the impact on shareholders as seen in the movement of bank stock prices. Government interventions benefited creditors at the expense of shareholders, with bank CDS spreads narrowing around the announcements in all cases. Despite a brief positive reaction, bank stock prices continued to underperform in all countries except the United States where the favourable terms of the government support allowed bank stocks to outperform.

Uncertainty cubed

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to discuss the vast variety of economists' opinions out there about the recession, the bailout, the bank rescue plan, and prospects for the future.Design/methodology/approachOpinion column.FindingsThis column lays out a wide variety of predictive statements about the economy by economists, in order to show that no matter what sort of strategy you pursue in this economy, you will have a lot of award‐winning economists throwing rocks at you (and some supporting you). So you need to use a framework for decision making that takes all plausible possibilities into account.Originality/valueA cross‐section of mutually exclusive economic opinion, showing how profound uncertainty truly is, and how people can actually learn to use it to their advantage.

A guide to the Banking Bill 2008

The Banking Bill 2008 was introduced into Parliament in October 2008 in response to the financial crisis of 2007–2008, and came following a series of consultations published by the Government during 2007 and 2008. The Bill has the overall objective of enhancing financial stability and improving depositor protection, and includes a raft of new powers, including tools the UK tripartite authorities can use to deal with failing and failed banks – known as the Special Resolution Regime (SRR). Following the failures of Northern Rock and Bradford and Bingley a number of new tools are proposed to deal with failing banks. Some of the tools proposed, principally the “partial transfer” powers, have proved controversial due to the effect they could have on stakeholders' private law rights during a bank insolvency or rescue. The Government has proposed a safeguard order and a code of conduct to meet concerns, but many feel the Government must go further if they are to prevent rising costs for UK banks and further financial instability.

The Janus-Headed Salvation: Sovereign and Bank Credit Risk Premia during 2008-09

As the global banking crisis intensified in the fall of 2008, governments announced comprehensive rescue packages for financial institutions. In this paper, we put the joint response of euro area bank and sovereign CDS premia under the microscope. We find that the bank rescue packages led to a clear structural break in these premia's comovement, which had been rather tight and stable in the weeks preceding the intensification of the crisis. Firstly, the packages induced a decrease in risk spreads for banks at the expense of a marked increase in risk spreads for governments. Secondly, we show that in addition to this one-off jump in the levels of CDS spreads, the packages strongly increased the sensitivity of sovereign risk spreads to any further aggravation of the crisis. At the same time, the sensitivity of bank credit risk premia declined and became more sovereign-like, reflecting the extensive government guarantees of banking sector liabilities.

What Explains the Surge in Euro Area Sovereign Spreads During the Financial Crisis of 2007-09?

This paper uses a dynamic panel approach to explain the determinants of widening sovereign bond yield spreads vis-a-vis Germany in selected euro area countries during the period end-July 2007 to end-March 2009, when the financial turmoil developed into a full-blown financial and economic crisis. Emphasis is given to the role of fiscal fundamentals and government announcements of substantial bank rescue packages. The paper finds that higher expected budget deficits and/or higher government debt ratios relative to Germany contributed to higher government bond yield spreads in the euro area during the analysed period. More importantly, the announcements of bank rescue packages have led to a re-assessment, from the part of investors, of sovereign credit risk, first and foremost through a transfer of risk from the private financial sector to the government.

Solutions to Japan's Banking Problems: What Might Work and What Definitely Will Fail

We study the longstanding banking problems in Japan. By examining both the past policies in Japan that have failed, and the successful policies in other high income OECD countries that have overcome banking crises, we develop a roadmap for resolving the problems. We distill the problems into four basic troubles. The first is that most of the banks are severely under-capitalized when their condition is properly evaluated. The second is that the banks are not currently allocating credit efficiently, and instead are directing many loans to borrowers that will not be able to repay them. The third is that the banking sector is too large (in terms of assets) to make adequate returns. The final problem is that the banks' lack of profitability is partly related to their inability to offer the high margin products that are commonplace amongst their foreign competitors. We then explore the implications of these observations for the long-run condition of the industry. In particular, a natural way to define the end of the problems is when the banking sector has shrunk to a level where it can profitably operate and the banks are once again adequately capitalized and no-longer ever-greening loans to deadbeat borrowers. Recognizing this constellation of conditions as the eventual equilibrium for the industry is helpful because it identifies the set of problems that a successful policy must confront. Our description of the equilibrium also helps to show why past policies have failed to end the problems. The evidence from other countries, however, shows that the problems are not insurmountable. We describe how the successful policies used elsewhere could be applied in Japan. We outline alternative transition strategies that could take us from the current conditions to the equilibrium. Finally, we illustrate the alternatives by analyzing the Resona Bank rescue and the Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group and UFJ merger.

Banking Crises and Bank Rescues: The Effect of Reputation

This paper focuses on bank rescue packages and on the behaviour of troubled banks in light of rescue offers. A puzzling feature of experience with banking crises is that in many cases policy authorities make offers of bank rescue, and banks are relectant to accept these offers. We study situations in which regulators have decided to offer bank rescue plans, and we show that a combination of factors, including bankers' reputational concerns, can explain banks' potentiel reluctance to accept offers of recapitalisation.

Banking Crises and Bank Rescues: The Role of Reputation

This paper focuses on bank rescue packages and on the behaviour of troubled banks in light of rescue offers. A puzzling feature of experience with banking crises is that in many cases policy authorities make offers of bank rescue, and banks are reluctant to accept these offers. We study situations in which regulators have decided to offer bank rescue plans, and we show that a combination of factors, including bankers' reputational concerns, can explain banks' potential reluctance to accept offers of recapitalization.

Distinguished Lecture on Economics in Government: Central Banking and Systemic Risks in Capital Markets

Bagehot's conception of the last resort lending function of the central bank is shared by most economists today. On several occasions, the Federal Reserve has digressed from its overall strategy of monetary control to also undertake a tactical rescue of individual banks and segments of the capital market. On three other occasions, the Federal Reserve has intervened to counter systemic risks to the financial system beyond the arena of commercial banks. The events which prompted these actions were the threat to the commercial paper market triggered by the bankruptcy of the Penn Central Railroad in June 1970, the pressures on broker-dealer firms generated by the collapse of speculation in silver in early 1980, and the near failure of the clearing and settlement systems operated by stock and commodity exchanges which occurred during the stock market crash of 1987. I was a Member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System during the Penn Central episode, and I shared in the decisions to intervene. As a Public Governor of the Commodity Exchange, I helped to formulate the policies applied during the silver speculation and in the aftermath of the stock market collapse. The discussion which follows draws on those experiences.